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Abstract. 
During the Great War many European annies (most notably the Russian) 
collapsed due to major disciplinary problems. However, the British Expeditionary 
Force avoided these problems up until the Armistice ofNovember 1918. 
This thesis examines how the discipline and morale of the RE.F. survived the 
war, by using a case-study of the Irish regiments. 
In 1914 with Ireland on the brink of a civil war, serious questions had been 
raised relating to the loyalty of the Irish regiments, particularly in the aftermath of the 
Curragh Incident. Indeed, intelligence reports prepared for Irish Command suggested 
that some reserve units would defect en masse to the V.V.F. if hostilities broke out in 
Ireland. 
As the Great War progressed, the rise of Sinn Fein produced further concern 
about the loyalty of Irish troops, seen most vividly in the decisions not to reform the 
16th. (Irish) Division following the German Spring Offensive of 1918 and to remove 
Irish reserve units from Ireland in 1917-18. 
Nevertheless, a detailed study of courts martial (studied comprehensively in a 
database project) recently released by the P.R.O., demonstrates that many of the fears 
relating to Irish troops were groundless. Certainly Irish courts martial rates tended to 
be high, however, these figures were inflated by cases of drunkenness and absence, not 
disobedience. Likewise, while a number of mutinies did occur in Irish regiments 
during the war, this study has revealed that mutinies were much more common in the 
RE.F. as a whole, than has been previously believed. 
This study has also considered the discipline and morale problems caused by 
the rapid expansion of the British army in 1914 and the appointment of many officers, 
especially in the 36th. (Ulster) Division, on the basis of their political allegiances rather 
than professional knowledge. 
Nevertheless, in general it appears that the discipline and morale of the Irish 
units in the RE.F. was very good. Incidents of indiscipline appear to have been 
caused by the practical problems facing units during training and on active service 
rather than by the growth of the Sinn Fein movement in Ireland. 
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INTRODUCTION. 
This study will focus on two key areas of Great War historiography, both of 
which have received very little attention from historians, albeit for very different 
reasons. A comprehensive account of discipline and morale in the British 
Expeditionary Force between 1914 and 1918 has only been made possible in the last 
five years due to the release of courts martial papers by the Ministry ofDefence. That 
is not to say that this topic has been completely ignored by historians. I Indeed, David 
Englander, J. Fuller, G. D. Sheffield and 1. Brent-Wilson have all produced interesting 
work relating to morale and discipline in the British army during the Great War.2 
However, the opening of previously restricted files now means that most of this 
previous work needs to be drastically reassessed. 
The second issue which this thesis will consider is the role of Irish troops in the 
First World War. This may seem rather strange given that a number of works have 
recently been published on Ireland's role in the Great War.3 Equally, compared to, for 
lOr, indeed, the general public. The leading Labour backbench M.P., Mr. Andrew 
McKinlay, has been carrying out a relatively high profile campaign to have all 306 
soldiers in the British army, who were executed during the 1914-18 period, 
posthumously pardoned. On the 24th. July 1998 the government refused to grant 
posthumous pardons, on the basis that insufficient evidence was available to reassess 
these cases. See, The Guardian, 2517/98, p.5 and The Daily Telegraph, 2517/98, pp. 
1,4 and 19. 
2D. Englander, «Discipline and morale in the British army, 1917-1918", in 1. Horne 
(ed.), State, society and mobilisation in Europe during the First World War, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, 1. Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular 
Culture in the British and Dominion Armies, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990, 
G. D. Sheffield, ''Officer-man relations: Morale and Discipline in the British Army, 
1902-22", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1994 and 1. Brent-Wilson, 
"The Morale and Discipline of the British Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918", 
unpublished M.A. thesis, University ofNew Brunswick, Canada, 1978. 
3Most notably, T. Denman, Ireland's Unknown Soldiers' The 16th (Irish) Division in 
the Great War 1914-18, Irish Academic Press, Dublin, 1992, T. P. Dooley, Irishmen 
or English Soldiers? The Times and World of a Southern Catholic Irish Man 
(1876-1916) Enlisting in the British Army during the First World War, Liverpool 
University Press, Liverpool, 1995, M. Dungan, Irish Voices from the Great War, Irish 
Academic Press, Dublin, 1995, M. Dungan, They Shall Grow Not Old, Irish Soldiers 
and the Great War, Four Courts Press, Dublin, 1997, D. Fitzpatrick (ed.), Ireland and 
2 
example, Scotland or Northern England, our knowledge of Ireland, in a military sense, 
between 1914 and 1918 is well developed. 
However, as recently as 1992, Keith Jeffery felt moved to describe Ireland and 
the First World War as an historical no-mans land, noting~ 
This dangerous zone sits between two opposing perceptions of 
Ireland's role in the war~ on the one side is a Unionist image of Irish 
Protestants loyally, and exclusively, rallying to the flag in 1914, along with 
Ulster's own losses at the front, sealing the Union with blood in an equivalent 
national sacrifice to that of the men of Easter 1916 in Ireland. On the other, 
Catholic and Nationalist, side, the men of the rising represent the 'real' and 
true Ireland, in sharp contrast to the misguided youths, duped into taking the 
'King's Shilling' by worn out politicians, who are slaughtered in France at the 
altar of British imperialism. Between these crude extremes lies a more 
complex and human reality.4 
This has meant that, while much has been written on the 1916 Easter Rising 
and the growth of Sinn Fein, the service of Irish troops in the war has been pushed to 
the fringes of Irish historiography in this period. 
This, in turn, has meant that, until very recently and still not decisively, the 
issues surrounding Irish involvement in the Great War have been left to retired army 
officers5 and enthusiastic amateurs6 to research. As a result, Irish troops' service 
during the First World War has been seen almost purely in terms of their actions in 
battle. Indeed, the recent republication of C. Falls and B. Cooper's divisional 
the First World War. Lilliput Press and Trinity History Workshop, Dublin, 1988, T. 

Johnstone, Orang~ Green and Khaki' The Story of the Irish Regiments in the Great 

War, 1914-18, Gill and Macmillan, Dublin, 1992~ and P. Orr, The Road to the Somme~ 

Men ofthe Ulster Division Tell Their Story, BlackstaffPress, Belfast, 1987. 

4K. Jeffery, foreword in T. Denman, Ireland's Unknown Soldiers. 

5For example, T. Johnstone, Orange, Green and Khakj 

6For example, P. Orr, The Road to the Somme 

3 
histories,7 which remain the definitive works on the units concerned, demonstrates 
that, in many ways, the debate on Ireland's role in the war has developed little since 
the 1920s. 
Given the lack of attention that has been paid to Irish units serving in the 
British army in the Great War, it has been decided to use them, as a sample, to 
consider discipline and morale in the British Expeditionary Force. A particularly 
important area to consider is the link between the home front and Irish troops on the 
Western Front, and especially how Irish men serving in the British army reacted to the 
Easter Rising of 1916 and the subsequent growth of Sinn Fein in the 1916-18 
period. 
Of course, there are problems in using Irish units as a sample, in that the "Irish 
experience" of the First World War was very untypical of the ''British Experience". 
Ireland was the only part of the United Kingdom to experience a domestic rebellion 
during the war, namely the 1916 Easter Rising. The war was not as ''total'' for Ireland 
as for other parts of the British Isles, largely as conscription was not introduced into 
Ireland and, also, as Irish civilians did not suffer the same dangers from Zeppelin and 
later Gotha bombers or coastal bombardments as did their counterparts in England. 
Equally, while the political situation in the rest of Britain could hardly be described as 
stable during the war, the Irish political situation was extremely fluid. In terms of Irish 
troop morale, this political setting was very important as the 16th. (Irish) and 36th. 
(Ulster) Divisions both assumed political overtones that were almost unique in the 
British army during the Great War. Lastly, the economic situation in Ireland was very 
different to that in the rest of the United Kingdom; many sectors of the economy failed 
to achieve a full war footing (most notably agriculture), while the absence of dilution, 
which was brought about in the rest of Britain by conscription, meant that labour 
7c. Falls, The History of the 36th (Ulster) Division. Mc Caw, Stevenson and Orr, 
Belfast, 1922, republished by Constable, London, 1996 and B. Cooper, The Tenth 
(Irish) Division at Gallipoli. Jenkins, London, 1918, republished by Irish Academic 
Press, Dublin, 1992. 
4 
unrest was not a serious problem in Irish industry. This situation means that both 
civilian morale and the pressures on Irish soldiers serving in France and Flanders were 
rather different from that of their counterparts from Great Britain. 
Purely from a military point of view, Ireland's experience of the First World 
War was unique. Firstly, in terms of military organisation, the 1908 army reforms had 
little impact on Ireland; no Territorial Force units existed in the country at all.8 
Secondly, and somewhat paradoxically, Ireland was a "militarised society" in 1914, to 
an extent that the rest of Britain was not, as between 200,000 and 250,000 Irishmen 
were members of either the Irish Volunteers, Ulster Volunteer Force or Irish Citizens' 
Army.9 Thirdly, Irish recruits were rarely specialists, most joining their local infantry 
unit; notably, even the artillery units of the 10th. (Irish), 16th. (Irish) and 36th. (Ulster) 
Divisions were raised in England. lO Fourthly, declining recruiting rates and the 
non-introduction of conscription in Ireland meant that Irish units serving overseas 
suffered from severe manning problems from a very early stage in the war and a very 
large number of Irish service and, in the case of the Connaught Rangers, even regular, 
battalions were forced to amalgamate. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, there was 
always some political concern about the Irish units. The assimilation of para-military, 
heavily politicised recruits into the British Army was far from easy, while the Easter 
Rising and growth of the Sinn Fein movement in 1916-18 did little to reassure British 
military and political leaders about the loyalty of Irishmen serving in the British 
80n this issue see, 1. B. Gailey, W. F. Gillespie and J. Hasselt, An Account ofthe 
TerritoriaJs in Northern Ireland 1947-1978, T.A.V.R., Belfast, 1979, p. 13 and 1. F. 
W. Beckett, The Amateur Military Tradition 1558-1945, Manchester University Press, 

Manchester, 1991, pp. 294-5. 

9Figures taken from, D. Fitzpatrick, "Militarism in Ireland, 1900-1922", in T. Bartlett 

and K. Jeffery (eds.), A Military History of Ireland, Cambridge University Press, 

Cambridge, 1996, pp.383 and 386. 

lOT. Denman, Ireland's Unknown Soldiers, The 16th (Irish) Division during the Great 

War, 19]4-18, Irish Academic Press, Dublin, 1992, p.62, C. Falls, The History of the 

36th (Ulster) Division, p.8 and 1. Lynch, "The Comparative Aspect in Local 

Studies", in R. Gillespie and M. Hill (eds.), Doing Irish Local History, Pursuit and 

Practice, The Institute ofIrish Studies, Queen's University ofBelfast, 1998, pp. 

135-8. 

5 
army. Nevertheless, it has been decided to concentrate on Irish units for the reasons 
outlined above and also because the nine Irish infantry and six Irish cavalry regiments 
provide a manageable and clearly definable sample. Equally, as Ireland in 1914-18 had 
a diverse economy with both industrial and agrarian components, the reaction of 
different economic groups to service in the British army can be examined. Lastly, the 
volatile Irish political situation during the Great War put particular strains on Irish 
troops serving on the Western Front. However, the disparities between Irish and 
British troops will be fully addressed in this thesis, by using sample non-Irish units for 
comparative purposes. This issue will be dealt with later in the introduction, but first a 
definition must be made of the terms "discipline" and "morale". 
Morale and discipline are, in a military sense, two complimentary, but rather 
separate concepts. The dictionary definition of discipline is~ "training or a way of life 
aimed at self control and obedience~ order maintained or observed among pupils, 
soldiers and others under control." II While morale is defined as~ ''the mental attitude 
or bearing ofa person or group, especially as regards confidence, discipline, etc.,,12 
Lord Moran, following his own experiences as a medical officer to the 1 st. 
Battalion, Royal Fusiliers during the Great War, clarifies these definitions~ 
A man under discipline does things at the instigation of someone in 
authority, and if he doesn't he is punished. A man with high morale does 
things because in his own mind he has decided to do them without any 
suggestion from outside sources. Discipline, control from without, can only 
be relaxed safely when it is replaced by something higher and better, control 
from within. To put it differently, discipline loses much of its vital 
importance when the human material - officers and men - is exceptional. Men 
rebel against discipline when they know in their hearts that it is not necessary. 
I I Oxford Reference Dictionary, p.233. 
12ibid, p.S34. 
6 
This they can only know with any assurance in the presence of danger, which 
is the acid test of their morale. 13 
R Holmes has developed this theme and stressed the thin line between morale 
and discipline stating; ''the most effective discipline is self-imposed, which springs 
from the tribal structure of small groups and from mutual confidence between leaders 
and led.,,14 Other historians writing about morale and discipline have formulated their 
own definitions. Brent Wilson has stated of morale; ''Like any product of the mind, it 
is difficult to explain in words and is usually spoken of in terms of being high or low. 
Field Marshal Montgomery defined morale as that which develops a man's latent 
heroism so that the soldier is able to overcome his desire to take the easy way out or 
surrender to his fears. Or, more simply, high morale is the ability to triumph over 
discomfort and dangers and carry on with the job."lS Brent Wilson further notes; 
"Discipline can be defined as intelligent and cheerful obedience to the letter and spirit 
oforders at all times. It has a dual purpose on the battlefield. Discipline's object is to 
conquer fear and create staunchness in action."16 
There are two generally recognised categories of morale; individual and 
collective. Collective morale can often be seen as esprit d'corps in a very literal sense, 
namely pride in one's regiment. However, Brent Wilson stresses that; "in the crisis of 
battle the majority of men do not seek encouragement from the glories of the past, but 
from their leaders and comrades of the present.,,17 However, O. D. Sheffield, in his 
study,18 suggests that esprit d'corps, in the sense of regimental pride, can be an 
important component ofmorale. 
13Lord Moran, The Anatomy ofCourage, Constable, London, 1945, p.177. 
14R. Holmes, Firing Line, Pimlico, London, 1994, p.332. 
ISJ. Brent Wilson, "The Morale and Discipline of the British Expeditionary Force", 
p.l. 
16'b"d 21 1 ,p.. 
17ibid, p.17. 
180. D. Sheffield, "Officer-man relations", 1994, pp.72 and 85. 
7 
However, for the purposes of this study, I have decided to stay with basic 
definitions, . concluding generally that morale is the force which comes from within 
which makes a soldier carry out his duty, while discipline is an external force which 
carries out the same function. Having defined what is meant by discipline and morale, 
it is necessary to outline previously published work on these topics and the IriSh units 
in the Great War, before considering at greater length, how discipline and morale in 
the British Expeditionary Force between 1914 and 1918 can be evaluated and the 
problems that this poses. 
Before 1993 all studies, with the exception of A. Babington's,19 suffered from 
the basic problem that authors were unable to consult the Courts Martial records held 
at the Public Record Office, Kew. These were finally released in 1993 as the 
seventy-five year restriction rule was substituted for the one hundred year closure 
which had been originally envisaged. 
Nevertheless, as early as 1919 the Court Martial system, the main disciplinary 
system in the British Army between 1914 and 1918, came under the spotlight with the 
publication of the Darling Report.20 During the war itself, the government was very 
reluctant to release information on the courts martial system and especially the number 
of men sentenced to death by it. For example, on the 21st. March 1916 when the 
Under Secretary of State for War, H. 1. Tennant, was asked directly how many 
soldiers under the age of twenty had been executed following courts martial he replied; 
"Just as it is not in the public interest that a question like this should be asked, so it is 
not in the public interest that it should be answered. ,,21 Nevertheless, a small number 
of M.P.s, never more than twenty in number, continued to raise the courts martial 
issue throughout the war and received some support in the popular press, notably in 
19A. Babington, For the Sake ofExample; Capital Courts Martial 1914-18 The Truth, 

Leo Cooper, London, 1983. 

2~eport ofthe Committee constituted by the Army Council to enquire into the Laws 

and Rules ofProcedure Regulating Military Courts Martial, Parliamentary Papers, 

Reports from Commissioners and others, H.M.S.O., London, 1919, command 428. 

(Henceforth cited as the Darling Report). 

21House ofCommons Debates, LXXI, 1916, column 30. 
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Horatio Bottomley's John Bull. Thus with the end of hostilities, the government 
decided to concede to parliamentary opinion and appointed a commission under Lord 
Justice Darling to investigate the operation of the courts martial system during the 
war. The commission was prohibited by the Anny Council from publishing all the 
evidence which came before it, but, nevertheless considered that; ''The results of our 
investigations into a limited number of cases put before us as typical lead us to the 
conclusion that, having regard to all the circumstances, the work of Courts-Martial 
during the war has been well done. We are satisfied that members of Courts-Martial 
intended to be absolutely fair to those who came before them, but also that the rank 
and file have confidence in their fairness. ,,22 
However, this report was certainly not a whitewash; the committee split and 
even the more conservative majority report was critical of the courts martial system 
operating during the First World War. A wide variety of problems were identified; the 
existing disciplinary code of the army was difficult for even trained lawyers to 
understand and officers' legal knowledge was generally poor. Delays between arrest 
and trial were too long, a counsel should always be available for the defence and the 
prosecution was often poorly prepared or incompetent. Sentence should be 
announced in open court before confirmation, a wider variety of punishments was 
required for officers, court proceedings on the court martial of an executed soldier 
should be available to his next of kin, or legal representative and the soldiers right to 
appeal a Court Martial decision should always be made clear to him.23 
Following the publication of the Darling Report debate largely ceased on the 
courts martial issue. The introduction of the Anny and Air Force Act in 1928, which 
reduced the number of offences for which servicemen could be executed, further 
removed the issue from the political arena. Apart from Brigadier General F. P. 
Crozier's tastelessly entitled work24 which made it clear, both that men had been 
22Darling Report, p.3. 
23ibid, pp.6-11. 
24F. P. Crozier, The Men I Killed, Michael Joseph, London, 1937. 
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executed without the benefit of courts martial and that political influence had been 
brought to bear to prevent at least one officer from being court martialled, the debate 
in historical and political, although not in literary circles, went silent until 1974. 25 
In that year, a journalist, William Moore published The Thin Yellow Line. 26 
This is, in many ways a rather confused book as it begins the study of military law in 
the English Civil War and then proceeds, in a very haphazard and unsystematic 
fashion, until 1945. The main section of the book deals with British army executions 
during the First World War, but the author's attempt to draw parallels with the 
military justice system in operation during the Peninsular War or while the Duke of 
Cumberland was Commander in Chief of the British army, fail to convince. Crucially 
he gives almost no information on the army in peacetime or the introduction of the 
Anny Discipline Regulation Act, in 1879, which governed how courts martial were 
held during the Great War. 
Moore's work on the 1914-18 war is also far from flawless. While it does 
raise some interesting points about the separate treatment of officers and men by the 
military authorities, the shell-shock issue and parliamentary and public concern over 
military executions, it does include a certain amount of journalistic licence. For 
example, Moore alleges that Sir Robert McCalmont, Unionist Member of Parliament 
for Antrim East, was involved in an attempt to vindicate the government's policy over 
courts martial. 27 However, an examination of the questions asked by him in the 
House of Commons28 fails to bear out this conspiracy theory and Moore fails to cite 
25Novels, such as A. P. Herbert, The Secret Battle, Metheun, London, 1919 and J. 
Johnston, How Many Miles to Babylon?, Hamilton, London, 1974 and films, such as 
David Lean's, King and Country. released in 1964, have dealt with the issue of 
executions in the Great War. However, they made little long term impact on public 
opinion, and certainly did not intrude into the political arena. This was in sharp 
contrast to the situation in France, where the government prevented the showing of 
Stanley Kubrick's damning indictment ofFrench courts martial policy, Paths ofGlory 
(made in 1957), until 1975. See, A. Kelly, Cinema and the Great War, Routledge, 
London, 1997, pp. 162-9 and 176-80. 
26W. Moore, The Thin Yellow Line, Leo Cooper, London, 1974. 
27ibid, p.123. 
28House ofCommons Debates, voL LXXVIII, 1916, column 630. I am grateful to 
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any source for this serious allegation that M.P.s with an army background were being 
asked by the War Office to ask misleading questions in the House ofCommons. 
The next significant piece ofwork to appear on discipline on the Western Front 
between 1914-1918 was D. Gill and G. Dallas' article.29 This work demonstrated 
that, in many ways, the "mutiny" at Etaples in 1917, was reminiscent of a pre-war 
industrial strike, rather than the blood thirsty mutinies of popular imagination. It also 
demonstrated that the mutineers singled out military policemen rather than officers for 
violence and that the High Command behaved with tact and restraint in dealing with 
the mutiny. With particular reference to this present study, Gill and Dallas noted that, 
while Scottish and A.N.Z.A.C. troops were most active in the disturbances, men of the 
16th. (Irish) Division played a very minor role; "all they did was to raid the canteen 
and sit outside and get drunk and encourage the others.,,30 
Gill and Dallas went on to give brief accounts of mutinies in Labour Corps 
units, which they believed were bloodily repressed, in contrast to the Etaples 
disturbances, as these mutineers were Chinese and Egyptians whom the army viewed 
as "natives".31 These authors concluded their article by pointing out that the largest 
mutiny in the British Expeditionary Force in France and Flanders, significantly, took 
place at Calais in January 1919, two months after hostilities had ceased. 
D. Englander and 1. Osborne's article,32 made a number of important points 
relating to discipline. They introduced an international perspective by noting; "The 
Russian armies collapsed, the Italians deserted, the French mutinied: the British 
soldier, however, apparently did little more than curse his fate.,,33 They went on to 
state that a number of arbitrary punishments without official sanction took place 
Dr. Alvin Jackson of the Queen's University ofBelfast for further information on Mc 

Calmont's career. 

29G. Dallas and D. Gill, "Mutiny at Etaples Base in 1917", Past and Present, 69, 1975. 

3~etter from Major O. C. Guiness to the authors, cited in, ibid, p.lOl. 

31ibid, p.102. 

32D. Englander and 1. Osborne, "Jack, Tommy and Henry Dubb: the armed forces and 

the working class", Historical Journal, 21, 3, 1978. 

33ibid, p.594. 
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during the war and also pointed out that desertion to the enemy and malingering were 
relatively common occurrences; however, they did stress that self-mutilation was very 
rare in the British Army. The authors also made an interesting point about regular, 
territorial, volunteer and conscript discipline, noting that by 1917118; '1,f naval unrest is 
any guide, it was from the professional soldier rather than the conscript that org'anised 
trouble was to be expected- or might have been, but for the regular army having been 
annihilated by the end of 1914.,,34 Finally, Englander and Osborne stressed that 
attempts to politicise the forces or to form soldiers' trades union were generally 
unsuccessful and most soldiers complaints rested, almost literally, on bread and butter 
issues, namely the poor quality and lack of variety of their rations and their poor pay, 
compared to the Dominion Forces. 
A Babington's work35 was groundbreaking for the simple reason that the 
author was able to gain access to the full courts martial records. Babington's book 
was useful in outlining the background of men executed and in showing that some 
contemporary accounts of courts martial were inaccurate and misleading. Crucially, 
he illustrated that men had been executed following mutinies at Etaples in 1917, 
Blargies in Autumn 1916 and in the Egyptian Labour Corps at Marseilles in September 
1917. However, this book was strongly criticised by reviewers at the time of 
publication as no primary material, apart from the courts martial records themselves, 
had been examined and the secondary material used was woefully incomplete.36 Also 
Babington had refused to name the men executed, referring instead to Privates A, B, 
C, etc. or the units with which they were serving. While this restriction was probably 
imposed by the Ministry of Defence, it does seem bizarre given that the cases of 
Sub-Lieutenant Dyett and Private Thomas Hope had been discussed in the House of 
Commons as early as 1917.37 
34ibid, p.602. 

35A Babington, For the Sake ofExample. 

36See, for example, I. F. W. Beckett's review in The Journal of the Society of Army 

Historical Research, 1985, pp.l05-7. 

37House ofCommons Debates, voI.XCVIII, 3111 0117. 
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Another flaw in Babington's work, not highlighted by reviewers, was its 
uncritical attitude to the legal system. This became even clearer in the preface he 
wrote to another book in which he stated; "I feel certain that Captain Griffith-Jones, 
the Judge Advocate at Dyett's court-martial, who was an experienced barrister, would 
not have allowed the trial to proceed if there had been anything amiss with the legal 
procedure. "38 Babington thus exonerates legally qualified officers from any blame that 
could attach to them over their role in courts martial. Even more irritatingly, 
Babington treats his readership as if they have no legal knowledge, and, as a result the 
summaries of many cases are insufficient and serious legal flaws, for example in the 
case ofPrivate Hope,39 which will be examined in chapter two, are not pointed out as 
they are seen as too complicated for a general readership to understand. Lastly, and 
most importantly, despite being a retired High Court Judge and a legal historian, 
Babington made no comparison between the operation of military and civil law in this 
period. Few legal historians share his rosy view of the Edwardian civil justice 
system40 pointing out, for example, that in magistrates' courts the Justice of the Peace 
rarely had any legal qualifications and that few working class or lower middle class 
people could expect legal representation in court. 
G. Dallas and D. Gill re-entered the debate in 1985 with the pUblication ofIhe. 
Unknown Army. 41 This book did make some useful points relating to trade union 
and Sinn Fein influence in the Army, but its strongest section remained that on the 
Etaples Mutiny. There is also a certain air of desperation in this work as the authors 
38L. Sellers, For God's Sake Shoot Straight I The Story of the Court Martial of Sub 
Lieutenant Edwin Dyett, Leo Cooper, London, 1996, p.XI. 
39See the transcript of the court martial ofPrivate Thomas Hope, P.R.O., W0711432. 
40See A. Babington, The Rule of Law in Britain from the Roman Occupation to the 
Present Day' The Only Liberty, Barry Rose Publishers, London, 1978, pp.260-2. This 
should be compared with, A H. Manchester, A Modern Legal History of England and 
Wales, 1750-1950, Butterworths, London, 1980, p.100, T. Skyrme, History of the 
Justices of the Peace, Barry Rose Publishers, Chichester, 1994, p.686 and W. R. 
Cornish, Law and Society in England. 1750-1950, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1989, 
p.620. 

41G. Dallas and D. Gill, The I Inknown Army' Mutinies in the British Army in World 

War One. Verso, London, 1985. 
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seemed intent on proving that indiscipline was widespread in the B.E.F .. The chapter 
entitled "Not Irishmen but English Soldiers", which is of most relevance to the current 
study, makes some farcical comparisons, for example; "All the great powers had their 
Ireland's, their irredentia, or recruited soldiers from their subject lands. Germany had 
her Polish, Danish, Alsatian and Lorraine soldiers, Russia her Muslims and her 'poles; 
Austria the Czechs and Slavs. ,>42 This ignores the point that, not only was indiscipline 
in Irish units inconsequential compared to that of say, the Czechs in the 
Austro-Hungarian service,43 but that, unlike in most other parts of Europe, 
conscription did not apply in Ireland during the Great War and, as a result, all Irish 
troops were, by definition, volunteers. Despite these flaws and the fact that Dallas and 
Gill ignore much important primary and secondary material, they do give some useful 
examples of Irish troops' reactions to the 1916 Easter Rising in Dublin and Sinn Fein 
infiltration into the Irish Regiments in 1917 and 1918. Much of this book, as in the 
case of other work on discipline and morale, continues the study until 1920 and thus 
will be discussed later. 
L. James,44 like W. Moore before him, looked at a collection of historical 
incidents, ranging from the Naval Mutinies of 1797 to the Army Mutinies in 
1917-1919. James' work relied heavily on secondary material and offered no new 
conclusions on disciplinary problems in the British army between 1914 and 1918. 
However, he did make some mention of Boer War and Sudanese courts-martial cases 
42ibid, p.47. 

430n disciplinary problems in Czech units during the Great War see, M. Cornwall, 
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which offer a useful comparison to those of the Great War.4S In his chapter "Red Coat 
and Green Flag: Irish Mutinies, 1798-1920" James notes that, while the 1916 Rising 
caused no problems regarding the loyalty of Irish troops serving on the Western Front; 
"a handful ofmen serving with the Royal Navy's armoured-car squadron in Russia had 
to be sent home after they had become restless on hearing reports from Dublin. ,>46 
J. Putkowski and 1. Sykes book, Shot at Dawn 47 appeared in 1989. Like 
Babington, they felt that it was useful in considering courts-martial cases, to 
understand the background of the executed soldier, and gave a brief biographical 
account ofeach man executed including his full name and unit details. Understandably 
there are some mistakes; the current author's work on the courts martial of Irish 
soldiers (see chapter two) has shown that sometimes Putkowski and Sykes simply 
used the wrong name.48 Nevertheless the work does suffer from serious problems. 
Firstly, one could question the concentration solely on those shot at dawn: most 
soldiers who appeared before a court martial were charged with nothing more serious 
than drunkenness and received, predominantly, three months field punishment number 
one. Secondly, the authors follow a clear, political agenda in this work, namely to 
obtain a pardon for all men executed under the Anny Act between 1914 and 1920. 
This, it can most charitably be said, clouds their judgement, for example they state 
that; "commanders reviewing capital cases frequently seemed reluctant to commute 
death sentences:>49 when it is quite clear that only eleven per cent ofmen sentenced to 
death by a court martial were actually executed. so 
4Sibid, p.85. 

46ibid, p.201. 

47J. Putkowski and 1. Sykes, Shot at Dawn, Executions in World War One by 

Authority ofthe British Army Act, Leo Cooper, London, 1989. 

48For example, they consistently refer to Private M. Monaghan of the 1st. Battalion, 
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G. D. Sheffield in his article on the military police in the First World warS1 
said disappointingly little about their role in the courts martial process and what 
influenced their decision on whether or not to charge a man found separated from his 
unit, behind the lines, with desertion. Sheffield instead concentrates on the Corps of 
Military Police and its battlefield role, namely how they helped to reorganise stragglers 
and stem panic in the reserve trenches. In considering this issue he makes the point 
that, even during the German Spring Offensive of 1918, straggling was not common 
amongst British infantry units, most of the stragglers actually being members of the 
Labour Corps. 
In his unpublished thesis,52 Dr. Sheffield does make some important points on 
discipline. For example, highlighting how differently it was applied in pre-war regular 
and territorial force units, and that this practice continued during the war. He also 
makes the point that, at least pre-war, regular soldiers preferred to be led by gentlemen 
and that, as a result, between 1914 and 1918, officers of humbler origins were 
moulded into replicas of the pre-war ideal. 53 Equally, he notes that a paternalistic 
attitude persisted in the British army between 1914 and 1918 and often officers would 
not report serious crimes, or even, personal insults from their men, as they did not 
want to risk their mens' lives at a Field General Court Martial trial. Dr. Sheffield, 
notes, sensibly, that; ''Men who were punished by death, penal servitude or field 
punishment number one constituted only a small minority of British other ranks. Yet 
these punishments had an impact on British soldiers out of all proportion to the 
number of men directly affected. Severe punishments acted as a salutary reminder of 
51G. D. Sheffield, ''British Military Police and their Battlefield Role, 1914-18", 

Sandhurst Journal ofMilitary Studies, 1, 1990. 
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the power that the anny had over their lives, and that the military authorities on 
occasions regarded the enforcement and maintenance of military discipline as more 
important than justice. ,,54 
1994 saw the publication of A. Peacock's article,55 on courts-martial, 
following the opening of these records at the Public Record Office. Peacock' s method 
of sampling cases was unsystematic and he ended his study in 1916. He did, however, 
make the valid point that while courts martial records are the most reliable indicator of 
disciplinary problems in a unit they are not entirely accurate as a unit commander may 
either have as many men as possible court martialled to tighten up discipline or may 
charge very few men, as he would see a high number of courts martial cases as an 
indication that he was not an effective disciplinarian. 
David Englander's work on discipline and morale in the B.E.F., during 
1917-18,56 made effective use of the Fifth Army war diaries and court martial records 
in assessing disciplinary problems. However, Englander's remarks on discipline in the 
B.E.F. appear rather confused. Initially concluding that discipline in the Fifth Army 
was very good,57 he then suggests that a major mutiny could have occurred in 1918, 
had the German Spring Offensive not taken place! 58 
P. Scott's article on discipline and morale in the B.E.F. in 1917,59 contains 
some interesting views on officers' legal training. However, this article is 
disappointing in two ways. Firstly, the author reveals his prejudices at the outset ofhis 
article, stating of the Army Act; "it was no finely honed legal instrument, but rather a 
broad-headed sledgehammer to be brought down smartly and with great force on any 
54ibid, p.96. 

55A. Peacock, "Sentenced by Court Martial, Some Notes", Gunfire. 29, 1994. 
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military delinquent.,06o Secondly, while Scott did make use of courts martial records, 
he did not assess these in any systematic fashion, instead dwelling on the most serious 
crimes, viz, desertion, mutiny and cowardice. 
The last two works to be considered, are what the opening of the archives to 
the general public may lead to, namely a series of ill informed works calling for the 
pardon of individual soldiers who were executed during the First World War. R. 
Ferguson61 does little to convince with his comment that; ''many trials were a sham. 
In today's terminology, some were little better than a paramilitary kangaroo court.'062 
One may not agree with the decisions of courts-martial, but to compare a properly 
constituted General Court Martial or Field General Court Martial of the Great War 
with the type of Irish Republican Anny or Ulster Defence Association meeting which 
hands out a punishment beating as a sentence in present day Belfast is clearly 
ludicrous. 
Equally Ferguson makes the point that; ''During some of the trials, which were 
called Field General Courts Martial, men who were accused of, say, Cowardice or 
Desertion were very rarely afforded the luxury of a defence representative. It may be 
hard to picture today, but many ordinary soldiers in the army at that time, whether 
enlisted or a volunteer, could not read or write:063 Not only were literacy rates 
considerably higher than Fergusson allows, but he should have made the point that 
working or lower middle class people tried by civilian courts in this period rarely had 
legal representation. Ferguson proceeds to outline the case of Rifleman James 
Crozier, of the 9th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, a notoriously unfair case, as a 
supposedly representative example ofFirst World War courts martial. 
Leonard Sellers' work64 is, if possible, even worse, largely as he expands what 
might have made a reasonable article into a full book. A brief history of the Royal 
6Oibid, p.349. 
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Naval Division is of little value, while the exchange of letters between Mr. Sellers and 
the Prime Minister, reproduced in full at the end of the book, hardly enhances one's 
knowledge of the case. Nevertheless the section on Dyett's case is well written and 
this is a case worth considering, ifonly because it is one of the few occasions during 
World War One when a British officer was executed. 
Morale is a much more elusive and complicated concept than discipline. As a 
result it has never been a politically charged term and has, therefore, produced much 
less work than discipline in the First World War. Lord Moran first tackled some of the 
issues behind morale in his The Anatomy of Courage. Moran outlined his view, 
formed as a medical officer during the Great War, that each man held a "bank 
account" of courage that would eventually run out, depending on the experiences he 
went through. Moran felt that volunteers from country areas, "Yokels" as he 
unflatteringly termed them, were better adapted to war than men from the towns and 
cities. (This idea may find little acceptance amongst modem psychiatrists, but it may 
be worth bearing in mind when examining the differences in morale between the Royal 
Irish Rifles, largely raised from industrial Belfast and the Connaught Rangers, 
recruited from an overwhelmingly rural area). His views on conscripts were frank; 
"Conscription when it came hustled to arms a lot of quivering creatures who would 
never have gone to war of their own free will.'>65 Moran also noted that; "The English 
are not good haters,'>66 and apart from when the Germans first used poison gas in 
April 1915, German prisoners ofwar were well treated. This suggests that, by nature, 
the English spirit was not as aggressive as some senior commanders hoped. 
1. Baynes provides an invaluable study, by a regular army officer, of morale in 
one battalion during the early part of the war.67 While the book does suffer from 
Lieutenant Edwin Dyett, Leo Cooper, London, 1996. 
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some flaws, namely that the sample taken is too small, the time period too short and 
that the author is perhaps too closely connected to the regiment to be completely 
impartial, it is particularly useful in showing how morale in a unit can be assessed. In 
Baynes' view; cheerfulness amongst all ranks, proper saluting, a good tum out, few 
disciplinary cases, good treatment of visitors, cleanliness, a small number of men 
reporting sick, constant patrolling. of "No-Mans Land", preparedness to assume 
responsibility and ultimately the ability ofmen to sacrifice themselves, are all indicators 
ofhigh morale. 
Baynes also makes the point that high loses helped to maintain high morale in 
the British army during the Great War~ ''To give loss of life as a cause of high morale 
may seem odd, and perhaps a little callous. However, a soldier gets less and less eager 
to fight the longer he stays in the battle area. A few men thrive on war, but most get 
progressively more unwilling to face danger as time goes on. A certain doggedness 
will keep them at their place of duty, but they become increasingly unwilling to face 
danger." 68 
J. Brent Wilson in his unpublished M.A. thesis of 197869 promised a radical 
reappraisal of the B.E.F. 's disciplinary problems stating~ "this survey shows that 
discipline in the front-line infantry frequently lapsed and officers were sometimes 
forced to use extreme measures to stem temporary panics.,,70 This early promise was 
not fulfilled, but Brent Wilson did demonstrate how the High Command measured 
morale; namely by considering records on courts martial, trench foot cases, shell shock 
cases and general illness in units and observing other tell tale signs; for example, if 
soldiers did not salute as frequently as they were meant to, this was seen as a sign of 
poor morale and discipline in a unit. Unfortunately, Brent Wilson's study ultimately 
gave little information on morale and discipline in the British Army as, not only were 
many primary sources crucially important for testing the validity ofthe thesis, not open 
68ibid, pp.l 00-1 0 1. 
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to the public, but the author chose too large a sample and relied too heavily on 
secondary works. 
Brent Wilson did make some comments on Irish units, but these were at best 
unen1ightening and at worst misleading. For example, he states; "Several units 
received a bad class of man because of their recruiting district. For instance, the'Royai 
Irish Rifles, who recruited in Belfast, could not compete with the Ulster Division and 
received only the rejects from other units. ,,71 This comment completely ignores the 
fact that nine of the original battalions in the 36th. (Ulster) Division, were actually 
service battalions of the Royal Irish Rifles! To conclude then on Brent Wilson's 
work, it was useful in highlighting periods when morale was in a crisis and provides 
some interesting material on both the High Commands concern and the 
"bureaucratisation" of the offensive spirit. However, the availability of courts-martial 
records, released in 1993, now means that much of this study needs to be drastically 
revised. 
S. P. Mackenzie in his book published in 199272 made some important points 
on the changing composition and ideals of the British Expeditionary Force; 
The long-service soldier of the Victorian and Edwardian eras would, 
generally speaking, accept the hardships and privations of active service as 
part of his professional existence. For most of the volunteers and conscripts 
who made up the bulk of the Army after 1914-15, however, the situation was 
different. Regarding themselves first and foremost as citizens and only 
secondarily as soldiers, men of the mass armies of the sort that appeared in 
the First World War often required ideals for which to fight, a sense of unity 
71ibid, p.83. 
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and purpose - which in practice could range from not wanting to let down 
one's pals to adesire to crush Prussian militarism. 73 
Mackenzie concludes that, with the advent of a "citizen army", the High 
Command had to think again about army education and that as early as August 1915 
some officers, led by Major-General Sir Charles Munro, commanding Third Army, felt 
that classes should be held to explain to men why they had to keep on fighting. 74 
J. Fuller, writing in 1990,75 made many interesting points, concluding that the 
export of British popular culture to France and Flanders during the Great War was a 
crucial factor in maintaining high morale. However, Fuller's work was concentrated 
very narrowly on trench journalism, a factor that will receive little attention in this 
study as only one Irish battalion, the 14th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles (Young Citizen 
Volunteers) , appears to have published a trench journal and even this was short 
lived.76 
G. D. Sheffield in his unpublished thesis,77 makes some useful observations on 
morale; crucially he has identified the problem in identifying good morale; "it was 
perfectly possible for a soldier's mood to be poor but his military spirit to be sound. 
Therefore, in arguing that the morale of the B. E. F. remained fundamentally sound 
throughout the war, it is not being suggested that soldiers were ecstatically happy all 
the time. Rather, British soldiers and units remained committed to fighting and 
winning the war, and this was reflected in their combat performance." 78 
Unfortunately, as this quote also demonstrates, some of Sheffield's statements can be 
730b"d 31 1 , p. . 
74obod 61 1 ,p. . 
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76Two issues ofthis battalion'sjoumalThe InCinerator, published in May and June 
1916, are in the archives ofthe Somme Heritage Centre, Newtownards. No 
subsequent issues were published. 
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too sweeping and based on insufficient material; notably there is a heavy reliance on 
Brent Wilson's work. 
Sheffield's material on Irish units appears to be based solely on secondary 
material, and sometimes is not referenced at all, for example he notes; ''The rout of an 
Irish battalion on the Somme in September 1916, or the 'bolting' of 9/Cheshires on 
24th. March 1918 provide even more dramatic evidence of the failure of the military 
spirit of specific units at specific times," 19 without providing any further references to 
these events. 
A study of previous work on morale and discipline in Indian and West Indian 
units may seem superfluous to the present work. However, given that T. Denman has 
argued that Irish troops were often seen as "natives"so and that military law seems to 
have been more harshly used against colonial troops and the Indian Corps, including 
the lst. Battalion, Connaught Rangers which served on the Western Front, 1914-15, 
this seems necessary. 
W. F. Elkins in his article on the mutiny of the British West Indies Regiment in 
December 1918 suggests that; "The soldiers of the British West Indies Regiment 
began the national liberation struggle that eventually led to the demise of open colonial 
rule in most of the British Caribbean."Sl Elkins, by suggesting that British army 
troops in the Great War could be politically motivated for a nationalist cause, does put 
forward an interesting thesis which should be tested with reference to Irish troops. 
I. F. W. Beckett's work on the Singapore Mutiny of 1915,S2 is worth 
mentioning partly as it was the mutiny which resulted in the highest number of 
executions in the British army during the Great War. Equally, it does illustrate that the 
19ibid, p.65. 
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British High Command dealt much more seriously with native than white troops, when 
they were involved in disorders, especially when those disorders resulted in the deaths 
ofwhite civilians. 
Finally, the service of the Indian Corps on the Western Front should be 
considered. Greenhut's wor}(83 on this force demonstrated that Indian units were 
badly prepared for service in Europe. This, in itself, led to poor morale, which was 
further lowered by the lack of reinforcements and lack of replacement officers. Poor 
morale manifested itself in the Indian Corps in a number of ways, namely, a large 
number of self inflicted wounds, an unwillingness amongst men to attack and even, 
desertion to the enemy. Greenhut further suggests that officers in the corps did not 
report these problems fully to higher authority, concerned that low morale would be 
seen as a result ofpoor leadership. 
D. Omissi's work on the Indian Army,84 includes a very informative section on 
Indian troops serving on the Western Front. He notes; "the collapse of morale among 
the Indian soldiers in France in 1915 was at times unusually complete:>85 Based on 
censors' reports on Indian troops' letters, Omissi reinforces many of Greenhut's 
points, concluding that; the distance of the troops from home, the bad weather 
conditions ofWinter 1914/15, the sepoys difficulty in adapting to an industrialised war 
and troops being returned to the front-line after being severely wounded, a practice 
without precedent in the Indian army, badly affected morale. He also suggests that 
self-mutilation, something that was very rare in the British army as a whole, was 
prevalent in the Indian Corps.86 It is also clear from Omissi's work that in March 1915 
a group of Afridis from 58th. (Vaughan's) Rifles deserted to the Germans, partly for 
religious reasons. 87 Significantly, Omissi has also found that morale in Indian Cavalry 
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1914-15", The Journal oflmperial and Commonwealth History. 12, 1, 1983. 
84D. Omissi. The Sepoy and the Raj; The Indian Army, 1860-1940, Macmillan in 
association with King's College, London, 1994. 
85ibid, p.114. 
86ibid, p.119. 
87ibid, p.12L 
24 
Divisions was much higher than that in the Indian infantry units on the Western 
Front. 
Perhaps of more direct relevance to the present work is a consideration of 
previously published material relating to discipline in Australian, Canadian and New 
Zealand units during the Great War, espeCially of those serving on the Western 'Front. 
P. Adam-Smith's The Anzacs,88 while unashamedly a "popular history", does 
consider, in some detail, disciplinary problems in the Australian and New Zealand 
Army Corps. She mentions the ''Wazzii'' riots of April 1915 when Australian and 
New Zealand troops ransacked the red-light district of Carlo. Adam-Smith suggests 
that there was an attempted official cover up, as the 'CSattle of Wazzir" was compared 
to a university rag-day in the official history.89 Adam-Smith proceeds to give some 
details regarding venereal disease amongst A.N.Z.A.C. troops on the Western Front, 
which is useful, as a soldier contracting a sexually transmitted disease was deemed to 
have a self inflicted wound, in disciplinary terms. Lastly, the 1918 mutinies amongst 
Australian infantry units are considered; these occurred when the 37th., 54th. and 
59th. Battalions, Australian Imperial Force refused to be amalgamated with other 
units. This is of particular relevance to the current study as, of course, recruitment 
problems led to the amalgamation and, later, disbandment of most Irish service 
battalions. 
C. Pugsley's work on the New Zealand units during the First World War,90 is 
particularly illuminating on disciplinary issues as Pugsley was, due to the New Zealand 
government's more enlightened attitude to public records, able to research New 
Zealand courts martial years before the files in Britain were released to the general 
public. Pugsley does make some interesting points relating to discipline, for example, 
that officers would often resign their commissions to prevent formal disciplinary 
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action.91 He also demonstrates that, after an inauspicious beginning on the Western 
Front, by the use of strict discipline, the New Zealand Division became one of the 
most effective units in the British Expeditionary Force by 1918. Also, Pugsley 
demonstrates that, throughout the war, large numbers of New Zealand troops who 
were given prison sentences had these suspended. Lastly, he concludes thai New 
Zealand discipline on the Western Front, measured in terms of court martial cases, was 
much better than that in Australian or Canadian units. 
A. Thomson, in his Anzac Memories92 does not deal with disciplinary 
problems in the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps in any detail. However, he 
does stress that Australian discipline was much laxer than that used in the British Army 
as a whole and that self-inflicted wounds were a common problem in the Australian 
Infantry Force. 
Very little work has been carried out on disciplinary problems in the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force during the Great War. However, D. Morton93 has made the 
point that, for political reasons, the legal position of the Canadian Expeditionary Force 
changed. In late 1916 it was decided that members of the Canadian units serving on 
the Western Front would be disciplined under the Canadian Militia Act, rather than the 
British Army Act. This brought them into line with Australian units which had, since 
the outbreak ofwar, been disciplined under the Australian Defence Act of 1903.94 
As in Britain, work on discipline in continental European armies is relatively 
sparse. L. V. Smith's book on the French army,95 is an excellent case-study of the 
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5th. Division during the Great War, based on French primary sources. Smith's work is 
particularly useful in demonstrating how the French anny recovered from the mutinies 
of 1917. Meanwhile, J. 1. Becker's work, 96 makes some interesting comparisons 
between military and civilian morale. 
The discipline and morale of the German anny has equally received little 
attention, partially due to the destruction of many archives in the Second World 
War.97 W. Deist suggests that post March 1918 German morale began to crack.98 
By contrast, H. Strachan suggests that the German anny faced serious morale 
problems from at least July 1917, and indeed, in April 1917 introduced a new legal 
code. This revised disciplinary system reduced maximum sentences for many offences, 
insuring that, despite increased indiscipline, the German anny would not unnecessarily 
lose manpower. 99 
The most recent work on discipline in the Russian anny during the Great War 
is that of A. K. Wildman. 100 Wildman stresses the links between the Russian anny 
and peasant culture. He also emphasises that the anny mutinies of 1917 were 
spontaneous and certainly not organised by Bolsheviks. 
As noted above, most of the work on discipline and morale in the 
Austro-Hungarian anny concentrates on the heterogeneous nature of this anny. 
Therefore the poor discipline of, for example, Czech troops, are highlighted by 
Cornwall, Plasichka and Jerabek. 101 However, none of these authors have 
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satisfactorily explained how an anny, near to collapse in 1914, survived as a 
reasonably reliable fighting organisation until 1918. 
Finally, work has been recently completed on the Italian anny in the First 
World War. In his study of this anny, 1. Gooch emphasises the brutal nature of 
discipline, which even included "death by lottery" in units which were perceived to 
have displayed cowardice in action. l02 
It is also worth considering previously published works on the immediate post 
war period of 1918-22. This period did see considerable discipIinary problems in the 
B.E.F. and thus merits some attention, if only to assess why men who had faultlessly 
obeyed orders during the conflict mutinied soon after the Annistice of November 
1918. 
The first published works on the post-war mutinies were two, unashamedly 
left-wing pamphlets. l03 A. Killick's work is based solely on his own experiences of 
the Calais mutiny and initially inspires little confidence as he states that the mutiny 
took place in 1918, when it actually occurred in 1919. Killick further misrepresents 
the situation by suggesting that the entire V Corps was sent to surpress the mutiny (in 
fact less than one division was required) and that this force went over to the mutineers. 
Lastly, Killick undoubtedly attributes too much political motivation to the strike, for 
example, in suggesting that the troops in France were waiting for a general strike in 
Britain before embarking on a full scale mutiny. 104 
D. Lamb's pamphlet relies very heavily on secondary sources. His comment 
that; "There is little doubt that during the years 1918-20 Britain was near to a social 
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revolution, much nearer in fact than in the well publicised days of 1926,"105 does not 
seem to be borne out by the facts. While the full political bias of this work becomes 
apparent in what can only be described as a rant against Trades Union leaders, past 
and present. 
The first scholarly contribution on this issue was A. Rothstein's work. 106 
Rothstein made the important point that many post war mutinies very closely 
resembled pre-war industrial strikes. Another important issue which he stressed was 
that most of the soldiers involved in these "strikes" were not front-line troops. Indeed, 
most of the men involved were members of the Army Service Corps or Army 
Ordnance Corps, frequently based in Britain. 
While Rothstein does probably over estimate the average British soldiers' 
political attitude towards allied intervention in Russia, he does make it clear that the 
strikes were caused by a number of factors. In a comprehensive list drawn up in 
January 1919, for example, 4,000 men of the Army Service Corps, based at Park 
Royal in London demanded; 1) speedier demobilisation, 2) reveille to be sounded at 
6.30a.m. rather than 5.30a.m., 3) work to finish at 4.30p.m. rather than 5.30p.m., 4) 
no men over forty-one to be sent overseas, 5) all training to stop, 6) a reduction in 
guard and picket duty, 7) no compulsory church parade, 8) no drafts to be sent to 
Russia, 9) a committee of one non commissioned officer and two privates to control 
messing arrangements for each company, 10) a written guarantee of no 
victimisation. 107 
Dallas and Gill in their 1985 work108 make some interesting points about the 
immediate post-war mutinies. They suggest that the Army Ordnance Corps and Army 
Service Corps units at this time were composed of an unstable mixture of time served 
infantrymen (many of whom, due to wounds, were no longer medically fit for infantry 
105D. Lamb, Mutinies, p.32. 
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service) and skilled men, often the very last to be conscripted, who were recognised as 
being more useful in these units than the front line. They also make the point that 
while some troops supported left-wing political demands, the Labour movement in 
Britain offered them little support. 
D. Morton and J. Putkowski's work, 109 relating to the Canadian Expeditionary 
Force in the immediate post-war period has also shown that mutinies resulted from a 
number of political and material issues. While there was some socialist agitation, the 
major problems which sparked the most serious Canadian military disturbance, at 
Kinmel Park were; the mismanagement of demobilisation, cold and uncomfortable 
barracks and high prices in the camp shops. In addition, the officers' lack of attention 
to their men, and the failure to organise group activities worsened the situation. 
Irish troops do not seem to have been involved in these demobilisation riots or 
"strikes". However, even more seriously, the 1 s1. Battalion, Connaught Rangers 
mutinied at Jullundur, India, in July 1920. Two books have been published on this 
incident110 and it merits attention in this thesis, as in assessing morale in the Irish 
Regiments between 1914 and 1918, it is important to consider the extent to which 
Sinn Fein was gathering support from Irish troops. 
S. Pollock suggested that the mutiny took place mainly as new recruits sent out 
to the battalion from Britain brought with them lurid tales of the "Black and Tan" 
atrocities being committed in Ireland. Pollock thus saw the mutiny as being inspired 
almost totally by political motives. However, Babington pointed to some material 
factors, which along with Sinn Fein sympathy, inspired the mutiny. He concluded that 
poor officer-man relations and the lack of organised activities for other ranks had 
much to do with the outbreak of the mutiny. Nevertheless, Babington does note that 
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there were also fears relating to Sinn Fein agitation in the 1st. Battalion, Royal Irish 
Regiment; 1st. Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers; and the Irish Guards at this time. 111 
Both authors, writing on the Connaught Rangers stress that the ringleaders were men 
who had recently joined the battalion, rather than Great War veterans. 
Disaffection in Irish regiments as a whole in the 1918-22 period is considered 
in much greater detail by Keith Jeffery. In his work, he notes that Sinn Fein infiltration 
of Irish units was generally unsuccessful, whether the units concerned were stationed 
in the United Kingdom, Silesia or India. 112 
To turn, now, to a consideration of previously published material on Ireland 
and the Great War, as noted at the start of this introduction, in Irish terms the Great 
War has become a "political event" in sharp contrast to the experience in the rest of 
the British Isles. As K. Jeffery has highlighted, 113 even the erection of War Memorials 
in 1920s Ireland became a subject of heated political controversy. This popular 
perception of the war flowed over easily into the academic sphere. C. Falls' work on 
the 36th. (Ulster) Division was inspired as much by the Ulster Unionist Council's 
desire to demonstrate the loyalty of Northern Protestants to the British Crown as by a 
desire to record the wartime services of the division. 114 Equally B. Cooper's history 
of the 10th. (Irish) Division 115 was firmly Nationalist in tone. 
This neglect ofIreland's role in the war saw some terrible misconceptions and 
intriguing conspiracy theories appear in Irish historical works. For example, R. Kee 
stated; 
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Redmond had fought hard, often in the teeth of War Office and regular 
Army Unionist dislike of southern Irish nationalists, to give a specifically, 
Irish National flavour to Ireland's contribution to recruiting. There had been 
a tendency at first to disperse southern Irishmen, who wanted to enlist, into 
English regiments rather than let them concentrate in their own units.' This 
was in marked contrast to the treatment given to the Ulster Volunteer Force 
who were at once allowed to form their own Ulster Division of the British 
Army with distinctive badges and emblems. But eventually, thanks to 
Redmond's pressure, there was formed, in addition to the regular 10th. (Irish) 
Division stationed at the Curragh, a third Irish Division (the 16th.) with 
headquarters at Cork and Tipperary.116 
This statement demonstrates an almost complete lack of knowledge about 
British army recruitment policy during the Great War and portrays the War Office as 
distinctly pro-Unionist, which, under Kitchener's leadership, it certainly was not. 117 
Lastly, and most bizarrely, Kee dubs the 10th. (Irish) Division "regular" when it was 
one ofthe first New Army divisions! 
Kee may be excused some of these inaccuracies as not only was his work 
unashamedly pro-Nationalist in tone, but it was a broad survey work. M. Laffin 
cannot be so easily excused for writing; 
Redmond urged Irish Volunteers to join the British army and fight in 
Flanders, but his goodwill was not reciprocated by Kitchener and the War 
Office. The army's unionist sympathies were reflected in the prompt 
formation of an Ulster division comprising former members of the Ulster 
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Volunteers; its long-standing dislike of Irish nationalists was revealed in a 
policy of dispersing Irish recruits throughout British regiments rather than 
fonning them into an Irish brigade as urged by Redmond. The Ulster division 
was not sent to the front until October 1915 and sceptical nationalists 
believed it was being protected and kept out of danger. 118 
One would not imagine from reading this that the 10th. (Irish) or 16th. (Irish) 
Divisions or the Irish regular battalions of the British army had ever existed. 
Thankfully, in recent years, the First World War has begun to enter the 
mainstream of Irish history, particularly through the revisionist work of R. F. Foster, 
who has commented; 
The First World War should be seen as one of the most decisive events 
in modem Irish history. Politically speaking, it temporarily diffused the Ulster 
situation, it put Home Rule on ice; it altered the conditions of military crisis in 
Ireland at a stroke; and it created a rationale for an lR.B. rebellion. 
Economically, it created a spectacular boom in agricultural prices, and high 
profits in agriculturally derived industries; though urban workers were less 
advantaged, and there was much resentment at the imposition of production 
quotas and the enforcement of tillage rather than pasture farming. 
The War also accounted for a great outflow of recruits; about 150,000 
were in active service by April 1916, and over 200,000 had enlisted by the 
end. Town labourers predominated over agricultural labourers, often 
encouraged by unemployment at home, and the prospect of a generous 
separation allowance for their families; Belfast provided a high proportion, 
for reasons of proletarianization as much as Protestantism. 119 
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Despite this new recognition of the importance of the Great War to Irish 
history; historians working on the First World War and Ireland still form something of 
a "cottage industry". The most prolific is T. Denman who has published widely on the 
10th. (Irish) and 16th. (Irish) Divisions and the military career of William Redmond. 
His work varies greatly in quality and, ofcourse, in relevance to the present work. His 
first book., Ireland's Unknown Soidiers120 was a well written and researched piece of 
work., which was all the more important as it was the first published history of the 
16th. (Irish) Division. Of particular interest, with reference to the s~dy of discipline 
and morale is his chapter on the German Spring Offensive, entitled "21 March 1918: 
Fight or Flight?" He concludes that, while the 16th. Division was clearly 
overwhelmed, this was a result oftactical errors, rather than poor morale; 
On 21 March 1918 the 16th. Division was, at the insistence of senior 
officers, holding its advanced line in heavy strength. It was a division which 
had been in the line for several months and was desperately tired. It had 
undergone a massive restructuring of its order ofbattle only weeks before. It 
was a division in need of training; and one defending a salient with a glaring 
tactical weak spot, of which the divisional commander and staff - the 16th. 
Division had a "rotten staff', Nightingale believed - were aware but had done 
little to rectify. With six dispersed battalions it had fought the best part of 
three (six ifwe include second-line formations) German divisions. 121 
Denman also made clear the 16th. (Irish) Division's manning problems, for 
example noting that 250 men of the Jersey Militia were incorporated into the 7th. 
Battalion of the Royal Irish Rifles by Spring 1915 to bring the battalion up to 
strength. Denman further notes that, when the division was reconstituted in July 1918 
120T. Denman, Ireland's Unknown Soldiers. 
12libid, p.170. 
34 
it contained only one Irish battalio~ the 5th. Royal Irish Fusiliers, the strength being 
made up with one Welsh, five English and two Scottish battalions. 122 
T. Denman's article, "The Catholic Irish Soldier in the First World War"123 
also provides some interesting views on the position of the Irish soldier in the British 
army which relate to morale and discipline, concluding that there were 'racist' 
attitudes to the Irish Regiments in the British High Command, for example, in 
believing that, like certain colonial troops, they were reckless in attack, but prone to 
indiscipline and lacking intellect. This is a concept which the current author has some 
difficulty with: to compare the Irish in the British army with the Senegalese in the 
French army, as Denman does, 124 is surely taking the concept of a ''Colonial'' 
relationship between Britain and Ireland too far. Nevertheless, this may be worth 
considering at a later date, especially if Irish disciplinary records are glaringly different 
to their English, Scottish or Welsh counterparts. 
Denman's work on the 10th. (Irish) Divisio~125 concludes in 1915 and is 
concerned only with the 10th. Division at Gallipoli, thus it is of little relevance to the 
present work. Another article by Denm~126 gives an interesting insight into morale 
and discipline in an Irish service battalion through the eyes of a temporary officer, 
based on Captain Staniforth's papers held in the Imperial War Museum. 
Unfortunately, in recent years, Denman's material has started to decline in its 
academic standards. His work on William Redmond,127 the Irish Parliamentary Party 
Member ofParliament, who became a Major in the 16th. (Irish) Divisio~ provides few 
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insights into how Redmond and the Irish National Volunteers as a whole adapted to 
life in the British army or to what extent his military and political positions conflicted 
with each other. Denman's basic premise, that we should remember that Irish 
Nationalists, as well as mster Unionists fought in the war, is not new and, indeed, 
twelve years before Denman's work was published, 1. B. Lyons,128 had examiried the 
career of an Irish Nationalist M.P. who joined the British Army on the outbreak of the 
Great War. 
David Fitzpatrick's work on Ireland during the war has provided some 
valuable insights into the Irish home front and recruitment during the war. His Politics 
and Irish Life. 129 while focused exclusively on Co. Clare, does make a number of 
important points about the changing perceptions towards the Army in Ireland between 
1914-18, and the decision to remove Special Reserve units of the Irish Regiments from 
Ireland in 1918. Fitzpatrick's article relating to the Great Warl30 provides interesting 
material on Irish recruitment and especially on the enlistment of Irish and mster 
Volunteers into the British Army. Lastly, the volume of undergraduate essays which 
Fitzpatrick edited,131 has chapters by P. Codd, "Recruiting and Responses to the War 
in Wexford", J. Leonard, "The Catholic Chaplaincy" and D. Lindsay, "Labour Against 
Conscription", which are all of some relevance to the current study. 
Philip Orr's work on the mster Division,132 made excellent use of oral history. 
Unfortunately, the author made few enquires with specific regard to discipline or 
morale in the Division and, following the recent fascination amongst "popular" 
historians with the Battle of the Somme, said little about the Division's experiences 
128J. B. Lyons, The Enigma ofTam Kettle, Irish Patriot, Essayist, Poet, British 
Soldier, 1880-1916, Glendale Press, Dublin, 1983. 
1290. Fitzpatrick, Politics and Irish Life, 19B-I92t Provincial Experience ofWar 
and Revolution, Gill and Macmillan Ltd., Dublin, 1977. 
1300. Fitzpatrick, "The Logic ofCollective Sacrifice: Ireland and the British Army, 
1914-1918", Historical Journal, 38, 4, 1995, especially p.1028. 
131D. Fitzpatrick (ed.), Ireland and the First World War. 
132p. Orr, The Road to the Somme. 
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after the 1st. July 1916. The oral history format was again used by G. S. Mitchell, l33 
in his study of the 10th. Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. While there is, again, 
no specific consideration of morale and discipline factors in this unit, the book is a 
useful study ofan Irish service battalion during the Great War. A similar problem with 
both of these books was, of ,course, that by the late 1980s there were vefy few 
survivors of the First World war left to be interviewed and one could question just 
how representative their experiences were of the battalion or division as a whole. 
T. Johnstone's work, l34 offered some new material; its basic premise being 
that the service of all Irishmen, Protestant or Catholic, regular, Special Reserve or 
New Army, serving in whatever theatres of war between 1914-1918 should be 
recognised. Unfortunately, Johnstone's study, like Harris' earlier work, l35 relies 
much too heavily on regimental histories published in the 1920s and therefore offers 
few insights into morale and disciplinary problems in the Irish regiments or the link 
between political changes in Ireland and disaffection in the Irish units. 
M. Dungan's work, 136 again makes use of oral history, largely from the Radio 
Telefaris Eirann sound archive. Unfortunately, it offers few new interpretations of 
Irish troops' role in the First World War and includes some rather unfocused 
comments relating to Irish men in the Australian Imperial Force. Equally, topics such 
as the political activism of Irish troops and discipline, while initially promised by 
Dungan in his first book on the Great War, l37 mysteriously failed to appear in the 
companion volume. Nevertheless, given R.T.E.s less than helpful attitude to 
researchers, Dungan's work is, at least, useful in bringing material from the R.T.E. 
sound archives to public attention. 
l33G. S. Mitchell, Three Cheers for the Denys!, Yes! Publications, Derry, 1991. 
l34T. Johnstone, Orange, Green and Khaki. 
135H. E. D. Harris, The Irish Regiments in the First World War, Mercier Press, 
Dublin, 1968. 
136M. Duggan, Irish Voices from the Great War, and They Shall Grow Not Old. 
l37M. Dungan, Irish Voices from the Great War, p.9. 
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The last published pieces of work which need to be considered in this survey 
are N. Perry's recent articles. 138 In this work, Perry considers the strains that the 
Great War put on the regimental system in Ireland in the faces of high losses and low 
recruitment levels. He concludes that Irish service battalions were disbanded more 
readily than their English, Scottish or Welsh counterparts,139 and that, while Irish 
units had to accept large numbers of non-Irish personnel, the Black Watch and 
Seaforth Highlanders, themselves facing severe manning problems, recruited heavily in 
Belfast. Perry's work also demonstrates the difficult relationship between the military 
authorities and Irish political leaders throughout the war over recruiting difficulties. 
However, Perry, like Denman, clearly has some difficulty in acknowledging the fact 
that, by the end of the war, due to dilution, most Irish units contained very large 
numbers of non-Irish personnel, concluding; "In summary, then, Irish units and 
formations did retain their Irish identities, and at any given stage of the war were likely 
to be at least as representative in terms of regional identity as most other units in the 
British Army.,,140 
Before moving on to the outline of this thesis, unpublished work which has 
been completed on Irish units in the Great War must be considered. M. T. Foy's 
thesis, 141 unsurprisingly deals mainly with the pre-August 1914 situation and 
organisation of the Ulster Volunteer Force. Nevertheless he does make it clear that, 
despite post war Unionist claims to the contrary, the Ulster Unionist leadership had 
severe qualms about letting the entire nV.F. leave Ireland while the Home Rule issue 
remained unresolved, indeed, as late as April 1915 there were still 62,000 men in the 
138N. Perry, "Nationality in the Irish Infantry Regiments in the First World War", War. 
and Society, XII, 1, 1994 and "Maintaining Regimental Identity in the Great War: The 
Case of the Irish Infantry Regiments", Stand To, 52, 1998. 
13~. Perry, "Nationality in the Irish Infantry Regiments", p.74. 
140ibid, p.89. 
141M. T. Foy, "The Ulster Volunteer Force: Its Domestic Development and Political 
Importance in the Period 1913 to 1920", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, The Queen's 
University ofBelfast, 1986. 
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U.V.F. anned with 54,000 ritles. 142 Foy further suggests that the nV.F. wanted a 
coastal defence role, in line with what had originally been envisaged for the Territorial 
Force in the event of war. Indeed, by January 1915 a scheme had been drawn up by 
whichU.V.F. units would defend the Antrim and Down coastlines and Belfast harbour 
and City in the event ofa German raid or invasion. 143 
I. Maxwell's thesis on Sir Wtlfrid Spender,l44 should also be mentioned at this 
point. Unfortunately this work is very slight on Spender's service as G.S.O.2 of the 
36th. (Ulster) Division from September 1914 to July 1916, and strangely says nothing 
about his frequent disputes with his superiors, partly due to his pre-war U.V.F. 
involvement or his, in some cases unbelievably indiscreet, correspondence with Sir 
James Craig and Sir Edward Carson. 145 
P. Callan's thesis,146 is very useful in demonstrating the efforts that were made 
to keep Irish units up to strength. He also demonstrates the political difficulties in 
forming the 16th. (Irish) and 36th. (Ulster) Divisions and the tensions between 
pre-August 1914 volunteer officers (whether from the nV.F. or Irish Volunteers) and 
regular anny officers. With particular reference to this work, Callan does give some 
examples of Sinn Fein infiltration into Irish units, for example; ''Captain Terance 
Poulter, a Royal Dublin Fusilier, who fought to surpress the rising, described why his 
unit was speedily moved from Ireland, 'The (Longford) I.R.A. had joined the 11tho 
battalion en masse. One night, they had brought up a barge along the canal behind the 
barracks. Two hundred rifles were taken, every rifle in the barracks, .... and neither 
they nor the rifles were ever seen again. That night the decision was taken to bring 
142ibid, p.21O. 

143ibid, p.211. 

1441. L. Maxwell, "The Life of Sir Wilfrid Spender, 1876-1960", unpublished Ph.D. 

thesis, The Queen's University ofBelfast, 1991. 

145See Spender's correspondence at P.R.O.N.I., D,1295/311-13 for examples of this. 

146p. Callan, "Voluntary Recruiting for the British Army in Ireland during the First 

World War", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University College, Dublin, 1984. 
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every Irish regiment out of Ireland, and relocate them in Scotland, ... , We only came 
back to disband for ever. "'147 
M. Staunton's work on the Royal Munster Fusiliers,148 despite using the 
traditional framework of a regimental history, does fully embrace the ''War and 
Society" school of military history. Therefore his thesis considers, in some depth, the 
experiences of the Munster home front during the war, recruitment, and, in a section 
particularly relevant to the current work "Morale, Politics and Religion" he makes 
some valid points relating to the politicisation ofthe regiment in late 1917 and 1918 by 
Sinn Fein activists. Staunton concludes that, while there was some Sinn Fein 
sympathy in the regiment; "Like most Irish servicemen, Royal Munster Fusilier soldiers 
continued to espouse the cause of Redmond during a period which saw the growth of 
support for Sinn Fein". 149 He does, however, suggest that Irish units on the Western 
Front were distrusted by other units by early 1918 as they were seen as active Sinn 
Feiners. 150 
One final piece of unpublished work which must be mentioned is L. S. 
Lemisko's M. A. thesis, regarding the 16th. (Irish) Division. 151 Lemisko's work, 
while weak on the formation and training of the division, makes important points 
relating to Irish soldiers on the Western Front, especially during the German Spring 
Offensive of 1918. Lemisko concludes that, generally, discipline in the 16th. (Irish) 
Division compared favourably with that ofother B.E.F. divisions. 
Having considered previous work relating to discipline and morale, it is now 
important to outline how this topic will be developed. In particular an outline of the 
1471rish Times, 24/4/84, cited in P. Callan, ibid, p.267. This incident allegedly took 

place in Co. Longford in November 1917. 

148M. Staunton, "The Royal Munster Fusiliers in the Great War, 1914-19", 

unpublished M.A. thesis, University College, Dublin, 1986. 

149ibid, p.200. 

150ibid, p.203. 

151L. S. Lemisko, "Politics, Performance and Morale: 16 (Irish) Division 1914-18", 

unpublished M. A. thesis, University ofCalgary, 1992. A useful summary of 
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rationale behind examining the sample units which have been chosen for examination 
in depth, must be given, along with how morale and discipline can be evaluated and 
the links between civilian and military morale during the Great War. Having 
considered these issues an outline of the various chapters which will comprise the 
thesis, will be provided. 
This work will rely heavily on the courts martial papers,152 held at the Public 
Record Office, Kew, to evaluate morale and discipline in the B.E.F.. However, as 
there were over 50,000 courts martial cases heard on the Western Front between 1914 
and 1918 a sample is clearly required. Sampling the British army during the Great 
War is a notoriously difficult practice, basically as there is no such entity as a "typical" 
division. It has therefore been decided to concentrate heavily on Irish units serving on 
the Western Front. 153 Thus the courts martial details of all men tried while serving in 
Irish units on the Western Front have been detailed in a database (see appendices 4 
and 6). In addition to this and for comparative purposes, courts martial in sample Irish 
units on home service have been compiled in a separate database (see appendices 4 
and 8). Likewise the courts martial records of five Irish battalions have been detailed 
in another database. This database covers these units service in other theatres of war, 
namely Gallipoli, Salonika and the Middle East (see appendices 4 and 7). 
Given these disparities between the "Irish" and "British" experiences of the 
First World War, outlined earlier in the introduction, a number of non-Irish infantry 
units will be included in the courts martial database sample. Very crudely, the B.E.F. 's 
infantry can be divided into six distinct components and an example of each will be 
examined. Firstly, there are the regular infantry units, in this context the 87th. infantry 
brigade (i.e., the 1st. Battalions, King's Own Scottish Borderers, Border Regiment 
and Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers and the 2nd. Battalion, South Wales Borderers) of the 
29th. Division will be examined. 
152See the following series, P.R.O., W071, W08!, W083, W084, W086, W090, 
W093 and W0213. 
153See appendix 1 for full details ofthe wartime services of the Irish units. 
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Secondly, the New Army Divisions raised directly by the War Office can be 
seen as a distinct entity within the British Expeditionary Force. In this category the 
entire 16th. (Irish) Division will be considered, along with one battalion of the 45th. 
infantry brigade of the 15th. (Scottish) Division (namely, the 6th. Battalion, Cameron 
Highlanders). Thirdly, New Army ''Pals'' formations must be considered and for this 
the 26th. Battalion, Northumberland Fusiliers, 34th. Division will be used. Lastly, as 
far as the New Army Divisions are concerned, there are units which were formed with 
political overtones, obviously the 16th. (Irish) and 36th. (lTIster) Divisions will be 
examined in this context but, in addition the 14th. Battalion, Royal Welsh Fusiliers, 
38th. (Welsh) Division will be considered. 
Lastly, the Territorial Force infantry divisions can be clearly divided into two 
groups. The first line units, of which the 1I14th. Battalion, London (Scottish) 
Regiment and the 6th. Battalion, Gordon Highlanders of the 51 st. (Highland) Division 
will be used for sampling purposes; and the second line units, of which the 2/6th. 
Battalion, Sherwood Foresters of the 59th. (Second, West Riding) Division will serve 
as an example. The only non-British unit to be examined will be the lst. Battalion, 
Australian Imperial Force, 1 st. Australian Division. 
This sample is clearly not a cross section of the British Expeditionary Force 
either in regional terms or arms of service as it concentrates heavily on infantry units 
from the "Celtic Fringe" of Britain and this requires some explanation. To begin with 
the regional question, a recent conference,154 demonstrated that the concept of the 
"Celtic Fringe" can meaningfully be applied during the First World War. By 
comparing Irish units with their Scottish or Welsh counterparts, the intention is, as far 
as is possible, to try to compare like with like. In military terms, the introduction of 
conscription does somewhat undermine the ''Celtic Fringe" similarities, but at the same 
time Irish troops were seen as having much more in common with their Scottish than 
154''The Great War and the Celtic Fringe", organised by Ms. Jane Leonard at the 
Queen's University ofBelfast, April, 1995. 
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their English counterparts. Indeed, in 1918, Sir Edward Carson suggested that an 
amalgamation between the 36th. (Ulster) and 51st. (Highland) Divisions would be 
more acceptable to the men in both Divisions than the amalgamation of the 16th. 
(Irish) and 36th. (Ulster) Divisions. iSS Equally, Irish, Scots, and Welsh units all had 
difficulty in retaining their national composition during the war, in terms of 
replacements. Therefore it seems much more sensible to compare the Irish units 
largely with Scots and Welsh units with similar characteristics, while a comparison 
solely with troops recruited from England would be much less enlightening. Equally, 
the use ofthe 1 st. Battalion, Australian Imperial Force as representative of all overseas 
units is rather unfair. However, the fact that the Australians, like the Irish, had a 
reputation for being both excellent fighting troops and poorly disciplined, accounts for 
this choice. 
As regards the over-concentration on infantry and cavalry units, this has been 
carried out for practical, rather than theoretical reasons. For example, if a member of 
the 174th. company, Army Service Corps, attached to the 36th. (Ulster) Division was 
court martialled, he would simply be listed in the records as a member of the Army 
Service Corps, without his unit or division being given. This also occurs with the 
Royal Field Artillery, Royal Garrison Artillery, Labour Corps, Royal Tank Corps, 
Royal Flying Corps, Royal Engineers and Royal Army Medical Corps personnel, 
which unfortunately makes a comparison between front line and rear area troops 
impossible, without the construction of a much larger database, which would be 
beyond the possibilities ofthis thesis. 
Again, the fashion in which the courts martial records are kept makes a 
thematic approach to the topic of discipline and morale virtually impossible. For 
example, if a soldier is found guilty of section 7 A of the Army Act for "mutiny and 
insubordination", it is unclear whether his crime was politically motivated, let alone if 
iSSN. Perry, ''Nationality in the Irish Infantry Regiments". 
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it was inspired by militant Labour or Sinn Fein sympathies. 156 Thus, with the 
exception of chapter two, ''The Administration of British Military Justice, 1914 to 
1918", the thesis will follow a chronological outline. 
Chapter one will consider the issue of discipline and morale in the British army 
and Irish paramilitary forces, c.1902-14. Irish soldiers in the British army were always 
viewed with some suspicion and this chapter will consider this issue with reference to 
the non-establishment ofTerritorial Force or National Reserve units in Ireland in 1908. 
Equally, the pressures put on Irish soldiers (especially Special Reservists) by the Home 
Rule controversy and labour unrest will be considered in detail. 
In broader terms, it was clear to many officers that the development of modern 
weapons meant that high casualties were inevitable in a future war. Against this 
background it was felt that high morale would be required among attacking troops. 
Therefore doctrinal thought in the British army during this period will receive some 
attention. 
Finally, the two main paramilitary forces in Ireland (the mster Volunteer Force 
and Irish Volunteers) contributed large numbers of recruits to the British army during 
the Great War. It is, therefore, worth considering the pre-war training, esprit d' corps 
and morale and discipline of these formations. 
In chapter two of the thesis the operation of British military law, in its widest 
context, will be considered. Previous authors, as outlined above, have suggested that 
the First World War courts martial system operated in an unfair and arbitrary manner. 
The release of the Judge Advocate General's office papers and courts martial files 
from this period means that this view needs to be radically reassessed. In particular, 
the role of the Judge Advocate General's office in reducing or quashing sentences will 
be considered. In addition, the point must be made that, in many respects, British 
military courts during the Great War, were no more arbitrary than their civilian 
156War Office, Manual ofMilitary Law 1914, H.M.S.O., London, 1914, pp.384-S. 
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counterparts. especially in minor cases which, in civilian society would have been 
adjudicated on by magistrates. 
Chapter three considers the experience of units of the RE.F. in France from 
August 1914 to September 1915. This chapter considers how well Irish battalions 
adapted to service on the Western Front in disciplinary terms and the links between 
casualties and the number of courts martial cases. The establishment of Sir Roger 
Casement's Irish Brigade will also be considered in this chapter as will the disciplinary 
and morale problems faced by the B.E.F. in the Winter of 1914/15. 
In chapter four. the formation and training of the 10th. (Irish). 16th. (Irish) and 
36th. (illster) Divisions will be considered. This chapter will focus on the mutinies 
and general indiscipline which took place in these formations during their training in 
the United Kingdom. The officering of these New Army divisions will also be 
considered in detail as it appears that many officers. especially in the 36th. (illster) 
Division received their appointments due to political involvement rather than military 
skills. Finally. consideration will be given to the methods used to develop and 
maintain morale in these units. 
Chapter five considers the disciplinary problems faced by Irish units on the 
Western Front from October 1915 to September 1916. While it does appear that, by 
this time. the discipline of Irish regular battalions had improved, the situation regarding 
Irish New Army formations was very different. It appears that the training of the 36th. 
(Ulster) Division was deficient. with discipline in the l07th. Infantry Brigade suffering 
as a result of this. The situation in the 16th. (Irish) Division is more difficult to assess, 
but appears to have been broadly similar. In this chapter consideration will be given as 
to how Irish discipline compared to that of the RE.F. as a whole. especially in the 
wake of the Easter Rising. 
Chapter six considers discipline and morale in Irish battalions on the Western 
Front from October 1916 to February 1918. During this period. Irish units, like those 
of the B.E.F. as a whole. were faced with high casualty rates and the arrival of 
conscripts. This period also saw a bewildering number of amalgamations between, 
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and the reduction of some, Irish battalions. In some cases, for example, the 7th. 
Battalio~ Royal Irish Rifles and 9th. Battalio~ Royal Dublin Fusiliers, battalions 
appear to have been disbanded due to disciplinary rather than recruiting problems. 
This chapter will also consider the growing concern amongst politicians and senior 
military figures over the reliability of Irish regiments as a whole, which was 
demonstrated by the removal of Irish Special Reserve units from Ireland in late 1917 
and early 1918. 
Finally, chapter seven will consider disciplinary problems in Irish battalions on 
the Western Front between March and November 1918. In particular, the 
performance of the 16th. (Irish) and 36th. (Ulster) Divisions during the German Spring 
Offensive will be assessed. Equally, the deployment of battalions of the 10th. (Irish) 
Division on the Western Front and the reconstruction of the 16th. Divisio~ post 
March 1918, will be considered. Finally, attention will be given to the so-called 
"Hundred Days", immediately proceeding the Armistice. 
This thesis also contains nine appendices. Appendix one simply details the 
wartime service of the Irish regiments during the Great War. Appendix two details the 
wartime service of the non-Irish units included in the database project. The third 
appendix details cases in which men were convicted of mutiny, while serving in the 
British army during the First World War. Appendix four provides an introduction to 
the database project and includes a list of the abbreviations and the sample units used 
in the project. The databases compiled in researching this thesis have been printed out 
and attached as appendices. 
Thus appendix five details men tried by court martial while serving in Irish 
battalions based in the United Kingdom between the Ist. August 1913 and 31st. July 
1914: while details relating to officers serving in Irish units in India, who were tried by 
courts martial during this period have been included, details of other ranks tried by 
court martial in India during 1913 and 1914 were not uncovered during this research. 
Appendix six lists men tried by courts martial while serving in Irish units on the 
Western Front between 4th. August 1914 and lIth. November 1918. Appendix seven 
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gives details of men serving in a sample number of Irish units, which served in theatres 
of war other than the Western Front. Meanwhile, appendix eight lists men tried by 
court martial, who served in a sample number of Irish units based in the United 
Kingdom during the First World War. Finally, appendix nine gives details of men tried 
by court martial, while serving in a sample number of non-Irish units on the Western 
Front, between the 4th. August 1914 and 11th. November 1918. 
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Chapter 1. 
Discipline aDd Morale in the British Army aDd Irish Paramilitary Forces, c.1902 to 
Before considering discipline and morale in the British Expeditionary Force during 
the Great War, it is important to reflect on the importance of these factors in the British 
army during the 1902-14 period. These twelve years, from the end of the Boer War to the 
outbreak of the First World War, saw major changes both in British military thought and 
the organisation of the British army. Equally, the position of the Irish regiments in the 
British army changed in this period; they were seen as more trustworthy in the aftermath 
of the Boer War, before new doubts were cast on them over the relationship of some Irish 
soldiers to the Ulster Volunteer Force. The politicisation of the army, generally, in these 
years, most notably over the Curragh Incident of March 1914 demands attention, as does 
the disciplinary and morale problems faced by troops called out in aid of the civil power 
during this period. Lastly, the issues of discipline and morale in the various paramilitary 
groups which developed in Ireland after 1911 will be considered as, ultimately, many of 
the men in these ranks were to serve in the British armed forces during the Great War. 
British military thought in this period was not as firmly developed as its 
counterparts in European armies, and indeed, as two historians have noted, the British 
army did not actually possess a coherent doctrine when war broke out in August 1914. I 
This had partly to do with the spirit of anti-intellectualism of the British officer corps,2 
which was to some extent shown in the educational backgrounds ofarmy officers. During 
the pre-war period many were still entering the army through the militia, rather than the 
IS. Bidwell and D. Graham, Fire-Power~ British Army Weapons and Theories of War 

1904-1945, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1982, p .15. 

2ib.id, p.19. 
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more intellectually demanding Royal Military College (R.M.C.). For example, a record of 
officers serving in the 4th. Royal Irish Dragoon Guards between 1909 and 1913 shows 
that, while 18 came from the RM.C., eight had joined the regiment from a militia or 
yeomanry unit and one from a colonial unit.3 In the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Regiment, 
during the same period, the picture was somewhat similar. While 35 officers had entered 
the battalion through the R.M.C., 16 came from the "old militia", four from the Special 
Reserve, one from the Territorial Force and one by a direct commission.4 There were, of 
course, other methods of entry, the officer training given by which is more debatable. In 
the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Regiment, one officer serving in this period was 
commissioned from the ranks, one had come directly from a public school and two 
directly from University.s In the 4th. Royal Irish Dragoon Guards, four officers serving in 
the 1909-13 period had been commissioned from the ranks and two directly from 
University.6 
Similar patterns are apparent in officers serving in the 1 st. Battalion, Leinster 
Regiment between 1906 and 1915: 44 had passed through the R.M.C., 27 come from the 
old militia, 3 from the Special Reserve, four from the ranks, five directly from University 
and one directly from a public school. In addition one officer in the regiment had gained 
his commission by the least intellectually taxing method of all, being nominated by a 
Colonial Governor. 7 
There is also some evidence to suggest that the officer corps was a second option 
for some men who were not intelligent enough to pursue another career. For example, in 
the 1 s1. Battalion, Leinster Regiment, nine officers who held commissions during the 
1906-15 period had attended University {two at Trinity College, Dublin, three at Oxford, 
3p.RO., W076/2, "Record ofOfficers' Service, 4th. Royal Irish Dragoon Guards". 

4p.RO., W076/25, "Record of Officers' Service, 21R0yal Irish Regiment". 

5P.R.O., W076/25, "Record ofOfficers' Service,2IRoyal Irish Regiment". 

6p.R.O., W076/2, "Record of Officers' Service, 4th. Royal Irish Dragoon Guards". 

7All details from, P.RO., W076/24, "Record ofOfficers' Service, llLeinster Regiment". 
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two at Cambridge, one at London and one at Edinburgh). Of these, four apparently failed 
to graduate.8 For such men, a brief spell in the intellectually undemanding militia 
provided a convenient "back door" into a profession in the army, when their own 
. educational achievement barred other professions to them. 
Conversely, the Victorian experiences of the British army, by no means redundant 
in the 1902-14 period when the British army had still, amongst other duties, to act as a 
colonial police force, had encouraged British officers to adopt a pragmatic view of future 
conflicts as opposed to the grand doctrines developed by their European counterparts. As 
O. Harries-Jenkins points out; 
These differences between these small wars and conventional warfare were 
clearly summed up by Captain C. E. (later Major-General Sir Charles) Callwell in 
1896. He suggested, on the basis of the experience gained by the Victorian Army 
in campaigns fought from Canada to the Cape and from Pekin[g?] to Ashanti, that 
in small wars, 'conditions are so diversified, the enemy's mode of fighting is often 
so peculiar, the theatre of operations presents such irregular features, that irregular 
warfare must be carried out in a method totally different from the stereotyped 
system. ' Since these were the actions in which, with the solitary exception of the 
Crimea, the British Army had been involved from Waterloo onwards, such 
differences had a profound effect on the development of military professionalism. 
This was particularly noticeable in the reaction of the officer corps to the study of 
theory, for it was considered that this often bore little relationship to what 
happened in practice.9 
8p.R.O., W076/24, "Record ofOfficers' Service, llLeinster Regiment". 
90. Harries-Jenkins, The Army in Victorian Socie~ Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 
1977, p.184. 
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Furthennore many British officers, in 1914, unlike their French or German 
counterparts had first hand experience of battle conditions and felt that this negated 
overlong consideration of theory. For example, of the 92 officers serving in the 1st. 
Battalion, Leinster Regiment between 1906 and 1913,45 had been on active service. lO In 
the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Regiment, of the 65 officers serving between 1909 and 
1913, 26 had similar battle experience.l1 While, of the 42 officers serving in the 4th. 
Royal Irish Dragoon Guards during the same years, 13 had experienced active service. 12 
Nevertheless, like other annies, the British did theorise over a problem which 
became increasingly apparent, especially in the aftennath of the Russo-Japanese War of 
1904-05. This was essentially the problem of the offensive; with the development of the 
magazine rifle, machine gun and fast firing artillery pieces, how could an attack best be 
carried out? 
The French responded to this problem by adopting the "cult of the offensive." 13 
This 'cult' expounded the concept that despite the development of modem weapons, an 
assault could still be successful, providing troops' morale was high. Major Grandmaison, 
a leading French exponent ofthe offensive stated; 
We are rightly told that psychological factors are paramount in combat. 
But this is not all; properly speaking, there are no other factors, for all others ­
weaponry, manoeuvrability - influence only indirectly by provoking moral 
reactions, ... , the human heart is the starting point in all questions ofwar. 14 
IOp.RO., W076/24, ''Record ofOfficers' Service, llLeinster Regiment". 
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While; ''the English-speaking nations never completely fell into the mainstream of 
continental military thought,"15 a number of senior officers in Britain did adopt the 'cult 
of the offensive' as providing a solution to the problems of overcoming firepower in 
modern war. As T. Travers notes, in the British army; 
This unofficial cult of the offensive was argued via several sequential 
theses in the 1902-14 period, namely (1) that new weapons (firepower) had 
definitely arrived and now influenced the battlefield to a high degree; nevertheless 
(2) the fire-power lessons of the South African war (1899-1902) were abnormal 
and not typical and so could not be seen as undermining the future of offensive 
strategy; furthermore (3) despite high losses the Japanese had defeated the 
Russians in Manchuria (1904-5) through offensive spirit, cold steel and high 
morale rather than fire-power; hence (4) the nation, the army and the individual 
must be taught to suffer losses because the essential but reliable offensive strategy 
of the next war would be very costly; moreover (5) offensive tactics must actually 
aim at heavy losses because this was the reliable and sure way of getting through 
enemy defences and fire-power, and therefore (6) because of these factors and the 
very stress of modern war, the individual soldier must either be more highly 
disciplined, or develop a much loftier sense of individual enthusiasm and initiative, 
or feel himself an organic fighting unit ofa virile nation. It was agreed that the end 
result was to be the higher morale of the individual and the army; and (7) that, in 
summary the offensive must be maintained at all costs, the more so because of the 
151. Luvaas, ''European Military Thought and Doctrine, 1870-1914", in M. Howard (ed.), 
The Theory and Practice of War; Essays Presented to Captain B. H Liddle Hart. Cassell, 
London, 1965, p.72. 
52 

doubts concerning the patriotism of the town-bred recruits and the very difficulty 
of the offensive. 16 
It will be seen that morale and discipline were central considerations to the 'cult of 
the offensive'. Sections, 3, 4, 6 and 7 above all relate to this theme. Section 6, does, 
however, demonstrate one of the serious contradictions over the offensive; namely 
whether the soldier should be more tightly disciplined or more reliance placed on his 
individual morale. This saw a tactical debate in the British command. Some officers, 
notably Kiggell, believed in mass formations, tightly disciplined, relying on the bayonet in 
the attack. I7 Meanwhile, others, such as McMahon, stressed that the individual soldier 
should be more highly trained in the use of the rifle, and therefore should act more on his 
own initiative. IS. 
The debate was also influenced by the basic mistrust placed on working class 
recruits in this period, mentioned by Travers, above. This was a Europe wide problem. 
The Polish financier Jean de Bloch; "was pessimistic, too, about the modern soldier, 
recruited from the cities, much less able than his ancestors to withstand the wear and tear 
of modem war. This meant, paradoxically, that the spirit of armies has much greater 
importance than before." 19 Underlying this, of course, was the idea of social Darwinism, 
and this was especially pronounced in the British army. The British, unlike most other 
European armies, relied on the voluntary system and this was important to contemporary 
social Darwinists. Some believed that volunteers were more highly motivated and 
16T. Travers, The Killing Ground~ The British Army, the Western Front & the Emergence 
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18ibid, p.l03. 
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intelligent than conscripts.2o However, others, aware that seventy per cent of British 
recruits were unemployed when they enlisted21 reflected that; "it followed that many 
'fighting men' by trade are anything but fighting men by temperament. It was easier in 
1913, even ifyou hated fighting, to enlist as a 'sodger' than to fight your own way in an 
overcrowded labour market. "22 Samuels notes that this enlistment of lower working class 
recruits meant that; 
To achieve the discipline required for assault tactics, the army imposed a 
strict system of regulations upon the troops: 'supervision was omnipresent and 
individuality was systematically stamped out of the recruit. The result was troops 
that were 'bred to deference and lacking in initiative.' Such troops could not be 
relied upon to carry out tasks on their own and depended on precise orders. This 
meant that the British Army required larger numbers of officers and N.C.O.s than 
did other armies in order to ensure the constant presence of authority. This 
constant presence, in turn, increased the troops' dependence on external controJ.23 
Despite this belief in the offensive as a solution to a series of fundamental 
problems in modem war, it was never adapted in its entirety by the British army. Indeed, 
by 1912, a number ofofficers were seriously questioning this 'cult'. 24 In infantry training 
there remained some belief in the offensive as a way to destroy enemy morale. General 
Alymer Haldane, observing the 1 st. Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers charge 150 yards 
across open ground in manoeuvres in August 1912, noted; "but in actuality the enemy 
20T. Travers, The Killing Ground. p.47. 

21S. Bidwell and D. Graham, Fire-Power, p.42. 

22A. Osburn, Unwilljng passenger, Faber and Faber Ltd., London, 1932, p.70. 

23M. Samuels, Command or Control? p.llS. 

24T. Travers, The KiUiog Ground. p.44. 
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would have probably flown when bayonets were fixed."25 Nevertheless, the Boer War 
experience also meant that British soldiers' marksmanship received considerable attention 
in the 1902-14 period and thus British soldiers were not taught solely to rely on the 
bayonet.26 
In the British Cavalry, the debate over the offensive took a very different form; 
this was in I 'arme blanche controversy. Essentially this debate was a matter of emphasis, 
as to whether the British cavalry should rely on the sword or the rifle as its primary 
weapon. In some respects it was unusual that this debate took place as other European 
armies had formed their doctrines on this issue many years previously. For example, the 
French army stressed the use of the sword in their 1882 and 1886 regulations.27 Also, 
British experience in the Boer War had practically shown the sword to be redundant. As 
with the discussion over the offensive, I 'arme blanche debate had much to do with 
morale. Sir John French in his evidence given to the Royal Commission on the War in 
South Africa, stated~ "if the cavalryman is taught that he is to rely mainly upon his rifle, his 
morale is taken away from him, and if that is done his power is destroyed."28 
In contrast Sir Ian Hamilton commented~ "Compared to a modem rifle, ... , the 
sword or lance can only be regarded as a medieval toy. "29 At its most advanced those 
opposed to I 'arme blanche, most notably Erskine Childers (in his War and the Arme 
Blanche, London, 1910) suggested that the cavalry should be armed with the rifle only.30 
By 1912 it seemed that the supporters of /'arme blanche had triumphed. The 
lance had been re-introduced for active service by Army Order 158 of 1909 and leading 
25Cited, ibid, p.71. 

26M. Samuels, Command or Control?, pp.118-9. 

27J. Luvaas, "European Cavalry",p.87. 

28Cmd., 1789, paras. 17218-41, cited in B. Bond, ''Doctrine and Training in the British 
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opponents of I'anne blanche such as Field Marshal Lord Roberts (retired) and Erskine 
Childers (a civilian, although a Boer War veteran who had served in the City Imperial 
Volunteers) were marginalised. However, the reliance on offensive tactics in the British 
Cavalry was criticised by General Sir Charles Douglas, observing the Cavalry Division at 
the annual manoeuvres of 1912; 
Our cavalry commanders are inclined to employ shock action whenever 
possible without reference to the circumstances of particular cases, ... , many of the 
manoeuvres showed a disregard of the effect of fire that could not be justified by 
our regulations, and the attempts to combine shock and fire action were seldom 
successful. There were grounds for fear that 'the present training ofcavalry shows 
tendencies that may lead to the useless sacrifice of our available cavalry force in 
war, and that it would be wise to impress on our Cavalry Commanders that while 
the mounted attack is the most effective method of obtaining decisive results, ... , 
attacks of this nature which promise nothing but a useless sacrifice cannot be too 
strongly condemned.31 
Nevertheless, the extent to which I 'anne blanche debate was merely a matter of 
emphasis is shown by Sir John French's view of the 1913 cavalry manoeuvres, in which, 
though a firm advocate of the use of the sword, he stressed that British cavalry had to be 
able to effectively perform the dismounted role32 and the actual performance of the British 
cavalry regiments in 1914. As R Holmes notes ofthe latter; 
31cited,.ibid, pp.117-8. 

32R. Holmes, The Little Field Marshal; Sir John French, Jonathan Cape, London, 1981, 
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The battlefield performance of British cavalry was not always perfect, but 
it was head and shoulders above that of its German opponents or its French allies. 
Horses were kept fresh because British troopers walked as often as they rode, and 
the skilful combination of shock action and dismounted fire quickly established the 
moral superiority of British horsemen. When the Cavalry Corps was thrown into 
the line at Messines in October 1914 it fought on foot with a tenacity of which 
infantry regiments could have been proud.33 
The debate over the offensive and the arme blanche in the British army between 
1902 and 1914 clearly centred on the issues of morale and discipline. In the age of the 
magazine rifle, machine gun and quick firing artillery piece it was realised that casualties 
would be horrific (Hubert Gough estimated that twenty-five per cent losses would occur 
in an assault and Major General Knox anticipated that 20,000 men would become 
casualties in the B.E.F.'s first engagement.34) In these circumstances, it was believed that 
only firm discipline and high morale would enable successful assaults to be carried out. 
Perhaps of even more importance to discipline and morale were the splits in the 
officer corps caused by these debates on the offensive. While regimental officers do seem 
to have been informed on these debates35 the main protagonists seem to have been either 
33ibid, pp.164-S. 

34T. Travers, The Killing Ground, p.45. 
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staff officers, generals or civilians. The old tradition of not 'talking shop' in the mess36 
seems to have prevented any serious splits between regimental officers over the tactics to 
be used. Indeed, as J. R. Harvey observed of officers of the 5th. Royal Irish Lancers, on 
first going into action in 1914, they had not come down firmly on either side of I 'anne 
blanche debate, although they were clearly informed about it; "A discussion arose 
amongst the officers, as to whether they should draw their revolvers or their swords first; 
but all those who were in possession of whiskey-flasks drew them without asking 
anybody."37 
Following the British experience in the Boer War of 1899-1902 it was painfully 
obvious to both soldiers and politicians that the British army was drastically in need of 
reform. The issues which reform specifically tackled were; the re-organisation of British 
reserve forces, recruiting problems for both the regular and reserve forces and the 
organisation ofan expeditionary force for immediate use overseas in the event ofwar. In 
terms of the discipline and morale of the British army as a whole, and the Irish units in 
particular, these reforms had few repercussions. Indeed, the 1908 Haldane reforms 
caused remarkably few changes in regular units and their effect on discipline and morale. 
This was in sharp contrast to the Cardwell reforms of 1868-81 when, in the case of the 
27th. Inniskilling Fusiliers, which received the 108th. Madras Infantry Regiment as its 
second battalion; "Officers, and indeed some long-serving soldiers, were outraged that 
their Regiment, which had served the Crown since King William Ill's days, should be 
merged with one that had not even formed part of the British Army until 1861 and could 
display only one solitary Battle Honour. "38 
36See E. A. Muenger, The British Military Dilemma in Ireland; Occupational politics, 
1886-1914, University Press ofKansas and Gill and Macmillian, Dublin, 1991, p.22. 
37J. R. Harvey, The History of the 5th (Royal Irish) Regiment ofDragoons. from 1689 to 
1799, Afterwards. The 5th RuyaJ Irish Lancers, from 1858 to ]92], Gale and PoJden 
Ltd., Aldershot, 1923, p.239. 
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Nevertheless, the refonns of the 1902-08 period do demand attention as, from the 
point of view of discipline and morale, they do provide a valuable insight into how Irish 
troops were viewed in this period. During the South African War, Irish units in the British 
Anny had been rewarded for their loyalty by the establishment of the Irish Guards in 1901 
and the right of the Irish regiments to wear shamrock on St. Patrick's Day, bestowed by 
Queen Victoria, following the Siege ofLadysmith.39 While some 300 Irishmen did selVe 
in the two Irish Transvaal Brigades, about 30,000 Irishmen selVed against the Boers; 'ihe 
disproportion between Irish involvement for and against the Boers was so obvious that 
unionists purred with approval and saw hope for Ireland yet."40 
However, while Irish units were now more fully trusted on overseas service, some 
doubts remained about Irish militia and regular units selVing in Ireland. In 1899 Lord 
Roberts, General Officer Commanding in Chief in Ireland, wrote to Lord Wolseley, the 
Commander in Chief; 
I have seen a confidential letter, ... , in which, ... , it is proposed to embody 
six militia battalions, (Irish), and to station five of them in Ireland. On talking the 
matter over with the Lord Lieutenant and the Under-Secretary, His Excellency 
begged me to express to you his hope that the whole six Irish battalions would be 
taken out ofthis country and replaced with either English or Scottish battalions. 
The Irish government think it would be better not to let the Irish battalions 
know where they are to be quartered until after they have been embodied and 
arrangements made for their move across the Channel. 41 
The Bodley Head, London, 1986, p.75. 
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This attitude changed gradually. In 1903 three Irish militia battalions out of 
fourteen were allotted to Ireland; in 1905, four, and in 1908, the number was increased to 
ten Irish Special Reserve battalions out of21.42 
The importance of the 1908 reforms in their relation to Ireland is not what they 
achieved, but rather what they did not attempt to establish. The National ReselVe was 
not extended to Ireland, partly out ofconcerns over the loyalty of Irish reservists, but also 
due to bureaucratic wrangling between the Irish Administration and the War Oflice.43 
Likewise, and more importantly, the Territorial Force was not established in Ireland44 and 
this was for a number of reasons. Firstly, and most obviously, the Rifle Volunteer 
Movement, established in 1859 in the rest of the United Kingdom, had never been 
extended to Ireland. This was in spite of attempts by Irish M.P. s to have legislation 
relating to this force made applicable to Ireland in 1859, 1860, 1863, 1877, 1878, 1879, 
1881, 1884, 1886 and 1897.45 
This was also despite a strong military interest by Irish Unionists. Two of the 
Secretaries of State for War in the 1902-14 period, St. John Brodrick (later 9th. Viscount 
and 1 st. Earl of Midleton and a leader of the Southern Unionists in the 1917-18 Irish 
Convention) and H. O. Arnold-Foster (Liberal-Unionist M.P. for West Belfast, 
1892-1906) had strong Irish IinkS.46 Equally, Edward Saunderson, M.P., the leader of the 
42p.R.0., W03217081,cited ibkLp.124. 
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mster Unionists from 1884 to 1906 was known as the "Orange Colonel", his rank coming 
from his command of the Cavan Militia, 4th. Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers.47 James 
Craig was also a militia officer, in the Antrim Militia, 3rd. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles and 
served in the 6th. company, Imperial Yeomanry, during the South African War. He 
continued the mster Unionist tradition of amateur military service, becoming M.P. for 
East Down in 1906, the year in which Saunderson died.48 
Secondly, the Territorial Force was not introduced in Ireland out of a sense of 
mistrust of Irishmen as a whole. This was a concern shared by British government 
ministers, some army officers and some Irish Unionists, that a wholesale introduction of 
the Territorial Force system to Ireland would simply have given arms to potential 
revolutionaries. Indeed, some British Territorial units with Irish immigrants in their ranks 
were a subject ofmistrust in this period. For example, there was concern over sending the 
West Lancashire Territorial Division to Ireland in the event of war, due to the; "political 
sympathies which may obtain in certain units.'>49 This concern was understandable and, 
indeed, was to be justified by the events of 1912-14. One of only two Irish reserve units 
fundamentally changed by the 1908 reforms in Ireland, the North Irish Horse,50 was 
believed to be riddled with U.V.F. sympathisers during the Third Home Rule crisis. In 
1981 and M. Arnold Foster, The Right Honourable Hugh Oakley Arnold-Foster~ A 
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1914, Count Gleichen suggested that this regiment was composed of; "'Black Protestants' 
who would desert to the U.V.F. at the first sign of trouble."51 It is also clear that in the 
Fermanagh Squadron of U .V.F. cavalry, all but six members were members of the North 
Irish Horse. 52 
Members of the North Irish Horse were also heavily involved in the U.V.F. 
elsewhere. Lieutenant E. C. Herdmen, a serving officer of the regiment was drilling 
U.V.F. men at Baronscourt Demesne.53 Indeed, it was noted that Herdman; "has taken a 
prominent part in the formation of the U.V.F. force in Tyrone."54 Meanwhile, in Omagh, 
Sergeant(?) Jack Neely, a Drill Instructor with the regiment was training 29 mounted 
men55 and Lieutenant B. Magill was drilling members of the Unionist Club at Newcastle, 
Co. Down, as early as March 1912.56 
While the North Irish Horse was the most pro-Unionist Special Reserve unit, 
officers and men from other Northern Special Reserve units did play an active part in the 
U.V.F.. A police report of August 1913 showed two serving officers of the Royal 
Inniskilling Fusiliers Special Reserve battalions and three other ranks of the Royal Irish 
Rifles Special Reserve battalions as being involved in drilling U. V.F. units. 57 In addition 
to this, other Special Reserve officers had shown great sympathy to the Unionist cause. 
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For example, Lieutenant Colonel McCammon, the commanding officer of the 5th. 
Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles (South Down Militia) inspected 608 UV.F. men at Lisbum in 
May 191358 and Colonel Sir Hugh H. Stewart of the 3rd. Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers 
(Armagh Militia) stated, in writing, to an Orange Lodge meeting in County Tyrone that he 
would resign his commission as soon as Home Rule became law. 59 By October 1913 
Lieutenant Colonel McCammon was commanding a UV.F. battalion.60 
There were also some fears about the loyalty of other ranks in the Irish Special 
Reserve battalions. The County Inspector in County Down reported to the Inspector 
General RIC. that he believed that the majority of men in the 4th. and 5th. Battalions of 
the Royal Irish Rifles (North and South Down Militia); "have signed the Covenant, and 
are also probably further organised in the Unionist interest and are looked upon by 
Colonel Wallace and other leaders as useful material to stiffen the Ulster Volunteer 
Force.''61 Likewise, a report by a special military intelligence bureau established in the 
Irish Command in early 1914 stated; 
There is no doubt that the Special Reserve battalions in Ireland afford an 
opportunity for men of both political parties to obtain military training without 
attracting attention. 
It is not recommended that the Special Reserve trainings in 1914 should be 
suspended, but watch must be kept on the numbers and class of men recruited, 
and precautions taken in conjuction with the civil police that the arms and 
58Report by Vere Gregory, District Inspector, RIC., 8/5/13, P.RO., W0141126. 
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ammunition temporarily in the hands of Special Reservists are not to be permitted 
to go astray. 62 
The fate of the unit raised by the Belfast Corporation following the 1908 reforms, 
also suggests that fears of arming and training Territorial units in Ireland were justified. 
The Young Citizen Volunteers ofBelfast were formed at a meeting at Belfast City Hall on 
the 10th. September 1912. This unit was clearly modelled on the more exclusive 
battalions of the London Regiment (Territorial Force) as each member had to pay a 
joining fee of 2s. 6d. and then the sum of 6d. per month.63 The Young Citizen 
Volunteers were designed as a non-sectarian force and also embodied many of the ideas 
then in circulation in England ofNational Service. The stated aims ofthis force were; 
To develop the spirit of responsible citizenship and municipal patriotism by 
means of lectures and discussions on civic matters... to cultivate, by means of 
modified military and police drill, a manly physique, with habits of self-control, 
self-respect and chivalry ... to assist as an organisation, when called upon, the civil 
power in the maintenance of the peace.64 
Although started with laudable aims, the history of the Young Citizen Volunteers 
was an unhappy one. Very quickly the unit, organised as an infantry battalion, began to 
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face financial problems.65 The formation of the U.V.F. in January 1913 also deprived the 
corps of recruits and it would seem that Belfast Corporation began to put its employees 
under pressure to join the Young Citizen Volunteers to compensate for this.66 Soon after 
its formation the battalion had been offered to the government, probably as a Territorial 
Force unit. However, the government refused to recognise the Young Citizen Volunteers 
and in 1913, after much discussion and a number of resignations by Catholic members of 
the force, the unit became a regiment in the U.V.F ..67 
Another point which should be made regarding the Territorial Force and Ireland, 
and which further suggests mistrust of Irish troops relates to the proposed employment of 
English Territorial units in Ireland in the event of war. There were real fears about a 
German raid on Ireland in the opening stages of a European war, with the intention of 
disrupting the mobilisation of the B.E.F ..68 It was thus decided that when the two regular 
infantry divisions and one regular cavalry brigade left Ireland to join the B.E.F. they 
should be replaced with Territorial troops, viz.~ the East and West Lancashire Divisions 
and the Welsh Border Mounted Brigade. 69 
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This replacement would clearly be fraught with problems. The East Lancashire 
Territorial Association made it clear that it could not mobilise as quickly as the War Office 
planned, due to the necessity of purchasing stores from contractors to complete 
mobilisation.7o Also the General Officer Commanding in Chief in Ireland pointed out that 
the limited railway network in Ireland would not allow regular troops to leave Ireland to 
join the B.E.F., while disembarking Territorial units to replace them.71 
The General Officer Commanding in Chiet: Ireland, suggested three solutions to 
this problem; 1) to increase the number of regular troops in Ireland and to maintain some, 
who were not committed to the B.E.F., in Ireland in time of war, 2) to despatch only one 
regular division from Ireland to the B.E.F. before the Territorial units arrived in Ireland, 3) 
to raise additional Special Reserve units in lreland.72 The most logical of these would 
appear to have been to increase the Special Reserve establishment in Ireland. The fact 
that the War Office was prepared both to delay full mobilisation and risk the defence of 
Ireland, while English Territorial Force units cumbersomely mobilised, again suggests a 
basic mistrust ofIrish troops in the 1902-14 period. 
Lastly, the Special Reserve system which was introduced in Ireland proved to be 
very beneficial in providing troops for overseas service. While the nine Irish infantry 
regiments consisted of twenty Special Reserve battalions in 1914, the eleven Scottish 
regiments provided just thirteen. 73 This organisation of reserve units in Ireland had 
definite advantages to the British government in that it had more units available for 
overseas service in the event of war~ the Territorial Force then having no overseas 
7~etter from Secretary, East Lancashire Territorial Association to Brigadier-General in 

charge ofAdministration, Western Command, 13112112, W03217110. 

71Letter, General Officer Commanding in Chiet: Ireland to Secretary, War Office, 3/5/12, 

W03217110. 

72ibid. 

73Figures calculated from R. Money Barnes, The British Army of 1914, Seeley Service & 

Co. Ltd., London, 1968. 
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obligation. If a regiment had more than one Special Reserve battalion, the others would 
be termed Extra Special Reserve battalions and the understanding was that, in time ofwar, 
these units would go overseas as complete units. (In addition to the Irish Extra Special 
Reserve battalions, twelve English and three Scottish regiments had one such battalion.).74 
In addition to this, with the decision not to extend the Territorial Force to Ireland, 
the two Irish Yeomanry regiments, the North Irish Horse and South Irish Horse, were 
converted into Special Reserve units and in time of war were partially committed to 
overseas service. The North Irish Horse had always, from 1908, one squadron trained 
and equipped for immediate overseas service.75 On the outbreak ofwar two squadrons of 
the North Irish Horse and one of the South Irish Horse went to France with the original 
B.E.F. and were the first non-regular British troops to see service during the war.76 
Why Ireland was given such special treatment over the issue of S'pecial Reserve 
units is unclear, but it would seem to be based on a desire to move Irish reserve units out 
ofIreland, as quickly as possible, in the event ofwar77. Certainly, there is little to suggest 
that they were better trained or more disciplined than their English or Scottish 
counterparts, and thus better prepared to take their place in the front-line. Captain 
Dorman, while noting that the North Irish Horse did not hold one court martial between 
1908 and 1913 noted some serious problems in the training of the Regiment. The unit 
74J. K. Dunlop, The Development of the British AnDy 1899-1914; From the eve of the 
South Afiican War to the eve of the Great War; with special reference to the Territorial 
Em:Qe., Methuen, London, 1938, p.274. 
75E. M. Dorman, "The North Irish Horse", Army Review, III, 1913, p.542. Captain 
Dorman was a regular officer in the 4th. Royal Irish Dragoon Guards and was serving as 
the adjutant ofthe North Irish Horse when he wrote this article. 
761. K. Dunlop, The Development of the British AnDy, p.262. 
77It should, however, be noted, that in August 1914, of the 20 Irish Special and Extra 
Special Reserve battalions, only two, the 4th. and 5th. battalions of the Royal Dublin 
Fusiliers, were detailed for duty outside Ireland, in Sittingbourne, England. See 
"Allocation of Extra and Special Reserve Battalions to Defended Ports, etc., December 
1914", P.R.O., W.O. 162/3. 
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covered a vast geographical area with the four squadrons based at Londonderry, 
Enniskillen, Dundalk and Belfast, and training was carried out at thirty-two drill stations 
doted all over the North of Ireland. This meant that some men had to travel up to twenty 
miles to the nearest drill hall. Also the regiment was unable to train with government 
horses and the men provided their own mounts, which were generally too heavy for 
cavalry work. As late as 1913 the regiment was being trained as mounted infantry and did 
not even possess swords - a serious deficiency given the role which cavalry was expected 
to play in a future war. Equally, men of the regiment could not take part in regular army 
manoeuvres as these were carried out at the same time as the harvest, when members of 
the North Irish Horse would have to be at their farms.78 
To counterbalance these deficiencies the regiments' annual camp lasted for 
twenty-four days, as opposed to the fourteen of most Territorial Yeomanry regiments, 
absenteeism was not a serious problem and the men received an extra four pounds per 
annum for undertaking the Special Reserve commitment.79 Of the officers, the four 
squadron commanders, two captains and the senior subaltern were ex-regular officers, 
which shows a good degree ofprofessionalism amongst the officer corps. Lastly, N.C.O.s 
of the regiment were able to attend courses at the Cavalry Depot in Dublin.80 
Details on other Special Reserve units are less comprehensive. C. C. Miller 
serving in a Special Reserve Battalion of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers in 1915 
commented on the persisting 'old militia' traditions in the battalion, noting that the 
Commanding Officer, Colonel MacClintock, had never served as a regular officer.81 By 
contrast, a number of officers in the 3rd. Battalion, Royal Irish Regiment refused to 
78p.R.O., W068/564, p.490. 
79ibid.. 
SOibid. Except where noted, all details on the North Irish Horse have been taken from E. 
M. Dorman, ''The North Irish Horse". 

81Captain C. C. Miller, manuscript entitled, "A Letter from India to my daughters in 

England', Imperial War Museum, 83/3/1, p.17. 
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transfer from the militia to the Special Reserve. For example, Captain 1. O. Johnston, an 
officer with twenty one years service preferred to transfer to the Reserve of Officers, 
informing his C.O.; 
I am sorry that we are disbanded without a chance of saying goodbye to 
one another, as long as we were the Wexford Militia I should have stayed on as 
long as they would let me, but to tell the truth I am not + never was very proud 
of the Regiment [i.e. the Royal Irish Regiment] we were attached to though I 
would never say a word to anyone against it, but I would rather not go into their 
Reserve Battalion if I could help it. 82 
In the 4th. Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fuslliers, it is clear that officers became 
more professional after 1908. For example, Lieutenant William Herbert Stuart Berry, 
who had served (presumably as an other rank) in Malta, Bermuda, Gibraltar, South Africa 
and Egypt, was commissioned into the battalion, after receiving his A and B certificates 
from the University of Reading's Officer Training Corps. The 4th. Battalion, Royal 
Inniskilling Fusiliers had continuing strong links with Reading University, 
Second-Lieutenant A E. Allnatt joined the battalion from this O.T.C in November 1911, 
as did four other officers between April and August 1912.83 During this period A R. 
Morsy also joined this unit as a second-lieutenant, having served in the University of 
London's O.T.C..84 
Thus the Haldane reforms did make an important change, at least to this battalion. 
Whereas, previously, any respectable and well-connected young man could have expected 
82Letter, Captain J. O. Johnston to Lord Stopford, 29/1108, N.AM., 6012/258/2. 

83Details taken from ''Record ofMilitia Officers Service in 3rd. and 4th. Battalions, Royal 

InniskillingFusiliers, 1847-1917", vol. II, pp.37-42, P.R.O., W068/382. 

84ibid.. p.49. 
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to receive a commission in an Irish militia unit, now a recognised military training was 
required. Another point which should be made is that, despite the local basis of these 
battalions, C.O.s were clearly keen to officer their battalions, at least partly, with non-Irish 
officers. In November 1914 the next of kin details of the officers of the 4th. Battalion, 
Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, suggests that four were normally resident in the Royal 
Inniskilling Fusiliers' Regimental Area, three in the rest of Ireland, eight in England and 
one in Jamaica.85 This again suggests a distrust of Irish troops, in this case Irish reserve 
officers, which was largely justified by the numbers of Special Reserve officers who were 
involved in the Ulster Volunteer Force on 1912-14. 
Discipline in the Special Reserve units appears to have been very good as between 
August 1913 and July 1914 just three Special Reservists were court martialled.86 
However, this does require some qualification, as Dorman noted of the North Irish Horse; 
There are very few cases indeed of offences which have to be brought 
before the commanding officer, in fact the average is about two per training. It is 
absolutely essential that the commanding officer should have a free hand in 
administering punishment. There is one offence - viz., drunkenness - for which the 
only suitable punishment is instant dismissal from the corps, a punishment which is 
85ibid. pp.66-78. This, of course, may not be representative of the pre-August 1914 
situation, as many men sought commissions in the Special Reserve on the outbreak of 
war. 
86See appendix 5 based on P.R.O., W086/60 and W086/62, District Courts Martial 
register for units on horne service, October 1912 to October 1914. The men 
court-martialled were Sergeant P. Boland, 4th. Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers, who 
was tried in Kinsale on the 19/8/13 under S.40 of the Army Act and found not guilty; 
Private J. O'Sullivan, 5th. Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers, tried in Limerick on 30/9/13 
for violence to a Colour Sergeant and sentenced to 56 days detention, and Corporal O. 
Dowling, 3rd. Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, tried in Dublin on 30/3/14 for absence 
without leave and reduced to the ranks. It is likely that Corporal Dowling and Sergeant 
Boland were regular instructors with these Special Reserve battalions. 
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felt much more by the man than any award of detention, for he has to undergo not 
only the ridicule of his comrades but also that of his friends when he gets home. 
Certain minor offences have to be dealt with rather leniently from a Regular 
soldier's point ofview.87 
Thus Special Reserve battalions did not have to tolerate the persistent offenders 
that regular units had to accommodate, as Special Reserve units could easily dismiss such 
men. However, having observed this, it should be noted that the North Irish Horse was 
atypical of Irish Special Reserve units. In Special Reserve infantry units men were initially 
trained for six months, on a full time basis, before entering the reserve system which 
demanded that they attended a two week annual camp for six years.88 This makes the 
court martial record of the Irish Special Reserve battalions in 1913-14 an impressive one, 
given that around 1,800 men were possibly training permanently for six months during this 
period.89 Equally, it is clear that absenteeism in the Special Reserve was often 
overlooked. In July 1911, 19 Privates, out of 377 in the 3rd. Battalion, Connaught 
Rangers were absent without leave, in the 1912 annual camp one sergeant and 18 Privates 
were absent without leave and, in 1913, one sergeant and 22 Privates were similarly 
absent, out of an establishment of 424 men, which included officers and 
non-commissioned officers. It would seem that no legal proceedings were taken against 
these men90 possibly as they had emigrated. Another reason why the courts martial 
87E. M. Dorman, "The North Irish Horse", p.S42. 

88E. M. Spiers, Haldane an Army Reformer, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 

1980, p.148. 

89This calculation is based on the figures of the 3rd. Battalion, Connaught Rangers. In 

the Summer of 1909 they had 89 recruits under instruction for the six month period. If 

we assume that the other nineteen Irish Special Reserve infantry battalions had a similar 

number, and in fact other units recruiting in more densely populated areas of Ireland were 

likely to have more, then this gives us a total of 1,780. See, P.R.O., W079/40, 

"Historical Records of the 3rd. Special Reserve Battalion, The Connaught Rangers", 

9Oibid.. 
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statistics fail to record indiscipline in the Special Reserve battalions, is that military 
offenders could be dealt with in civil courts. For example, in July 1909 Gunner W. N. 
Foy, a deserter from the Mid-Ulster Royal Field Reserve Artillery (Special Reserve), was 
tried at Omagh Assizes.91 
This organisation ofExtra Special Reserve battalions in Ireland, was, as in the case 
of many features of the 1908 army reforms, not actually utilised when war broke out. 
Indeed, instead of serving overseas as complete units, as planned, these battalions simply 
served, like the third battalions, as draft finding units. As early as the 6th. August 1914, 
224 men from the 4th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, were sent to the 2nd. Battalion, Royal 
Irish Rifles at Tidworth.92 However, the disparity in the numbers of men sent as 
reinforcements to Regular and New Army units overseas by Special Reserve battalions of 
the Royal Irish Rifles does suggest that the role of the 4th. and 5th. battalions was 
primarily seen as coastal defence, although whether this was due to necessity or, out of a 
greater belief in the loyalty of Irish units, is unclear. Between 1914 and 1918, the 3rd. 
Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles sent 8,069 men to the front, but the 4th. Battalion only 2,188 
and the 5th. Battalion, 1,934.93 This transformation of Extra Special Reserve battalions 
into draft finding units was not a popular one and it seems that a number of officers of 
these battalions wrote to John Redmond, M.P., regarding their promised overseas service 
and suggesting that the battalions be formed into an Irish Division. Redmond approached 
91p.R.O., W068/68, "Digest of services of the Tyrone Militia Artillery (from 1908 
Mid-Ulster Royal Field Reserve Artillery) disbanded 20110109". 
92Anon., "4th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, Service ofRegiment 1793-1918", handwritten 
manuscript, Royal Ulster Rifles Museum, Belfast and C. Falls, The History of the First 
Seven Battalions. The Royal Irish Rifles, (Now The Royal Ulster Rifles) in the Great War, 
Gale and Polden Ltd., Aldershot, 1925, vol.II, p.l. 
93C. Falls, The History of the First Seven Battalions, Royal Irish Rifles" p.186, appendix 
IV. 
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the War Office with this proposal, but it was rejected, although it had been planned to 
raise the Fourth New Army from Special Reserve battalions.94 
During the 1902-14 period there was an important change in the roles of the 
British army. Most importantly troops were withdrawn from many colonial stations. 
Indeed, it had been accepted that some overseas commitments were simply a waste of 
manpower. For example, in July 1905 the Committee of Imperial Defence had accepted 
that the United States government could not be prevented from invading Canada, if it 
wished to do so.95 At the same time garrisons in Malta and Gibraltar were reduced. 96 
This realignment of military forces was carried out to create a "striking force" of six 
divisions which would be available for overseas service in Europe or the colonies in the 
event ofwar. 97 
These reforms brought few immediate implications for the discipline and morale of 
British soldiers. The traditional role of the British army in providing support to the civil 
power, did. During this 1902-14 period soldiers were regularly to be called out to help 
police the increasing number of well organised industrial disputes and, in Ireland, also 
against sectarian riots in Belfast in 1912 and Nationalist gun-running in July 1914 and, 
much more controversially, in what appeared to be an attempt to surpress the U.V.F., in 
March 1914, leading to the infamous Curragh Incident. Involvement in these episodes 
had serious implications for troop morale and military discipline. 
Policing strikes was always an unpopular duty for the military. The work was 
thankless in the extreme and had the potential to introduce class consciousness into a 
94F. E. Whitton, The History of the prince of Wales Leinster Regiment (R.uyal 
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military unit where the danger always seemed to be present of officers supporting the 
employers and other ranks, those workers on strike. J. W. Riddle, stationed in Belfast 
with the 1 st. Battalion, Rifle Brigade, following the 1907 strike in the city (which 
ultimately saw, dockers, workers in Gallaher's Tobacco Factory, iron moulders, engineers 
and carters involved in strikes)98 noted that one of his fellow soldiers was unwilling to 
give evidence relating to the riots.99 Other soldiers, engaged in policing strikes elsewhere 
in the United Kingdom, were equally unhappy with their position. 100 
Some soldiers also disliked aiding the civil power as often they had to restore the 
situation after inefficient police forces had lost control of the situation. In July 1912 
troops were sent into the shipyards in Belfast in an attempt to let expelled Catholic 
workers return to their jobs. Brigadier-General Count Gleichen, Officer Commanding 
troops in Belfast, was very critical of the 100 strong Harbour Police, responsible for 
maintaining order in the shipyards and employed by the Belfast Harbour Commission. He 
stated that this force was; "of very little use, for it is to their interest to be 'in' with the 
workmen, and in matters ofrepressive duty their heart is not by any means in it: for if they 
carried out these duties to [the] utmost, they would very possibly, as I am told has 
happened before now, find themselves individually set upon and thrashed."lOl He further 
noted that the Royal Irish Constabulary~ "do not, in fact, dare to go on the [Queen's] 
Island without the protection of troops - so that for all practical purposes they are 
98E. O'Connor, A Labour History of Ireland. 1824-1960. Gill and Macmillan, 1992, 

pp.70-72. 

99J. W. Riddell, "The Army Life of J. W. Riddle, Rifle Brigade, 1907-33", unpublished 

manuscript, Imperial War Museum, 7717311, p.6. 

l~er to Ramsay MacDonald, PR030/6911158, cited, G. D. Sheffield, "Officer-man 
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uselesS."I02 Gleichen also had little respect for the head of the Harbour Police, noting; 
''Their Chief, Mr. Iohnstone, is best described by the term 'old woman'."I03 
Nevertheless, the policing of strikes in the 1902-14 period never witnessed a 
breakdown of discipline in any regular anny unit. The problems apparent in policing 
strikes became clear in 1907 when between 500 and 800 men of the 1,000 strong Belfast 
Royal Irish Constabulary mutinied after a policeman was dismissed for refusing to escort a 
motor wagon driven by a non-unionised worker. The strike resulted in troops being 
rushed into the city. The strike collapsed with one constable being dismissed, several 
suspended and 208 transferred to other areas of Ireland. 104 There are a number of 
reasons as to why no regular army unit so mutinied. Firstly, the War Office utilised a 
sensible rotation scheme, which meant that, in normal circumstances, no unit would serve 
in the area which it was recruited from. lOS Thus, only soldiers from non-Welsh units were 
sent to police the Welsh coal strikes of 1910.106 
Secondly, central government, and many seruor soldiers, were increasingly 
unhappy with local authorities calling in the army when local police forces were unable to 
deal with industrial disputes. In 1907, Brigadier General Vesey Dawson, in charge of 
Northern Command, Ireland, and thus responsible for policing the strike in Belfast stated; 
"in my opinion it is very undesirable that troops should be called out to do police duty in a 
102ibid. 
I03Letter from Gleichen to Major General in charge of Administration, Irish Command, 
24/7/12, P.R.O., W035/60. 
1041. Gray, City in Revolt, James Larkin and the Belfast Dock Strike of 1907, Blackstaff 
Press, Belfast, 1985, pp.111-136. 
105A rare exception to this was during the Iuly and August disturbances in Belfast in 
1912. Brigadier-General Count Gleichen noted that, at one stage, if called upon to assist 
the civil power, he had, at his disposal only 120 men of the Chesire Regiment and; "some 
50 of the R[ oyal] Irish Rifles (permanent staft) - the latter of whom should not be used if 
it could possibly be avoided." See, letter, Gleichen to Major-General in charge of 
Administration, Irish Command, 18/7/12, W035/60. 
I06J. Blake, "Civil Disorder in Britain, 1910-39: The Roles of Civil Government and 
Military Authority", D. PhiL thesis, University of Sussex, 1979, p.85. 
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town like Belfast."107 The government did take note of such comments, and during the 
1910-11 South Wales coal strikes, men of the London Metropolitan Police were sent in, 
along with soldiers, to control the disturbances.108 Similarly. in 1913, men of the Royal 
Irish Constabulary were sent to aid the Dublin Metropolitan Police, during the Dublin 
Lockout, while troops were confined to protecting property. 109 Over this period, officers 
became increasingly unhappy with taking up a policing role. For example, in 1912, 
Brigadier-General Count Gleichen, whose men were acting in aid of the civil power noted; 
Are we, the 'Military', obliged to step in and try to carry out the duties that 
should obviously be done by the Police?, ... , This may be all very well for a day or 
two; but we cannot carry out these Police duties for an indefinite period. At 
present it looks as if the troubles might last for weeks; and in the middle of the 
training season this is a very serious matter .110 
Meanwhile, in September 1911, General Sir Neville Lyttleton had to cancel the 
remainder of the manoeuvres in Irish Command due to the Railway Strike. III 
Thirdly, many strikers felt that the troops were more impartial than the local 
police. This was certainly the case in South Wales where the local forces were seen to be 
tools of the mine owners. Equally, in Belfast, the Royal Irish Constabulary, with its 
Catholic majority, was disliked by Protestant workers, for sectarian reasons. 112 
107J. Gray, City in Revolt, p.66. 

108B. Weinberger, Keeping the Peace? Policing Strikes in Britain, 1906-26, Berg, Oxford, 
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Lastly, just as some soldiers sympathised with strikers, so a number of strikers 
sympathised with soldiers deployed in the aid ofthe civil power. Partly this was related to 
class issues, strikers and soldiers generally being from working class backgrounds. Also, 
the impression created by troops was an important one. J. Hutchinson, interviewed in 
1987 remembered; "It was 1907 a great strike was raging at the Belfast docks. I was a 
six-year old then and one morning on my way to school in Comber Street, soldiers were 
on duty outside the Catholic chapel, ... , it was an event in our otherwise miserable 
lives."113 The fact that Hutchinson remembered this eighty years later, suggests that 
neatly turned out troops made a deep impression in the Belfast slums and soldiers perhaps 
had the appearance of working class men who had achieved an important position in 
society. The other reason for striker/soldier sympathy was the presence of numbers of 
Boer War veterans amongst the strikers, who understood the soldiers' position. 
Remembering the situation in 1907, one former striker commented of the troops~ "We 
didn't insult them because we knowed they was doing their duty - most ofus was soldiers 
ourselves."114 
There was also concern as to how strikes would affect Territorial Force units, 
from both ends of the political spectrum. Indeed, as P. Dennis observes; "The Labour 
Party and the trade unions refused to be associated with the new citizens' army, fearing 
that it would eventually be turned against the working class to maintain an essentially 
conservative society by intervening in strikes and industrial action on behalf of the civil 
authority."1l5 In fact, despite the magnitude of industrial disputes in the 1902-14 period, 
no Territorial or Special Reserve units were called out to surpress or police them, 
113p. Orr, The Road to the Somme, p.9. 

1141nterview with Joseph Cooper and William Hughes, P.RO.N.I., D335811, cited, 1. 
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although a number of Territorial Force officers were sworn in as Special Constables in 
Liverpool during the 1911 strike there. 116 
More concrete concerns came from the government, over the discipline of 
Territorial Force units in areas where strikes were taking place, and the fear that anns 
would fall into unauthorised hands. Thus, during the South Wales coal disputes of 1910, 
Territorial units in the affected area were ordered to return their rifles and ammunition to 
the annouries. II7 There were also some fears about recruits to the anny being in 
sympathy with the strikers, or indeed, strikers trying to infiltrate the military. For 
example, during the September 1911 Railway Strike no recruits were sent to Ireland for a 
period often days, it would appear, over fears oftheir subversion. I IS 
Irish units were, like other British anny units, heavily involved in support of the 
civil power in the 1902-14 period. For example, the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Munster 
Fusiliers sent 100 other ranks, under the command of Captain G. A. Woods, to Newport 
during the South Wales miners' strike and these men remained there from 9th. November 
1910 to 31 st. March 1911.119 The battalion presumably performed well in this situation 
as, in August 1911, men of the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers were involved in 
policing the Birmingham Railway strike. I20 
While industrial disputes always threatened disciplinary problems in military units 
sent to police them, the most serious breakdowns in military discipline during the 1902-14 
period occurred over the Irish Home Rule issue. This issue witnessed four disciplinary 
116J. Blake, "Civil Disorder in Britain, 1910-39", p.106. 
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breakdowns~ firstly, the cause celebre of the resignation of Captain Wtlfrid Spender; 
secondly, the "Curragh Incident" of March 1914, still referred to by many historians, 
incorrectly, as a mutiny; thirdly, the large number of serving and retired officers and other 
ranks who sympathised with and drilled units of the U.V.F.; and. lastly. the shooting of 
civilians at Bachelor's Walk, in Dublin, following the Iuly 1914 Howth gun-running. 
Captain Wilfrid Spender was not exceptional amongst British army officers of this 
period in holding Unionist views~ what did, however, make him exceptional was that he 
held a number of important staff positions at a very early age and these posts gave him 
easy access to the High Command, where he made his views known. Spender was also 
rather unusual in that his views against Home Rule were not, as in the case of so many 
British supporters of the Unionist cause, based on either a vague notion that the 
constitution was being undermined or the belief that the Liberal government had 
over-stretched itself in curtailing the powers of the House of Lords. 121 Instead, Spender 
opposed Home Rule for Ireland due to the military threat posed to Britain by this 
measure; "The lessons of history were evident to Spender when studying the strategic 
importance of Ireland. They convinced him of the folly inherent in the creation of a 
Dublin Parliament."122 
Spender, while serving in a staff appointment in India in 1912 made it clear that he 
would not help to surpress Ulster. A somewhat unlikely scenario, given his geographical 
location! His Commanding Officer advised him to submit a request to retire and in 
August 1912 he sent this to the War Office. This was refused and Spender was initially 
ordered to return to regimental duty. However, on the intervention of the Commander in 
Chief. India, he was ordered to return to Britain to explain his views at the War Office. 
1210n British support for Irish Unionists, see, W. S. Rodner, "Leaguers, Covenanters, 
Moderates, British Support for Ulster, 1913-14", Eire-Ireland, XVII, 3, 1982. 
1221. Maxwell, "The Life of Sir Wilfrid Spender, 1876-1960," unpublished Ph.D., Queen's 
University ofBelfast, 1991, p.ll. 
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Spender made a good impression and was told that he was to join Haig's staff at 
Aldershot. I.E.B. Seely, Secretary of State for War, interviewed Spender and it became 
clear that he; "was demanding the sort of assurances which, when granted in March 1914 
to the officers at the Curragh, would lead to the humiliation of the Asquith 
government."123 
The government, given Spender's views, was left with three options. Firstly, to 
approve Spender's request to retire. This would not only seem to vindicate Spender's 
position, but leave him with a pension; action which, in itself, could encourage a host of 
officers with Unionist sympathies to request to retire. The second option was to court 
martial Spender. There does seem to have been some threat of this, as Seely, in his 
interview with Spender, made it clear that, by becoming involved in politics, Spender had 
committed a grave offence.124 Equally, Sir Edward Carson, leader of the Ulster 
Unionists, feared that he could be tried for incitement to mutiny, over Spender's case. 125 
The third option, which the government favoured, was to force Spender to resign his 
commission. This would suggest to other officers that Spender had been at fault and few 
officers would be tempted to follow his lead, as he would be denied any pension rights. 
Sir Nevil Macready, soon to become Adjutant-General and, already, in 1913 a 
leading authority on military law, as Director of Personnel Services at the War Office, 
despite seeing Irish Unionist intervention in the Spender case, supported the first option. 
Thus in 1913, Spender was permitted to retire with a pension of £120 per annum. 126 
123M p.2S. 

124M pp.26-7. 

125M pp.31-2. 

126Spender was to become Assistant Quarter-Master General of the Ulster Volunteer 

Force in September 1913 and was to re-enter the army in August 1914. He again caused 

controversy over his views on the 36th. (Ulster) Division's performance on 1st. July 1916, 

when he was serving as G.S.0.2 in the Division. 
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The Curragh Incident of March 1914 shares some similarities with the Spender 
case, as again, officers made it clear that they were not prepared to act against Ulster 
Unionists and demanded guarantees from the government on this point. This 'incident' 
has been covered in substantial detail elsewhere.127 However, with reference to discipline 
and morale some observations should be made about this event. Firstly. it would be very 
wrong to describe this incident as a mutiny, as no orders were actually disobeyed. The 
sixty officers of the 3rd. Cavalry Brigade, led by Brigadier-General Sir Hubert Gough, 
merely threatened to resign if they were ordered against Ulster. Secondly, this whole 
incident was precipitated by the General Officer Commanding in Chief, Ireland, 
Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Paget, who, in an ill-advised and incoherent speech to 
officers of the brigade made it rather unclear what options there were for officers ordered 
against Ulster, suggesting that officers with Ulster links could 'disappear' during 
hostilities. Lastly, it was unclear what exactly officers were expected to do in Ulster. The 
most recent research suggests that men of the brigade were merely to be used to reinforce 
depots in Ulster, to prevent arms and equipment falling into U.V.F. hands. 128 
The wider implications of the Curragh Incident were vast. Gough's assurance 
from the government that he and his men would not be used against Ulster saw not only 
the resignation of the Secretary of State for War, Chief of the Imperial General Staff and 
Adjutant-General, but the collapse of any coercive power which the British government 
had to deal with the Ulster Volunteer Force. The incident also showed strong Unionist 
sympathy in the army, even amongst units with no Irish links. For example nine officers in 
the 2nd. Battalion, King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, nine or ten in the 2nd. Battalion, 
Manchester Regiment, ten in the 2nd. Battalion, King's Own Scottish Borderers, thirteen 
127See especially, I. F. W. Beckett, Tbe Army and tbe Curragh Incident, 1914, published 

by The Bodley Head for the Army Records Society, London, 1986. 

128ibid.. pp.8-1O. See also, Order to Paget from the War Office, 14/3/14, P.R.O., 

W035/209. 
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in the 1 st. Battalion, Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, a majority in the 1 st. Battalion, 
Norfolk Regiment, fifteen in XV Brigade, Royal Field Artillery and possibly six in the VIII 
Brigade, Royal Field Artillery, also threatened to resign.129 Equally, the incident 
threatened further serious disorders and breaches in discipline as it was clear that if 
officers were not prepared to act against Ulster Unionists, then other ranks might refuse 
to act against strikers during industrial disputes. 130 
Thirdly, in terms ofanny discipline relating to the Irish Home Rule Issue, the issue 
of officers and other ranks in the UV.F. must be further considered, as clearly this was 
the most fragrant breach of discipline in this period. Shortly after the outbreak of war, 
Lieutenant-General Richardson, General Officer Commanding the U.V.F. asked for the 
return of officers serving with British units, who had previously played an active part in 
the UV.F. and whose services he required both for the U.V.F., in its new coastal defence 
role and in the formation ofthe 36th. (Ulster) Division. The number of officers requested 
is as shown in table 1.1, overleaf 131 
This list is far from comprehensive, and there are some startling admissions of 
regular officers who had been involved in the UVF.. For example, Captain the 
Honourable Arthur O'Neill, who had rejoined the 2nd. Lifeguards on the outbreak ofwar, 
had been M.P. for Mid Antrim and Officer Commanding Antrim U.VF.. He was killed in 
the early stages of the war and so was not included in this list.132 Equally, officers who 
had been involved in the UVF. on a temporary basis were not included in Richardson's 
return. Thus, Second-Lieutenant Sir Basil Brooke (later Lord Brookeborough) who 
129I. F. W. Beckett, The Army and the Curragh Incident, p.14. 
130ibid, p.16. 

131This table is compilled from a "Roll of Officers recently serving with the UV.F. 

recalled to anny service", Richardson Papers, P.R.O.N.J., 0.1498/7. 

132T. O'Neill, The Autobiography of Terence O'Neill. Prime Minister of Northern 

Ireland, 1963-1969, Granada Publishing Limited, London, 1972, pp.I-5. 
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drilled the U.V.F. in Colebrooke, County Fermanagh in 1912, while on leave from the 
10th. Hussars, was ommitted from Richardson's return. 133 
Table 1.1. British army officers involved in the U V F 1914. 
Regiment 
Household Cavalry 

9th. [8th. 7] Hussars 

North Irish Horse 

Guards Reserve 

7IR.oyal Fusiliers 

3/Somerset Light Infantry 

7!North Staffordshire Regiment 

Border Regiment 

3IR.oyal Irish Regiment 

4IR.oyal Irish Regiment 

4IR.oyal Irish Rifles 

4IR.oyal Irish Fusiliers 

SlR.oyal Irish Fusiliers 

Depot, Royal Dublin Fusiliers 

SlR.oyal Irish Rifles 

S. E. Coastal Defences 

Embarkation Staff 

Staff: B.E.F. 

Officer Training Corps 

RAM.C. (T.F.) 

Antrim RG.A 

Reserve, RF.A 

RS.O. (7) 

Remounts 

Depot, 38th. Division 

Regiment not known 

Number of officen requested 
2 
1 
8 
2 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
4 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
IS 
133B. Barton, Brookeborougb; The Making ofa Prime Minister, Institute of Irish Studies, 
Queen's University ofBelfast, Belfast, 1988, p.21. 
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British officers' involvement was even more widespread than this would suggest. 
Major Viscount Crichton, Royal Horse Guards, was drilling with the 205 strong 
'Enniskillen Horse' in October 1913.134 Other regular officers showed sympathy to the 
V.V.F., without playing an active role in the movement. Lieutenant Charles A. M. 
Alexander, attending an Orange Order meeting in Tyrone, while on leave from the 2nd. 
Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers; "explained to the meeting that he could take no part 
in the proceedings while serving in the Anny, but added that as soon as the Home Rule 
Bill becomes law he will sever his connection with it."135 
V. P. Le Frau, Augustine Birrell's Private Secretary made it clear that action could 
easily be taken against reserve or serving officers with V.V.F. links, noting that if two 
Justices of the Peace authorised drilling by V.V.F. units; 
The question then arises of the purpose of this training. It cannot with any 
show of veracity be contended that it has a purely educational objective, as in the 
case of the boy scouts. The object may be seditious resistance to constituted 
authority as has often been openly stated; but it does not need either statute or 
regulation to condemn any action taken with such an object as contrary to the first 
duty of a soldier, ... , An officer who takes part in meetings for such a purpose 
(political demonstrations) at all events in Belfast or any of the towns where 
soldiers are quartered, would appear to come within Clause 451 of the King's 
Regulations, by which an officer or soldier is forbidden to institute or take part in 
any meetings, demonstrations or processions for party or political purposes in 
barracks, quarters, camps or their vicinity. 
134Letter, P. A Morrison, Deputy Inspector to Inspector General, Royal Irish 

Constabularly, 17/10114, P.R.O., W0141126. 

135Report by Sergeant J. English, Royal Irish Constabularly, 27112112, 

P.R.O.,W0141126. 
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Belfast Weekly News informing him that they had raised £IS 6s. Sd. for the Ulster Defence 
Fund and continued; 
time-expired men going home this trooping season are looking forward to 
taking their place in the [U.V.F.] ranks with their fellow countrymen. 'The Flag 
must be kept flying', & the motto of 'No Surrender' upheld. Those who will still 
be serving their King in India, & cannot go home for some years, sincerely hope 
that Ulster will win, & nothing will shake their loyalty to the Union. 140 
On the 22nd. March 1914, Major R. F. Uniacke, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, 
reported to Headquarters, Irish Command; "Although I have no proof for saying so, I 
estimate that about ten per cent of [lnniskilling] Fusiliers, chiefly N.C.O.s are 
disaffected."141 
Despite these clear pro-Unionist sympathies in some units recruited from the 
North of Ireland, the High Command's views of Irish troops did not seem to change 
markedly in this period. Partly this was due to the perceived unreliability of many 
non-Irish units over the Home Rule issue, shown by the Curragh Incident; all British army 
units, not just Irish ones were under some suspicion. Equally, Irish units in the British 
army had always been under a certain degree of suspicion. Muenger believes that the 
Indian mutiny had left a deep impression on British officers and they were thus always 
14~etter from men of 1st. Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, to Editor, Belfast 
Weekly News, published in same, ?11I14, cited, I. F. W. Beckett, The Army and the 
Curragh Incident, p.51. 
141p.R.O., W035/209, cited I. F. W. Beckett, The Army and the Curragh Incident, p.41S 
and Intelligence summary for 22/3/14, P.R.O., W014114. 
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wary of non-English troops. 142 While there may be an element of truth in this, the Fenian 
experience of the 1860s was probably more pertinent in British officers minds. 143 
This basic mistrust of Irish regular units meant that few of them were ever 
stationed in Ireland, as table 1.3, below, showing dispositions for July 1914144, illustrates. 
Table 1.3. The Dispositions ofIrish Regular units. July 1914 
.
R ent 
4th. R.I.D.O. 

6th. Inns. Dragoons 

8th. KR.I.H. 

5th. R. I. Lancers 

Irish Guards 

Royal Irish Regiment 

Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers 

Royal Irish Rifles 

Royal Irish Fusiliers 

Connaught Rangers 

Leinster Regiment 

Royal Munster Fusiliers 

Royal Dublin Fusiliers 

lst. Battalion 2nd. Battalion 
Tidworth none 
Muttra none 
Amballa none 
Dublin none 
Wellington Barracks none 
Nasirabad Devonport 
Trimulgherry Dover 
Aden Tidworth 
Shomcliffe Quetta 
Ferozepore Aldershot 
Fyzabad Cork 
Rangoon Aldershot 
Madras Gravesend 
However, a study of the stations of Scottish regiments, overleaf, shows that 
equally few ofthem were based in ScotIand145. 
142E. A. Muenger, The British Military Dilemma. p.35. 

143See, A. 1. Semple, "The Fenian Infiltration ofthe British Army", Journal of the Society 

for Army Historical Research. 52, 1974, on this issue. 

144This table is compiled from R. Money Barnes, The British Army of 1914. 

145ibid. 
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Table 1.4 The Dispositions of Scottish Regular units, Ju1y 1914 
R iment lst. Battalion 2nd. Battalion 
2nd. R.S.G. Dragoons 

Scots Guards 

Royal Scots 

Royal Scots Fusiliers 

K.O.S.B. 

Cameronians 

Black Watch 

Highland Light Inf 

Gordon Highlanders 

Seaforth Highlanders 

Cameron Highlanders 

A&S Highlanders 

York 

Aldershot 

Allahabad 

Gosport 

Lucknow 

Glasgow 

Aldershot 

Ambala 

Plymouth 

Agra 

Edinburgh 

Dinapore 

none 

Tower ofLondon 

Plymouth 

Gibralter 

Dublin 

Malta 

Bareilly 

Aldershot 

Cario 

Shomcliffe 

Poona 

Fort George 

The disposition of Scottish troops demonstrates that in the 1902-14 period, when 
troops were increasingly being called out in support of the civil power, War Office policy 
was not to station regular units in, or near, their recruiting districts. However, the point 
must be made that battalions had always recruited outside their own regimential areas. In 
some units this was particularly noticeable, for example in 1878 five nominally Scottish 
regiments drew less than fifteen percent of their other ranks from Scotland. 146 Therefore, 
the fact that a battalion was stationed outside its recruiting area was no guarantee that 
soldiers serving in it would not confront friends or relations, when acting in aid of the civil 
power. 
The High Command, equally had few concrete examples of indiscipline in Irish 
regular units on home service. The numbers of men found guilty by courts martial 
146H. J. Hanham, "Religion and Nationality in the Mid-Victorian Army", in M. R. D. Foot 
(ed.), War and Society. Historical Essays in Honour and Memory ofJ R Western 
1928-1971, Paul Elek, London, 1973, pp.165-6. 
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between lst. August 1913 and 31st. July 1914, as detailed in tables 1.5 and 1.6, overleaf: 
could not be considered excessive. 147 
It will be noted that the 5th. Royal Irish Lancers and the 2nd. Battalion, Leinster 
Regiment, stationed in Ireland did have marginally higher courts martial rates than Irish 
units based elsewhere in Britain, with the exception of the Irish Guards, whose proximity 
to the fleshpots of London, put a heavy strain on their discipline. However, in all of the 
above it would appear that no soldier was tried for a specifically ''political'' offence. 
While relatively large numbers of men were tried for insubordination, disobedience, or 
violence to superiors, it should also be noted that these were "traditional" crimes in the 
British army and were not necessarily linked to the situation in Ireland. 148 
In tenns of sentences following trial by courts martial, as outlined in table 1.6, it 
would seem that, in peace time, the army had a relatively lenient sentencing policy. Most 
men found guilty following courts martial were sentenced to detention, and none received 
either the death penalty or a tenn of penal servitude, in the period in question. Two other 
points worth highlighting are that four courts martial verdicts were quashed or not 
confinned in this period. This demonstrates that the Judge Advocate General's Office, 
responsible for reviewing cases, carried out a thorough review of court martial sentences 
in peacetime and found that even long serving regular officers could make procedural 
mistakes. Secondly, nine cases did not result in a conviction during this period, which 
illustrates the fact that court martial trials were, by no means, forgone conclusions. 
147This table and the infonnation in table 1.6 is based on appendix 5, compiled from 

P.RO., W086/60 and W086/62, District Courts Martial Registers. Please see appendix 

4 for further details on how offence and sentence tables have been compiled. 

148For a study ofcrime in the Victorian army, see A. R Skelly, The Victorian Army at 

Home~ The Recruitment and Terms and Conditions of the British Regular, 1859-1899, 

Croom Helm, London, 1977, pp.3I3-4. 
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Table 1.5. Offences for which men serving in Irish units stationed in the United Kingdom 
were tried by court martial, 1st. August 1913 to 31st. July 1914. 
4 21 T 
R 5 11 21 21 11 L 21 21 0 
I R Jr. 21 R. R. R. 21 e R. R. T 
D I Grd R.I. Inns L Jr. C. i D. M. A 
Offences G L s Regt F. RiCs F. R. n F F. . L 
Mutiny 0 0 0 0 01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Desertion 0 0 1 1 4 1 4 1 2 0 1 15 
Absence 1 0 12 0 0 5 5 0 2 0 0 25 
StrikingIViolent 0 0 4 1 0 2 1 0 3 3 0 14 
Insubordination 0 1 4 3 0 0 1 0 1 2 1 13 
Disobedience 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Quitting post 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Drunkeness 0 0 4 1 2 5 2 0 4 4 0 22 
Injuring property 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 7 0 1 11 
Loss ofproperty 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Theft 1 4 0 3 1 2 1 3 3 4 1 23 
Indecency 0 I I 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Resisting escort 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Escaping confinement 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 
I 
Miscelleneous and 
multiple offences 
10 111 25 11 
II 
3 21 
I 
I 
1 14 23 14 7 
1 
140 
Mise.civiloffences 0 10 1 I 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 1 
i 
Self Inflicted Wound 
Fraudulent enlistment 
Enlisting after discharge 
0 
0 
1 
II 0 0 0 
I 
1 0 I 0 
II 
I 3 2 I 3I ! 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
i 
I 
I 
0 0 
0 2 
0 3 
0 
I~ 
0 0 
0 1 
0 0 
0 
4 
13 
with disgrace 
False answer 0 I 
: I 
I 
I 0 1 i 0 
i I 
0 1 
0 
I 
1 
i 
I 
I 
I 
1 I 0 
I 
j 
I 
3 
I 
1 
I 
0 7 
INeg1ect 0 I 0 0 0 1 I 0 0 0 1 0 2 I . 
Fraud 010 1 I 0 o 1010 0 i 0 I 0 
i iI I
TOTALS 14 i20 59 123 • 39 116 23 151 1 29 ! I 12 2961 
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Table ]. 6 Sentences past on men serving in Irish units stationed in the United Kingdom 
tried by court martial, 1st August 1913 to 31st. July 1914 
4 	 2/ T 
R. 	 5 2/ 2/ 2/ 11 L 1I 2/ 0 
L R. 11 R. R. R. R. 2/ e R. R. T 
D. L Ir. L Inns L Ir. C. I D. M. A 
Sentences G. L. GrdsK F. Rifs F. R. n F. F. L 
confirmed 
Not 1 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 3 2 0 9 
Death 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
P.S. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
H.L. 2 6 3 4 1 3 1 4 9 6 0 39 
Imprisonment 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Detention 9 14 54 17 7 29 12 18 33 16 12 221 
C.B. 0 0 ' 0 : 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Discharged with 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
. .19nommy 
Cashiered/reduced! 2 0 1 1 2 4 3 : 0 4 5 0 22 
reprimanded 
Stoppages, fines, 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
etc. 
Quashed/not 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 4 
guilty/acquitted! 
unable to 
prosecute/guilty but I 
insane I 
iTOTALS 14 20 59 
The last breakdown in military discipline, during the Home Rule crisis of 1912-14, 
concerned the shooting of civilians at Bachelor's Walk in Dublin, by men of the 2nd. 
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Battalion, King's Own Scottish Borderers. 149 This event was triggered by the landing of 
anus at Howth, by the Irish Volunteers in July 1914, as R V. Harrell, the Deputy 
Commissioner of the Dublin Metropolitan Police, requisitioned troops to prevent the 
dispersal of the anus. From the very start this was clearly a controversial use of military 
forces. As Nationalists pointed out, for in April 1914 the UV.F. had been allowed to land 
25,000 rifles, without any interference, whereas the landing of 1,000 rifles by the Irish 
Volunteers immediatedly led to a swift government reaction. Sir John Ross, 
Commissioner of the Dublin Metropolitan Police, defended his Deputy's actions, pointing 
out that, firstly the Howth gunrunning was carried out in broad daylight in view of the 
police and, secondly, there was evidence to connect the Irish Volunteers with the rifles. 
He further continued~ "A body of more than 1000 men armed with rifles marching on 
Dublin which is the seat of the Irish Government, is a menace to the King's Government 
and that such a body constitute an unlawful assembly ofa peculiarly audacious nature.,,150 
The troops, and men of the Dublin Metropolitan Police arrived at Howth to find 
the guns gone. The trouble occurred when the detachment of the 2nd. Battalion, King's 
Own Scottish Borderers was returning to barracks. They were jeered at by a crowd, had 
stones thrown at them and two men were wounded by revolver shots. Major Haig, in 
charge of the detachment, ordered his men to prepare to fire~ however, this order was 
mis-understood and 21 men under his command, opened fire, firing between 29 and 31 
rounds. This resulted in the deaths of four civilians. 15I Following this the regiment was 
confined to barracks and two courts of enquiry were held on the 27th. July and 7th. 
August 1914. It would seem possible that only the outbreak of war prevented further 
action being taken against Major Haig, and Harrel was forced to resign over this incident. 
149This topic is best covered in J. V. O'Brien, ''Dear, Dirty Dublin". pp.249-50. 

15~nute Ross to Under-Secretary, DublinCastle, 2717114, copy in Midleton Papers, 

P.RO., 30/67/29. 

151Evidence ofMajor Haig and Captain H. Cobden given to the Court of Enquiry held on 

the 2717114 and a ''Nominal Roll ofmen who expended ammunition", P.RO., W035/60. 
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As noted above, Nationalists certainly portrayed this as a political incident, but it does 
seem that a simple breakdown in command, a not uncommon occurence in such riot 
situations, took place. 
Lastly, in terms of Irish troops discipline and morale, something must be said of 
the Republican campaign against enlistment, between the Boer War and the Great War. 
As early as 1842 Republicans had opposed Irish enlistment into the British Army. 152 This 
campaign reached new heights in October 1899 when the Irish Transvaal Committee was 
formed by Maud Gonne and Arthur Griffith. The committee's anti-recruiting activities 
involved handing out leaflets, anti-recruiting tours and publicly shaming women walking 
out with soldiers. In addition the United Irishman newspaper contained a great deal of 
anti-recruiting propaganda. 153 Following the Boer War the Dungannon Clubs movement 
continued this campaign.l54 A typical leaflet from this organisation, issued in 1905-1906 
stated; "Make a vow that you will not recognise or mix with any man who dons the livery 
of an Irish slave - a red or black coat, or blue jacket - and keep your children from mixing 
with the anti-Irish horde - the slaughterers of innocent Boer women and children."155 By 
1906 the Ancient Order of Hibernians, Irish Republican Brotherhood, Young Ireland 
Society and Irish National Foresters were all involved in the anti recruitment campaign. 156 
On its formation in 1907 the Sinn Fein party adopted anti-recruiting as a key element of its 
policies; indeed, it was one ofthe few policies on which all Sinn Fein members agreed. 
By definition the anti-recruiting campaign was focused on men who were not 
members of the British army, although, as can be seen from the above, the boycott of Irish 
152T. Denman, "The red livery of shame; the campaign against army recruitment in 

Ireland, 1899-1914," Irish Historical Studies, X:XIX~ 114, 1994, p.21D. 

153ibid, p.213 and P. Callan, "Voluntary Recruiting for the British Army in Ireland during 

the First World War", unpublished Ph.D., University College Dublin, 1984, p.25. 

154p. Callan, "Voluntary Recruiting", p.29. 

155Cited in T. Denman, "The Red Livery of Shame", p.220. 

156ibid,. p.221. 
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soldiers was also advocated. Largely, this must have been due to the legal charges which 
could have been brought against these various groups, if they had followed their campaign 
to its logical conclusion, and advocated desertion. Most of these groups were run on very 
tight financial budgets, and would, therefore, have found great difficulty in defending 
themselves from such charges. I57 The actual success of the anti-recruiting campaign 
appears to have been minimal; most historians agree that fluctuations in Irish recruitment 
figures in the 1899-1914 period were a reflection of employment patterns, rather than 
political preferences. I5S 
Nevertheless, the anti-recruiting campaign did have some success in alienating 
Irish recruits from their homeland. It was not unusual for Irish soldiers to be publicly 
insulted in this period and their female companions could also be subject to ridicule. 159 
Equally, the campaign did produce some misgivings amongst the more thoughtful Irish 
recruits, for example, John Lucy, joining the army on the 3rd. January 1912 recalled; 
Avoiding the recruiting sergeant, because I objected to presenting myself 
to any of that bluff, florid, beribboned type, we walked into the local barracks and 
took oath to serve and protect the King and his relations, and to obey the 
157The only actually seditious literature circulated amonst troops in this period was by 
Rowland Hunt, urging troops to support the U.V.F., see, I. F. W. Beckett, The Army and 
the Curragh Incident. p.5 and a pro-Labour pamphlet circulated to troops by Keir Hardie, 
during 1911 and 1912, see, P.R.O., HOI44/213S49. However the government's concern 
over the possibility of indiscipline occuring in army units policing strikes is demonstrated 
by the use of the Incitement to Mutiny Act in 1912. In February 1912 The Syndicalist 
reprinted a leaflet entitled "Open Letter to British Soldiers" which urged soldiers to refuse 
to obey orders if ordered to act against strikers. Guy Bowman, Tom Mann, B. E. Buck, 
C. E. Buck and Fred Crowsley were all given prison sentences following their 

prosecutions under this Act, which had not been utilised for over one hundred years. J. 

Blake, "Civil Disorder in Britain, 1910-39", pp.132-3 and B. Holton, British Syndicalism 

1900-1914, Myths and Realities, Pluto Press Ltd., London, 1976, p.11S. 

158p. Callan, ''Voluntary Recruiting", p.23 and D. Fitzpatrick, '"Militarism in Ireland, 

1900-1922", in T. Bartlett and K. Jeffrey, A Military History ofIreland. p.380. 

159f:. A. Muenger, The British Military Dilemma. pp.7S-6. 
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superiors set over us by him for a period of seven years with the colours and five 
in the reserve. 
We swore with some national qualms of conscience. As a sop to our 
feelings we chose an Irish regiment, and one stationed far away at the other end of 
Ireland.160 
Lastly, in this chapter some consideration should be given to discipline and morale 
in the various paramilitary forces which developed in Ireland between 1910 and 1914, 
especially to the most developed organisation, the V.V.F.. This is important, as while it 
would be wrong to state either that all V.V.F. members joined the British army during the 
Great War, or that the 36th. (Ulster) Division was fonned exclusively from nV.F. 
members, a considerable number of members of this force and from the Irish National 
Volunteers did enlist during 1914-18.161 
By October 1913 the nV.F., officially fonned in January of that year, appeared to 
be a numerous and well disciplined force, with a considerable number of fonner British 
army officers heading it. Certainly Detective Sergeant Edwards of the Royal Irish 
Constabulary present during a parade at Balmoral show grounds in September 1913 was 
most impressed by what he witnessed.162 However, the elaborate mass military displays 
which the force frequently indulged in, disguised a number of basic problems within the 
lUster Volunteers. 
Firstly, there was a split in the movement on political issues; this was apparent in 
the competition between Orange Lodges and Vnionist Clubs to control V.V.F. units, at a 
higher level between "hawks" and "doves" in the Ulster Vnionist leadership and, lastly, 
160J. F. Lucy, There's a Devil in the Drum, Faber and Faber Ltd., London, 1938, p.15. 

161These issues will be considered in greater depth in chapter 4. 

162Report of Detective Sergeant Edwards, R.I.c. in "Report for the use of the Cabinet, 

October 1913", P.R.O., W.O. 141126. 
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between "provincial" officers and the Belfast based High Command. Secondly, there was 
some confusion over the role of the force; was it to be prepared to fight British troops, or 
was its raison d'etre simply to keep the Unionist hooligan element under control? 
Equally, was the U.V.F. to be trained in regular or guerrilla tactics? Thirdly, as a military 
unit, the force remained poorly trained and equipped. Fourthly, officers had few 
disciplinary powers over their men. Lastly, morale in Iliany units remained low, 
manifesting itself either in non-attendance at drills or attempts to side with more sectarian 
Unionist groups. 
The origins of the U.V.F. were largely in the Orange Order and Unionist Clubs 
movement, elements ofwhich had started to drill by March 1912. Other U.V.F. units had 
more obscure foundations; in Magherafelt the "Catch my Pal" Temperance Society had 
started drilling twice weekly by May 1912163 and, in Londonderry, the Church Lad's 
Brigade had considerable links with the u.V.F.I64 Elsewhere, many army veterans began 
drilling men on their own initiative, for example, Osbourne Young, a former Sergeant in 
the Imperial Yeomanry, started to train an embryonic cavalry unit in Omagh in October 
1912.165 
Thus, when the force began to form, it had a very "democratic basis". With the 
foundation of the U.YF. proper in January 1913, with its own staff, headed by 
Lieutenant-General Sir George Richardson, late of the Indian army, the force became 
more hierarchical and centralised. This witnessed some serious disciplinary problems in 
local units. For example, in Newry, the Unionist Club tried to regain control of the 
volunteer movement from the officer appointed by the U. V.F. headquarters. 166 
163Report by District Inspector 1. Wilband, Royal Irish Constabulary, to the County 

Inspector, Co. Londonderry, 24/5112, P.RO., W0141126. 

164Report by C. G. Cary, County Inspector, Co. Londonderry to the Inspector General, 

RlC., 3117/12, W0141126 and The Irish Times, 2917112. 

165Report by Constable T. Hynes, RI.C., 10/10112, W0141126. 

166p.RO.NJ., 0.1540/3112, cited, P. Buckland, Irish Unionism 1885-1923, A 
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More seriously, Colonel Oliver Nugent, the Commanding Officer of U. V.F. units 
in Cavan became very distrustful of the Belfast dominated U. V.F. headquarters, fearing 
that they would sacrifice border counties in a political settlement and that "hawks" in 
Belfast would put unionists in border counties in personal danger. Thus, he began styling 
his unit as the Cavan Volunteer Force and made it clear that his men would only serve in 
Cavan. Indeed, commenting on the situation in County Cavan, Nugent stated; 
The County of Cavan therefore is geographically and politically isolated 
from North East lllster, with a small Unionist community scattered over an area 
of460,000 acres in the midst of a Nationalist population. 
It is clear that as far as this County is concerned there will be no men 
avaliable for other work after the requirements of horne defence have been 
provided for, ... , The Organisation proposed has nothing in common with a 
Military Organisation, ... , I have therefore used no purely military titles and so far 
as the forces enrolled in the County are concerned I prefer to call them the Cavan 
Volunteer Force and not the Cavan Regiment. 167 
Likewise, Captain the Hon. Arthur 0' Neill, M.P., Commanding Officer of the 
County Antrim, U.V.F. made it clear that in the event of a confrontation none of his men 
would be available to serve outside the County. 168 
Equally, the lllster Unionist leadership seemed divided over the use of force, 
which can have done little to reassure rank: and file U.V.F. members. This "hawks"/ 
"doves" split became most obvious in January 1914 when Godfrey Fetherstonhaugh, M.P. 
documentary history, H.M.S.O., Belfast, 1973, p.232. 

167Typescript booklet entitled, "C.V.F. Scheme, Copy No. VI", compiled by Colonel Sir 

Oliver Nugent, Farren Connell papers, P.RO.N.I., MIC/57119, pp.1-2. 

168p.RO.N.0., D.1238/121, cited 1. Howie, "Militarising a Society", p.2l7. 
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for North Fermanagh, publicly suggested a compromise settlement to prevent civil war, at 
a time when Carson was relying on the threat of force to gain concessions from the 
Liberal government. 169 
The actual role of the force caused great confusion. Carson seems to have been 
motivated to raise the U.V.F. out of fears that the Unionist hooligan element in Belfast 
would riot over the Home Rule Bill, giving the government the excuse to move in troops 
and surpress Unionist opposition.170 Equally, it was clear that; "any local and armed 
aggression by the loyalists would have had disastrous implications for support in England 
and within English Conservatism."I7I Thus it was clear that the U.V.F. could not be an 
"army" in the real sense of the word, as any bloodshed would see sympathy for Unionism 
in Britain evaporate. 
Also, political considerations dictated the method in which the force would fight. 
Realistically the U.V.F:s only hope to secure victory, or at least a negotiated settlement 
with crown forces would be to adopt Boer-style guerrilla tactics. However, as Jackson 
has stressed, fighting such a "dirty war" would seriously damage Unionist support in 
Britain.172 
There were wider concerns about the U.V.F.'s ability to fight. Lord Dunleath 
stated; "I do not believe our men are prepared to go into action against part of His 
Majesty's Forces."173 Likewise, Sir James Craig's view of the U.V.F.'s war, seems to 
have been based on a fear that Ulstermen did not have sufficient morale to act as 
guerrillas, he noted; "Neither this country or your men are suited to 'Guerrilla warfare', 
169p. Bew, Ideology and the Irish Question; Ulster Unionism and Irish Nationalism. 
1912-16, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994, p.1 02. 

170ibkL p.lO!. 

171A Jackson, "Unionist Myths, 1912-85", Past and Present, 136, 1992, p.18l. 

172ibkL p.182. 

173Letter, Dunleath to Carson, March 1915(1), cited, P. Bew, Ideology and the Irish 
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'Boer tactics' and so on. If you stake all on a big fight, there will be no doubts or 
hesitations."174 
Equally, in a rather bizarre move by Craig, at a time when most U.V.F. members 
were training to oppose Crown forces, in November 1913 he actually suggested that the 
U. V.F. should be incorporated in the Territorial Force to make up the deficiency in its 
ranksP75 This may simply have been an attempt to demonstrate the loyalty of the U.V.F. 
and their determination to oppose a foreign invasion of Britain. (This theme was 
developed by Sir Henry Craick, Tory M.P. for Glasgow and Aberdeen Universities who, 
on inspecting U.V.F. units in June 1914 stated; "the Empire will probably soon need these 
men to protect the East coast of England from the invasion of the Kaiser."176). 
Nevertheless it does illustrate the lack of planning that had been made for the U.V.F.'s 
strategy and tactics in a conflict with British forces. 
The U.V.F. remained poorly trained and equipped, although it was often able to 
hold impressive displays, the view of the force expressed by journalists had often more to 
do with their political bias than the actual efficiency of the force. While a special 
correspondent ofthe unionist Yorkshire Post described a U.V.F. parade in Antrim in 1913 
thus; 
As far as I could detect in very careful observation, there were not half a 
dozen of them unqualified by physique or age to playa manly part. They reminded 
me more than anything else - except that but a few of them were beyond the best 
fighting age - of the finest class of our National Reservists. There was certainly 
nothing ofthe mock soldier about them. Led by keen, smart-looking officers, they 
marched past in quarter column with fine, swinging steps, as if they had been in 
174Memorandum by Craig, 2617/13, cited, J. Howie, "Militarising a Society", pp.222-3. 

175ibid. p.223. 

176Cited, P. Bew, Ideology and the Irish Question, p.l15. 
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training for years, ... , officers who have had the teaching of them tell me that the 
rapidity with which they have become efficient is greater than has ever come 
within their experience in training recruits for either the Territorials or the Regular 
Service. That is a tribute to the resolute and determined spirit which animates 
them. 177 
By contrast, the Nationalist, Irish News, described one nV.F. demonstration as ; 
"a straggling wavy line offarm yokels, chauffeurs, grooms and veterans of seventy winters 
stumbled forward in ragtime ... causing much hilarity to the onlookers. "178 
The nV.F. did have an impressive number of serving and retired officers and 
other ranks acting as drill masters in the movement, however, the usefulness of some of 
these men in training the volunteers is questionable. A Royal Irish Constabulary report on 
the man drilling Orangemen in Magherafelt in September 1912, noted; "The Instructor is 
Robert Hamilton of Rainey Street. He was a Private in the Inniskilling Fusiliers, and was 
invalided on account of insanity. He does not belong to the Army Reserve."179 Equally, 
as Orr notes ofthe Tyrone nV.F. camp held in October 1913; 
the camp would have enhanced the esprit de corps of the Tyrone nV.F. 
and, in some ways, would have improved its military efficiency, but many of the 
lectures were delivered by army officers whose experience of war had been in the 
outposts of the British Empire, to men whose knowledge of fighting was nil. For 
example, the 'Lecture on Scouting and Intelligence Duties in the Field' had more 
relevance to the South African veldt than to the lush fields of Co. Tyrone - the 
177Yorkshire Post, 22/9/13, cited in, P. Buckland, Irish Unionism: 2. Ulster Unionism and 

the Origins ofNorthern Ireland. 1886-1922, Gill and Macmillan, Dublin, 1973, p.59. 

178Irish News, 23/9113, cited, P. Orr, The Road to tbe Somme, pp.13-14. 

179.Report by District Inspector, J. Wilband, 2119/12, W0141126. 
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lecturer bade scouts to remember that 'a low thick dust indicates infantry while a 
light, high cloud of dust is raised by cavalry' .180 
Also some regular officers drilling V.V.F. units verged on the antediluvian and 
must have forgotten almost anything they ever knew about company drill. For example, 
Major-General W. E. Montgomery, Scots Fusiliers (retired) was certainly not in the prime 
of life, when witnessed drilling men in County Down in 1913.181 Equally, many of the 
men officering the U.V.F. were amateur in the extreme. As Buckland observes; ''The 
orders given were not always conventional. One commander used to halt his men with 
''Whoa', and another commander, anxious to impress a rival platoon, was heard to give 
his special version of the order to move off: 'By the right, left, Quick March!"'.182 
In broader terms there was a serious problem in training generally, as Jackson 
notes~ ''truancy was a marked problem in certain UV.F. regiments, and, ... , officers found 
it much easier to mobilise their men for a weekend at camp, or for a day out in Belfast, 
than for sustained training programmes."183 Training camps did little to correct this 
problem due to the poor state of UV.F. regimental finances. For example, men of the 
Tyrone Regiment were expected to pay seven shillings, a considerable sum which many 
members would have been unable to pay, to attend a three day camp. 1M 
1SOp. Orr, The Road to the Somme, p.17. 

181''Retum of ex-soldiers acting as Instructors to UC., etc.", August 1913, P.RO., 
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Absenteeism in the nV.F. was somewhat understandable, as by January 1914, 
some units had been formed for over a year and the attraction of endless drilling with 
wooden dummy guns soon began to pale. In January 1914 the 10,700 strong County 
Antrim U.V.F. had only 150, .303 rifles and 200, Italian Vetterlis,185 the latter without 
ammunition. This meant one rifle to every 28-29 men; and one rifle with ammunition to 
every 59 men. As U.V.F. leaders in Antrim stated~ "Battalion Commanders all report that 
the men are manifesting considerable disappointment at the present condition of affairs 
and are tiring of elementary drill."186 
The Lame gun-running of April 1914 should thus be seen as an attempt to boost 
morale in the nV.F., rather than an attempt to properly arm the movement. By April 
1914 the volunteers possessed five types of rifle with varying calibres. As Jackson 
comments; ''Lame, therefore, turned an unarmed force into a badly armed force."187 
nV.F. officers, somewhat like their counterparts in the Territorial Force, wielded 
pitifully few disciplinary powers. The strongest power they possessed was that of 
dismissal. As Buckland notes of the West Belfast, Special Service Section, under Captain 
F. P. Crozier's command; "Rather than face the disgrace of having his rifle and uniform 
taken from him, and having the women and children call after him in the street, a special 
volunteer would make any sacrifice, even to giving up drink."188 Previous to April 1914 
men who regularly attended drilling were rewarded with being allowed to take care of a 
gun as an incentive to continued training. 189 
185The latter were purchased from the ''bargain basement" of the international arms 
market, having been withdrawn from service in the Italian Army in 1887. See, J. Whittam, 
The Politics of the Italian Army, 1861-1918, Croom Helm, London, 1977, p.194. 
186<'Statement on the arms question, laid before Sir Edward Carson and Sir James Craig", 
20/1114, P.R.O.N.!., D.1238/108, cited, P. Buckland, Irish Unionism, H.M.S.O., 1973, 
p.243. 

187A. Jackson, ''Unionist Myths", p.183. 
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1 89Howie, "Militarising a Society", p.220. 

103 

The last problem which faced those responsible for discipline in the U.V.F. was the 
attraction of more rabidly sectarian politics. Inter-communal rioting was a relatively 
common occurrence in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Belfast. Equally, in at 
least one rural U.V.F. battalion, the 2nd. Battalion, County Down Regiment, there was a 
breakdown in discipline in October 1913, The battalion's adjutant, in a report on the 
affair, stated; 
During a route march of the Newry Volunteers to Bessbrook. The Local 
Band came with us & I instructed them as to the road to take & I was surprised 
when I found that they passed by the turning arranged - when I went up to the 
Leader of the Band he informed me they would go on to the 'Pump' a little further 
on & as we were entering the Village of Bessbrook I consented A policeman 
appeared on the scene shortly afterwards & informed me he had been requested by 
the principal Unionist Leaders in the Village, ... , to ask me not to march the 
Volunteers to this 'Pump' as it was 'out of bounds' neither parties Unionist or 
Nationalist being allowed there so I went up to the Band Leader & asked him to 
halt the band but they would not do so and said they would go to the 'Pump' & 
very threatening language was used to me & I was told I had no control over the 
Band (which I admit) & consigned to 'Hades", etc., etc. 
I immediately wheeled the Volunteers to the left down a side road & halted 
them, the Band going straight ahead - There was some grumbling in the ranks 
about the Band & I got the opinion of three Committee Members, ..., they 
unanimously decided not to wait for the band coming back but to march back 
without it (I might mention that a few men of the front section went on with the 
Band). I turned the Battn. about, right-wheel & marched back accordingly. 
Instructor Morrow called on the men to fallout & follow the Band inciting 
them to disobey orders (really mutiny) but I am proud to say when I called the 
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Vols. to stand steady & obey my orders not a single Volunteer fell out showing 
splendid discipline of which any Line Regt. might feel proud. It appears to have 
been a pre-arranged affair by the band & we would be well rid of them & also any 
others refusing to obey orders. 190 
Therefore, the U.V.F. despite being a large organisation (boasting 90,000 to 
100,000 members at its peak)191 capable of holding impressive military pageants and one 
highly impressive military operation (the landing and dispersal of arms at Lame, Bangor 
and Donaghadee in April 1914) suffered from serious weaknesses. The Ulster Unionist 
leadership was split over the role of the force, morale in many units was low, at least until 
arms were provided, retired officers and other ranks were often poor instructors, officers 
possessed few disciplinary powers and hard-line loyalists tried to draw some units into 
sectarian incidents. Thus, the usefulness of the nV.F. as a training unit for men joining 
the 36th. (Ulster) Division, or other units of the British army during 1914-18 must be 
severely questioned. 
The Irish Volunteers, although finally outnumbering the U.V.F. by August 1914 
were never as well trained or equipped as the Unionist force. Partly, this was due to the 
late formation ofthe force as compared to the nV.F.. Also, the Irish Volunteers failed to 
attract the numbers of retired army officers which the U.V.F. enrolled. The highest 
ranking officer involved in the Irish Volunteers was Colonel Maurice Moore, formerly of 
the Connaught Rangers. Significantly, while Lieutenant-General Sir George Richardson 
19Outter, R Nesbitt, Adjutant, 2nd. Battalion, County Down Regiment, nV.F. to 
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105 
was appointed General Officer Commanding, U.V.F. Moore was finnly subjected to 
political control, being appointed merely, Inspector-General ofthe Irish Volunteers. 
Equally, unlike the U.V.F., the Irish Volunteers were basically unarmed when war 
broke out. The Howth gun-running of July 1914 had brought just 1,000 rifles into 
Ireland, almost all of them going to the Dublin Volunteers, most of whom followed Eoin 
MacNeill in the volunteer split which occurred shortly after the outbreak ofwar. 192 
The Irish Volunteers were best organised in the North of Ireland, as Nationalists 
there realised that, in the event of civil war, they would have to protect themselves from 
the U.V.F .. 193 However, even here, morale cannot have been high as Moore refused to 
send any arms to the North as~ ''We are not and will not be in a position to resist an attack 
in the North and it will just be handing the arms over to the Ulstermen. If the Carsonites 
do nothing the arms are no use~ if they do they will simply surround any force we have 
and take away the arms."194 
The only plans Captain George Berkeley, the C.O. of the Belfast Irish Volunteers, 
had prepared, in the event of Ulster Unionists declaring a Provisional Government were 
almost designed to destroy morale and discipline. His plan was to attempt to extricate his 
men from Belfast and retreat South, leaving their families to the tender mercies of the 
Ulster Provisional Government!195 
Major M. Earle, of the Grenadier Guards, involved in army Intelligence work in 
Ireland, observed the Dublin Volunteers at drill in March, 1914 and pointed out a number 
of their weaknesses commenting; 
192D. Fitzpatrick, The Two Irelands 1912-39, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998, 
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It was obvious that the men had some slight previous instruction. for they 
fell in well and stood to attention in quite a soldierlike way •...• There were three 
Sergeant Instructors who were obviously old N.C.O.s. Two appeared to be Irish 
and one English. There were also some organisers who helped or superintended. 
and who were evidently not military men. 
The men were very poor at extending., and reminded one of the average 
Territorial company one sees in England. One Sergeant instructor encouraged the 
men by saying., 'You will get shot ifyou huddle together like that. ' 
No arms or sticks were carried. The public were admitted to the field, and 
there were perhaps a dozen or so spectators who appeared interested. The men 
drilling were chiefly of what appeared to be the shop assistant class. Very well 
dressed. In fact, they corresponded exactly to the class of men one sees in a drill 
hall of a middle class T.[erritorial] F.[orce] unit in London. They were, however, 
of an older or more mature type, the vast majority being between 25 and 35 years 
of age. There was one boy ofabout 16, a couple of older men of 50 perhaps, and 
two or three undersized weaklings, but the bulk of the men were physically 'good 
food for powder'. 
It rained hard the whole time, with a cold wind, and the longish grass was 
very wet. But all ranks were very keen on the work, and they laughed when they 
made mistakes in a way which, if rather shocking to the soldier, showed they were 
very happy and keen. 
There was an absence of officers or of anyone who could be classified as a 
leader, but one fat middle-aged gentleman in a mackintosh assisted the Sergeant 
Instructors to get the men to the correct extension. 
This body, which has been drilling in the open on Wednesdays and 
Saturdays for close on a couple ofmonths, is reputed to be the most efficent of the 
lO7 
I.[rish] N.[ational] V.[olunteers]. It is, as far as is known, entirely deficient of the 
class of men of the officer type, and in consequence is probably a good deal 
inferior in fighting value to the U.V.F .. One of the rules of the I.N.V. is that each 
man must purchase a uniform or a rifle. The pattern of uniform has not yet been 
chosen, and, although a badge has been designed, none were seen today. The 
D.[ubJin] M.[etroploitan] Police know nothing of any arms either in possession of 
the men or stored in any house. 196 
Lastly, something should be said of the smallest of the pre-war paramilitary 
groups, the Irish Citizens' Army. This force had been created during the 1913 lockout, to 
maintain order amongst the strikers. Most of its members were drawn from the Irish 
Transport and General Workers Union, and it is not inconcievable that some later saw 
service in the British army. However, by 1914 the force numbered only around 200 men. 
Nevertheless it was seen as a formidable force by British military intelligence, a report of 
March 1914 noting; 
The most dangerous (from peace of the city point of view) party drilling is 
White's citizen army. It drills quite openly and [the] Government has been asked 
to stop it. The men consist of unemployed and [the] lowest class in the city, and 
being led by a mad man might cause serious trouble. 197 
In conclusion, the 1902-14 period saw a heightened awareness of the importance 
of discipline and morale in modern warfare. It was believed that twentieth century 
firepower could only be overcome by attacking troops with high morale and kept under 
196Intelligence summary, 28/3114, P.R.O., W014114. 
197Intelligence summary, 23/3114, P.R.O., W0141/4. 
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tight discipline. Nevertheless, the British army, generally more pragmatic and with more 
campaign experience than its European counterparts did not adopt the 'cult of the 
offensive' wholesale. This meant that, especially in relation to the use of cavalry, the 
British army was better prepared physchologically for the Great War than its counterparts. 
The period 1902-14 also saw strains put on army morale and discipline when 
called upon in aid of the civil power. The 1908 reforms and future of the Special Reserve 
battalions in relation to the defence of Ireland suggests that a basic mistrust of Irish troops 
discipline persisted in the British army, based largely on the fears of Fenian infiltration of 
Irish units, which had occurred in the 1860s. 
Equally, the Third Home Rule controversy, the Curragh Incident and the numbers 
of British Army officers and other ranks who helped to train the U.V.F. do show that 
traditional fears of the political subversion of Irish units was not misplaced in this period, 
although the major threat now came from the opposite end of the political spectrum, to 
that initially associated with sedition. Indeed, by April 1914, one could argue, the 
traditional concern over the loyalty and discipline of Irish units was being voiced over 
many component units of the British army. 
Lastly, the paramilitary, political armies raised in Ireland between 1912 and 1914, 
despite occasional impressive parades, faced serious disciplinary and morale problems. 
This issue will be explored further in chapter four, but, for the present, it should be 
observed that the U.V.F. and Irish Volunteers were far from perfectly disciplined and 
certainly were not in a position to be absorbed directly into the British army as many 
Unionist and Nationalist politicians desired. 
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Cbapter2. 
The Administration of British MDitary Justice. 1914=1918. 
The system ofmilitary justice used by the British anny during the First World War 
bad not been designed for the mass citizen armies that the British government raised 
during that conflict. Instead, the disciplinary system used by the British Expeditionary 
Force between 1914 and 1918 had been designed for the small, paternalistic, regular anny 
of the late Victorian period, in the form of the 1879 Army Act. In this chapter 
consideration will be given to how accurately courts martial reflected disciplinary 
problems in the British anny and how well this system was adapted to the conditions of 
the Great War and the new situations which this brought about. 
Other key issues to consider in this work, particularly in view of the damning 
criticisms made of the courts martial system operating on the Western Front by A. 
Babington and Putkowski and Sykes, are the differences between courts martial and 
Edwardian civil courts, the legal knowledge of officers and other ranks, the legal errors 
made at courts martial, the appeals system available to those tried by military courts, the 
extent to which Dominion and Imperial troops (especially Canadians and members of the 
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps) were treated in comparison to their British 
counterparts and how British military justice differs to the legal system used by other 
powers during the conflict. Lastly, the issue of"informal discipline", as it operated within 
the B.E.F., must be considered, as it is quite clear that a number of soldiers received 
punishment without going through the formal procedure ofa court martial. 
Between 1914 and 1918 four different types of courts martial were used by the 
British anny and it is worth examining these in some depth. Firstly, there was the General 
Court Martial; this was the military court which was given the strongest powers and was 
the only one capable of trying an officer. If held in the United Kingdom, India, Malta or 
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Gibraltar, it had to consist ofa minimum of nine officers; elsewhere it had to consist of at 
least five. The officers were, if possible, to come from different corps and every member 
had to have held a commission for a minimum ofthree years. 1 The President had to be, at 
the very least, a Major. During the 1913 to 1919 period 2,828 General Courts Martial 
were held in Britain and 3,244 overseas. 2 
Secondly, there was the Field General Court Martial; as the Manual of Military 
Law states; "A Field General Court Martial can only be convened on active service or 
abroad for the trial of offences which it is not practicable, with due regard to the public 
service, to try by an ordinary General Court Martial.,,3 In other words, Field General 
Courts Martial were, largely, wartime expedients and, as a result, the differences between 
their composition and that of a General Court Martial are very marked. A Field General 
Court Martial could consist of as little as two officers, although in this case it could not 
award any sentence exceeding two years imprisonment or three months field punishment.4 
IWar Office, Manual ofMilitary Law. H.M.S.O., London, 1914, pp.36-7. 
2War Office, General Annual Reports ofthe British Army (including the Territorial Force) 
for the period from 1st. October 1913 to 30th September 1919, Accounts and Papers, 
Cmd. 1193, H.M.S.O., London,. 1921, pp.82-3. It should be noted that there are glaring 
differences between the statistics avaliable relating to courts martial, partly explained by 
the different time periods being covered in each. In relation to General Courts Martial an 
unpublished War Office table of statistics, considering the period August 1914 to 
September 1919 puts the figures at 2,828 held at home and 3,224 abroad (p. R. 0., 
W093/49, pp.75-8). Meanwhile another government report, considering the period 4th. 
August 1914 to 31 st. March 1920, states the numbers ofGeneral Courts Martial as 3,120 
held at home and 3,442 abroad (War Office. Statistics of the Military Effort of the British 
Empire during the Great War, 1914-20, H.M.S.O., London, 1922, pp.643-5). In the 
database relating to men tried by courts martial while serving in Irish units on the Western 
Front, 63 officers and men were tried by General Courts Martial (see appendix 5), which 
given that by 1917118 Irish units accounted for only something in the region ofone 
percent ofBritish troops in France suggests that the figures given in the General Annual 
Report are much too low. 
3War Office, Manual ofMilitary Law, p.39. 
4The fact that so many sentences of this type were awarded by Field General Courts 
Martial sitting on the Western Front suggests that, in many cases, only two officers were 
avaliable for the court. See appendix 6. 
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However, it was more normal for this court to consist of a minimum of three officers of at 
least two years commissioned service. The powers of the Field General Court Martial 
were broadly similar to those of the General Court Martial. Between 1913 and 1919; 373 
Field General Courts Martial were held in Britain and 162,683 abroad. S 
Thirdly, there were District Courts Martial. These could not award a sentence 
greater than two years imprisonment and could only sentence an N.C.O. to forfeiture of 
pay. The court had to consist of a minimum of three officers of at least two years 
commissioned service, ifpossible, the officers were to be from different units. During the 
1913 to 1919 period; 161,186 District Courts Martial were held in Britain and 5,216 
6overseas.
Lastly, Regimental Courts Martial were held during the Great War. This court 
could sentence a soldier to a maximum of forty-two days detention. The court had to 
consist of at least three officers who had held a commission for at least one year. 
Regimental Courts Martial will receive little attention in this study as it is unclear whether 
any were actually held on the Western Front, or indeed in any theatre ofwar. However, it 
is apparent that they were held amongst reserve units based within the United Kingdom. 7 
It should, also, be noted that Commanding Officers held considerable personal 
powers to discipline the men under their command. They were entitled to detain a soldier 
SWar Office, General Annual Reports of the British Army. pp.86-87. Again these figures 
are contradicted by the other sources available, which cite 312 cases tried at home and 
117,506 abroad (p.R.O., W093/49, pp.75-7) and 312 Field General Courts Martial held 
at home and 154,399 abroad (War Office, Statistics ofthe Military Effort, pp.643-5). 
6War Office, General Annual Reports of the British Army. pp.84-85. Other sources 
suggest that 131,147 District Courts Martial were held at home and 3,162 abroad 
(p.R.O., W093/49, pp.77-8) or that 137,683 were held at home and 5,326 abroad (War 
Office, Statistics oftbe Military Effort, p.643). 
7See volume ofRoutine Orders for the 3rd. Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. 
1914-1918, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers' Museum, Enniskillen, Co. Fermanagh. This 
makes frequent mention ofRegimental Courts Martial being held within the battalion 
throughout the war. 
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and/or stop his pay for up to twenty-eight days on their own authority, without recourse 
to any form of court martial. Company officers could also impose lesser punishments 
(normally consisting of extra drill) on soldiers who had been involved in minor military 
offences, for example, being late for parade.8 However, if the accused requested a court 
martial this had to be held and the available evidence suggests that a reasonably large 
number ofsoldiers, throughout the war, were aware of this right and made use ofit.9 
Full details of cases tried by C.O.s or company commanders were never kept in a 
systematic, centralised fashion, and few actual case details have survived. However, it 
would seem fairly clear that, in most cases, the C.O. acted in a reasonably impartial 
fashion. The then Private R. McKay, attending an orderly room parade in the 109th. Field 
Ambulance in May 1915 noted; 
One man, Joe McMinn, was charged by the Sergeant-Major with refusing 
to obey an order, and the sequel was rather interesting. After the charge was 
read out by the S[er]g[ean]t. Major, McMinn asked the Commanding Officer 
could he cross question the S[er]g[ean]t. Major. Given permission, McMinn 
began by asking the S[er]g[ean]t. Major, 'When I was doing extra drill, were 
there not a number of other men also undergoing punishment?' The 
S[er]g[ean]t. Major admitted this was so. McMinn: 'You gave me an order to 
quick march, and I obeyed; now I was at the far end of the parade ground and my 
back was toward you. When you gave the order 'About Tum' did you name 
me?' S[er]g[ean]t. Major: 'No, I did not.' McMinn, 'How, then, was I to know 
the order 'About Tum' was for me?' The result was the case was dismissed. 
8War Office, Manual ofMilitary Law, p.27. 

9See Courts Martial Registers, 1914-18, P.R.O., Kew, W0213/1-28 for examples ofthis. 
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And, after we came out of the orderly room the S[er]g[ean]t. Major came up to 
McMinn and said 'Congratulations, McMinn, you got out of that well. 10 
However, not all hearings by company officers were conducted within the 
requirements of the Anny Act. Second Lieutenant Percy McElwaine on joining the 19th. 
Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles at Newcastle, Co. Down in August 1916, remembered; 
I had to take company orderly room and I had a case in which a man was 
charged with refusing to go into the sea on a bathing parade. The only evidence 
provided was a note written by the sergeant in charge of the party. I refused to 
accept this and as no witness was produced to prove either that the order had 
been given or that it was disobeyed I dismissed the case. This got round like 
wildfire and the cases in the other companies were dismissed too. The company 
commanders did not like my 'technicalities'. II 
Clearly, therefore, the orderly room system was open to some abuse. However, 
neither the War Office or the Judge Advocate General appear to have raised any concerns 
about this, which suggests that, in general, this system was seen as reasonably fair and 
impartial. 
If a C.O. felt that a case should be referred to a court martial then he had to 
establish a court of enquiry. The role of members of this court was simply to collect 
evidence, they then sent this to the officer who had established the court of enquiry. The 
proceedings of a court of enquiry were not admissible as evidence in a court martial. 12 
They were simply used by a C.O. to decide whether or not to refer a case to a court 
l<T.ntry for 10/5/15 in the diary ofSergeant R. McKay, 109th. Field Ambulance, I.W.M. 

l1Sir Percy McElwaine papers, I.W.M., 92/35/1, p.71. 

12War Office, Manual ofMilitary Law, p.638. 
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martial. Members of the court were not to express any comments about a man's 
innocence or guilt or to suggest whether a court martial should be held. 13 
Few transcripts of courts of enquiry survive. Two examples which have been 
found during this research do suggest that courts of enquiry did proceed in an unbiased 
fashion. The first, concerning a breach of battalion anti-gas measures in the 2nd. 
Battalion, Royal Irish Regiment in May 1915 took evidence from five witnesses. 14 The 
second, relating to accidental injuries to Second Lieutenant R W. Spurgin of the 4th. 
Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers in November 1917 collected just two witness 
statements. 15 While the Manual of Military Law made no specification regarding the 
numbers ofand rank ofofficers sitting on a court of enquiry, in both these cases, the court 
consisted of three officers ofthe rank oflieutenant or captain. 
This, was in theory, the constitution of courts martial held during the Great War. 
It is now important to consider how these courts operated in practice and to what extent 
they dispensed a form ofjustice recognisable to those familiar with Edwardian civil courts. 
In this study, Field General and General Courts Martial transcripts, particularly those 
relating to Irish troops, will be used as records on District and Regimental Courts martial 
are incomplete and do not lend themselves to a comparative study. 
Field General Courts Martial are the most controversial element of the British 
military justice system as it operated during the Great War as they were, of all the types of 
courts martial, the ones responsible for sentencing the highest number of men to death. 
Before examining these courts in more detail, it should be noted that, with few exceptions, 
13ibid, pp.637-8. 
14 "Report ofa Court ofEnquiry into why R[egimential] O.[rder] No. 181 Para.[graph] 
3, 18/5/15 was not complied with on 24/5/15 during a gas attack on 2/r.[oyal] I.[rish] 
Reg[men]t.", N.A.M., 5010/29. 
15Papers ofa Court ofEnquiry held at Luddan Camp, Buncrana, 6/11/17 in ''Record of 
Officers' Services, 4th. Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers", P.RO., W068/382. 
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only files relating to soldiers who were actually executed following their court martial, 
have been preserved. 16 This makes the sample used both unscientific and limited in scope. 
In most capital Field General Court Martial cases it would appear that the court 
consisted of three to four officers. Interestingly, while, when Irish regular soldiers were 
being tried, officers from non-Irish units predominated at the courts martial, when New 
Army soldiers were being tried, the officers were generally drawn from service battalions 
of the accused's regiment. There are a variety of explanations for this; perhaps New 
Army officers, being rather protective of their own status, preferred not to demonstrate 
embarrassing disciplinary problems in their own units to regular officers. However, it 
seems more likely that officers simply wanted to deal with courts martial regimentally, 
whenever possible and the New Army organisation allowed this, while the manner in 
which regular units were brigaded, at least before 1916, generally prevented it. It is 
unclear whether there was any real difference in terms of how the accused's case was 
heard if the officers comprising the court were from his regiment or members of other 
units. Some officers undoubtedly relished the opportunity to make examples of some of 
their men, but, at the same time, the paternalistic nature of the British regimental system 
could have served to help the accused. 17 
16During this research the case transcripts of two officers tried by courts martial but not 
executed were discovered. The officers concerned were Major e. H. Stainforth, M.e., 
7/8th. Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, tried on the 5/1/18 for drunkeness (see his 
personal file, P.R.O., W0339/17067) and Second Lieutenant A. 1. Annandale, 9th. 
Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, tried on the 112/16 for "Conduct to the prejudice ofgood 
order and Military Discipline (see his personal file, P.R.O., W0339/14160). 
17On the issue of paternalism in the British army pre-1914, and particularly in the Irish 
regiments, see E. A. Muenger, The British Military Dilemma in Ireland, Occupation 
Politics, 1886-1914,University Press ofKansas and Gill and Mac Millan, Dublin, 1991, 
pp.19-21. For paternalism in the British Army as a whole during 1914-18 see G. D. 
Sheffield, "Officer-Man Relations, Discipline and Morale in the British Army of the Great 
War" in H. Cecil and P. H. Liddle (eds.) Facing Armageddon; The First World War 
Experienced, Leo Cooper Ltd., London, 1996, pp.413-424. 
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It is unclear, from existent transcripts, who carried out the prosecution at a court 
martial. P .H. Winfield noted that the prosecutor at District Courts Martial was usually the 
adjutant of the accused's unit, while, in more complicated cases and at General Courts 
Martial, trained lawyers attached to O.H.Q. usually carried out this task. IS A defence 
was, at least at Field General Courts Martial, rarely put forward with much vigour. The 
sole defence, if it can even be called such, put forward by Rifleman 1. Templeton 15th. 
Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, when tried on 26th. February 1916 was; "I am sorry for what 
I have done,"19 and, unfortunately this was fairly typical. Few soldiers were represented 
at courts martial by a "soldier's friend" (i.e. defence counsel); a random sample of 
thirty-two cases demonstrates that only three of the accused were afforded any legal 
representation at their trials. 
There is no consistent pattern in the cases of these soldiers, who were represented 
at their trial Rifleman A. E. Allsop served with the 12th. Battalion, King's Royal Rifle 
Corps and was tried for desertion on the 31st. May 1917; Private O. Ainley of the 1I4th. 
Battalion, King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry was charged with three counts of 
desertion on the 13th. July 1918; and Private 1. Mitchell of the 1st. Battalion, British West 
Indies Regiment was tried for murder, manslaughter and an offence against an inhabitant 
(i.e. rape) on the 15th. December 1917.20 The only obvious point to be made is that these 
cases all took place in the last two years of the war, when some public concern had been 
voiced against the courts martial system. 
One of the most damning criticisms of the courts martial system was voiced by the 
Darling Report over the "prisoner's friend" issue, which remarked; "Evidence has been 
ISp. H. Winfield, "Courts Martial from the Lawyer's Point of View', Law Quarterly 

Review, 1918, p.148. 

I 9Transcript of the court martial ofRifleman 1. Templeton, P.R.O., W0711454. 

20AlI details from P.R.O., W093/49. 
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given before us to the effect that, in some instances, superior authorities have actively 
discouraged officers from appearing on behalf ofaccused persons. "21 
With regard to Irish units, it is rather unclear how well the prisoner's friend system 
worked. Lieutenant Percy McElwaine of the 14th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, who had 
served as a barrister in both Ireland and Canada before the war, believed that he was 
transferred as he successfully defended three men. He stated; 
These last three acquittals seem to have annoyed Divisional Headquarters 
who, realising that any man was entitled to have as prisoners friend any junior 
officer he might name - if avaliable - ordered me to go to Amiens as Divisional 
Purchasing Officer. As Amiens was 30 or 40 miles from the Division I was no 
longer avaliable. The excuse for sending me was that I had a knowledge of 
French.22 
It should be noted, however, that the role of a prisoner's friend in courts martial 
was not exactly analogous to that of a defence counsel in a civil trial. While a defence 
lawyer would always seek to have his client found not guilty, or, if clearly guilty of a 
crime, to be sentenced to the most lenient sentence possible, this was not the case with 
reference to the role of prisoner's friend. This difference is shown very clearly in the 
writings of Captain E. A. Godson ofthe 9th. Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers. On the 17th. 
December 1916, Godson noted that he was; 
Busy looking into the defence of Private Edgar who is charged with 
'desertion' & looks as if he will suffer the extreme penalty. This is a stigma for 
21Darling Report, p.7. 

22 Sir Percy McElwaine papers, I.W.M., 92/35/1, p.8l. 
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the Batt[ alio In. & if possible to be avoided. On looking into the case it strikes 
one as being very pathetic as he gave a false age on enlistment in order to be able 
to join up & is now only 18Y2 & has been in the Army 2 years. He got a dose of 
gonorrhea in Ireland & it has weakened him physically & morally. On the night 
before he fell out of the ranks on the way up to the trenches he undoubtedly was 
done up & did not realize what his action would bring him in for. If he were 12 
years older his action would be unpardonable but I think it will be hard for the 
youngster to be shot.23 
Godson felt that the court martial of Edgar was carried out fairly.24 However, he 
was disappointed by the outcome stating~ ''P[riva]te. Edgar's sentence was published 
today - 6 months imprisonment, this is too light, not good for the B [attalio In. but it is 
something ofa personal triumph. ,,25 
However, Pugsley, in his study of courts martial held on New Zealand troops 
concedes that more legal support was given to the accused than is generally recorded~ 
"Soldiers faced serious charges, ignorant of their position and usually totally unaware of 
procedure. They were completely dependent on the ability of their officers to speak on 
their behalf A "soldier's friend" was always appointed to represent the soldier at each 
court martial, but the transcripts are evidence that it was rare for this officer to play any 
part in the proceedings. ,,26 
This situation, of inadequate legal representation, did not persist in the case of 
either officers or spies tried by courts martial. The trial of spies was, naturally, a sensitive 
issue, especially as so many of them claimed to be citizens of neutral states. Indeed, of the 
23Entry for 17112/16, Captain E. A. Godson diary, lW.M., P.446. 

24Entries for 23112/16 and 111117, ibid. 

25Entry for 9/1117, ibid. 

26C. Pugsley, On the Fringe ofHe11. New Zealanders and Military Discipline in the First 

World War. Hodder & Stoughton, Auckland, 1991, pp.63-64. 
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twenty·eight spies tried by General Courts Martial in Britain during the First World War; 
four claimed to be Swedis~ four Dutc~ one Brazili~ three citizens of the United States 
of America, two Danis~ one Peruvi~ one Spanis~ three Swiss, one Norwegi~ one 
Belgian and only four German.27 With the eyes of the international community focused 
on these trials, many of the rough and ready methods of a court martial were dispensed 
with. For example, when Carl Hans Lody was tried by a General Court Martial the trial 
lasted for three days (the 30th. and 31st. October and 2nd. November 1914) and the court 
consisted of eight eminent officers, viz.; two full colonels, four lieutenant colonels and 
two majors. The prosecutor was, officially, Lieutenant Colonel S. H. God~ 3rd. 
Battalion, Scots Guards, but the prosecution was actually carried out by two civilian 
lawyers; Mr. A. H. Bodkin and Mr. Gattic, instructed by the Director of Public 
Prosecutions. The defence case was advanced by Mr. George Elliott, K.C. and Mr. 
Rowland Harker. Finally, the case was heard in the very unmilitary surroundings of the 
Guildhall, London.28 Thus the trial of spies was carried out in an atmosphere which 
resembled a civilian court much more closely than a typical court martial and as such the 
accused was always provided with a defence counsel. However, while superficially it may 
appear that a German spy was better represented at a court martial than the average 
British soldier, we should perhaps reflect that, in time of war, the trial of spies often 
served as show trials. The result was rarely in any doubt and the elaborate provision of 
defence counsel merely served to show Britain's adherence to international law. 
Two cases serve to illustrate the degree to which officers were represented at 
courts martial. Second Lieutenant John Henry Paterson of the 1st. Battalion, Essex 
Regiment was tried by a General Court Martial at Boulogne on the 11 tho September 1918, 
charged with desertion while on active service, the murder of Detective Sergeant H. A. 
27P.R.O., W093/49, p.l04. 

28A11 details from the transcript of the court martial ofCarl Hans Lody, W07111236. 
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Collinson, Military Foot Police, and five charges of forgery. He was represented by 
Lieutenant E. P. Walsh, Barrister at Law. However, the presence of a trained defence 
counsel did little to help Paterson's case, as he was found guilty of the first two charges 
and executed. The cross-examination of witnesses by Walsh was desperately ineffective 
and, indeed, possibly did some damage to Paterson's case when it was revealed that, far 
from being inexperienced in noting details correctly, Lance Corporal W. Stockton, 
Military Foot Police, the main prosecution witness for the murder charge, had been a 
railway detective in civilian life!29 
The case of Sub-Lieutenant Edwin Dyett, Royal Navy is a peculiar one, if only 
because he was tried by Field General Court Martial, when officers should only have been 
tried by General Courts Martial.30 Dyett was defended by Sub-Lieutenant Cecil Cameron 
Trevanion, Hawke Battalion, Royal Naval Division, who, in peace time, was a solicitor. If 
Second Lieutenant Paterson had been badly represented at his General Court Martial, 
Dyett, being charged with remaining absent from his battalion in the field on the 13th. 
November 1916 and conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline in that 
he did not go up to the front line when ordered to do so, was appallingly defended. 
Indeed, Leonard Sellers believes that the testimony of Acting Petty Officer H. C. Aimes, 
under cross examination by Trevanion that the; "Accused did not look as if he was afraid 
or in a funk. He looked as if he wanted to get out ofit,,,31 was probably the remark that 
secured Dyett's execution, coming, as it did, from ajunior rank. 
This issue, of the representation of the accused, does bring into question the much 
wider issue of how much officers and other ranks actually understood about military law. 
To deal with the officers first, it is quite clear that many, even quite senior officers, 
29All details from transcript of the court martial of Second Lieutenant J. H. Patterson, 
P.R.O., W07111028. 
30nyett was not alone in this see, P.R.O., W0213/1-28 for examples. 
31Cited in L. Sellers, For God's Sake Shoot Straight, p.43. 
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understood little about military law. For example, Major General Powell, the 
commanding officer of the 36th. (Ulster) Division, frequently held Field General Courts 
Martial in his division when it was based in Britain (these were only to be held 
overseas).32 Major Bullen-Smith, President of the court at the trial of Private Thomas 
Hope, 2nd. Battalion, Leinster Regiment was clearly acting in a conflict of interests, as he 
was also the accused's C.O ..33 Finally, many officers tried men with several charges that 
were very similar and vast numbers of officers who sat on courts martial resulted in the 
sentence being quashed, simply as the officers who sat on them did not have an adequate 
amount ofcommissioned service to legally be a member of the court. 34 
Ignorance of military law was not purely limited to temporary officers or those 
serving in New Army or Territorial Force units. Major-General 1. F. C. Fuller, while at 
Sandhurst in the period before the First World War recalled that; ''Military Law was a jest. 
Once a week for two hours at a stretch we sat in the classroom and read the Manual (of 
Military Law) and when we had exhausted those sections dealing with murder, rape and 
indecency, we either destroyed Her Majesty's property with our penknives or twiddled 
our thumbs.,,35 One would have thOUght that the influx of legally qualified men into the 
officer corps following the outbreak of war would have helped to remedy this situation, 
however, as P. H. Winfield noted; 
the lawyer-officer has the advantage of a professional training which 
enables him to seize a point quickly, to understand and to apply the rules of 
32See P.RO., W0811144, p.504 for a letter dated 22nd. April 1915, from the Judge 

Advocate General to the Commanding Officer, 36th. Division, relating to the cases of 

Privates 1. Hoey, W. Jordan, J. Burns and 1. Love, 9th. Battalion, Royal Inniskilling 

Fusiliers, who were all tried by Field General Courts Martial. 

33See transcript of the court martial ofPrivate T. Hope, P.RO., W0213/401. 

34See District Court Martial ledger, P.RO., W083/26 for examples. 

35Cited in G. R Rubin, ''The Legal Education ofBritish Army Officers, 1860-1923", 

Journal ofLegal History, vol. IS , no. 3, 1994, P.228. 
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evidence and correctly to weigh evidence given at the trial. To that extent he is 
better equipped than an officer without such technical education. But when this 
much has been granted, it is not so easy to see what, if any, superiority he has 
over an officer of the old regular army. Not many lawyers before they receive 
their commissions know much ofmilitary law. 36 
The point must also be made that no exceptions were made to the established 
system of selection for service on courts martial during the war and a legally qualified 
officer, like his unqualified counterpart, had to possess between one (for a Regimental 
Court Martial) and three (for a General Court Martial) years commissioned service before 
he could serve as a member of a court martial. 
If a relatively large number ofofficers were deficient in their knowledge of military 
law, most other ranks knew virtually nothing about it. The 908 page Manual of Military 
Law. is not exactly designed for the layman and most of it, if ever actually seen, by the 
typical pre-1914 regular army recruit must have been largely incomprehensible, given his 
educational background. Indeed, the employment backgrounds of pre-1914 recruits 
suggests that some were barely literate, as D. Fitzpatrick notes; 
Irish recruits, like their British counterparts, were typically unemployed 
lads in their late 'teens for whom the risks entailed by soldiery (casual violence, 
venereal disease, oppressive discipline, active service) were outweighed by its 
benefits (long-term employment, bed and board, camaraderie, adventure). In 
1909, less than one recruit in ten had a job at the time of enlistment; and the 
attestation of 'comer boys' or loungers was notoriously brisk in the vicinity of 
36p. H. Winfield, "Courts-Martial from the Lawyer's Point ofView", Law Quarterly 
Review, 1918, p.146. 
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public houses. Between 1905 and 1913, half of the recruits accepted in Ireland 
thought of themselves as unskilled urban workers such as porters, carters, 
servants or casual labourers. One-sixth were skilled workers, while the 
proportion with professional or clerical experience was negligible.37 
These employment backgrounds suggest that most pre-war regulars were poorly 
educated; indeed J. Fuller notes that between 1907 and 1913 seventy percent of British 
recruits had been unable to pass the educational standards set for eleven year old 
children.38 When this is compared with the intricacies of British military law, it is not 
surprising that so few regular soldiers put up a reasonable defence at courts martial. 
Private B. O'Connell of the lst. Battalion, Irish Guards, who, while he enlisted in 1916 
would appear to be similar to a pre-1914 recruit, evidently bewildered by the whole 
experience of being court martialled simply stated; "I can't read or write except my name. 
I did not realise it was a serious offence to leave the company nor that I would be 
punished. I left to find a woman in one of the villages. I intended to return to the 
battalion."39 One would expect soldiers of Kitchener and Territorial Force units, with 
their much more varied educational and social backgrounds, to be capable of offering 
more convincing defence cases at courts martial, but this rarely seems to be the case. 
However, in this context, it is worth considering Lieutenant Colonel H. M. Meyler's 
evidence, given before the Committee Appointed to Consider Proposed Amendments to 
the Army Act, which sat in 1924, in which he stated; "The argument that I shall develop is 
that it is the uneducated and stupid soldiers only who get arrested after desertion whilst 
37D. Fitzpatrick, " A Militarised Society, 1900-22", in T. Bartlett and K. Jeffery (eds.) A 

Military History of Ireland, C. u.P., 1996, p.381. 

38J. G. Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture in the British and Dominion Armies, 

Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, p.47. 

39Transcript of the court martial ofPrivate B. O'Connell, P.RO., W071/659. 
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the more clever ones get clear away and do not return until a war is over:'"'o It is, of 
course, impossible to verifY this statement; while some men tried by courts martial were 
clearly educationally backward, it may have been the case that soldiers did not want to 
question authority by defending themselves, believing, instead that the paternalism of the 
army would protect them. 
Lastly, on this issue, we should recognise that in civilian courts in this period few 
working class people would have offered a convincing defence case, especially if being 
tried in a magistrates court for a crime such as drunk: and disorderly; where the evidence 
ofa police officer would almost invariably be believed rather than their own. Equally, few 
working class or lower middle class defendants could afford legal representation in court. 
The 1903 Poor Prisoner's Defence Act did make some tentative moves towards providing 
what we would recognise today as legal aid, however, as A. H. Manchester notes of this 
Act; 
either the magistrates who were committing an accused person for trial, or 
the judge before the hearing of the trial, might certifY for legal aid. Thereupon 
solicitor and counsel might be assigned at public expense. Yet there were serious 
draw-backs. In particular the Act limited legal aid to those prisoners who had 
discarded their defences, nor did the Act provide for legal aid before commital.41 
Therefore, as far as the legal education of other ranks is concerned, this was 
virtually non-existent. However, having said this, we should recognise that many working 
class people would have been equally bewildered if tried by a civil court. Indeed, P. H. 
4Op.R.O., W093/49, p.4S. 

41A. H. Manchester, AModern Legal History ofEngland and Wales. 1750-1950, 

Butterworths, London, 1980, p.1 00. 
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Wmfield suggested that courts martial were, in many ways, more favourable to those 
without any legal knowledge, than civil courts, commenting that; 
the court does not relish attempts on the part of the prosecutor to get a 
conviction at all costs. Courts martial, in practice as well as in theory, go further 
than this, and many a question which would be unexceptional if asked by the 
prosecutor at any assize or quarter-sessions court may incur a disapproval at a 
court martial which is none the less damaging to the prosecutor because it is 
silent; he may hear nothing of it till the trial is over and even then only by indirect 
channels.42 
So far, some elements of how courts martial were conducted; namely how the 
court was comprised and the legal knowledge of officers and other ranks in relation to 
how effectively they offered their defence, have been considered. Some attention must 
also be paid to the issues of witnesses at courts martial, where courts martial where held 
and the issue ofofficers acting as judges. 
The number of witnesses attending courts martial was never very large. In 
Second-Lieutenant J. H. Paterson's General Court Martial, twelve witnesses appeared 
(ten for the prosecution and two for the defence)43 while, more typically, at Private James 
Cassidy's Field General Court Martial, four witnesses, all for the prosecution appeared.44 
These small numbers can be accounted for by the fact that where, for example, a man had 
deserted from his unit before a major action and had been absent for a number of months, 
few men from his unit would remember him by the time he was apprehended. Indeed at 
42p. H. Winfield, "Courts martial from a lawyer's point ofview", p.148. 

43Transcript ofthe court martial of Second Lieutenant J. H. Patterson, P.R.O., 

W07111 028. 

44Transcript of the court martial ofPrivate 1. Cassidy, P.R.O., W071/484. 
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Cassidy's trial, Private T. Connolly, 1st. Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers was called 
as the first prosecution witness and after testifYing that Cassidy had deserted between nine 
and eleven in the morning of the 23rd, June 1916, mournfully stated; "I am the only man 
left in the platoon.'>4S 
The small number of witnesses was not a serious problem in most cases, but, at 
least in the case of one Irish soldier, a number of key witnesses were not present at his 
trial. Lance-Corporal Peter Sands, 1st. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, was tried on the 
30th. August 1915 for, when on active service, deserting His Majesty's service and losing 
government property; a bicycle worth £7 lOs Od. Unlike most regular soldiers, Sands 
offered a coherent and, in the circumstances of early 1915, almost believable, defence. He 
claimed that on leave in Belfast he lost his travel warrant and when he went to the depot 
to obtain a new one the Corporal on duty denied all responsibility for Sands. Sands then 
stated; "I then went away. Had I decided to desert I would have worn plain clothes, but 
up to the time I was arrested I always wore uniform.'>46 Crucially, no officer or other 
rank (Sands identified the N.C.O. who had sent him away from the depot as Corporal 
Wright) from the Royal Irish Rifles depot appeared at the Field General Courts Martial, 
neither did Constable J. W. Clarke of the Royal Irish Constabulary, who had arrested 
Sands. While it is perhaps understandable that witnesses, especially a police officer, could 
not be expected to travel to a war zone it should be noted that Sands could have been 
tried in the United Kingdom and that the court did not even write to the depot to clarifY 
the situation. Therefore, in at least one Field General Court Martial involving Irish troops, 
the number ofwitnesses present was clearly insufficient. 
Another allegation made against the convening of Field General Courts Martial by 
Anthony Babington is that they were held in cramped rooms in estiments, so that no 
4Sibid. 

46Transcript of the court martial ofLance Corporal P. Sands, P.R.O., W0711432. 
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members of the public could attend.47 Rather bizarrely, the only definitive example of 
closed courts which has been discovered relates to Field General Courts Martial held in 
the United Kingdom, namely those held in Dublin following the 1916 Easter Rising and, 
even here, there is some doubt. The Judge Advocate General writing on the issue noted; 
In the first place enquiry should be made whether any order for exclusion 
of the public was in fact made, or any member ofthe public seeking admittance in 
fact excluded, ... , F.G.C.M. can therefore only be held in the u.K. at all in the 
event of invasion or armed rebellion normally they are held in a country beyond 
the seas, and it is impossible to apply to them the ordinary rules as to admission 
of the public. In these cases the public would mean foreigners, enemies or 
rebels, ... , The justification for holding the trials in question in camera was that 
the rebellion was in progress, that the safety of the court and witnesses would 
have been endangered, and that information might have reached the enemy and 
the rebels which it was desirable in the public interest that they should not 
48possess.
However, on this point, it should be noted that few venues where Field General 
Courts Martial were held could have been less luxurious or well equipped than some civil 
courts, for example the Petty Sessions Court in the Old Market house, Ballycastle, County 
Antrim.49 Equally, C. P. Crane, who was a Resident Magistrate in County Sligo before 
the war, noted the variety of surroundings in which courts were held; 
47A. Babington, For the Sake ofExample., p.14. 

48Judge Advocate General's minute book, P.R.O., W083/26, pp.S09-13. 

49This building has been rebuilt at the Ulster Folk and Transport Museum, CuItra, County 

Down. 
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The courts in which all this 'amusement' occurred varied in size and 
dignity, from the somewhat pretentious, Corinthian-pillared edifice guarded by 
two guns captured at Sebastopol, which graced the county town, where assizes, 
quarter sessions and petty sessions were held, to the little whitewashed, thatched 
cabin in the remote country district, with its mud floor and bare rafters, and, in 
winter weather, its pungent smell ofturf smoke mingled with wet frieze. so 
Another allegation made against the courts martial system was that the officers 
trying the case understood very little about the accused's circumstances. In this context, 
one enduring myth, that it was mostly staff officers who sat on courts martial, should be 
laid to rest. Certainly, as the war progressed, special court martial officers were attached 
to G.H.Q. and would attend courts martial as Judge Advocates. However, the numbers of 
such officers was never large, during the Great War Judge Advocates were present at just 
326 courts martial and, even these legally qualified officers could make mistakes as five of 
the sentences passed by these courts were later quashed, one partially quashed and one 
partially not confinned.Sl Equally, the role of Judge Advocate was to advise other 
members of the court, not to sit in judgement or to act for the prosecution and the 
members of the court were, certainly in the case of Field General Courts Martial, 
front-line infantry officers. These men clearly had a good understanding of the privations 
which men suffered in the trenches, but at the same time a yawning class difference 
between officers and other ranks remained, to a large extent, throughout the Great War. 
Again, on this point, it is worth considering the civilian comparisons. In 1906 the 
property qualification for Justices of the Peace was removed, as T. Skynne notes; 
SOC. P. Crane, Memories ofa Resident Magistrate, 1880-1920, T&A Constable Ltd., The 

University Press, Edinburgh, 1938, p.195. 
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this change finally broke the link between the magistracy and the landed 
gentry. Even before the Royal Commission (of 1909) the county benches had 
become less exclusive, and after 1911 they began to include numbers of 
individuals who were unconnected with landed property and who were also 
drawn more evenly from the two political parties. On the other hand there was 
little sign on county benches of the working-class men whom the Royal 
Commission wished to see appointed. This was not because of any deliberate 
policy on the part of the committees to exclude the working class. It was due 
partly to a tendency of the committees to choose persons who occupied 
prominent positions in public life and whose capability could be judged by their 
performance in other fields, but the principal reason was that it proved to be far 
more difficult than had been expected to find members of working-class men, and 
later women, who were both suitable for appointment and also able and willing to 
serve.52 
It should also be noted that trial by jury was not common in Edwardian civil 
courts. By 1900, less than one-eighth of trials in Ireland were by jury. 53 Johnson further 
noted that jury trial; ''was supposed to represent judgement by one's peers, although, in 
nineteenth century Britain, given the property qualification for jurors, there was frequently 
a wide social gulf between those in the jury box and those in the dock.,,54 
Therefore, in a civil court, the working-class accused would normally face a class 
difference between himself and a magistrate or judge which would often be as great as 
that between a soldier and officer at a court martial. Equally, as D. Philips points out 
52T. Skyrme, History of the Justices of the Peace, Barry Rose Publishers, Chichester, 

1994, p.686. 

53D. Johnson, "Trial by Jury in Ireland, 1860-1914", Legal History, vo1.17, no.3, 1996, 

p.271. 
54ibid, p.289. 
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many of the ''new type" ofJ.P. s who had emerged from the mid-nineteenth century, in the 
Midlands were industrialists and factory owners, who frequently tried their own 
employees at quarter or petty sessions for work related crimes. 55 An officer, as a 
member of a court martial, trying a soldier from his own unit, was at least as impartial in 
his judgement as these civilian magistrates. 
Another allegation frequently made against the courts martial system is that the 
trials were over in a very short period of time. Indeed, most trials seem to have been 
conducted in about one hour or less. Captain W. A. Montgomery noted in a letter of 
January 1917, that four Field General Courts Martial cases on which he had sat were 
completed in two and a half hours.56 Equally, Major Walter Guinness of the lIth. 
Battalion, Cheshire Regiment, remembered presiding over a court martial (presumably a 
Field General Court Martial) which tried five cases on 18th. September 1916.57 Of 
course, some court martial cases would be relatively cut and dried, for example cases of 
drunkenness, whereas we would expect cases involving capital offences to have been 
given more consideration. Again, a comparison with civil courts can be made, as Clive 
Emsley notes; "During the eighteenth and early nineteenth century most criminal trials 
were over in a matter of minutes, they rarely seem to have taken as long as an hour.,,58 
Further, Emsley makes the point that from the mid-nineteenth century civil trials had 
taken more time as juries then retired to consider their verdict, rather than grouping in a 
huddle in the middle of the court room. As courts martial did not consist of juries, the 
military practice in this, as in so many other issues, is not completely detached from the 
civilian precedent. 
55D. Philips, Crime and Authority in Victorian England; The Black Country, 1835-1860, 
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56Letter, Montgomery to his parents, 30/1117, P.R.O.N.I., D.2794/11112 1. 
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The sample of courts martial examined has shown that a number of serious legal 
mistakes were made~ of which the conflict of interest shown by Major Bullen-Smith in 
Private Thomas Hope's trial, the lack of crucial defence witnesses at Private Sands trial 
and the lack of 'prisoners' friends" have already been discussed. The failure to examine 
men tried by courts martial in relation to serious crimes for shell shock was another 
serious flaw in the courts martial system. Babington comments that; "It was most unusual 
in the early stages of the war for a soldier under sentence of death to be examined by a 
doctor.,,59 While this was the case, by 1916 medical boards frequently examined men 
being tried by Field General Courts Martial. In the case of Private J. Carey, 8th. 
Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers, tried on 21 st. August 1916 for desertion, the accused 
stated; "I lose my head in the trenches at times and 1 do not know what 1 am doing at all. 
My family is aftlicted the same way. My father committed suicide over it. My brother's 
death in the Phoenix Park, five years ago on 17th. March 1911 was due to the same 
thing.'>60 This resulted in an eminent medical board consisting of Colonel A. Brennan, 
Assistant Director of Medical Services, 16th. (Irish) Division (president), Major G. F. 
Sheehan, RA.M.C. and Captain George Buchanan, RA.M.C. examining the accused. 
They concluded that Carey was; "of sound mind at the present time and there is no 
evidence to suppose that he was insane on the 15th. June 1916.'>61 
However, Private James Cassidy of the lst. Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, 
who was tried on 28th. June 1916 claimed that after a shell landed beside him and covered 
him in clay; ''I got nerve shock and proceeded down the trenches;>62 was not examined 
by a doctor. This was probably because, being apprehended in Belfast, Ireland, his crime 
was clearly deliberate involving as it did, two sea crossings and three rail connections, 
59aabington, For the Sake ofExample, p.25. 

60Transcript ofthe court martial ofPrivate J. Carey, P.RD., WD711500. 

61ibid. 

62Transcript of the court martial ofPrivate J. Cassidy, P.RD., WD711484. 
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which could hardly have been made by a man in a dazed state of shell shock. It is also 
clear that, later in the war, many men, like Cassidy, used the term shell-shock as an excuse 
for their actions. Nevertheless, the failure to have all men carefully examined by medical 
authorities in such cases was a major failing of the courts martial process. 
A number of other problems arose at courts martial, which generally saw the 
sentence passed quashed. One has only to examine any of the Judge Advocate General's 
minute books63 to find courts wrongly constituted, mainly as members of the court did 
not hold sufficient commissioned service to be sitting in judgement. Equally, the 
sentences against Privates J. Doyle and 1. Dunne of the 6th. Battalion, Royal Dublin 
Fusiliers and Private F. Lahiff, 7th. Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers were quashed as; 
a Captain of the 6th. B[attalio]n., Royal Dublin Fusiliers and a Lieutenant 
of the 7th. B[attalio]n., Royal Munster Fusiliers served on the court in each case 
in place of a Captain of the 6th. B[attalio]n., Royal Munster Fusiliers and a 
Captain of the 7th. B[attalio]n. Royal Munster Fusiliers as appointed by the 
Convening Order; and the Courts therefore had no jurisdiction. 64 
Another problem was with wrongly completed paperwork. The case of Private F. 
Dillon is an extreme, if not untypical example, the Judge Advocate General's Office 
noting; 
With reference to your letter of the 23rd. inst., I am directed by the Judge 
Advocate General to return the proceedings in the case of Pte. Francis Dillon, 
6th. (S.[ervice]) B[attalio]n., Connaught Rangers, and to point out that; 
63 A good example is P. R. 0., W083/23. 

64Judge Advocate General's letter book, P.R.O., W083/20, p.246. 
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1) The attestation forms of the accused ought to have been attached to the 
proceedings. 
2) The accused confesses to having fraudulently enlisted on December 23rd. 
whereas the first charge on the sheet alleges Dec. 21 st. as the date of such 
enlistment. 
3) The second charge upon the second charge sheet should not have been 
proffered (See note 5 to section 10 ofthe Army Act). 
4) There is no evidence in the summary with reference to the surrender of the 
accused to the military authorities on February 1st. 
5) There is no certificate on P.1 as required by the notes on P.679 of the M[anual 
of] M[ilitary] L[ aw]. 65 
Admittedly these examples are taken from units based in the United Kingdom, but 
it should be noted that within six months of these errors occurring these units were all on 
active service. Taken together this catalogue ofmistakes demonstrates that many officers, 
especially in New Army units, were almost completely unfamiliar with the intricacies of 
courts martial proceedings. Writing on his own legal training, Captain Montgomery, a 
New Army officer in the 36th. (Ulster) Division noted; 
I have had to make up a lot of law, both military and civil and also, of 
course get a real good practical working knowledge of the rules of evidence. It 
is like everything else, I have had to pick it up by doing it in real earnest. No 
fancy courses or other luxury of that kind - just go and do it and may the Lord 
have mercy on you if you make a mess of it. I have been lucky enough up to 
65Judge Advocate General's letter book, P.R.O., W0811144, p.47, entry for 26/2115. 
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now. I haven't even had a case returned to me. It is largely a matter of luck 
however.66 
This lack of knowledge and resulting ineptitude led to a great deal of time lost, as 
the Judge Advocate General's office had little hesitation in quashing cases where the 
proper procedure had not been followed. 
Having now considered the courts martial system and some of the problems 
experienced in administering it during the Great War, it is important to consider the 
second stage of the process in capital cases; the comments attached to courts martial 
hearings by commanding officers. Before considering this situation the point must be 
re-iterated that, with a few exceptions, only the case transcripts for men actually executed 
were available for inspection., and one must concede that those available are therefore 
almost totally unrepresentative. 
As a general rule, it would be safe to concede that soldiers who received wholly 
complimentary comments from their commanding officers were almost always reprieved. 
Indeed, C.O.s were very reluctant to send a man clearly guilty of desertion for court 
martial. John Lucy, who at the time was working in the orderly room of the 2nd. 
Battalion., Royal Irish Rifles, remembered that the battalion's adjutant, who was collecting 
evidence against a deserter, connived to have the man found insane. This was as much 
out of a desire to maintain the good reputation of the battalion., as out of a concern for 
this deserter!67 
Likewise Lieutenant Colonel Denys Reitz was relieved when two privates came to 
see him to confirm that a suspected deserter in the 7th. Battalion., Royal Irish Rifles had 
actually been in hospital during the period he was missing from his battalion. Reitz, who 
66Letter from Montgomery to his parents, 30th. January 1917, P.R.O.N.J., 
D.2794/111121. 
67J. F. Lucy, There's a Devil in the Drum, Faber and Faber Ltd., London, 1938, pp.295-6. 
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was preparing the case against this soldier to transmit to brigade, simply tore up the 
casenotes!68 
Nevertheless, the C.O.'s comments still merit attention for two important reasons. 
Firstly, to consider to what extent men were executed 'for the sake of example', rather 
than out of any real sense of justice, and; secondly, to consider how well the system 
designed for a small, professional army, coped with the mass armies of 1914-18. Equally 
Pugsley has raised this as an issue by stating of these commanding officers' comments; 
"Such submissions were mandatory for each death sentence. They could save or condemn 
the accused based on the judgement of the commanding officer and whoever he chose to 
consult. This proved to be a trial after the trial, but one where the odds were stacked 
against the defendant. ,~9 
Clearly numbers ofmen were executed largely due to disciplinary problems in their 
unit. However, having said this, commanding officers' comments on their characters and 
their number of previous convictions must also have influenced the decision as to whether 
they were executed or not. For example, if we take the case of Private T. Murphy, 2nd. 
Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, tried on the 30th. April 1917 for desertion. 
Brigadier-General L. 1. Ashburger, 96th. Infantry Brigade noted~ 
The state of discipline in the Battalion is at present bad. There have been 
six convictions for desertion since 1 st. April last, .., I strongly recommend the 
sentence of the Court be put into execution. At the time Private Murphy 
desertion it appeared probable that the Brigade would shortly be engaged. This 
combined with the prevalence of this particular offence in this battalion during 
the period the Brigade was engaged in arduous operations, under the most 
68D. Reitz, Trekking On. Faber and Faber Ltd., London, 1933, pp.183-4. 
6~gsley, On the Fringe ofHeU, p.128. 
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inclement weather conditions, makes it essential, if discipline is to be upheld, to 
make an example ofthis man. 70 
Clearly this illustrates that Ashburger felt that an exemplary case was needed to 
reinforce discipline in the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. However, it is 
impossible to discover whether it was this factor that led to Murphy's execution or other 
circumstances, namely that he was clearly guilty of desertion and had eight previous 
military offences, including; breaking out of his billet, hesitating to obey an N.C.O.s order, 
and being absent from his billet for five days. It should be stressed that Murphy was not 
unique in having previous offences, of the twenty one Irish cases examined in depth; 
twelve had at least one previous offence. Equally, many of these men had a string of 
serious military offences before them; for example Rifleman I. Templeton, 15th. Battalion, 
Royal Irish Rifles, tried for desertion on the 26th. February 1916 had five previous 
offences, viz; 1) 27112115, Absent from parade. Seven days field punishment number one 
awarded by commanding officer. 2) 2011116, Disobeying an N.C.O.'s order. 28 days 
field punishment number one awarded by commanding officer. 3) 29/1116, Absent from 
working parade. 14 days field punishment number one awarded by commanding officer. 
4) 18/2116, Absent from parade. 28 days field punishment number one awarded by 
commanding officer. 5) 12/2116, Absent from parade. Seven days field punishment 
number one awarded by commanding officer. 71 
Other soldiers had a smaller number of cases, although these were of a more 
serious nature. For example, Private I. Carey of the 8th. Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers, 
tried on the 21 st. August 1916 on two counts of desertion by Field General Court Martial 
had two previous offences, namely; 1) 18/8/16, At Southampton. Absent when under 
70Transcript of the court martial ofPrivate T. Murphy, P.R.O., W071/557. 
71All details from transcript of the court martial ofRifleman 1. Templeton, P.R.O., 
W0711454. 
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orders for active service. 14 days detention awarded by commanding officer. 2) 4/5/16, 
Desertion; found guilty of being absent without leave. 90 days field punishment one, 
awarded by Field General Court Martial. 72 
The most extreme example of previous offences encountered in this sample was in 
the case of Private W. Hanna of the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers, tried for 
desertion on 16th. October 1917. He had two previous offences; firstly there was a 
charge ofdesertion tried by Field General Court Martial on 9th. August 1915. Hanna was 
sentenced to death on this charge, but had his sentence commuted to ten years penal 
servitude by Lieutenant General Sir Brian Mahon, G.O.C., 10th. (Irish) Division. This 
sentence was suspended. Secondly, Hanna was tried on the 29th. August 1917 for 
breaking out of camp. He was sentenced, probably by his C.O., to 14 days field 
punishment number one. 73 
It should be stressed at this point that the element ofpour les encouragement de 
les aulres was not present in all these capital cases. For example, in the case of Rifleman 
S. McBride of the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, tried for desertion on the 25th. 
November 1916, Major H. P. Goodman, commanding officer of the battalion stated; "I 
can find no reason why the extreme penalty should not be inflicted in this case beyond 
that, in the interests of the Battalion's discipline, I do not consider an example 
necessary."74 Brigadier-General Bitthill, 74th. Infantry Brigade, echoed this, noting; "I 
am of opinion that the crime was deliberately committed, ..., and that there is no reason 
why the extreme penalty should not be inflicted. I took over command of this B[riga]de. 
on October 16th., 1916, I am quite satisfied with the state ofdiscipline in the regiment."75 
72Transcript of the court martial ofPrivate 1. Carey, P.RO., W0711500. 
73Transcript of the court martial ofPrivate W. Hanna, P.RO., W0711611. 
74Transcript ofthe court martial ofRifleman S. Mc Bride, P.RO., Kew, W0711529. 
75ibid. 
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Sometimes, it appears that officers felt that men should be executed, not to 
provide examples, but as they were ''bad'' soldiers. Major William B. Ewart, 
Commanding Officer of the 15th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, noted of Rifleman J. 
Templeton ofhis unit, tried on 26th. February 1916 for desertion; 
1) This man's character is poor, indeed, and his general conduct is always open 
to complaint, he is naturally ofa stubborn disposition and requires a great deal of 
his attention, for some reason this only applies to his case for the past 3 months, 
his offences previously were ofa minor nature. 
He came to France with the Unit on 4th. October 1915. 
2) He no doubt left the Front Line deliberately but doubtless looked at his action 
as any of his previous ones and did not realise how serious an offence he was 
committing, no case of this nature having previously occurred in the Battalion or 
within the knowledge ofthe men. 
3) While in the Trenches I cannot speak highly of this man's character and have 
no experience ofhim as a fighter, so could form no definite opinion. 76 
Some officers in service battalions appear to have felt that exemplary executions 
were needed, not because ofindiscipline in their unit, but as wartime volunteers needed to 
be shown the power of military law. This is particularly clear in Lieutenant-Colonel F. P. 
Crozier's comments on Private James Crozier (no relation), 9th. Battalion, Royal Irish 
Rifles, sentenced to death for desertion in February 1916. Again this commanding officer 
also picked up on the individual concerned being a ''bad'' soldier~ 
76Transcript ofthe court martial ofRifleman J. Templeton, P.R.O., W0711454. 
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1) From a fighting point of view this soldier is of no value - His behaviour has 
been that of a 'shirker' for the past 3 months. He has been with the 
Exped.[itionary] Force since 3/10/15. 
2) I am firmly of opinion that the crime was deliberately committed with the 
intention of avoiding duty in the Redan, more particularly as he absented himself 
shortly after the case ofanother soldier had been promulgated for a similar crime. 
The officer commanding the man's company is of the same opinion. Sentence 
was remitted in the case mentioned~ to 2yrs. H[ ard] L[ abour]. 77 
Brigadier-General Wittycombe, General Officer Commanding 107th. Infantry 
Brigade, made it clear that an example was not needed in Crozier's battalion, stating; "The 
discipline ofthe 9th. R[oyal] I.[rish] Rifles is good for a service Battalion."78 
A key element of British military law was that an officer should be able to give a 
reference relating to any soldier under his command. In the early months of the war, 
officers in regular units were able to do this. For example, Major 1. F. Frefusis, 1st. 
Battalion, Irish Guards, was able to remark of Private A. Smyth, sentenced to death for 
desertion on the 19th. January 1915; "I have known this man all his service (Smythe had 
enlisted in 1909) personally."79 However, by 1916 this system had broken down in 
regular army units due to the high casualty rates amongst both officers and other ranks. 
In the case of Private S. Mc Bride, 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, it would appear that 
both his conduct sheet and officers who knew him were unavailable, leaving Sergeant 
Kelly to recall on oath; "I have known the accused since February 1916. He has been in 
77Transcript ofthe court martial ofRifleman J. Crozier, P.RO., W0711450. See chapter 
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my platoon since then. So far as [I] have known him he has always been a good, steady 
and willing soldier.,,80 
In Kitchener units, this reference system survived until late 1916. When Private J. 
Carey, 8th. Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers was sentenced to death with a recommendation 
to mercy on grounds of defective intellect on 19th. September 1916 his commanding 
officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart was able to state~ ''His character from a fighting point 
of view is quite useless, ... , In my opinion the crime was deliberately committed to avoid 
going into the front line. He always had enough intelligence to find himself out of range 
ofguns.,,81 However, as early as March 1916 Major William B. Ewart felt himself unable 
to give an indication of Rifleman J. Templeton 'from a fighting point of view' and only 
supplied this under pressure from his superiors. 82 
By 1917 it would appear that this system had basically collapsed. No notes 
whatsoever are provided on the characters of Privates J. Hepple, 1 st. Battalion, Royal 
Inniskilling Fusiliers (executed on 29th. June 1917), 1. Wishart, 7th. Battalion, Royal 
Inniskilling Fusiliers (executed on 15th. June 1917) and M. Monaghan, 1 st. Battalion, 
Royal Dublin Fusiliers (executed on 9th. November 1917).83 Meanwhile, in the case of 
Private T. Murphy, 2nd. Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, executed on 14th. May 
1917, no officer below the rank ofBrigadier-General commented on the case, and he only 
considered the state of discipline in the battalion, not Murphy's character.84 Thus, in the 
face of a rapid turnover of personnel, the old paternalism of the British regular army, so 
deeply embedded in the courts martial system through this referencing system, 
disappeared. This is further reinforced by the fact that, of the above soldiers, Privates 
80Transcript of the court martial of Rifleman S. Mc Bride" P.RO., W0711529. 

81Transcript of the court martial ofPrivate 1. Carey, P.R.O., W071/500. 

82Transcript of the court martial ofRifleman 1. Templeton, P.RO., W0711454. 

83The transcripts of these cases are, P.RO., W0711571, W0711563, and W0711613. 

84Transcript of the trial ofPrivate T. Murphy, 2nd. Battalion, Royallnniskilling Fusiliers, 

P.RO., Kew, W0711557. 
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Hanna and Murphy were tried by Field General Courts Martial where none of the officers 
from their own battalion were members of the court. 
However, the fact that the only two Irish soldiers to be executed by courts martial 
during the Great War who were represented by a "prisoner's friend" were tried in July 
1918, might suggest that the old paternalism was still alive in some of the Irish units, 
namely, the 1st. Battalion, Irish Guards and 2nd. Battalion, Leinster Regiment,85 albeit in 
a very different form. This we would expect in the Guards, which tried to maintain 
pre-war standards; but the fact that it occurred in the 2nd. Battalion, Leinster Regiment 
and, frankly, that the defence offered was totally ineffective, may suggest that the army 
was more concerned with appeasing public opinion in Ireland than the officers in the 
battalions concerned were in defending their own men. 
Once a court martial had made its ruling, the case notes and officers' comments 
had to be sent to the Judge Advocate General's office. It has often been alleged that one 
of the greatest failings of the British courts martial system was that there was no appeals 
system. Strictly speaking, of course there was no appeals structure avaliable to those 
found guilty by courts martial.86 However, in a very real sense the Judge Advocate 
General's office did act as an appeal court. Large numbers of cases were either quashed 
or amended.87 In some ways, the system was fairer than the civilian appeals procedure; 
85The soldiers so represented were Private B. O'Connell (see, P.RO., W0711659) and 
Private H. Hendricks (see P.RO., W0711661). 
86War Office, Manual ofMilitary Law, p.120. In September 1918 a Mrs. Barffappealed 
to the Privy Council, in an attempt to have her husband's court martial verdict overturned. 
The Judge Advocate General's view was that; "In the event ofany miscarriage ofjustice 
the only Appeal is by way ofmemorial to the Crown acting through the Secretary of 
State. It is the usual practice to refer the matter to the l[udge] A.[dvocate] G.[eneral] 
and ifneed be to the Law Officers of the Crown for report, that no innocent man may 
suffer from error in the tribunal." (Letter, Judge Advocate General to the Secretary, Privy 
Council Office, 11/9/18, Judge Advocate General's letterbook, P.RO., W083/32). 
87For example, in the case ofsoldiers serving on the Western Front, in Irish regiments, of 
5,645 tried by court martial between the arrival of their units in France and the Armistice, 
1,917 (or 34%)had their sentence altered, in some way, following the submission of the 
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all courts martial cases were subject to scrutiny to insure that proper procedures had been 
followed. An interesting comparison with civil courts is that between 1909 and 1912 the 
Court of Criminal Appeal heard an average of only 450 applications to appeal and 170 
actual appeals, per annum. 88 
Equally, it should be noted that between 1914 and 1918 of the 97 people 
sentenced to death by civil courts in the United Kingdom. 40 were executed, 43 had their 
sentence commutted to penal servitude and only three had their convictions quashed by 
the Court of Criminal Appeal.89 This compares very unfavourably to the situation in the 
B.E.F., where just 10.82% ofmen sentenced to death were actually executed.90 
The Judge Advocate General frequently made drastic changes to the rulings of 
courts martial. For example, Rifleman W. Robinson of the 1st. Battalion, Royal Irish 
Rifles, who was sentenced to death by a Field General Court Martial on 21st. May 1915, 
had this commuted to three months field punishment number one!91 Equally, a wide 
variety of sentences were simply quashed, presumably as there had been some irregularity 
in the procedure or composition of the court martial. 
Of course, to date, it seems to have been suggested that the Judge Advocate 
General's office was the final arbiter in the courts martial process. This was not the legal 
position of the Judge Advocate General's office, which was responsible to civilian control 
through the Secretary of State for War and it was on this government minister's authority 
that cases were quashed or remitted. However, given the burden of work dealt with by 
Kitchener in the early years of the war, it would seem that Lord Haldane dealt with courts 
case transcript to the Judge Advocate General. Ofthese cases, 161 were quashed. These 

figures have been calculated using the database contained in appendix 6. 

88W. R Cornish, Law and Society in England 1750-1950. Sweet and Maxwell, London, 

1989, p.620. 

89pigures compiled from. Royal Commission on Capital Punishment. 1949-53 Report, 

Cmd. 8932, H.M.S.O., London, 1953, pp.298-9. 

9OP.RO., W093/49, p.73. 

91See appendix 6 (Irish Western Front database) for full details of this case. 
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martial review from August 1914 to May 1915.92 From May 1915 it would seem that F. 
E. Smith, as Solicitor General and later Attorney General took over this responsibility, 
until he left office.93 The role of the Commander in Chief, British Expeditionary Force, is 
unclear. It is certain that Sir John French and later Sir Douglas Haig were given the final 
decision as to whether or not an execution should be carried out on a man serving under 
their command, but their responsibility does not appear to have extended any further. 
The Judge Advocate General's office consisted of very few staff and it is incredible 
that courts martial records were so carefully scrutinised. On the 22nd. January 1918 the 
office employed nine officers, five civilian staff, three male clerks and messengers, three 
boy clerks and five woman clerks.94 Closer examination of the military officers employed 
in the office reveals that, of the eleven officers working there in April 1918, eight were 
qualified barristers and three solicitors. Interestingly, of this eleven, five were Territorial 
Force officers and two, Second Lieutenants Reginald R. Croon-Johnson and Frank C. 
Motto of the 14th. Battalion, Royal Welsh Fusiliers, had only thirteen months and one and 
a half years commissioned service respectively and, therefore, while both Barristers, 
neither would have been eligible to sit on a District, General or Field General Courts 
Martial themselves!95 
The Judge Advocate General's office was very much a "Cinderella service" in 
other respects. By May 1918 more office space was desperately needed.96 The 
employment of civilian staff was severely curtailed by the introduction of conscription and 
by May 1917 civilian clerks were working up to thirty hours overtime per week. 97 
92M. and E. Brock (eds.) H. H. Asquith; Letters to Venetia Stanley, O.UP., Oxford, 
1982, p.338. 

93Second Earl ofBirkenhead, The Life ofF E Smith. First Earl ofBirkenbead. Eyre and 

Spottiswoode, London, 1959, p.397. 

94Judge Advocate General's minute book, P.R.O., W083/30, pp.434-5. 

95Judge Advocate General's minute book, P.R.O., W083/31, pp.131-3. 

%Judge Advocate General's minute book, P.R.O., W083/31, p.301. 

97Judge Advocate General's minute book, P.R.O., W083/27, p.735. 

144 

Equally, in Apri11918 the Judge Advocate General complained that he was not receiving 
War Office circulars regularly, or even at all.98 
With this small military and civilian staff, a great deal of work had to be 
transacted. The Judge Advocate General outlined the role of his office on 13th. May 
1917; 
The work at present consists ofthe following: 
A) Renewing the proceedings of all G[eneral] F.[ield] G.[eneral] and D.[istrict] 

C.[ourt] M.[artials] and Mil[itary] Courts which now amount on an average to 

1,200 per week. 

B) Advising on:­
1. Ques[tions] submitted by the W[ar] O[ffice]. 
2. Ques[tions] submitted by G[eneral] O[fficers] C[ommanding] with 
regard to confirmation ofproceedings and otherwise. 
3. The charges and evidence in the case of all G.[eneral] C.[ourt] M.[artials] in 
the UK.. 
4. The charges and evidence in all cases offraud in the U.K.. 
5. Questions submitted by D[eputy] J[udge] A[dvocate] G[enerals] in all 
parts ofthe world. 
6. Questions submitted by any other Military Authority.99 
Front line officers took very different views of the role of the Judge Advocate 
General's office in amending sentences. Captain W. A. Montgomery. 9th. Battalion. 
Royal Irish Rifles, writing to his family stated; 
98Judge Advocate General's minute book, P.R.O., W083!31, p.31. 
99Judge Advocate General's minute book, P.R.O., W083!27, p.933. 
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I still continue to do lots of legal and judicial work. I am President of a 
Court again tomorrow. Field General Court Martial work is very interesting, 
very practical, very quick and very safe provided that evidence is recorded fairly 
at both the taking of the Summary ofEvidence prior to the trial and again during 
the trial, it is very, very unlikely that a miscarriage might occur in any case. 
There are so many reviewing and commuting authorities above the Court 
President who have the benefit of the advice ofexperienced barristers. There are 
excellent safeguards all along the line of whole procedure. It is all singularly free 
from red tape. 100 
The 4th. Division Staff took a rather different view of the system, noting; 
A protest sent on the tone of a minute by D.J.A.G. imputing carelessness 
to B[riga]de. Staff and to Court in the case of a Court Martial, the decisions of 
the D.lA.G. have caused dis-satisfaction as it is obvious he does not make any 
allowances for it is doubtful if he realises the difficult conditions under which 
Courts Martial have to be conducted in the front lines. 101 
Few private soldiers make any reference to courts martial. One member of the 
36th. (Ulster) Division, in his diary for the 14th. September 1916 noted; "I congratulate 
myself. I have two years service today. Two years under the Army Act, and not yet shot 
at dawn, surely a miracle.,,102 This statement is somewhat ambiguous, but does suggest 
that other ranks did give some thought to the possibility of court martial and understood 
lOOr..etter, Montgomery to his parents, 10/3117, P.R.O.N.!., D.2794/111/23. 

10lEntries for 24th. December 1914, in war diary of4th. Division, P.R.O., W0154/25 and 

W095/1449. 

102Anon., Service with the 14th. battalion Ro.ya1 Irish Rifles (Young Citizen Volunteers). 
1914-18 war, unpublished account held at Royal Ulster Rifles museum, Belfast, p.173. 
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what the ultimate penalty could be. 1. Brophy and E. Partridge, themselves veterans of 
the Great War, state; 
Once the machinery of military law was set in motion, there was little 
injustice done, except what is inherent in its rough and ready methods. Injustices 
began before that. If a private soldier incurred the dislike of an unscrupulous 
superior, his life might be made a misery and there was no way of escape for him 
from a thousand daily vexations and petty punishments. 103 
This perception suggests that private soldiers generally accepted the authority of 
courts martial and did believe that they would receive a fair hearing at them. However, 
the courts martial system seems to have held little interest for most soldiers as it does not 
appear to feature at all in either trench journalism, or soldiers marching songs; 104 both 
important forms of media where British soldiers raised their grievances against the military 
system. 
This leads on to the issue of "informal discipline" in the British army. At its most 
extreme this involved shooting retreating troops105 but it could take much more subtle 
forms and seems to have been practised fairly widely in Irish regular and New Army 
battalions. Captain Montgomery of the 9th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles gives an example 
of"informal discipline" at work; 
1031. Brophy and E. Partridge, The Long Trail' What the British soldier sang and said jn 

1914-18, Andre Deutsch, London, 1965, p.96. 

104See ibid; K. Dallas, The Cruel Wars; 100 Soldier's Songs from Agincourt to lUster, 

Wolfe Publishing Ltd., 1972, H. Williamson (ed.) The Wipers Times. Peter Davies, 

London, 1973 and The Incinerator (Journal of the 14th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles), 

numbers one and two, held in the Somme Heritage Centre, Newtownards. 

105See F. P. Crozier, The Men I Killed, Michael Joseph Ltd., London, 1939, p.86 and 

tletter from Major T. H. Westmacott to his wife, March 1918, Westmacott papers, 

I.W.M., 87/13/1, for examples of this. 
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1 got a draft the other day. Undesirables from the 3rd. Batt. in Dublin 
mostly old soldiers - tried some of the old tricks on the young fellow that 
couldn't know anything, 1 don't but nice and quietly 1 said 'Sergt. Major please 
arrange to have these people well beaten after parade, 1 don't want to be 
bothered writing things on their conduct sheets. 1 don't like writing. If one 
beating isn't enough you needn't bother me about it. Just have 'em beaten 
everyday at reveille for as long as it takes to lick 'em into OULshape. When we 
get 'em in the trenches we can see if any of them are likely to come up to our 
standards or not. 106 
The attitude of Captain Gerald Achilles Burgoyne is even more interesting as he 
had served in the 3rd. Dragoon Guards during the Boer War of 1899-1902 and in the 3rd. 
Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles (Special Reserve) before joining the 2nd. Battalion, Royal 
Irish Rifles. He recalled that the 'worst man' in his company had forgotten to draw 
ammunition before coming up to the line; "I kicked him as far as 1 could and then 
hammered him over the back with my stick, ... , 1 think I'd have shot him had 1 had my 
revolver on me at the time.,,107 Burgoyne justified this by noting that this man had put 
the entire company at risk. 
During the Great War the massive expansion of the B.E.F. raised major problems 
for the military justice system. Firstly, a number of colonial and dominion units, most 
notably the Australian forces, were not subject to the same system of military law as the 
British army. Secondly, the creation ofnew units, such as the Royal Air Force, Women's 
106 Letter of24th. July 1916 from Montgomery to his parents, P.RO.N.!., 
0.27941111113 . 
I07C. Davison (ed.) The Burgoyne Diaries, Thomas Harmsworth Publishing, London, 
1985, p.60. 
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Army Auxiliary Force and Chinese Labour Corps, raised serious issues. Thirdly, military 
law had, increasingly to deal with civilian groups; most notably conscientious objectors to 
military service and Irish rebels captured after the 1916 Easter Rising in Dublin. 
Colonial units which had served in the Second Boer War were all disciplined under 
the British Army Act and the expectation of a short European war meant that little 
consideration had been given to the employment of these units in future wars. lOS 
However, during 1903-11 the Australian government had passed a number of Defence 
Acts which not only introduced a system of universal military service which was unknown 
in Britain, but also meant that Australian units serving overseas would no longer come 
under the authority of the British Army Act. 
This saw a number of differences between Australian and British military law, the 
most serious being that Australians could not be executed for desertion. A more serious 
flaw was that an Australian soldier found guilty ofmurder could not be sentenced to death 
under the Australian Act, while under the British Army Act the only punishment that a 
court martial could award for murder was death. This situation led to an embarrassing 
problem in February 1918 when this situation actually arose. The Judge Advocate 
General had to recommend that either the accused soldier be found guilty of manslaughter 
or the law revised. ID9 
The Canadian Expeditionary Force originally served in Britain and Europe under 
the provisions of the British Army Act. However, in 1917 this situation changed, as an 
Order in Council deemed all members of the C.E.F. to be members of the Canadian Militia 
serving overseas. lID This was, apparently, a poorly planned political gesture, designed to 
I08For example, the Judge Advocate General did not receive a copy ofthe Australian 
Defence Act until June 1918. Judge Advocate General's minute book, P.R.O., W083/31, 
p.626. 

I09Judge Advocate General's minute book, P.R.O., W083/30, p.499 and pp.845-7. 

1100. Morton, "Exerting Control: The Development ofCanadian Authority over the 

Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-19", in T. Travers and C. Archer (eds.) Men at War; 
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give the Canadian government more control, at least in theory, over the C.E.F .. In reality 
this meant that Canadian troops were still tried by courts martial of the British pattern, the 
main difference being that Canadian officers exclusively comprised the court. III 
However, this change in the status of the C.E.F. did open up an embarrassing legal 
loophole, in that it was not an offence under the Canadian Militia Act for a soldier to 
desert from the British regular forces and join a Canadian Militia unit. The fact that the 
Judge Advocate General commented on this in February 1918 suggests that at least one 
British soldier had made use of this legal anomaly. 112 
The other '~hite" dominions of South Africa and New Zealand were content to 
have their troops, serving overseas, disciplined by the British Army Act. However, Indian 
units serving on the Western Front were tried under the Indian Army Act and this 
extended not only to British units which were brigaded with Indian troops, i.e. the 1st. 
Battalion, Connaught Rangers, but British units temporarily attached to the Indian Corps. 
Thus, in June 1915, seventy four men of the British 8th. and 49th. Divisions were tried by 
courts martial serving under the auspices of the Indian Army Act. 113 
The British army clearly took account of colonial views in carrying out executions. 
Table 2.1, overleaf, gives figures for men sentenced to death between 1914 and 1920. 
This table does suggest that the British government was very wary of executing soldiers 
provided by the white dominions~ although whether this was due to the influence which 
the dominions exerted over the British government during the Great War or other factors 
is unclear. 
Politics, Technology and Innovation in the Twentieth Century, Precedent, Chicago, 1982, 
p.14. 

11IJudge Advocate General's minute book, P.R.O., W083/31, p.514. 

112Judge Advocate General's minute book, P.R.O., W083/30, p.531. 

1 13Deputy Judge Advocate General's war diary, Indian Corps, May-December 1915. 

P.R.O., W0154115. 
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Table 2.l Death sentences passed in the B.E F, 1914-18. 114 
Commuted Carried Out 
Imperial Troops 2,399 291 (10.82%) 
Colonial Forces 5 5 (50%) 
Overseas Contingents 324 31 (8.73%) 
Chinese Labour Corps 3 10 (76.92%) 
Coloured Labour Corps 0 4 (100%) 
Followers 3 5 (62.5%) 
The creation of new units, many ofthem simply seen as wartime expedients 
also received little pre-planning in terms of military law. In some instances this could 
easily be resolved. For example, in the case of Queen Mary's Army Auxiliary Corps, it 
was decided in July 1918 that, for the purposes of military law, they should be treated as 
camp followers. II5 Royal Navy-Army relations were surprisingly cordial regarding the 
discipline of the 63rd. (Royal Naval) Division given Field Marshal Lord Kitchener's 
complaint in December 1914 that; 
We have a good deal of trouble with the admiralty [sic.] about the many 
freaks they are constantly enstating [sic.] in the army, but which they maintain are 
still under admiralty control. The Motor buses is [sic.] one of these, a large 
number of armed motor-cars is another which they want us to arm - now I hear 
that an admiralty flying wing is to be attached to your force. The admiralty are 
114Table compiled from figures given in P.R.O., Kew, W093/49, p.73. 
115Judge Advocate General's minute book, P.R.O., W083/32, p.106. 
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constantly asking me for officers which they use for prepanng army 
experiments, ... , I cannot help thinking that when the admiralty have anything 
they can lend us which we want it should be handed over to the army for 
complete administration by the army until returned. 116 
Men serving in the 63rd. (Royal Naval) Division were tried under the Army Act 
by military courts, with the findings being submitted to both the Judge Advocate General 
and the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty for their consideration. 111 However, as 
late as June 1917 there was some difficulty in disciplining naval personnel under the Army 
Act as it was unclear whether a leading seaman should be considered to be a corporal for 
the purposes of the Act. 118 
Other "new" units posed much more serious problems. The Chinese Labour 
Corps had a poorly defined status in military law. In May 1917 the Judge Advocate 
General considered the Corps to be; "employed by or in the service of His Majesty's 
troops within the meaning ofsection 176 (A) or alternatively as followers ofHis Majesty's 
troops within the meaning of section 176 (lO). In my opinion on the above assumption 
they will be subject to military law while at the rest camp.,,119 However, by March 1918 
the Judge Advocate General was expressing concern over the status of the Chinese 
Labour Corps as it did not appear to be a properly constituted military unit. 120 One must 
assume, from the large number of Field General Courts Martial held on members of the 
116Letter, Kitchener to Field Marshal Sir John French, 11112114, French papers, I.W.M., 

PPIMCRlC331588. 

ll1Judge Advocate General's minute book, P.RO., W083/27, p.191. 

118Judge Advocate General's minute book, P.RO., W083/27, p.1043. 

11~etter of9th. May 1917 from the Judge Advocate General to Lieutenant-General, 

Commanding in Chief, Eastern Command, Judge Advocate General's minute book, 

P.RO., W083/27. 

120Judge Advocate General's minute book, P.RO., W083/30, p.1121 and W083/31, 

p.499. 
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Chinese Labour Corps in 1918121 that it was ultimately decided to view the Chinese 
Labour Corps as a military unit, subject to the provisions ofthe Army Act. 
While oversights on the legal status of such a wartime expedient as the Chinese 
Labour Corps are, perhaps, understandable, surprisingly little thought seems to have gone 
into the precise legal status of members of the Royal Air Force when it was created in 
1918. A number oflegal difficulties soon arose; in May 1918 the Judge Advocate General 
pointed out that R.A.F. personnel attached to naval or army units could, respectively, be 
tried under naval law or the Army Act. 122 In August 1918 another serious legal anomaly 
occurred as the Judge Advocate General queried whether, as head of an independent 
force, General Trenchard was actually under the command of Field Marshal Sir Douglas 
Haig. At the same time there was consideration given to how Trenchard could actually 
establish a Field General Court Martial to try a member ofthe RA.F.123 
The whole issue of conscription and the position of conscientious objectors put 
enormous strain on the military justice system. The Adjutant-General, Sir Nevil 
Macready, outlined to the cabinet on 15th. May 1916 the difficulties of bringing 
conscientious objectors under the jurisdiction ofthe Army Act; 
It cannot be too clearly understood that once a man is handed over by a 
decision of a tribunal to the military authorities as a soldier, it is not for the 
military authorities to consider the reasons such a man may have for refusing to 
do his work. It is the clear duty of every commanding officer to do his best with 
the legitimate means at his disposal to make every man who is handed over to 
him an efficient soldier. 124 
121See Field General Courts Martial registars, P.RO., W0213/24-6. 

122Judge Advocate General's minute book. P.RO., W083/31, pp.285-7. 

123Judge Advocate General's minute book. P.R.Q., W083/32, pp.291-2. 

124p.RO., CAB371147/35, cited in. J. Rae, Conscience and politics~ The British 

Government and the Conscientious Objector to Military Service. 1916-19, Oxford 
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Of course the first stage in the process of proving conscientious objection was left 
to the Local Tribunals, the majority ofwhose members were civilians. 125 Ultimately, the 
legality of a man's service in the armed forces had to be decided in a civil, not a military, 
court. However, as late as January 1918, the Judge Advocate General had to make this 
position clear, noting that Military Policemen should not try to arrest reluctant conscripts 
as firstly, they had no right to enter private houses and, secondly, they would be open to 
actions for false imprisonment in cases ofmistaken identity. 126 
The problem which the Adjutant General had stressed was that, if a conscientious 
objector was drafted into the army, after appearing before a tribunal or civil court, then 
the Army Act gave C.O.s no latitude to treat conscientious objectors any differently than 
other soldiers. Historians have generally been sceptical of the Non-Conscription 
Fellowship's statements regarding the treatment of conscientious objectors by the 
military. 1. Rae was unconvinced by the figures given by 1. W. Graham regarding the 
number ofmembers of the Non-Conscription Fellowship sentenced to death in France. 127 
Consideration of newly released material demonstrates Graham's work to be substantially 
true; whereas by 26th. June 1916 he claimed that thirty four men of the Non Combatant 
Corps, serving in France, had been condemned to death, actually thirty five men of this 
corps had been sentenced to death by Field General Courts Martial by this date. 128 
University Press, Oxford, 1970, p.135. 
125K. R. Grieves, "Military Tribunal Papers: The Case ofLeek Local Tribunal in the First 
World War", Archives. XVI, 70, 1983 and A. R. Mack, "Conscription and Conscientious 
Objection in Leeds and York during the First World War", unpUblished M.Phil., 
University ofYork, 1982, p.156. 
126Judge Advocate General's minute book, P.R.O., W083/30, p.289. 
127J. W. Graham, Conscription and Conscience; A History 1916-19, George Allen and 
Unwin Ltd., London, 1922, reprinted by Augustus M. Kelly Publishers, New York, 1969, 
p~.115-6 and J. Rae, Conscience and Politics"pp.152-3. 
1 8See entries for 7/6/16, 10/6/16, and 1216/16, relating to members ofthe Eastern Non 
Combatant Corps, 2nd. Company, Northern Non Combatant Corps and 3rd. Company, 
Eastern Non Combatant Corps, Field General Courts Martial Registar, P.R.O., W0213/9 
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All the members of the Non Combatant Corps who were sentenced to death in 
France had their sentences commuted to ten years penal servitude. This, both Graham and 
Rae agree, was a result of political intervention by Gilbert Murray, the Liberal Chief 
Whip. H. H. Asquith made it clear to Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig that no 
conscientious objector was to be executed without Cabinet approval. 129 
The military had dealt harshly with conscientious objectors serving in the Non 
Combatant Corps in France and, indeed, many senior officers were not well disposed 
towards conscientious objectors. For example, Brigadier General Sir Wyndam Childs, 
Director of Personnel Services at the War Office stated~ ''For my part I always thought 
that the No-Conscription Fellowship, or at any rate its organisers, should have been dealt 
with under the Incitement to Mutiny Act."130 Equally, Sir Nevil Macready, the Adjutant 
General, believed that conscientious objection status should only be granted on religious 
grounds. 131 However, the existing Army Act and the legislation used to introduce 
conscription made no allowance for conscientious objectors serving in the British army. 
In having such men executed military officers would, simply, have been canying out their 
duty under the Army Act. The Adjutant General certainly did not enjoy dealing with the 
complicated issue ofconscientious objectors noting; 
The whole question of conscientious objection on the lines laid down by 
the Prime Minister was complicated, irritating, involved much unnecessary work 
at a time when pressure was heaviest, and created much discontent, both in the 
Army and among the conscientious objectors themselves. 132 
1291. Rae, Conscience and Politics, p.lS4. 
13OW. Childs, Episodes and Reflections; Being Some Records from the Life ofMajor 

General Sir Wyndam Childs, Cassel and Co. Ltd., London, 1930, p.149. 

131 Sir N. Macready, Annals ofan Active Life. Hutchinson and Co., London, 1924, vol.I, 
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132ibid, vol.I, p.2S1. 
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While British generals of the First World War are nonnally seen as opposing 
political interference in military matters, it would seem that the anny authorities were glad 
to hand most of the work relating to conscientious objectors over to the Home Office in 
June 1916.133 
In dealing with conscientious objectors military law had been forced to come into 
contact with the civilian population. During the Boer War, of course, civilians had been 
tried by courts martial, for taking part in or aiding guerrilla activity. However, this had 
been far from satisfactory. As early as 1900 Joseph Chamberlain and Sir Alfred Milner 
had proposed that a High Court Judge should preside over courts martial~ a suggestion 
completely rejected by the Commander in Chief 134 
Some officers were uncomfortable about trying civilians for serious crimes. Major 
Sir Francis Vane noted; 
The more serious cases, namely those accused of High Treason - were all 
very young men or even boys, ofcourse, Dutch, and they undoubtedly had joined 
the enemy out of a sense of kinsmanship, and the enthusiasm of youth. The 
authorities, however, had made it as difficult for us to be lenient as they could, 
for it was insisted that when a person was charged with rebellion he should be 
also indicted for attempted murder - and if you found him guilty of one you had 
to find him guilty of the other. This was very much resented as an obvious 
attempt at biasing the Bench in favour of severe judgements. 135 
During peacetime, it was very rare for a civilian to be tried by a military court. 
One of the few examples is of Frank Duigman of Emmet Road, Inchicore, who was tried 
133J. Rae, Conscience and Politics. p.159. 

134p.R.O., Kew, W032/8177. 
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by a military court in Dublin, on the 11tho May 1914 for being intoxicated and wearing the 
uniform ofthe South Irish Horse, a unit ofwhich he was not a member. He was fined five 
shillings for these offences. 136 Equally, in the 1902-14 period, little consideration was 
given to the issue of civilians who would be liable for trial under military law; which is 
rather surprising given the activities of the Ulster Volunteer Force, Irish Volunteers and 
Irish Citizens' Army during 1913-14. 
During the Great War, the War Office had to deal with two very different groups, 
apart from conscientious objectors, who straddled the line between civilians and members 
ofa military force namely, German and Austro-Hungarian nationals interned in Britain on 
the outbreak of war and members of the Irish Volunteers and Irish Citizens' Army 
arrested after the Easter Rising of 1916. In the case of German internees, it appears to 
have been War Office policy to treat them as Prisoners of War, as otherwise it would be 
very difficult to discipline this group. However, as late as January 1918 some questions 
were being raised about this legal status. 137 
The issue of Irish prisoners was more complex and emotive than that of interned 
German civilians. Following the rising and courts martial of 149 rebels by Field General 
Courts Martial,138 a large number of prisoners were held on the charge of being; 
"reasonably suspected of having favoured, promoted or assisted an armed insurrection 
against His Majesty."139 While these internees were initially split up and sent to various 
civil prisons in the United Kingdom before being sent to an internment camp at Frongoch, 
it would seem that from June 1916 the army regarded them as Prisoners of War. 140 In 
May 1916 a "combing out of innocents" was held of the Irish prisoners as there was the 
136Registar ofConvictions of Soldiers, Kilmainham Papers, N.L.I., Ms. 1298. 
137Judge Advocate General's minute books, P.RO., W083/30, pp.255-63. 
138See Field General Court Martial registars, P.RO.,W0213/9-1O. 
139utter from General Sir John G. Maxwell, G.O.C., Irish Command to Secretary, War 
Office, 2915/16, P.RO., W032/9571. 
14Op.R.O., W032/9571. 
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possibility that a prisoner could obtain a writ of Habeas Corpus and thus gain his or her 
release. 141 This demonstrates that even in the area of holding rebels, under military 
guard, during war time, military law was subject to civil law. 
As in the issue of conscientious objectors, senior officers at the War Office found 
the work relating to the Irish prisoners time consuming and unrewarding. Brigadier 
General Childs, Director ofPersonnel Services stated; 
The number of parliamentary questions on the Irish question are now 
appalling and I cannot keep pace with them, I never get any chance to do my 
own work and I spend my whole time doing yours which as you know consists in 
running from one Cabinet Minister to another. It cannot go on much longer as 
the work of my Directorate will cease. Conscientious Objectors absorb the few 
spare moments that I may be in my room and the parliamentary questions on this 
subject are simply appalling. 142 
As over the difficult military-political issue of treatment of conscientious objectors, 
the military authorities seem to have been relieved that the Home Office took over 
responsibility for the "Sinn Fein" prisoners in May 1916. 143 
Of course, not all officers wanted to divorce military from political considerations 
and, at least in one instance, military law was used as a pawn in the conflict between 
''frocks'' and "brass-hats". When F. E. Smith, then Attorney-General, visited France in 
February 1916 he did so in uniform (he held the rank of staff colonel), but without a 
military pass. A practical joke by officers meant that a telegram to the Adjutant General, 
141Letter from Brigadier General B. E. W. Childs, to Lieutenant Colonel(?) Byrne, 
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Sir Nevil Macready, from the War Office was altered so that instead of reading that Smith 
should be given a military escort it inferred that he should be arrested. 
F. E. Smith was rudely awoken at 4 a.m. by two Military Policemen and told that 
ifhe moved he would be shot. Macready then interviewed Smith, later remembering; 
He was annoyed, perhaps naturally, that he had been technically 'arrested' 
a step that was not intended, the original order from G. H. Q. being that he 
should be escorted back to G. H. Q.. It was, I think, the fear of ridicule more 
than anything else that disturbed the equilibrium of the Attorney-General, but, as 
I pointed out to him, the Commander in Chiefs order in regard to passes had 
evidently not been unwittingly evaded, because the other members of his party 
had arranged for the necessary permits, and further, in view of the fact that he 
himself had been on the Staff of the Indian Corps earlier in the war, it was a 
matter of greater surprise that he should have placed himself in such a position. 
In addition, I explained that had an application been made for him to visit 
Lieutenant Colonel Winston Churchill, I should have been glad to arrange it with 
the 2nd. Army.144 
There was a certain irony in F. E. Smith's detention under military law. Not only 
from his appointment as Solicitor General in May 1915 to at least January 1916 had he 
taken over the responsibility for reviewing courts martial from Kitchener, but when 
arrested, he was the government's chief legal officer and, conceivably. the final arbiter in 
any dispute between the use ofcivil and military law. 
As Smith's most recent biographer concludes on this whole episode; 
144Macready, Annals ofan Active Life. voU, p.233. 
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F. E. was in the wrong, of course, and the alteration of the telegram does 
not alter that. Nevertheless the impulse to alter it, the evident relish with which 
the authorities from Macready downwards carried out the false instruction, and 
the glee with which the story was repeated in military circles for years afterwards 
add up to a striking illustration of the poisoned relations that existed between 
soldiers and politicians in the First World War. 145 
During the Great War, the whole process of military law came under considerable 
scrutiny and a number of reforms were proposed. However, while few of these were 
implemented, they do merit some attention due to the criticisms made of military law by 
the Darling Report and some modem historians. 
Most of the proposed reforms were voiced in Parliament, but gained 
comparatively little support. One of the most radical proposals made was that put 
forward by Philip Snowden, M.P., who in November 1917 proposed that a jury of soldiers 
should try court martial cases. 146 
Another proposal, which would drastically have altered the punishments awarded 
by courts martial was that field punishment should be abolished. 147 The campaign to have 
field punishment abolished received considerable support. A number of branches of 
various Trades Union (for example, the London District of the Workers' Union and 
Crewe Number 5 Branch of the National Union of Railwaymen) and private individuals 
(including Rev. Thomas Alexander, the Presbyterian Minister at Crossgar, Co. Down) 
wrote to the Secretary of State for War in late 1916 and early 1917 in support of this 
reform.148 All G.O.C.s were contacted to establish their views regarding field punishment 
145J. Campbell, F E Smith~ First Earl ofBirkenhead, Jonathan Cape, London, 1983, 
p.429. 

146Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th. Series, vol.XCVIII, c.1426, 31/11117. 
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and, as only one senior officer (the Commander in Chief, Force D, Mesopotamia) was in 
favour of the abolition of this measure, field punishment was retained. 149 
A number of changes were made to the system of military justice which operated 
in the British army during the Great War. Most of these were purely administrative and 
required no change in the law; for example the introduction of the "referencing system" 
for men convicted by courts martial. However, two important changes required 
government action, the introduction of the Suspended Sentences Act and the appointment 
of a Royal Commission to enquire into the murders carried out by Captain 
Bowen-Colthurst in Dublin in 1916 and the greater openness which this had brought to 
military justice, both required government action. 
Early in the war and apparently on his own authority as Director of Personnel 
Services, Brigadier General Sir Wyndam Childs introduced the referencing system for 
convicted men outlined earlier in this chapter. Evidently the new scheme was in use by 
January 1915. Childs introduced this amendment as a man of his old battalion, whom he 
knew to be an effective soldier, had been sentenced to death for desertion. The procedure 
introduced by Childs helped to maintain the paternalistic nature of the British army, in the 
face of high losses and, more importantly, provided the confirming officer with more 
detailed information on the sentenced soldier and any possible grounds for a reduction in 
sentence. ISO 
The Suspended Sentences Act of 1915 meant that a man sentenced to 
imprisonment, or death, by a court martial, could be returned for service with his unit, if 
he re-offended his original sentence would be immediately imposed. In his autobiography 
Childs suggested that this was introduced on his initiative; 
P.R.O., W032/5460. 
149Letter, Adjutant General to Secretary of State for War, 11112116, P.R.O., W032/5460. 
ls0Childs, Episodes and Reflections, pp.140-2. 
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I was walking through the streets of St. Orner just after we got there when 
I met about a hundred and twenty soldiers being marched under escort through 
the streets. They were singing and whistling and in very good humour. I 
ascertained that they were all on their way to the base to undergo punishment in 
the military prisons there. It was pretty obvious, at once, that such a state of 
affairs could not be allowed to continue, as it was evident that certain types of 
men would commit crimes solely to avoid duty at the front. 
I spoke to Sir Nevil [Macready, the Adjutant General] at once and that 
same evening drafted the Army Suspension of Sentences Act, which went 
through Parliament without opposition and became law within about fourteen 
days. The Act enabled the military authorities to suspend the sentence of any 
offender, or to put it into execution at any time. Thus, when a soldier committed 
an offence and got ten year's penal servitude, he found that, instead of going 
home to England to undergo his sentence (penal servitude cannot be carried out 
in the field), he actually remained in the trenches, with the sentence hanging over 
his head. Conversely, there was power taken to remit any sentence, no matter 
how severe, as a reward for a period ofgood conduct or any act ofgallantry. 151 
As well as closing what must, to some, have appeared an attractive way out of the 
trenches, the Suspended Sentences Act was also, clearly, a response to manpower 
shortages in the British Army. As C. Pugsley demonstrates, the Act was widely used and 
the number of men per 100 in the British Army sent to prison fell from 4.5 in April 1915, 
just before the Act was introduced, to 0.8 in November 1918. 152 Equally, suspended 
sentences were implemented on men who had committed serious military crimes and were 
151 ibid.. pp.137-8. 
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there must have been considerable concern over whether the men could actually be 
rehabilitated. For example, the decision to suspend the sentences of 106 men of the 2nd. 
and 7th. Battalions, Royal Irish Regiment and 7/8th. Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers 
in April 1918, who had been sentenced to between five and ten years penal servitude for 
mutiny, seems incomprehensible unless seen against the serious manning problems being 
experienced by these units. 153 
It should be noted that this response to manpower problems was not unique to the 
British army. In May 1916 prison sentences were replaced with corporal punishment in 
the field in the Ottoman army to prevent further depletion of the army.154 By April 1917 
the French army had also introduced a system similar to the British suspended sentences. 
Lastly, political pressure forced certain elements of military law to become more 
open. The most obvious example of this was in the murder of three unarmed civilians; 
Francis Sheehy Skeffington, Thomas Dickson and Patrick James McIntyre by Captain 
Bowen Colthurst, 3rd. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles during the 1916 Easter Rising in 
Dublin. Bowen-Colthurst shot these men, who had nothing to do with the insurrection 
(Sheehy-Skeffington was a pacifist and the others both editors of Unionist newspapers) 
without any fonn of court martial. The military authorities in Ireland were apparently 
prepared to ignore this incident. However, Major Sir Francis Vane took the matter 
directly to Field Marshal Lord Kitchener, with the result that Bowen-Colthurst was tried 
by a General Court Martial and found guilty but insane. 155 
153See chapter seven for further discussion of these cases. 
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Vane also approached a number of Irish M.P.s, including John Redmond, leader of 
the Irish Parliamentary Party and William O'Brien, 156 which brought it clearly into the 
political arena. This meant that, in addition to the court martial, a Royal Commission was 
appointed to enquire into Bowen-Colthurst's actions. Vane suggested that the Royal 
Commission simply served to deflect blame from the military authorities. 157 Nevertheless, 
the report's conclusion that; "The shooting of unarmed and unresisting civilians without 
trial constitutes the offence of murder, whether martial law has been proclaimed or not. 
We should have deemed it superfluous to point this out were it not that the failure to 
realise and apply the elementary principle seems to explain the free hand which Captain 
Bowen-Colthurst was not restrained from exercising throughout the period of crisis,"158 
was suitably critical of both Bowen-Colthurst's activities and the military authorities' 
refusal to restrain him. 
Comparisons between British and other nations' military law are difficult to make, 
partly as little research has been carried out on French, German, or United States military 
law during this period and also as the whole basis of military law in continental Europe 
was different to its British counterpart. Whereas, in Britain, martial law was only imposed 
when civil law had broken down, the best example being during the Easter Rising in 
Dublin in 1916, the declaration of war immediately saw the introduction of a "state of 
siege" in France and Germany. H. W. Koch notes the implications ofthis in Germany~ 
With the proclamation of the state of war the state of si~ge was 
automatically invoked which made the military commanders in the various 
districts the supreme heads of regional government in co-operation with the 
156F. Vane, Agin the Governments, p.268. 
157ihid, pp.271-2. 
158A Royal Commission on the Arrest and Subsequent Treatment ofMr Francis Sheehy 
Skeffington., Mr Thomas Dickson and Mr Patrick James Me Intyre, H.M.S.O., London, 
Cmd.8376, 1916. 
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existing civil authorities. They had powers to issue local decrees, prohibitions, 
arrest requisition and :fix prices. Extra-ordinary war courts were instituted. By 
1914-15 there were forty six of them; the highest number reached was sixty. 
Each of them had five judges: two civilian judges, one of which presided and 
three officers. Throughout the war they dealt with about 150,000 cases, but 
figures do not exist to show how many led to conviction, acquittal or 
dismissal. 159 
Until December 1916 these courts were responsible only to the Kaiser. 
Work on French courts martial is dominated by the reaction to the 1917 mutinies. 
Pedrocini estimates that, following the mutinies 3,427 soldiers were convicted of offences 
relating to the mutinies; ofthese 554 received death sentences and 49 (16%) were actually 
executed. 160 This does seem to be a very low number of executions compared to the 
British total of 346 between 1914 and 1920. But we need to balance this by firstly, 
considering that, during the entire war, more than 49 French soldiers must have been 
executed i.e., some soldiers must have been executed in the periods before and after the 
mutinies. Equally, it is clear that a number of French soldiers were summarily executed 
during the war. 161 Petain apparently approved ofthis action. 162 
Some other aspects of French military law merit comparison with the British 
system. Firstly, in the aftermath of the 1917 mutinies, civilian control over the courts 
159ff. W. Koch, A Constitutional History ofGermany in the Nineteenth and Twentieth 
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martial system was effectively suspended. The decision on whether or not a sentence 
should be confirmed being delegated to Petain by both the President and Minister for 
War. 163 Secondly, a number of punishments were awarded by French courts martial 
which were completely alien to British military law. For example penal units existed in the 
French army; 
such as the Zephyrs, a unit stationed in Africa and composed of Army 
outcasts who were kept in discipline by methods verging on sadism and were 
given military tasks too dangerous and dirty even for the Foreign Legion. Some 
of the more fortunate offenders were lucky enough to be sentenced to serve with 
'punishment companies' in the most dangerous spots in the trench lines until, in 
the opinion of their specially trained officers, they had earned the privilege of 
restoration to an infantry division which was considered much less hazardous by 
comparison. 164 
Lastly, French courts martial were quite happy to use innocent men as examples, 
which again contrasts sharply with the British practice. As Leonard Smith comments; "the 
courts-martial 'stigmatised' a particular group of men who appeared to have behaved no 
differently from dozens of others who were not prosecuted but who could nevertheless 
conveniently bear responsibility for the collectivity."165 
The United States of America's courts martial system demonstrates a strong racist 
tendency, which is much stronger than that evident in British military law, given that only 
two of the divisions in the American Expeditionary Force, were composed of black 
personnel. Between 5th. November 1917 and 20th. June 1919 there were eleven 
163ihid.. p.198. 
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executions in the American Expeditionary Force. Two of the men were white, one either 
white or native American and eight black. 166 
One country whose courts martial system has been well researched is Italy's and 
this also bears comparison with Britain as both countries put around 5,200,000 men in the 
field during the Great War. From the beginning of Italy's intervention in the war the 
Commander in Chief, Luigi Cadorna, made it clear that it was the duty of N.C.O.s and 
officers to shoot cowards without benefit of a court martial. 167 Again, as with the 
French, the number of courts martial which resulted in death was low, 141 during the 
entire war,168 but by October 1917 the Italian army had experienced five cases of 'death 
by lottery' two of them involving decimation of a unit. 169 Soldiers in the Italian army 
could also be executed for the most minor offences. For example, when General Graziani 
caught a soldier smoking a pipe during an inspection, he was immediately shot! 170 
In conclusion, while much of this chapter may not seem to be directly related to 
the rest of this thesis, it is important to establish the disciplinary framework within which 
the B.E.F. operated during 1914-18. This system was far from perfect but was clearly 
much more just than previous historians writing about it have allowed. The British courts 
martial system also seems to compare favourably with those operated by other states, 
especially in its comprehensive reviewing procedures. The courts martial system also 
seems to have much more in common with Edwardian civil courts than has been 
previously acknowledged. 
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Clearly the system underwent a number of challenges and changes during the war~ 
especially in dealing with various civilian groups to which little consideration had been 
given pre-war (conscientious objectors, German and Austro-Hungarian internees and Irish 
rebels) and new military units (for example, Queen Mary's Army Auxiliary Corps, the 
Royal Air Force and the Chinese Labour Corps). However, given that the British system 
of military law had been designed to discipline a small, volunteer army, involved largely in 
garrison duties and "small wars" throughout the Empire, it should be conceded that the 
British military justice system adapted well to the challenges of modem warfare and a 
mass, conscript army. 
168 
Chapter 3 
"A Regular Army at War". Tbe Britisb Expeditionary Force. August 1914 to 
September 1915. 
The period from the landing of the British Expeditionary Force in France in 
August 1914 until the end of September 1915 saw a large number of strains put on the 
discipline and morale of the Irish regiments, and the expeditionary force in general. 
Firstly, there was the transition from a peace-time to a war-time situation, which 
naturally saw many changes in the British army, not least in its disciplinary code. 
Offences, such as sleeping on duty and desertion, which would, in peace-time, have led 
to little more than a short term of imprisonment, became capital offences in wartime. 
Secondly, the horrific losses incurred by the B.E.F. led to serious problems. 
Men, who were either army reservists (who, in some cases had not been in the army 
since the end of the South African War in 1902) or special reservists (who, in many 
cases, had very rudimentary training) were required to bring units up to their 
establishment on the outbreak of war and keep them up to strength for the early part 
of the war. Many of these reservists were either too old or unfit for active service, 
and, in at least some cases, resented being commanded by non-commissioned officers 
who had less service than them. 
Time expired men were another potential problem group as, soldiers nearing 
the end of their "colour service" in August 1914 resented being kept in the army for 
another year. Lastly, middle class recruits who, in a few cases, had joined Kitchener 
units, but then been posted as drafts to regular battalions, found the habits and 
behaviour of their new colleagues unpalatable. Such men, serving in Territorial Force 
units, had the added grievance that the High Command often did not feel that they 
were adequately trained for front line service. 
High losses also led to serious problems in the supply of officers. While the 
most decrepit retired officers were used to train New Army battalions in Britain (see 
169 
chapter four), a number of officers who were unfit to command did see service in 
France.' Equally, the desperate need for officers saw the rapid commissioning of men 
from, for example, the ranks ofexclusive London Territorial Force units, with only the 
most minimal officer training. l 
The replacement ofN.C.O.s was even more difficult. The shortage of officers 
saw some ofthe most intelligent N.C.O.s being promoted to commissioned rank, while 
the supply of suitable privates, capable of carrying out an N.C.O.s duties, soon 
dwindled. Within a short space of time many units were thus reliant heavily on 
N.C.O.s with little experience or those who had been reservists on the outbreak of 
war. 
Thirdly, the Winter of 1914 to 1915 is seen by many historians2 as a low point 
in the RE.F.'s morale. The unofficial "Christmas Truces" of 1914, some of which 
lasted into January 1915, certainly caused concern amongst the High Command. This 
low point in morale seems to have been a result both of the appalling conditions in the 
trenches and the realisation that no early end to the war was in sight. 
Thus, in this chapter, an assessment of the disciplinary problems facing the 
B.E.F. will be made, based on the courts martial records, which are a much more 
reliable indicator of indiscipline and poor morale than statistics, either of trench foot or 
shell shock, used by previous historians.3 Attention will then be devoted to perceived 
disciplinary problems in the R E. F. during this period. With reference to Irish units, 
Sir Roger Casement's attempt to form a German-Irish Brigade in early 1915 will be 
considered as the failure of Casement's scheme does suggest that even the relatively 
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apolitical regular soldier did maintain certain ideals and values which made him 
actively anti-German even when other factors which would have retained his loyalty to 
the British Crown had vanished. Consideration will then be given to the morale 
problems facing the B.E.F. in this period, especially the difficulties involved in keeping 
the force supplied with both trained personnel and essential equipment. Most 
importantly, issues, such as comforts funds, recreational activities, religion and the 
regimental system which helped to maintain morale and discipline will be considered. 
A consideration of Irish regiments serving on the Western Front during this 
period provides a number of interesting insights into discipline in the B.E.F... The 
most striking feature is the variation ofthe number of courts martial cases tried in each 
battalion; as table 3.1, overleaf, demonstrates. 
Some of the disparities in this graph are easily explainable. The 2nd. Battalion 
of the Connaught Rangers were amalgamated with their 1 st. Battalion on 5th. 
December 19144 and only four of the cases in this chart refer to the period after this 
merger. The comparatively low courts martial rate in the lst. Battalion of the Irish 
Guards is seemingly explicable due to the large number of Irish Guards reservists 
serving in the Royal Irish Constabulary pre war. In August 1914, seventy men from 
the force were recalled to active service with the Irish Guards, and by 11th. February 
1915, a further 200.5 Clearly, if such men were involved in any disciplinary action, it 
could endanger their post-war prospects in the Royal Irish Constabulary. 
Surprisingly, given their high courts martial record, the 2nd. Battalion of the 
Leinster Regiment, as part of the 6th. Division did not arrive in France until the 8th. 
September 1914,6 and their disciplinary record thus appears to be very poor. Indeed, 
4H. F. N. Jourdain, The Connaught Rangers, Royal United Services Institution, 

London, 1924, voLl, p. 450. 

5J. Herily, The Royal Irish Constabulary; A Short History and Genealogical Guide, 

Four Courts Press, Dublin, 1997, pp. 98-9. Also see, P. Reese, Home-Coming heroes, 

An Account ofthe Re-Assimilation ofBritish Military personnel into Civilian Life, Leo 

Cooper, London, 1992, p.59, on the unique arrangements made for the employment of 

retired members ofthe Irish Guards in the Royal Irish Constabulary. 

6F. E. Whitton., The History of the Prince ofWales Leinster Re&iment (Royal 


171 
this record does call into some question the reasons as to why the 6th. Division was 
detained in Britain after the original expeditionary force left for France. 
Table 3.1. Courts Martial held in the Irish infantry battalions in the original 
expeditionary force, from arrival in France (August 1914) until 30th. September 
160: 
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However, there appears to be no easy explanation as to this marked difference 
between battalions, in terms of courts martial. An urban/rural recruiting area may 
provide part of the explanation, as the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles (with a 
recruiting area centred on Belfast) and the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers (with 
Canadians), vol II~ The Great War and the Disbandment ofthe Regiment, Gale and 
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a recruiting area centred on Dublin City) both had a very high number of men tried by 
courts martial. As Belfast and Dublin both had heavily unionised work forces in this 
period one may reasonably have expected some of this class antagonism to spill over 
into the anny. There does seem to be some evidence to support this view as, by April 
1915 at least some members of the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers had joined 
the regiment after being locked out during the 1913 general strike in Dublin. 7 
Nevertheless, in the case of the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, the argument that 
the men were drawn from the heavily unionised Belfast workforce seems distinctly 
. unconvincing. John Lucy, serving with this unit pre-war, stressed that many of the 
men serving in it came from outside the regimental recruiting area. Father Henry Gill 
made a similar observation when he joined the battalion in late 1914, noting the 
unexpectedly high number of Catholics serving in this unit. Finally, Nicholas Perry's 
work confinns that the regular battalions of the Royal Irish Rifles obtained a large 
percentage of recruits from outside their recruiting area. 8 
Lastly, an obvious answer to high courts martial rates would lie in losses in 
action; units with high losses naturally having fewer courts martial cases. However, 
again this does not provide a solution. While the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Dublin 
Fusiliers had 627 deaths in 1914 to 1915 and the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, had 
a death toll of 648 over the same period; the 2nd. Battalion of the Leinster Regiment, 
7T. Johnstone, Orange, Green and Khaki; The Story of the Irish Regiments in the 
Great War, 1914-18, Gill and Macmillan, Dublin, 1992, p.75. It also appears that in 
some Dublin firms the outbreak: ofwar saw a repeat of the lock out, as men were 
forced, by their employers, to join the British anny. See, P. Murray, "The First World 
War and a Dublin Distillery Workforce: Recruiting and Redundancy at John Power & 
Son, 1915-1917", Saothar, 15, 1990, p.50. 
8See, J. F. Lucy, There's a Devil in the Drum, Faber and Faber Ltd., London, 1938, 
pp.13 and 43, and H. V. Gill, "As seen by a Chaplain with the 2nd. Battalion, Royal 
Irish Rifles", unpublished manuscript, Jesuit Archives, Dublin, p.7. Perry notes that in 
1914, just 44% of men in the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles came from the 
regimental recruiting area ofBelfast, Antrim and Down, N. Perry, ''Nationality in the 
Irish Infantry Regiments in the First World War", War and Society, 12, 1, 1994, p.68. 
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with a court martial record almost similar to the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers 
had only 351 deaths; one of the lowest for Irish units on the Western Front.9 
If we consider the numbers of men in Irish units serving overseas on the 
outbreak of war who were court martialled while the unit was serving in France, 
disparities are equally clear, as shown in graph 3.2. 
Table 3.2. Men tried by court martial on the Western Front, while serving in 
Irish units returned from overseas service. 10 
llRIRegt llRIRifs 2lRIrF IIConnaughts llLeinster 
• Men convicted by CM • Men tried by C.M. 
The only proviso which should be added to this chart regards the 1st. 
Battalion., Connaught Rangers. It would seem clear that a number of British troops 
attached to the Indian Anny Corps were tried under the Indian Anny Act. Thus, it is 
91 would like to thank Mr. Nicholas Perry for providing me with these figures for 
deaths in the Irish units during 1914 and 1915. It should be noted that, while the 
courts martial record has been calculated from the units arrival in France until 30th. 
September 1915, the total number ofdeaths per unit was calculated from the units 
arrival in France until 31 st. December 1915. 
lOThe number of courts martial cases are calculated from the date of the battalions 
arrival in France, until 30th. September 1915. 
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likely that some men of the Connaught Rangers were tried under this system, from 
which an individual battalion breakdown is not available. 1 1 
While it would appear that the High Command based their assessment of a 
unit's disciplinary state on the number of courts martial held in it, it is important to 
consider the offences for which men were tried by courts martial in some detail. (See 
table 3.3 overleaf). 
It is clear from table 3.3 that, for British units in general, as well as Irish units 
more specifically, the major courts martial offence committed by men during this 
period was drunkenness. As Brent Wilson points out~ "Of course, most drunkenness 
occurred in the rearward areas or during open warfare, drunkenness at the front was 
uncommon.,,12 Therefore, drunkenness rarely impeded the combat effectiveness of a 
unit, although there were notable exceptions to this. For example, following a 
particularly raucous St. Patrick's Day in 1915, men of the 1 st. Battalion, Royal Irish 
Fusiliers were unable to dig new communications trenches, due to widespread 
drunkenness in the unit. 13 
Drunkenness, in disciplinary terms, was much more senous In that it 
demonstrated the incapacity of some N.C.O.s to adequately carry out their duties. 
Lieutenant Hitchcock of the 2nd. Battalion, The Leinster Regiment noted that on the 
12th. August 1915; 
At 'Stand to' an issue of rum, which had been sent up under cover of 

darkness, was dished out, and was thoroughly appreciated. Serg[ean]t. 

Shields, Piper's platoon sergeant, who was somewhat ancient and had felt the 

11 Deputy Judge Advocate General, Indian Corps, War Diaries, P.R.O., W0154/15 
and WOI54/16. 
I2J. Brent Wilson, "The Morale and Discipline ofthe B.E.F.", p.57. 
13War diary of 1st. Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers, entry for 18/3/15, P.R.O., 
W09S/1482. 
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Table 3.3. Offences for which men serving in sample units on the Western Front were tried by Courts Martial, from the unit's arrival in France to 
30th. September 1915. 
i~
• !'t 0;; 
>'00 
.:d ~:i~'" I;j Ib :f! :g g ca ~ :§~:!a ~ ~ 'ti ~ '4i ~ ~ 'c <:I Ciis ~ g g ] ,~ I ~ ~i g ~ I ~ ~
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~ ~ ~ .,., ~ en ~ - =~~c:::: ~ N ~ \0 00 N 
War Treason 0 o 0 o o 0 0 0 i. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 :0' 0 
D.O.RA 0 o 0 o o 0 i 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 
Offence against an inhabitant 3 0 ' 0 o o 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7' 0, 134 
Mutiny 0 o 0 o 00'00000000000000006 
Cowardice 0 o 02100000 1000001006096 
Desertion 3 o 1 21 14 3 2 3 0 0 4 5 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 71' 0 ' 381 
Absence 3 o 0 o 1 4 0 3 8 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 24: 0 2581 
Striking or violent 2 o 1 o 2 0 0 0 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 i 0 i 573 
Insubordination o o o 1 2 0 4 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 15: I ! 1105I 
Disobedience 3 3 2 2 4 5 2 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 29 O· 950 
Quitting post 3 4 9 2 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 34. I : 1455 
Drunkeness 32 15 30 36 17 36 25 18 6 10 10: 46 31 83 9 5 10 12 7 ,439 : 5 6214 
Injuring property 0 o 0 o o 0 0 0 0 0 0' 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 
Loss of property 0 o 0 o o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 i 0 159 
Theft 1 1 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 4 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 17 i 0 285 
Indecency 0 o ! 0 o 00000000:10000000 04 
Resisting escort 0 o 0 o o 0 0 0 0 0 0' 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 i0: 196 
Escaping confinement 0 o 0 o o o o o o o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 I 1 211 
Miscellaneous and multiple 16 21 23 31 50 64 26 25 7 5 '29 ,72 13' 46 ' 22 . 1,5 2 20 3 3 493 10' 1846 
military offences 
MisceUaneous civil offences 1 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1, 0 81 
Self-inflicted wound I o 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3: 1 34I 
Fraudulent enlistment 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 1 
Enlisting after discharge 0 o 0- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 '0 0 0 0 0 0 '0: 0 
False answer 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 
Ne~~ 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 00: 0 
Fraud 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 '0,4 
TOTALS 6Q 42 63 94 99 119 64 49 18 30 45 145 51 : 150 34. 23 14 36 10 4 1159 19 16334I 
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strain of the day more than younger men, took a double ration, and started 
firing up at the stars and shouting out about the Battle of Colenso! 14 
Captain Burgoyne, commanding "c" company of the 2nd. Battalion, Royal 
Irish Rifles was determined to prevent drunkenness in his unit, particularly after the 
events of the 27th. December 1914, when one of his sergeants was shot while issuing 
the rum ration. Burgoyne, with the endorsement of his C.O. and Divisional G.O.C., 
ceased issuing rum to his company following this incident. IS However, in February 
1915, when, following the distribution of pay, a number of N.C.O.s in his company 
became inebriated, Burgoyne felt unable to take disciplinary action; ''No use running 
them up before the C.O.; they'd be tried by court martial, and I couldn't get other men 
to take their places."16 
Table 3.3 suggests that disciplinary offences in the Irish regiments during this 
period were broadly in line with those of the British army as a whole. However, exact 
estimates are difficult, given the fluctuating strength of the B .E.F. from August 1914 
to September 1915. T. Johnstone suggests that just over one-fifth of the original 
B.E.F. was Irish. 17 However, by September 1915, it is likely that the proportion was 
under five percent. This makes comparisons between the Irish regiments and the 
B.E.F. as a whole, very difficult. Nevertheless it would appear that desertion and 
miscellaneous offences18 were a particular problem in the Irish regiments, while 
offences against inhabitants and insubordination were comparatively infrequent, in 
comparison to the general British figures. However, the figures for the two non-Irish 
14F. c. Hitchcock. "Stand To", A Dicu:y ofthe Trenches, 1915-18, Gliddon Books, 
London, 1988, p.70. 
ISC. Davison, (ed.), The Burgoyne Diaries, Thomas Harmsworth Publishing, London, 
1985, p.34. 
16ibid., pp.122-3. 
17T. Johnstone. Orange. Green and Khaki, p.6. 
18In compiling these tables from the database multiple offences were included under 
the heading "miscellaneous offences". It is possible that the official figures, quoted in 
the annual army report categorised multiple offences, simply under the most serious 
offence committed. 
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units considered in this period, the 1 st. Battalion, The Gloucester Regiment and the 
1114th. Battalion, London (Scottish) Regiment19, with nineteen and zero men tried 
respectively by courts martial, suggest that Irish regiments had more disciplinary cases 
than their English counterparts. 
There are other indications that Irish discipline was considered to be much 
worse than that of other British units. In January 1915 Major General Alymer 
Haldane visited the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles to; "give them hell" as they were 
the; "bad boy" of his division.20 Meanwhile, when commenting, in February 1915, on 
the death sentence passed on Private Thomas Hope of the 2nd. Battalion, The Leinster 
Regiment, General Sir Horace Smith Dorrien, G.O.C., Second Army noted; "The 
Brigade discipline is 2nd. worst + the Batt[ allio In. discipline also the 2nd. worst in the 
army.,,21 The lst. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, in September 1915 was also deemed 
to have an unsatisfactory disciplinary record, although it was seen to be improving by 
this date. 22 
Men, or at least officers, in the Irish regiments, were aware of their poor 
disciplinary records. At least one officer subscribed to a conspiracy theory over this 
issue. Father McCrory, the chaplain to the 2nd. Battalion, Connaught Rangers, 
believed that there was a general anti-Irish feeling in the army, which led to harsher 
punishments for Irish troops.23 At the other extreme, portraying a deeply paternalistic 
interpretation, Brigadier General W. Carden Roe, who served as a Lieutenant in the 
1st. Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers during the Great War commented; 
19As no men in the 1I14th. London (Scottish) Regiment were tried by court martial in 

this period, the unit was not included in tables 3.3. 

20C. Davison, (ed.), The Burgoyne Djaries, p.43. 

21Transcript ofPrivate Thomas Hope's court martial, P.R.O., W0711432: 

22Comments ofBrigadier General P. R. Stephens, commanding 25th. Infantry 

Brigade, transcript ofLance-Corporal Peter Sands's court martial, P.R.O., W0711432. 

23Diaries ofFather McCrory, P,R.O,N.I., D.1868/1, p.34. 
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The Irish soldier is undoubtedly a pleasant fellow to deal with. He 
gives a certain amount of trouble at times, but there is no malice behind it: it 
rather resembles the behaviour ofa naughty child. 24 
The comparatively small number of courts martial in Irish cavalry, as opposed 
to Irish infantry units, also deserves consideration. The small number of men tried in 
the North Irish Horse and South Irish Horse can be explained by the fact that neither 
of these units was at full strength during this period. Only two SQuadrons of the North 
Irish Horse and one of the South Irish Horse were serving in France during August 
1914 to September 1915. The small number of men tried in these units, and in the 
1114th. Battalion, The London (Scottish) Regiment, may also be explicable by an 
unwillingness on the part of the military authorities to try part time soldiers, with the 
same rigour as their regular counterparts.25 In general terms, it is not surprising that 
the number of courts martial carried out in Irish cavalry units generally compared 
favourably to those carried out in Irish infantry regiments, as the nominally "Irish" 
regular cavalry units were composed oflargely non-Irish personnel.26 
Another possible explanation for the comparatively good courts martial record 
of the Irish cavalry regiments could be the better discipline seen in cavalry as opposed 
to infantry units in the RE.F. in general. Reporting on his experiences with cavalry on 
the Western Front, J. E. R Seely stated; 
24W. Carden Roe, "Memoirs ofWorld War r', unpublished manuscript, LW.M., 
771165/1, p.8. The comparatively small numbers ofmen serving in Irish units 
generally, and the 1st. Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers in particular, tried for offences 
such as striking or violence to a superior, insubordination or disobedience appears to 
support Carden Roe's view. 
25The North and South Irish Horse were both Special Reserve units, while the 1114th. 
Battalion, The London Regiment, was a unit of the Territorial Force. 
26As early as 1878 none of the "Irish" regular cavalry regiments had an Irish 
component in excess ofthirty percent. See E. M. Spiers, "Army organisation and 
society in the nineteenth century", in T. Bartlett and K. Jeffiey, (eds.), A Military 
History ofIreland. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p.337. 
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it has been the experience of both the French and the English Armies 
that the cavalryman in the trench is more valuable man for man than the 
infantryman. I have seen many French Generals and they all agree that this is 
so, the reason generally given being that the proportion of officers and Non 
Commissioned Officers with dismounted cavalry is much greater than in the 
case ofinfantry.27 
The initially high ratio of officers and N.C.O.s to men in cavalry units, 
combined with low casualty rates in comparison with front line infantry would seem to 
explain how discipline was better maintained in the cavalry units of the B.E.F .. 
Nevertheless, the disparities between Irish and non-Irish units courts martial records 
(and, indeed, between those of Irish battalions) in this period lack any simple 
explanation.28 
It will be noted that a number of offences, often regarded as important 
indicators of morale, notably self mutilation and suicide are almost absent from table 
3.3. Suicides, it would appear, were largely concealed by battalion officers. Second 
Lieutenant Robert Graves, serving in the Royal Welch Fusiliers, claimed that he found 
a man of the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers who had committed suicide, 
while inspecting the front line trenches; 
Two Irish officers came up. 'We've had several of these lately', one of 
them told me. Then he said to the other: 'While I remember Callaghan, don't 
27Letter, Seely to Lord Kitchener, 2111115, P.R.O., PR030157/58. 
28The release ofsoldiers' personal records at the P.R.O. would now make possible a 
comparison between the conduct sheets ofIrish and non-Irish units during 1914-18. It 
may, simply be the case that, in Irish regiments men were referred to courts martial 
after only a few offences had been dealt with by the unit's commanding officer, while 
in other British units, men were disciplined by their commanding officers and a court 
martial used as a last resort. The manner in which these records have been catalogued 
(by surname only) meant that any systematic study ofsample units was beyond the 
time constraints placed on this thesis. 
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forget to write to his next-of-kin. Usual sort of letter, tell them he died a 
soldier's death, anything you like. I'm not going to report it as suicide. ,29 
In the case of self-inflicted wounds, the situation is not as simple. Certainly, in 
some cases, the maiming itself was seen as punishment enough. As Sergeant A. T. 
Mathews of the 1 st. Battalion, Royal Irish Regiment recounted of an incident in late 
1915; 
One of the men - he did not belong to my platoon - said, 'I am fed up 
to the teeth, I'd blow my toes off if 1 had the guts to do it.' We were all 
terribly fed up but what was the use ofgiving way to our feelings. One of the 
other chaps said, 'If you haven't got the guts to do it, I'll do it for you', 
'Right', he said, 'carry on and do it.' 'Put your foot against the side of the 
trench', and the chap who wanted his toes shot off did as he was bid. Up to 
this point we thought they were joking. Then there was a terrific bang as he 
fired at the foot. But his mate had not hit him in the toes but in the ankle and 
smashed it to smithereens, ... , The shooter was placed under arrest. They 
both got what they wanted - they got out of the line - one to undergo 
punishment and the other to be maimed for life. An act of cowardice? 1 
would say it was.30 
However, even if we assume that a number of men who committed self 
mutilation were not tried by courts martial, this still leaves some serious discrepancies 
in the statistics. For example, Jeffrey Greenhut suggests, apparently with the evidence 
2~. Graves, Goodbye to All That, Penguin Books, London, 1969,p.89 and M. 
Staunton, ''The Royal Munster Fusiliers in the Great War, 1914-19", unpublished 
M.A. thesis, University College, Dublin, p.32. 

30A. T. Mathews, ''The Thin Khaki Line", unpUblished manuscript, N.A.M., 6508-5, 

pp.16-17. 
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contained in the Acting Director of Medical Services' war diary31 that from the arrival 
of the Indian Corps in France in October 1914, until 14th. August 1915 there were 54 
cases of hand wounds in the 1st. Battalion, Connaught Rangers.32 Greenhut's 
implication is that all of these wounds were self-inflicted, but that the information 
regarding self inflicted wounds was surpressed.33 
The Medical Officer of the 1st. Battalion, Connaught Rangers, who 
presumably would not have been involved in any "cover up", when sending in his 
casualty returns, recorded only one case of self inflicted wounds and one case of 
probable suicide for this period.34 Equally, for the Indian Corps as a whole, the 
Deputy Judge Advocate General recorded just nine Indian and two British troops 
convicted for self mutilation or mutilation ofa comrade, over the period that this corps 
was stationed in France.35 This figure does appear very low, given Greenhut's figures 
of 1,808 Indian and 140 British troops in the Indian Corps suffering from hand 
wounds from October 1914 to 14th. August 1915.36 However, one would assume 
that the Deputy Judge Advocate General kept precise figures on such matters, even if 
he did not pass them on to a higher authority. 
The last issue with regard to self inflicted wounds, which should be considered 
is how the charge was made. It would seem possible that men suspected of this 
offence were simply tried under section 40 of the Army Act, which states; «Every 
person subject to military law who commits any of the following offences; that is to 
say, is guilty of any act, conduct, disorder, or neglect, to the prejudice of good order 
and military discipline."37 
31p.RO., W095/1093, entry for 4/11114 and W095/3917, appendix CLXVII. 
32J. Greenhut, "The Imperial Reserve: The Indian Corps on the Western Front, 
1914-15", Journal ofImperial and Commonwealth History, 12, 1, 1983, p.57. 
33ibid. p.58. 
34See entries for 15112114 and 20/6/15 in War Diary of the Medical Officer, 1st. 

Battalion, Connaught Rangers, P.RO., W095/3923. 

35S~e War Diary of the Deputy Judge Advocate General, Indian Corps, P.RO., 

W0154115 and 16. 

36J. Greenhut, ''The Imperial Reserve", p.57. 

37War Office, Manual ofMilitary Law. H.M.S.O., London, 1914, p.412. 
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Section 40 is, therefore, something of a comprehensive charge without parallel 
in civil law. In cases involving other ranks, "S.40" is simply entered as a charge; 
however, in the more detailed officers' registers, a charge is also stated. This 
demonstrates that Section 40 was used to prosecute officers for a whole host of 
offences, from ownership ofa camera to homosexual activities. 38 Thus, it would seem 
unlikely that all "S.40" cases related to self-mutilation, although a minority presumably 
did. 
It is clear, from a comparison between tables 1.5 and 3.3, that there was a 
massive variation between peacetime and wartime offences. The first, and most 
obvious point is that the number of men tried by courts martial increased greatly in 
wartime. For example, while only 29 men of the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers 
were tried by courts martial between 1st. August 1913 and 31st. July 1914, 150 were 
tried between the battalion's arrival in France in August 1914 and 30th. September 
1915. Secondly, the disciplinary system itself showed different priorities. Fraudulent 
enlistment, seen as a serious matter in peacetime, became of considerably less 
importance in a war situation. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the difference 
between peacetime and wartime crimes was not a large one. Absence without leave, 
drunkenness and miscellaneous offences, all serious problems in Irish units on home 
service during 1913 to 1914, remained the major disciplinary offences committed by 
Irish troops in France during 1914 to 1915. Most noticeably some opportunities to 
commit crime, afforded by active service (for example the opportunity to commit 
offences against inhabitants) do not seem to have been exploited by many of the Irish 
or British soldiers serving in France during 1914 and 1915. 
38For an example of the former see the case ofTemporary Lieutenant G. B. M. Reed, 
14th. Company, Machine Gun Corps, tried, in the field on 10/4117 for; "S.40 
(ownership ofa camera)", General Courts Martial Register, P.R.O., W090/6, p.114. 
For the latter see the trial ofLieutenant H. Pope Hennessy, 49th. Battalion, Canadian 
Expeditionary Force, tried on the 10/3/17 for; "S40 (getting into bed with a private 
soldier),'. General Courts Martial Register, P.R.O., W090/6, p.109. 
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A comparison between tables 1.6 and 3.4, overleaf, is also infonnative. As a 
general order to the army noted of the difference between peacetime and wartime 
discipline; 
The Commander in Chief has had under consideration certain sentences 
recently awarded by Courts-Martial, ... , He wishes to point out that certain 
offences which in peace time are adequately met by a small sentence, assume, 
on active service, a gravity which wholly alters their character. This principle 
is fully recognised in Military Law; for instance in the case of desertion, the 
Army Act in time of peace, permits a maximum sentence of two year's 
duration only, whereas on active service a Court is allowed to award a 
sentence ofdeath for the same offence, ... , The Commander in Chief wishes to 
impress upon all officers serving upon Courts-Martial that it is their duty to 
give weight to consideration of good character, inexperience and all other 
extenuating circumstances, but that, at the same time, they are seriously to 
consider the effect which the offence in question may have upon the discipline 
of the Army.39 
Therefore it is not surprising that the severity of many sentences increased 
during wartime. No British soldier had been executed since the Boer War (even when 
37 men of the 13th. Hussars mutinied in India in 191140). However, from August 
1914 to September 1915, 51 British, including four Irish, soldiers were executed.41 
Penal servitude, a sentence awarded to no man serving in an Irish unit on home service 
during 1913 to 1914, was awarded to 55 men serving in Irish units in the B.E.F. from 
August 1914 to 30th. September 1915. Equally, the sentence of hard labour was used 
more frequently in wartime. Most noticeably ofall, detention, the sentence awarded 
39General Routine Orders for 19/9/14; Adjutant General's War Diary, P.R.O., 
W095/25. 
40General Courts Martial Register (India), P.R.O., W09017, pp.62-3. 
41J. Putkowski and 1. Sykes, Shot at Dawn, Executions in World War One by 
authority of the British Army Act. Leo Cooper, London, 1993, p.292. 
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most frequently in peacetime, was not used at all in the first thirteen months of the 
war. In wartime field punishment replaced detention as the most frequently awarded 
sentence. As discussed in chapter 2, field punishment was an unpopular sentence, 
involving corporal punishment. However, from the point of view of the military 
authorities, it had the advantage that, while serving his sentence, a man could remain 
on active service with his unit. 
However, it would be wrong to suggest that wartime saw the entire apparatus 
ofmilitary law become more repressive. The number of not guilty verdicts, at least in 
the Irish units used in this case study, increased from 2.8% in 1913-14 to 4.8% in 
1914-15. Likewise, the number of sentences quashed increased from 1.4% in 1913-14 
to 5.2% in 1914-15. This suggests that army officers themselves, sitting on courts 
martial, and the Judge Advocate General's office refused to sentence men, the charges 
against whom were poorly framed, simply because they were on active service. Also, 
the introduction of the Suspended Sentences Act meant that men who, previously, 
would have faced death or long terms of imprisonment, continued to serve with their 
units and, by future good behaviour or heroism in action, could have their sentence 
reduced or removed altogether. 
It is now necessary in evaluating the discipline and morale of the RET as a 
whole, and the Irish units in particular, during the August 1914 to September 1915 
period to examine three instances where discipline was under a severe strain. The first 
is the so-called "Colonels' Surrender" at St. Quentin in August 1914 when Lieutenant 
Colonel Mainwaring of the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers and Lieutenant 
Colonel Elkington of the 1 st. Battalion, Royal Warwickshire Regiment proposed to 
surrender themselves and their men to the advancing German forces. The second is 
the "Christmas Truce" of 1914 and the general crisis of morale faced by the B.E.F. in 
Winter 1914/15. The last issue to be examined will be the formation of Sir Roger 
Casement's "Irish Brigade" from Irish prisoners ofwar, during 1914 and 1915. 
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The "Colonels' Surrender" at St. Quentin has already received considerable 
attention elsewhere.42 However, given the involvement of men of the 2nd. Battalion, 
Royal Dublin Fusiliers and 4th. Royal Irish Dragoon Guards in this affair and the fact 
that this was one of the few occasions on the Retreat from Mons when discipline did 
break down, it merits some attention. 
On the 27th. August 1914 Lieutenant Colonels Mainwaring and Elkington 
promised the Mayor of St. Quentin that they would not fight in the town. If they 
could not evacuate their men before the arrival of the Germans they pledged to 
surrender.43 This much is clear about the incident, however, the lack of primary 
accounts means that it is difficult to ascertain the Colonels' motivation in taking this 
course of action. Mainwaring apparently suggested that he faced a mutiny situation, 
with his men refusing to continue to retreat.44 By contrast Captain Arthur Osburn, the 
medical officer of the 4th. Royal Irish Dragoon Guards, believed that the surrender 
was perfectly justified by the position in which the men found themselves. He stated; 
To me it seems there was every excuse for the two colonels and the 
one or two pale exhausted-looking subalterns whom I had noticed mingling 
with the crowd down at the station. Without Staff, without maps or orders, 
without food, without ammunition, without support from artillery or cavalry, 
what could the remnants of broken infantry do before the advance of the 
victorious army, whose cavalry could have mopped them up in an hour? 
Probably, looking back on it now, the two colonels did almost the only thing 
feasible and the brave thing.45 
42See especially, P. T. Scott. ''Dishonoured''~ The 'Colonels' Surrender' at S1. 

Quentin, The Retreat from Mons, August 1914, Tom Donovan Publishing, London, 

1994. 

43ibid, p.54. 

44A. E. Mainwaring, A Statement by A E Mainwaring, Privately published, N.D., 

cited, ibid, p.54. 

45A Osburn. Unwilling Passenger, Faber and Faber Ltd., London, 1932, p.83. 
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The arrival of Major Tom Bridges, with a rearguard of the 4th. Royal Irish 
Dragoon Guards, averted the surrender. Bridges' account of the incident again 
highlights the near mutinous state of the troops involved; 
Apparently a meeting was then held and the men refused to march on 
the ground that they had already surrendered and would only come away if a 
train was sent to take them. I therefore sent an ultimatum giving them half an 
hour's grace, during which time some carts would be provided for those who 
really could not walk, but letting them know that I would leave no British 
soldier alive in St. Quentin. Upon this they emerged from the station and 
gave no further trouble. 46 
Accounts vary as to how Bridges did finally rally the men. Bridges himself 
suggested that it was partly by issuing threats, but also by the use of a hastily 
improvised musical band, which helped to raise the men's morale.47 However, Osburn 
believed that some men of the 4th. Royal Irish Dragoon Guards may have shot a few 
of the most truculent stragglers.48 
With reference to the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, a few further 
points relating to this incident must be made. Firstly, Lieutenant Colonel Mainwaring 
was only actually commanding forty men of his battalion at St. Quentin. Major H. M. 
Shewan and Captains Clarke and Trigona successfully extricated the rest of the unit 
from German encirclement, albeit with heavy casualties.49 Secondly, Mainwaring was 
the only member of the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers to be tried by court 
martial following the "surrender", suggesting that the military authorities fully 
understood the pressures put on men during the Retreat from Mons. Lastly, and most 
46T. Bridges, Alarms and Excursions; Reminiscencies ofa Soldier, Longmans, Green 

and Co., London, 1938, p87. 

47ibid. p.87. 

48A. Osburn, Unwilling Passenger, p.83. 

49p. T. Scott, 'Dishonoured"; The Colonels' Surrender, pp.49 and 60-68. 
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importantly, it must be stressed that this action was largely atypical of the actions of 
other Irish battalions during this period. Indeed, the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Munster 
Fusiliers and 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, were seen as highly successful 
rearguard units. The 2nd. Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers, in their action at Etreux 
were decimated, with only five officers and 196 other ranks surviving. 50 Nevertheless, 
the battalion's action effectively prevented German pursuit ofI Corps.51 
The high regard shown for the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles for its 
rearguard action was outlined by the unit's chaplain, Father Henry Gill, who observed~ 
The Battalion had also the unique honour of being received by the 
Brigade at the close of their rearguard action during the Retreat from Mons 
by a special ovation. The road was spontaneously lined by troops from the 
other units who rushed out to shake hands with the officers and men. 52 
The only other Irish unit over which any doubts concerning discipline and 
morale lay, in this period, was the 2nd. Battalion, Connaught Rangers. This unit was 
surrounded at Le Grand Fayt on the night of the 26/27th. August 1914 while serving 
as a rearguard. The regimental history suggests that most of the battalion escaped 
from the position, but that Lieutenant Colonel Abercrombie and a number of others 
were either captured or killed.53 However, Father McCrory, the Battalion's chaplain 
stated that Abercrombie surrendered to German soldiers, leaving his men to their own 
devices. 54 Equally, Colonel (then Second Lieutenant) Seymour Jourdain, who served 
50S. McCance, History of the Royal Munster Fusiliers, vol II, From 1861 to 1922 

(Djsbandment), Gale and Polden Ltd., Aldershot, 1927, p.119 and H. S. Jervis~ 

2nd Munsters in France. Gale and Polden Ltd., Aldershot, 1922, p.8. 

51H. S. Jervis, The 2nd. Munsters, p.12, T. Johnstone, Orange, Green and Khaki. 

pp.27-34 and M. Staunton, ''The Royal Munster Fusiliers in the Great War", p.26. 

52H. V. Gill, "As seen by a Chaplain", p.8. 

53H. F. N. Jourdain, The Connaught Rangers, vol. II, Royal United Services 

Institution, London, 1926, pp. 417-8. 

54Diaries ofFather McCrory, P.R.O.N.!., D.1868/1, pp.12-13. McCrory states that 

the action took place at Louducies. 
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in the 3rd., 5th. and 6th. Battalions, Connaught Rangers during the Great War 
believed that; "The 2nd. Battalion had walked into Germany in 1914.,,55 It seems that 
this may partially explain why the 1 s1. and 2nd. Battalions of the Connaught Rangers 
were amalgamated in December 1914, in what was the only permanent amalgamation 
of regular British battalions during the entire war, although this amalgamation is 
usually attributed solely to the regiment's recruiting problems. 56 
A major "crisis of morale" for the RE.F. during the Great War is believed by 
many historians to have occured in the Winter of 1914/15. As J. Brent Wilson notes; 
"A study of the RE.F. during the first winter is essentially a portrait of a shaken 
peacetime army attempting to cope with a war gone wrong.,,57 However, table 3.5, 
overlea±: (for details of all battalions please see appendix 6) demonstrates that during 
the Winter of 1914/15, while morale throughout the RE.F. may have been low, the 
disciplinary record was far from uniform. 
This sample of men tried by courts martial in Irish units during 1914 and 1915 
suggests that the disciplinary record is an extremely complex one, and certainly does 
not suggest that the RE.F. was facing a "crisis of discipline" in Winter 1914115. The 
1s1. Battalion, Irish Guards, 1 s1. Battalion, Royal Irish Regiment and 2nd. Battalion, 
Royal Dublin Fusiliers all had worse disciplinary records in the Summer months of 
1915, than in Winter 1914/15. By contrast the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles had 
just over half of its total number of courts martial trials for this entire sixteen month 
period, conducted during December 1914 and January and February 1915. Lastly, it 
should be noted that the worst period, in terms of disciplinary offences, for the 2nd. 
550ral interview with Colonel F. W. Seymour Jourdain, I.W.M., 11214/2. 
56H. F. N. Jourdain, The Connaught Rangers, voU, pA50. The only other 
amalgamation ofregular units occurred when the 2nd. Battalions ofthe Royal Munster 
Fusiliers and Royal Dublin Fusiliers were temporarily amalgamated and known as the 
"Dubsters" following the battalions' heavy losses at Gallipoli. The 2nd. Battalion of 
the Connaught Rangers was only re-established after the war, when the 5th. Battalion 
became the 2nd., the only New Army battalion to become part of the Regular forces. 
57J. Brent Wilson, ''The Morale and Discipline of the B.E.F.", p.67. 
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Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, was November 1914, and some of the Battalion's 
worst disciplinary offences appear to have been resolved by the onset ofWmter. 
However, the point must also be made that the unofficial Christmas truces of 
1914 were serious breaches of military discipline, although no soldier in the B.E.F. 
was actually court martialled for his actions in arranging or participating in these 
festivities. 58 Reactions to the truce varied in the Irish regiments, as indeed they did in 
the B.E.F. as a whole. 
Table 35 The number ormco tried by courts martial, per month in a sample number 
of Irish jnfantry units 
J F M A M J J A SON D 
llIrGrds 1914 I I 0 3 3 5 4 
4 8 
5 1 
9 0 
12 10 
4 10 
1915 
l/RlRegt. 1914 
1915 
2lRIRifs. 1914 
1915 
7 
3 
40 
5 

5 

9 

I5 6 
2 0 
17 1 
6 

3 

3 

4 

9 

0 

10 
6 
6 
4 
0 
6 
0 
1 
8 5 
0 0 
2 0 
8 10 
2 6 
2IRDF ,1914 0 8 732 151 
15 4 14~ 1915 5 6 0 19 20 5 35 9 
Major Trefusis, the acting C.O. of the 1st. Battalion, Irish Guards 
noted in his diary for the 27th. December 1914; 
I hear that on Christmas day in one part of the line, some Officers were 
invited by the Germans to come and have a drink. They went and asked the 
Germans to come back. They refused but two or three hours afterwards, they 
came over and were taken prisoners. So complications may arise, and we 
have been told not to hold any sort of Armistice, but I don't suppose any 
sensible man would. 59 
580n this issue see, M. Brown and S. Seaton, Christmas Truce, The Western Front, 

December 1914, Papermac, London, 1994. 

59The papers ofBrigadier General The Hon. 1. F. Trefusis, I.W.M., 82/30/1. 
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In sharp contrast, the 1 st. Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers were keen 
participants in the Christmas truce, and, as late as the 13th. January 1915, Captain 
Burrows noted; ''No sniping, this has been the case since Christmas. Enemy seem to 
understand that we will not snipe them so long as they do not snipe us.'>60 
The 2nd. Battalion, Leinster Regiment took a more pragmatic view of the 
truce. While, on Christmas Eve, the battalion refused overtures from the Germans 
(even shooting to pieces Chinese lanterns raised over the German trenches), on 
Christmas Day men of "A", ''8'' and "c" companies fraternised with the Germans in 
no-mans' land. Meanwhile ''D'' company refused to co-operate in the truce, continued 
to snipe at German units opposite it and generally used the truce to strengthen their 
defences.61 Nevertheless, like the 1st. Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers, the 2nd. 
Battalion, Leinster Regiment maintained a truce until ordered to resume hostilities in 
mid-January 1915.62 
Table 3 6 Men tried by courts martial in Irish units not involved in the Christmas 
Truce of 1914. 
_____~__u=D1:.:.·t ___________=c::::..:o:..::u:.:..rt=s Martial to 31/1=2=.1=-14-'---__ 
llIrish Guards 15 
llRoyal Irish Regiment 6 
2IRoyal Irish Regiment 29 
21R0yal Inniskilling Fusiliers 19 
2IRoyal Irish Rifles 40 
2IRoyal Irish Fusiliers 1 
IIConnaught Rangers 11 
21Connaught Rangers 26 
llLeinster Regiment 4 
2IRoyal Munster Fusiliers 27 
60Entry for 13/1115, Captain Burrows' diary, Royal Irish Fusiliers' Museum, Armagh. 
61F. E. Whitton, The History of the Prince ofWales' Leinster Regiment, pp.77-8. 
62_ pp.142-3. 
192 

There is a reasonably clear link between Irish battalions' disciplinary records 
and their involvement in the Christmas truce. The 2nd. Battalion, Royal Dublin 
Fusiliers, 1 st. Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers, 1 st. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles and 2nd. 
Battalion, Leinster Regiment, participated in the truce63 and had, respectively, 62, 26, 
35 and 62 men tried by courts martial from their arrival in France until the end of 
December 1914. Meanwhile, the numbers of men tried by courts martial in Irish units 
which did not participate in the truce were as shown in table 3.6 for the same period. 
While there is no absolute link between poor discipline and participation in the 
Christmas truce, it is clear, from table 3.6, that units with good courts martial records 
were much less likely to participate in the armistice than units with bad or indifferent 
disciplinary records. 
Political pressures were put on the discipline of Irish soldiers in the British 
army during 1914 and 1915 by the formation of Sir Roger Casement's "Irish Brigade". 
Casement had been in the U.S.A. when war broke out and travelled to Germany with 
the backing of Republican Irish-American groups. Initially his activities met with 
success; by the end of 1914 the German government had agreed to supply arms and 
ammunition to Irish Republicans, to recognise and support an independent Irish 
government and, lastly, to authorise the formation of an Irish Brigade in the German 
army.64 
Casement's ''Brigade'' was, of course, to be raised from Irish prisoners of war 
and firm reports of its existence did not reach M.I.5 until March 1916. However, it 
would seem appropriate to examine this brigade and its impact on Irish soldiers in this 
chapter as Casement's aim was to raise it from Irish regular soldiers, captured in 1914 
and 1915. 
63M. Brown and S. Seaton, The Christmas Truce, pp.225-30. 

64The most comprehensive study of this unit is, A. Roth, " 'The German soldier is not 

tactful': Sir Roger Casement and the Irish Brigade in Germany during the First World 

War", Irish Sword, XI~ 78, 1995. 
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The package offered by Casement and the German authorities to Irish 
prisoners of war, prepared to join the Irish Brigade was a comprehensive and, indeed, 
a generous one. This was fully outlined in a circular distributed to prisoners at 
Limburg Camp on the 9th. May 1915, which stated; 
Irishmen. 
1) Here is a chance to fight for Ireland, you have fought for England your 
country's hereditary enemy, you have fought for Belgium in England's 
interest though it was no more to you than the Figi Islands. 
2) Are you willing to fight for your country with a view to securing the 
national freedom of Ireland with the moral and material assistance of the 
German government an Irish Brigade is being formed. 
3) The object of the Irish Brigade shall be to fight solely for the cause of 
Ireland and under no circumstances shall it be directed to any German end. 
4) The Brigade shall be formed and fight under the Irish Flag alone, the men 
will wear a special distinctive Irish uniform and have only Irish officers. 
5) The Brigade shall be clothed, fed and officially equipped with arms and 
ammunition by the German government and shall be stationed near Berlin and 
be treated as guests ofthe German government. 
6) At the end of the war the German government undertakes to send each 
member of the Brigade who desires it to the US.A. with necessary means to 
land. 
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7) The Irishmen in America is [sic] collecting money for the Brigade, those 
men who do not join will be removed from Limburg and distributed among 
other Camps. Ifinterested see your German company commander. 
Join the Irish Brigade and win Ireland Independence. 
Remember batchelors [sic.] walk. 
GOD SAVE IRELAND65 
Despite these generous terms and conditions, Casement's so called "Irish 
Brigade" did· not approach company strength, at its height consisting of only around 
50 men.66 
This sluggish recruitment suggests that, even when removed from the threat of 
disciplinary action (and the only action that the British army could take against 
members of the "Irish Brigade" in Germany was to stop their pay and allowances to 
their farnilies67) and measures which would enhance their morale (the regimental 
system, comforts from home, etc.), most Irish soldiers continued in their loyalty to the 
crown. Indeed, many soldiers risked disciplinary action from the German authorities 
65An original ofthis pamphlet is enclosed with notes by Colonel Maurice Moore on 
the court martial ofPrivate Dowling in July 1918, in COS 46, Cathal O'Shannon 
Papers, Irish Labour History Museum and Archives, Dublin. 
66K. Jeffery, "The Irish military tradition and the British Empire", in K. Jeffery (ed..).. 
"An Irish Empire?", Aspects oflreJand and the British Empire, Manchester University 
Press, Manchester, 1996, p.114. Evidence given to M.I.5 by repatriated P.O.W.s put 
the size of the Brigade at between 50 and 63 men, see ''Formation ofan 'Irish Bde. ' 
among Prisoners ofWar in Germany", P.R.O., W0141/9. Roth states that the 
maximum size ofthe Brigade was 56 men, A. Roth, "'The German soldier is not 
tactful': Sir Roger Casement and the Irish Brigade", pp.311-2. 
67In the case ofPrivate M. O'Toole ofthe 1st. Battalion, Irish Guards, for example, a 
memo of 117116 stated; 'We think Mrs. O'Toole should be informed that her 
allowance is stopped because her husband has joined the German Irish Brigade. It is 
no use fencing with the question." P.R. 0., WO 14119. 
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to show their opposition to the Brigade. When Irish P.O.W.s (excluding officers) 
were all moved to Limburg Camp, the senior N.C.O.s present sent a message to the 
camp commandant stating that, while they appreciated the better conditions as 
Limburg, they wanted no special treatment as; "in addition to being Irish Catholics, we 
have the honour to be British soldiers. ,>68 When he visited Limburg Camp in early 
1915, Casement was poorly received and was manhandled by the P.O.W.s, greeted by 
cheers for John Redmond and taunted by shouts of; "how much are the Germans 
paying you?".69 In addition to this, most of the Irish P.O.W.s were apparently put on 
a starvation diet, in an attempt to force them to join the Brigade. 70 
The quantity of men recruited for the German Irish Brigade was thus very 
disappointing to both Casement and the German authorities. However, the men 
recruited by Casement were also not the proselytising Republicans he had hoped for. 
Wyndham Childs, commenting on the Brigade's personnel noted; 
My own belief is that the Irishmen who joined it merely did so to get 
better treatment, and that none of them ever had the slightest intention of 
raising a hand against this country - anyhow, that is what they all said when 
they returned after the war. 71 
Childs' view does seem to be an accurate appraisal of the Brigade; even 
Casement had to admit that men had joined his unit for better treatment, rather than 
68B. Inglis, Roger Casement, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1973, pp.287-8. 
69ibid, p.289 and the evidence ofPrivate Thomas Higgins, 2nd. Battalion, Royal 
Dublin Fusiliers and Private Andrew Duffy, RA.M.C. in file entitled, "Sir R. 
Casement's visits to Limburg Camp", P.RO., W0141115. 
7<>:Evidence ofPrivate William Dooley, 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Regiment and 
Private John Cronin, 2nd. Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers, P.RO., W014119. 
7lB. E. W. Childs, Episodes and Reflections, Being Some Records from the Life of 
Major General Sir Wyndham Childs, Cassel and Co. Ltd., London, 1930, p.113. 
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out of any sense of Irish patriotism.12 Commenting on one of the men in the Brigade, 
Major Ivan Price, the Intelligence Officer at Irish Headquarters stated; 
Pte. J. Daly before enlistment was continually an inmate of Ballina 
Workhouse. He was [an] idle, worthless fellow, ... , There is no reason to 
suspect them of disloyalty, but owing to the depravity of character of these 
people they could if opportunity offered lend themselves to any condition of 
things which might arise. 73 
The mercenary nature of the force is also demonstrated by the fact that one of 
its members, Timothy Quinless, acted as an informer to the British forces during the 
Anglo-Irish War, being executed by the I.R.A. following a bungled attempt to capture 
Michael Collins.74 The presence of at least two men from English Regiments in the 
Brigade also suggests a "mercenary" incentive amongst its members. 75 
Finally, the failure of Casement's Brigade would appear to be confirmed by the 
treatment of its two members who were captured during the war. Sergeant Daniel 
Bailey, late of the Royal Irish Rifles, who accompanied Casement to Ireland in 1916 
and was captured there76 was; "re-instated on account of his previous good character 
12K. Jeffery, "An Irish Empire"?, p.114. 

73Letter, 5/4/16, Major Price to Lieutenant Colonel V. G. W. Kell, M.I.5 G., War 

Office, P.R.O., W014119. Major Price had, on the outbreak ofwar, been an Inspector 

in the Royal Irish Constabulary and was seconded to the War Office with the rank of 

Major. It is therefore possible that he was writing with a personal knowledge ofDaly. 

See, E. O'Halpin, The Decline of the Union; British Government in Ireland, 

1892-1920, Gill and Macmillan Ltd., Dublin, 1987, p.250. 

74L. 6 Broin, Michael CoUins, Gill and Macmillan, Dublin, 1991, p.54. 

75Letter from P.O.W. Department to M.I.5(?), 27/2/17, lists Lance Corporal H. P. 

Delamore ofthe Bedfordshire Regiment and Private D. Golden of the Somerset Light 

Infantry as members of the Brigade, P.R.O., W014119. It is, ofcourse, possible that 

these were Irishmen who had opted to join English regiments. 

76M. Caulfield, The Easter Rebellion. Gill and Macmillan, Dublin, 1995, p.33. 
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in the Army, and not as some people believe, because he gave, or offered to give 
King's evidence against Casement.,,77 
Private Joseph Dowling, another member of the German Irish Brigade was 
captured in Galway in May 1918, having been landed from a V-Boat to ascertain if 
another rising was possible.78 Dowling was tried by a General Court Martial held in 
the Guildhall, Westminster on the 8th. July 1918. He was sentenced to penal servitude 
for life and in, 1923, when the British government had already released the men 
involved in the 1920 Connaught Rangers mutiny, recognising them as "political 
prisoners", Dowling was still an inmate ofWands worth prison.79 
The sentence passed on Dowling raises two key issues. Firstly, Dowling, who 
could, quite easily have been executed by the British authorities for treason, received a 
more lenient sentence. This suggests that the German-Irish Brigade's threat was not 
seen as a serious one; either in fomenting rebellion in Ireland or of undermining the 
loyalty of Irish soldiers serving in the British army. 
Secondly, the refusal to release him as a "political prisoner" suggests both that 
the British government saw his motives as inspired by personal financial gain, rather 
than political motives, and that the Irish Free State government was unwilling to 
petition for his release, as this would, retrospectively, appear to endorse his actions. 
Ironically, it was Colonel Maurice Moore, a former officer of the Connaught Rangers 
(in which Dowling had also served) and member of the Irish Free State Senate, rather 
than Dail ministers, who was most vocal in an attempt to gain Dowling's release. 
Therefore, it would appear that Casement's Irish Brigade was largely viewed 
as an irrelevance by British senior officers and politicians. Indeed, after Casement's 
execution, the unit became something ofan embarrassment to the German government 
77Notes by Colonel Maurice Moore, in COS46, Cathal O'Shannon Papers, Irish 
Labour History Museum and Archives, Dublin. 
78F. S. L. Lyons, Ireland since the Famine, p.396. 
79All details ofDowling's case were taken from the Art O'Brien papers, National 
Library ofIreland, Ms.8456. This collection includes a transcript of his court martial 
and details on the campaign for Dowling's release. 
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and, despite plans to move it to Egypt, spent the rest of the war near Berlin.80 Post 
war, no action was taken by the British government against men who had served in the 
unit. 
The experience of Casement's Irish Brigade demonstrates that the concept of a 
crisis of morale, or indeed, of discipline, in the 1914/15 period, at least in the Irish 
regiments, can be overstated. Nevertheless, this period did see serious problems in the 
morale of the B.E.F .. Regular soldiers, as discussed in chapter one, expected a short 
war, and when the Great War settled into stalemate, serious weaknesses in the British 
army were revealed. The supply of replacement officers and other ranks on such a 
large scale had never been envisaged with the result that units were frequently 
under-strength and composed, at least partially, of poorly trained men. Equally, many 
of the essentials of trench warfare, such as grenades, trench mortars, machine guns and 
heavy artillery, which the Germans appeared to have in abundance were conspicuous 
by their absence in the B.E.F .. 
Losses obviously effected different units at different times during the first 
fourteen months of the war and battalions showed different propensities to maintain 
their regular character. Second Lieutenant Hitchcock, joining the 2nd. Battalion, The 
Leinster Regiment, in May 1915, commented; 
My platoon paraded in the trench for rifle inspection. They were a fine 
body of men; the majority hailed from Tipperary, King's and Queen's 
Counties and Westmeath and were time serving soldiers, ... , There was a 
splendid esprit de corps throughout the Battalion. 81 
80s. Inglis, Roger Casement, p.296. 
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Other units were less fortunate, Captain Burgoyne, in the 2nd. Battalion, Royal 
Irish Rifles, commented about his unit in April 1915 ~ "an Irish Militia Regiment, and 
that is all we are now, for the class of man we have in it now is a class which would 
not be accepted for the regular Arrny.,,82 However, by May, the situation was not 
quite as desperate; Burgoyne commented; 
since last February our drafts have been improving both in quality and 
training, and we've got rid of our wasters, and I had some 155 quite useful 
lads under me; a small company, but quite good; none better in Flanders 
outside the guards.83 
These observations suggest that, in some respects, the disciplinary record of 
regiments is not, necessarily, a good guide to their morale. The courts martial record 
of the 2nd. Battalion, Leinster Regiment was much worse than that in the 2nd. 
Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, despite (or perhaps because of) the fact that the Rifles 
had suffered higher losses and was made up to strength with what were, in many 
cases, poorly trained drafts. 
The poor quality of replacements sent out to Irish units, even in the very early 
stages of the war, was frequently commented on. The Medical Officer of the 1st. 
Battalion, Connaught Rangers, reported a number of serious problems in that unit. 
Some of the men were over fifty years of age and were thus too old for work in the 
trenches.84 Others had no teeth and found it impossible to eat ration biscuits. 85 
Worse still, from a medical point of view, Lieutenant Colonel Loveband of the 2nd. 
Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers noted, in October 1914, that; 
82c. Davison (ed.), The Burgoyne Diaries, p.172. 
83ibid.. p.21O. 

84War diary of the Medical Officer, 1st. Battalion, Connaught Rangers, P.R.O., 

W095/3923, entries for 6/12114 and 2617115. No such diary survives relating to any 

other Irish unit. 
85ibid, entries for 14/5/15 and 1/6/15. 
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Several cases of crabs have occurred recently amongst the men of this 
Battalion. On investigation it was found that most of the cases were men of 
the last reinforcement. I suggest that a careful medical examination should be 
made of all drafts before they leave the overseas base and all suspected 
case[s] be kept back as owing to the insanitary life men are forced to lead 
when in trenches any disease of this nature spreads with great rapidity.86 
The 1st. Battalion, Connaught Rangers, may be an extreme example in regard 
to poor quality drafts, given their serious recruiting problems. However, in other units 
there were also problems of men being over-age and/or poorly trained for front line 
service. Burgoyne, commenting on his company of the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish 
Rifles, in December 1914 noted; 
One of my beauties had the following conversation with Kearns (a 
second lieutenant), 'Sure, Sir, I'm over 50, haven't I done over 30 years 
service Sir, and sure Sir I don't know how to fix the sights of this rifle, I who 
haven't seen a gun for 15 years!!!' And we found another man who didn't 
know how to work his rifle. Useful sort to send out to us!87 
Service with such men can have done little to raise the morale of other ranks in 
this period. However, some men felt that they had more concrete grievances against 
the army's drafting policy. Private A. R. Brennan, drafted to the 2nd. Battalion, Royal 
Irish Regiment in July 1915 commented; 
86Appendix I, to October 1914 entries in the war diary of the 2nd. Battalion, Royal 

Dublin Fusiliers, P.R.O., W095/148 1. 

87C. Davison (ed.), The Burguyne Diaries, p.39. 
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In barracks in Dublin we had occupied quarters apart from the other 
companies (of the 3rd. Battalion, Royal Irish Regiment) and we had an idea 
that this practice would be followed even in France. On arrival at Acheux, 
however, our Company was broken up and we were drafted to different 
Companies. I suppose this was inevitable, but we were new to the Army then 
and some ofus thought that it was a breech offaith. 88 
Brennan, who had served in the "Cadet Corps" of the 3rd. Battalion, Royal 
Irish Regiment was shocked both to be separated from the men he had trained with 
and to serve with ordinary working class soldiers.89 
Equally, some army reservists, who had been away from "colour service" for 
up to seven years, found rejoining the army, and especially, serving under younger 
N.C.O.s unsatisfactory. John Lucy, then a Lance Corporal in the 2nd. Battalion, 
Royal Irish Rifles noted; "Of my eight men four were reservists, older men who were 
not so easy to command as the serving regulars. They groused rather too much and 
offered gratuitous advice on soldiering."90 It also seems likely that men, whose colour 
service was due to come to an end in late 1914 were not happy with being forced to 
stay on in the army for another year, although little direct evidence relating to this 
group of men has come to light.91 Lastly, in terms of drafts it should be noted that 
88Entry for 118115, First World War diary ofPrivate A. R. Brennan, I.W.M., P.262. 
890espite its title and attempt to recruit middle class men into the army, this Cadet 
Corps never became an Officer Training unit, although there is some evidence that it 
had been designed for this purpose. It was also reffered to as a "Pals"unit, a rather 
strange situation given that, as a draft finding unit, the 3rd. Battalion Royal Irish 
Regiment could not make the guarantee ofjoint service, implicit in the entire "Pals" 
concept.
901 F. Lucy, There's a Devil in the Drum, p.80. 
910ne soldier, due to enter the reserve in late 1914, Lance Corporal S. Wilkes of the 
Monmouthshire Regiment noted; "After being in India some seven years I was 
expecting to come home in the October as the war broke out in the August previous 
well of course I knew that I should not be allowed to go away into civilian life and I 
can assure you that I was very upset as I had been preparing for the last 12 months of 
my service thinking to myself 'put a little away for a rainy day'." Manuscript entitled, 
"A Touch ofMemory", I.W.M., Misc. 163, item 2508. 
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some men had minimal training before being drafted to France. For example, Private 
Michael Irwin joined the 4th. Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers on 9th. November 
1914 and arrived, as a draft, with the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers on the 
4th. January 1915.92 
Rather less needs to be said regarding the inferiority of the B.E.F. equipment 
during this initial period of the war. Most soldiers were painfully aware that devices, 
unknown in the pre-war British army, such as hand grenades and trench mortars, were 
plentiful in the German forces. Even worse than this, in their effect on morale, were 
some of the improvised weapons produced in the B.E.F. during this period. When, on 
the 17th. December 1914, the 1st. Battalion, Connaught Rangers relieved the 1st. 
Battalion, Manchester Regiment in the front line; 
A trench-mortar was taken over in these trenches and used with some 
success until December 19th., on which day it burst, killing Private Murray, 
the man working it. The first weapons of the type used in the British Army, 
the barrels being made of wooden battens frapped round with wire or metal 
hoops, had been constructed just three weeks previously, originating in the 
Indian Division. The enemy opposite were at this time using minenwerfers 
against the Rangers' trenches, but with indifferent success. 93 
Having examined the disciplinary record and some problems in the B.E.F. 
which may have engendered low morale, in the final section of this chapter issues 
which helped to maintain morale during the August 1914 to September 1915 period 
will be briefly considered. Thus the importance of; news from other theatres of war, 
dignitaries visits, the goods received from comforts funds and individuals, organised 
92M. Staunton, "The Royal Munster Fusiliers", p.30. It would appear that this was 

not an isolated incident, see entry for the 2614115 regarding the poor standard of 

proficiency in musketry in the war diary of the 2nd. Battalion, Leinster Regiment, 

P.R.O., W09511612. 

93H. F. N. Jourdain, The Connaught Ra.niers, volJ, pp.451-2. 
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sports, the regimental system, religion and patriotic feelings in raising morale will be 
assessed. 
News of events on other fronts was heavily censored, both by the British and 
foreign governments. Nevertheless, there are a number of suggestions that British 
soldiers felt that the situation on the Russian front was much more positive for the 
allies and that, if they could only maintain a holding action in France, then a decisive 
victory could be achieved in the East. For example, the war diary ofthe 1st. Battalion, 
Royal Irish Fusiliers for the 1st. November 1914 recorded; "good news was received 
from the Eastern theatre, which had a good effect on all ranks. '>94 
Irish units on the Western Front received a bewildering array of visitors, both 
civilian and military during this initial phase of the war. Field Marshal Lord Roberts 
was an early visitor to the 2nd. Battalion, Leinster Regiment in November 1914, 
although, perhaps not surprisingly given his stand over the Home Rule issue, his 
welcome does not appear to have been effusive. 95 
Political visitors to the Irish regiments did not arrive until much later. On the 
1st. September 1915, Second Lieutenant Hitchcock of the 2nd. Battalion, Leinster 
Regiment noted; 
'The O'Mahoney' came to visit us with some members of the Irish 
League, who were visiting the Front. He gave us a long speech about 
Ireland, and congratulated the C.O. on having such a fine Battalion with such 
an excellent fighting record. The men cheered him like blazes, as they had a 
second payment that morning, and had spent some time in an estaminet hard 
by!96 
94War diary ofthe 1st. Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers, P.R.O., W095/1482. Also on 
this theme see; letters from Captain F. W. Filgate, 2nd. Battalion, Royal Munster 
Fusiliers to Mrs. Nightingale, 4/3115 and 1314115, Major Guy Nightingale papers, 
P.R.O., PR03017113 and letter from Captain 1. A. T. Rice, 5th. Royal Irish Lancers, to 
his mother, 26/3/15, N.A.M. 7511-80-68. 
95F. E. Whitton, The History of the prince ofWales' Leinster Regiment, vol.lI, p.73. 
96F. C. Hitchcock. "Stand to". A Diary ofthe Trenches, p.86. The United Irish 
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From the religious community, Cardinal Bourne visited the 1 st. Battalion, Irish 
Guards and the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Regiment in January 1915.97 It is 
somewhat unclear what effect these visits and, of course, many more like them by 
Divisional or Corps Commanders, had on other ranks. Politicians' visits to units were 
normally sneered at, as in the case of Hitchcock's comments above, as the politicians 
were mostly Nationalist and the officers Unionist in political allegiance. However, 
Sergeant A T. Mathews noted that the men of the 1 st. Battalion, Royal Irish 
Regiment derived much humour from faked visits of David Lloyd George to their 
lines. As he noted, one ofthe men in his company, nick-named ''Kaffir'' Smith; 
always carried a top-hat with him - he treated it as a kind ofmascot, he 
had found it in some French village. It had as many holes in it as a pepper 
box, and the reason for this was that we would have a lark with Jerry - so all 
one night we kept shouting across to them that Lloyd George- who always 
wore a silk hat - would be visiting the trenches next day. During the morning 
following 'Kaffir' got his top hat and stuck it on a long stick and walked 
slowly along the trench with just half the hat showing above it, so the 
Germans could see it, I don't know if the German soldiers really thought it 
was Lloyd George, all I do know is that they fairly peppered the hat with rifle 
and machine gun fire, as 'Kaffir' walked slowly on his way. When Jerry 
started shelling us well we thought it was time to tell 'Kaffir' to pack up and 
go somewhere else with his topper.98 
League was somewhat similar to a constituency association for the Irish Parliamentary 

Party, see F. S. L. Lyons. Ireland since the Famine, p.261. 

97 Diary entry for 28/1115 in Brigadier General The Hon. 1. F. Trefusis' First World 

War diary, I.W.M., 82/3011 and entry for 2611115 in the war diary of the 2nd. 

Battalion, Royal Irish Regiment, P.R.O., W095/14215. 

98Sgt. A T. Mathews, "The Thin Khaki Line", unpublished manuscript, N.AM., 

6508-5, pp.22-3. 
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Another boost to morale was provided by gifts sent to the soldiers by various 
comfort funds and individuals. Perhaps the most famous gifts were those provided to 
each man in the B.E.F. for Christmas 1914 from the Princess Mary fund. This was of 
particular importance to Irish units as Private T. Duffy of the 2nd. Battalion, Leinster 
Regiment received the box personally packed by Princess Mary, while Private J. 
Fitzgerald of the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers received the one packed by 
the Queen. 99 
Other, more localised comforts funds, also operated in this period. By late 
October 1914 a comforts fund, established by the wife ofLieutenant Colonel Churcher 
of the 1 st. Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers, and operating in the Armagh area. had 
already dispatched forty, eleven pound packages to the Battalion. These packages 
included electric torches, tobacco and daily newspapers. 1OO Meanwhile, in March 
1915 the 1 st. Battalion, Connaught Rangers received an ambulance from "The People 
ofGalway". 101 
At a lower level, individuals sent out gifts for the troops. Mrs. Nightingale, 
whose son was serving in the 1 st. Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers, sent out razors 
to men in the 2nd. Battalion, in France. 102 The same Battalion also received Irish War 
Pipes from John Redmond, M.p.103 and a green flag with the Irish harp and word 
'Munster' embroidered on it from Lady Gordon. 104 Meanwhile, by March 1915, "D" 
company of the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles had received a football from the 
employees ofMackie and Sons Foundry, Belfast. lOS Equally, as G. D. Sheffield notes, 
9'lwar diary ofthe Quarter Master General's branch, P.RO., W095/27, entry for 
25/12114. 
lOOArmagh Guardian, 23110114, extract in folder entitled "War Cuttings 1914", Royal 
Irish Fusiliers Museum, Armagh. 
101Entry for 19/3/15, war diary of the 1st. Battalion, Connaught Rangers, P.RO., 
W095/3923. 
102Letter, 4/3115, Captain F. W. Filgate, 2nd. Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers, to 
Mrs. Nightingale, Major Guy Nightingale papers, P.RO., PR030/71/3. 
103same to same, 30/5115, ibid. 
l04H. S. Jervis. The 2nd Munsters in France, p.1S. 
lOSC. Davison (ed.), The Burgoyne Diaries, p.143. 
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many officers directly obtained gifts for their men. 106 One such officer was Lieutenant 
J. A. T. Price, who obtained cigarettes, footballs and clothing for men in his troop. 107 
The army High Command itself also took measures to improve morale. The 
most important institutions developed in this way were Divisional baths, concert 
parties and the establishment of canteens (often run by the Young Men's Christian 
Association).108 At the battalion level, officers generally relied on tried and trusted 
methods to maintain morale. While St. Patrick's Day would, ifpossible, be a rest day, 
with, perhaps extra foodstuffs, some battalions also celebrated their own regimental 
days in such a fashion. For example, the 1 st. Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers celebrated 
Barrosa Day on the 5th. March 1915 with an extra dinner for other ranks and 
officers. 109 However, much more common were a wide variety of battalion, brigade 
and divisional sports, ranging from football to polo. 110 
Lastly, some Irish units built up very strong relationships with other units in the 
B.E.F.. Father Henry Gill, serving as the chaplain of the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish 
Rifles noted; 
There was a warm friendship between the R[oyal] I.[rish] R[ifles] and 
the H.[onourable] A[rtillery] C.[ompany]. They were recruited from classes 
about as far apart as possible, but there were two bonds of sympathy between 
100G. D. Sheffield, "Officer-Man Relations; Morale and Discipline in the British Anny, 

1902-22", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London University, 1994, p.186. 

107Letter, J. A T. Price to his mother, 10110114 and to his father, 3111114, N.AM., 

7511-80115 and 20. 

lOSOn these issues, see, 1. G. Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture in the British 

and Dominion Armies, 1914-18, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, especially pp.94-110 
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lO9£ntry for 5-6/3/15 in war diary of the 1st. Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers, P.R.O., 

W095/1482. 

1l0See, for example, letter, Lieutenant J. A T. Rice, 5th. Royal Irish Lancers, to his 

Father, 2217/15, N.A.M., 7511-80-109 (on polo), entries for 6-7112114 in the war 
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them, both were made up of sportsmen and both had the instincts of 
gentlemen. III 
The 1 st. Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers built up a similar relationship with the 
28th. Battalion, London Regiment (Artists' Rifles).112 These relationships not only 
boosted morale in all units concerned, but also enabled experienced soldiers of these 
Irish battalions to pass on advice to the territorial soldiers in an informal setting. 113 
As Hew Strachan notes~ "Logically, the experience of the First World War 
should have destroyed the regimental system. The mechanics of the Cardwell/Childers 
arrangements were redundant in 1914-18.,,114 A mixture of poor recruiting during the 
war and a regimental structure which had failed to keep pace with demographic 
changes in Ireland since the 1880s115 meant that from a very early stage in the war the 
Regimental structure of the Irish regiments virtually collapsed. The bitter truth was 
that, while Cardwell's system of localisation (completed by 1881) had aimed to 
increase rural recruiting,1I6 almost one-half of all recruits in Ireland in 1913 came 
from the Belfast and Dublin recruiting areas. 117 This meant that, as early as 1910, the 
llIH. V. Gill, "As seen by a Chaplain", p.23. 

112Entry for 16/3115 in the war diary of 1st. Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers, P.R.O., 

W09511482 and entries for 26-29/2115, Captain Penrose's diary, P.R.O.N.!., 

D.3574/E/6/8. 

113Men serving in the Irish units seem to have had little prejudice against members of 

the Territorial Force or New Armies. Private Harold J. Hayward ofthe 12th. 

Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment, when under instruction from the 1 st. Battalion, 

Connaught Rangers, noted that they were; "a very good sort, very willing." However, 

commenting on the class differences between the two units he continued; "we would 

perhaps never have met them in civil life. " Taped interview with H. J. Hayward, 

I.W.M. sound archive, 9422/5. 

114H. Strachan, The Politics of the British Army, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997, 
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3rd. Battalion, Connaught Rangers was permitted to recruit in number 12 (The Suffolk 
Regiment's) and number 102 (The Royal Dublin Fusiliers') regimental areas. 1l8 
With the outbreak of war and high losses in the initial stages, the drafting 
system in Irish regiments started to collapse and a system, not dissimilar to the pre 
1868 depot organisation, emerged, by which Irish recruits were simply sent to 
whatever Irish unit required them. In November 1914, for example, three officers of 
the Royal Munster Fusiliers, five of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers, one of the Connaught 
Rangers and one of the North Staffordshire Regiment arrived for duty with the 2nd. 
Battalion, Royal Irish Regiment. 1l9 Likewise, by April 1915, officers from Special 
Reserve battalions of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers and Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers were 
serving in the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers. 120 
The regimental system did, of course, provide esprit de corps in the B.E.F., 
and meant that new drafts were mixed with experienced veterans. However, 
regimental pride often meant that outsiders were not exactly welcomed into the 
regiment. As Captain Filgate noted, in May 1915~ 
The other day the Corps Commander, Gen.[eral] Monro paid us a 
surprise visit and inspected the men. They turned out splendidly + I think he 
was most awfully phased. We have just got about II young officers from the 
Connaughts + Gen. Monro noticed their badges. Gen. [eral] Haking who was 
also their [sic] remarked, 'another good regiment' and General Monro said, 
'yes, but not as good as the Munsters.' I thought it very bad luck on the 
Connaught Officers but it was rather amusing. 121 
118 "Historical Records ofthe 3rd. Special Reserve Battalion, The Connaught 

Rangers", unpaginated manuscript, P.RO., W079/40. 

119Summary for November 1914 in war diary ofthe 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish 

Regiment, P.RO., W095/1421. 

120Appendix to April 1915 in war diary of the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers, 

P.RO., W095/2266. 

121Letter, Captain Filgate to Mrs. Nightingale, 5/5115, Major Guy Nightingale papers, 

P.R.O., PR03017113. 
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Also, the importance of the regimental system in cementing drafts together 
should not be over-estimated. Commenting on the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, 
brought up to strength in November 1914, John Lucy (then a sergeant) commented; 
The new battalion was shiftless, half-baked in every way, and the 
non-commissioned officers were very poor stuff. I and the few remaining 
Regular non-corns. were always ticking them off and warning them against 
familiarity with the men, whom they called by their Christian names. The old 
army was finished. 122 
There also seem to have been some serious doubts about the ability of some 
Irish units to reform following heavy losses. For example, after the action at Etreux 
the five officers and 196 other ranks left of the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers 
were; "split up into parties and sent to the 1st. and 2nd. Army Corps to take on the 
onerous and thankless task of Corps troops.,,123 Therefore, while the regimental 
system did help to foster morale in some respects (mixing the inexperienced with the 
experienced and linking the men in the regiment, however tenuously both to a 
geographical area and the past glories of their unit) its importance should not be 
over-estimated. The regimental system was not a panacea which automatically turned 
raw drafts into battle hardened veterans. Likewise, regimental pride, when taken to 
extremes, could mean that outsiders, temporarily attached to the unit, were treated 
with scant courtesy or respect. 
In terms of fostering morale, the importance of patriotism, although rarely 
expressed by soldiers, should not be ignored. John Lucy suggested that the pre-war 
regular soldier thought little about international affairs and was ready~ ''to fight any 
foreigner."124 However, a rare glimpse into working class patriotism in this period 
122]. Lucy, There's a Devil in the Drum, p.293. 
123S. Mc Cance, History ofthe Royal Munster Fusiliers, voUI, p.121. 
124J. Lucy, There's a Devil in the Drum, p.73. 
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can be seen in a letter from Private William Cavish of the 1 st. Battalion, Irish Guards 
offering condolences to the family of one of his former officers, Lieutenant N. L. 
Woodroffe. In this he states; "one thing you can be proud of, he died for a good cause 
+ he died a Hero for God, for King + Country + especially for the unfortunate Women 
+ children ofFrance and Belgium.,,125 
Lastly, the importance of battalion chaplains in maintaining morale must be 
examined. Like patriotism, religious belief is a very personal matter and it is almost 
impossible to judge its importance on morale. However, some comments can be made 
regarding the influence ofchaplains on morale. Firstly, the point must be made that, at 
this stage of the war, the overwhelming majority of Irish soldiers in France were 
Catholic and this, naturally, meant that most chaplains attached to Irish battalions were 
Catholic Priests. This, in itself was important in the work of the chaplains as; 
the Catholic chaplain could accompany his men right up to the 
firing-line, whereas the Anglican chaplain was not officially permitted to go 
beyond base camp. This rule was relaxed in 1916, but the troops continued 
to label Anglican chaplains as cowards. 126 
Father Henry Gill, ofthe 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, outlined his reasons 
for visiting the front line; 
It was no doubt necessary that the Chaplain should frequently visit his 
men in the trenches and let them see that he was not afraid to share their 
dangers, for otherwise how could he preach to them of courage, patience and 
125Letter from Cavish to Woodroffe's family, 211115, Woodroffe Papers, I.W.M., 
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confidence in God? But this must be merely accessory to the solid work of 
administering the Sacraments, which could only be done at all satisfactorily 
when the men were out oftrenches.127 
In addition to their spiritual duties, Catholic Chaplains also organised activities 
for the troops. Catholic chaplains had a greater responsibility to act independently in 
this field, as unlike the Protestant Chaplains, who could simply refer men to the 
Y.M.C.A. huts, there were no recreational facilities provided by Catholic Associations 
in France, with the exception of the St. Patrick's Soldiers' Clubs in Boulogne. 128 
Thus, in March 1915, Father Gill obtained the gift of a gramophone and twenty-five 
records for the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, after writing to the ''His Master's 
Voice Gramophone Company". 129 
Chaplains with the Irish regiments received high praise for their work in raising 
morale and maintaining discipline. As Father Gill noted; 
the Brigade Major speaking of the R.[oyal] L[rish] RitIle]s. said they 
were a 1000/0 a better battalion than a month before. He apparently 
connected it with the presence of the Chaplain for he said 'When you came 
the regiment was at it's worst' i.e. It had lost most of its original men, and 
had got a lot ofvery poor reserve men to fill up its ranks. 130 
Likewise, Captain Filgate was most complimentary about the chaplain 
appointed to the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers; "I hope the 1st. Batt.[alion] 
have got a man like him, as you can't realise what a difference it makes to the men + 
Everyone for the matter of that whatever religion he may be.,,131 
127H. V. Gill "As seen by a Chaplain", p.14. 

128J. Leonard, ''The Catliolic Chaplaincy", p.8. 
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In conclusion, it is obvious that the picture of morale and discipline in Irish 
units in the B.E.F. from August 1914 to September 1915 was a complicated one. 
Certainly indiscipline was a relatively serious problem in some Irish units (especially 
the 2nd. Battalions of the Royal Irish Rifles, Leinster Regiment and Royal Dublin 
Fusiliers). However, it is very difficult to generalise on this theme. There is no 
absolute co-relation between losses and indiscipline, although, not surprisingly, it is 
clear that more military offences were committed in units during wartime, than in 
peacetime. However, it is clear that if the B.E.F., as a whole, faced a crisis of morale, 
during the Winter of 1914115, then, at least in the Irish units, this period did not see a 
crisis ofdiscipline. Also, the point must be made that different units had very different 
disciplinary records and faced disciplinary problems at different times. This variation 
of experience should not really prove any surprise, as the whole rationale behind the 
regimental system in the British army was that no two battalions were exactly the same 
in terms of personnel, traditions or experience. 
Clearly, the formation of Sir Roger Casement's Irish Brigade raised serious 
issues regarding the loyalty of Irish soldiers in the British army during this period. 
However, the failure of Casement to obtain more than fifty or so men, demonstrates a 
basic patriotism and determination among ordinary Irish troops, which existed even 
when measures designed to maintain his morale had been removed. 
Lastly, a number of both official and private measures existed to raise morale. 
Official policies ranged from long held, traditional, regimental days, to newly formed 
divisional entertainment troops. Private contributions were equally varied, comprising 
everything from the gifts ofbagpipes and green flags, sent by prominent public figures, 
to the more practical sweets, cigarettes and clothing sent by comforts funds and 
private individuals. 
During this period, the B.E.F. had adapted, fairly successfully, to the 
conditions of trench warfare. .:Certainly its disciplinary record showed a few black 
PR030171/3. 
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spots (most notably the "Colonels' Surrender" at St. Quentin); nevertheless, in what 
was, even in August 1914, a hastily improvised force, which during much of this 
period was not only under-equipped, but also received many replacements of poor 
quality, this is hardly surprising. By September 1915, it would appear that some of the 
worst cases of indiscipline had been ironed out in the Irish regular units and officers 
and men were slowly adjusting to the prospect ofa long war with high casualties. 
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Chapter 4. 
Building Discipljne and Morale; The Fonnation and Training of the Irish New Army 
Divisions 
The outbreak of the Great War saw in Ireland, as in the rest of the United 
Kingdom, the rapid expansion of the army. In Ireland, the 10th. (Irish), 16th. (Irish) 
and 36th. (Ulster) Divisions were raised and trained during August 1914 to February 
1916. While this dissertation is primarily concerned with the discipline and morale of 
Irish units serving on the Western Front, it seems logical, at this point, to discuss the 
formation of the Irish New Army divisions. It is clear that deficiencies in equipment, 
training and leadership effected these units performance at the front. This chapter will 
be concerned mainly with the 16th. (Irish) and 36th. (Ulster) Divisions, as they spent 
their entire overseas service on the Western Front, while the 10th. (Irish) Division 
served in the Middle East, until its "Indianisation" in April 1918 when a number of its 
Irish battalions were sent to France to reinforce other divisions. 
Expansion of the armed forces, in Ireland was, in some ways, much more 
simple than that in the rest of the United Kingdom. There was none of the 
competition between New Army and Territorial Force units, which led to such 
recriminations in Great Britain. 1 Also, few Irish depots were overwhelmed with 
recruits to the extent that many of their English counterparts were. Finally, the 
pre-war paramilitary bodies provided a number of bonuses for the Irish New Army 
divisions, primarily large numbers of men with some rudimentary training and, in the 
case of the Ulster Volunteer Force (V.V.F.), arms and equipment. 
Ip. Simkins, Kitchener's Army; The Raising of the New Armies, 1914-16, Manchester 
University Press, Manchester, 1988, pp.41-6 and I. F. W. Beckett, The Amateur 
Military Tradition, 1558-1945, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1991, 
pp.226-8. 
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Conversely, the expansIon of the army. in Ireland, created a number of 
problems for the military authorities which were unparalleled in Great Britain. The 
36th. (Ulster) and. to a lesser extent. the 16th. (Irish) Divisions, were, in a very real 
sense "political" divisions. Both had strong political patrons. and this affected the 
formation and traming of these units in many ways. Trained officers, an increasingly 
scarce commodity in Britain in 1914, were objected to by politicians if they did not 
share their own political or religious views. Conversely, there was great political 
pressure brought to bear to appoint certain officers, involved in the pre-war 
paramilitary bodies, to high ranks in the Irish New Anny divisions. Certainly this 
lumbered both divisions with large numbers of officers, whose qualifications rested 
more on their political influence than their military experience. 
These political pressures also extended to other issues, such as the exact names 
of units, the type of flags carried and badges worn and the type of regimental mascots 
used. While seemingly innocent enough in itself, this overdue interference of 
politicians in military minutiae had some serious side effects. It not only distracted 
officers from the more important task of preparing units for active service, but 
threatened the British regimental system, itself long prized in maintaining morale . 
amongst British soldiers. 
Finally, difficulties arose as the War Office and Irish politicians did not agree 
on the exact roles of these political divisions. Sir Edward Carson, and the Ulster 
Unionists, had little option, given their professed loyalty to the British Empire, but to 
2offer the nV.F. to the British government on the outbreak of war. However, the 
intention was that proper military training and experience would prepare these 
volunteers to resist Home Rule, after the war. 3 For John Redmond and the Irish 
2As J. O'Stubbs has commented; "The Unionists as a result ofthe war had lost their 
greatest weapon, the threat ofa civil war in Ulster. They were imprisoned by their 
patriotism." 1. O'Stubbs, "The Unionists and Ireland, 1914-18", Historical Journal, 
33,4, 1990, p.871. 
3H. Montgomery Hyde, Carson. The Life of Sir Edward Carson. Lord Carson of 
Duncairn, Constable, London, 1987, pp.377-9 and, S. Gwynn, John Redmond's Last 
Years. Edward Arnold, London, 1919, p.163. 
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Parliamentary Party, the situation was more complicated. Certainly Redmond was 
very keen to see an "Irish Brigade" formed from the Irish National Volunteers 
(I.N.V.), on active service. At the same time he wanted the British government to 
provide equipment and instructors for the tN.V. units left in Ireland. Redmond's plan 
was that, post war, the "Irish Brigade" and I.N.V. would provide the basis for an Irish 
army.4 
In this chapter, the contribution of the pre-war paramilitary bodies to the 
creation of the Irish New Army divisions will be considered. The experience, 
appointment and training of officers will be discussed. This will be followed by a 
consideration of the composition of the other ranks of these divisions and how they 
differed from the pre-war norm and adapted to military discipline. The training, 
equipping and billeting of these units will be investigated. The political pressures on 
unit names and divisional symbols will then be examined. Finally, consideration will be 
given to the disciplinary problems faced by these divisions while based in the United 
Kingdom and the efforts made by the military authorities and civilian bodies to 
improve morale. 
As a result of a well organised Ulster Unionist campaign, which started almost 
immediately after the outbreak of the First World War, the 36th. (Ulster) Division has 
been seen as an entirely Protestant and Unionist Division, formed solely from the 
pre-war U.V.F .. Writing in 1922, Cyril Falls noted; 
The Ulster Division was not created in a day. The roots from which it sprang 
went back into the troubled period before the war. Its life was a continuance 
of the life ofan earlier legion, a legion of civilians banded together to protect 
themselves from the consequences of legislation which they believed would 
affect adversely their rights and privileges as citizens ofthe United Kingdom.5 
4T. P. Dooley, "'Politics, bands and marketing': army recruitment in Waterford city 

1914-15", The Irish Sword, XVIII, 72, 1991, p.209. 

5C. Falls, The History of the 36th. (Ulster) Division. Constable, London, 1996, pp.1-2. 
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This view of the link between the U.V.F. and the 36th. (Ulster) Division has 
been accepted by a large number of modern historians. Thomas Johnstone, for 
example, has noted; 'lhe battalions of the (36th.) division, based on the Ulster 
Volunteer Force (V.V.F.) order ofbattle, had been in existence since before the war.'>6 
Meanwhile, Philip Orr has even suggested that the 36th. (Ulster) Division was a; 
"covenanting army,'" all its members supposedly having signed the Ulster Covenant 
opposing Home Rule. 
While there was, undoubtedly, some continuity between the U. V.F. and the 
36th. (Ulster) Division, this constant reliance on Fall's original account has tended to 
over emphasise this relationship. While Falls is remembered as the Chichele Professor 
of Military History at Oxford University, it is forgotten that, in 1922, he was writing 
both with the patronage of Sir Edward Carson and Sir James Craig8 and at a time 
when Ulster Unionists felt that their position in the newly formed Northern Ireland 
state was by no means secure.9 Thus his study emphasised the extent to which Ulster 
Protestants and Unionists had rallied to the Empire in her hour of need, the clear 
implication being that the British government now owed them a debt ofhonour. 
A more detailed, and impartial, consideration of the formation of the 36th. 
(Ulster) Division suggests that the overlap between the U.V.F. and this division varied 
considerably from battalion to battalion. This issue is of great importance to the 
(First edition, Mc Caw, Stevenson and Orr, Belfast, 1922). 

6T. Johnstone, Orange, Green and Khakj~ The Story of the Irish Regiments in the 

Great War, 1914-18, Gill and Macmillan, Dublin, 1992, p.216. 

7p. Orr, The Road to the Somme~ Men of the Inster Division Tell their Story, The 

BlackstaffPress, Belfast. 1987, p.45. 

sC. Falls, The History of the 36th (Inster) Djvision. pJOII and A. Jackson, "Irish 

Unionism", in D. George Boyce and A. O'Day (eds.), The Making ofModem Irish 

History, Revisionism and the revisionist controversy, Routledge, London, 1996, p.126. 

9See, P. Bew, P. Gibbon and H. Patterson, Northern Ireland 1921-1996, Serif, 

London, 1996, pp.21-54, P. Buckland, A History ofNorthern Ireland, Gill and 

Macmillan, Dublin, 1981, pp.31-54, C. Campbell, Emergency Law jn Ireland, 

1918-1925, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994, pp.268-337 and B. Follis, A State Under 

Siege" The Establishment ofNorth em Ireland 1920-1925, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 

1995, on this theme. 
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current study, as the extent to which the morale, discipline and, indeed, unit cohesion 
and loyalty of the V.V.F. transferred to the 36th. (Ulster) Division, influenced this 
formation's own discipline and morale. 
The 14th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, had its roots in the pre-war Young 
Citizen Volunteers of Belfast. Yet the next of kin addresses of men joining this 
battalion, following the outbreak of war, detailed in table 4.1 overleaf, demonstrates 
the unit's geographical spread. However, if the personnel of the pre war Young 
Citizen Volunteers of Belfast did not transfer en bloc to the 14th. Battalion, Royal 
Irish Rifles, there were other connecting factors. The distinctive grey, pre-war Young 
Citizen Volunteer uniform was issued to all men in the new battalion, while they were 
based at Finner camp. 10 Lieutenant Colonel Robert Chichester, who had been C.O. of 
the Young Citizen Volunteers, became the C.O. of the 14th. Battalion, Royal Irish 
Rifles and always addressed his men as; ''young citizens."ll Finally, men who had 
been N.C.O.s in the Young Citizen Volunteers became N.C.O.s in the 14th. Battalion, 
Royal Irish Rifles. 12 
In Belfast, it would appear that most units of the 36th. (Ulster) Division were 
filled relatively quickly with former nV.F. members. By the 3rd. October 1914, the 
8th., 9th., 10th. and 15th. Battalions, Royal Irish Rifles, recruited from Belfast had 
over 1,000 men each. 13 However, even in Belfast, it would be wrong to see nV.F. 
units entering the 36th. (Ulster) Division en bloc. For example, in a political display 
on the 4th. September 1914, Sir Edward Carson and Sir James Craig reviewed 800 
men of the North Belfast Regiment, nV.F. as they went to enlist. I'" At first sight this 
appears an impressive display; however, it must be remembered that the North Belfast 
Regiment, V.V.F., in May 1914, had consisted of 6,001 men organised in seven 
IOAnon, "Service with the 14th. BattalionR.[oyal] I.[rish] RifIle]s. (Y.C.V.), 1914-18 
War", Royal Ulster Rifles Museum, Belfast, p.42. 
llibid, p.23. 
12ibid, p.26. 
13Belfast Evening Telegraph, 3/10114, p.6. 
141. Colvin, The Life ofLord Carson, voL ill, Victor Gallancz Ltd., London, 1936, 
p.34. 
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battalions. I5 Seen in this context the enlistment of a mere 800 men from this unit in 
the 36th. (Ulster) Division is far from impressive. 
Table 4 1 The backgrounds of original recruits to the 14th Battalion. Royal Irish 
Rifles. 16 
Number of men in 14IRoyai Irish 
Next of kin resident in Rines. 
Belfast 1203 
Co. Antrim 104 
Co. Down 237 
Rest of Ireland 140 
England 652 
Scotland 40 
Wales 12 
U.S.A. 6 
Australia 1 
Argentina 2 
New Zealand 2 
Canada 1 
South Africa 1 
Channel Islands 1 
TOTAL 2402 
I5See Royal Irish Constabulary returns for 31/3/14 and 3115/14, in B. Mac Giolla 
Choille, Intelligence Notes, 1913-16. State Paper Office, Dublin, 1966, pp.37 and 100. 
I6This table is based on a manuscript booklet entitled, "Membership of the 141R0yaJ 
Irish Rifles (YC.V.)", Royal Ulster Rifles Museum, Belfast. It is unclear when this 
book was compiled, but the fact that deaths are not recorded, suggests that it was 
before this unit left for overseas service. The over establishment strength of the 
battalion is due to the fact that it was acting as a draft finding unit for other battalions 
ofthe 36th. (Ulster) Division. For example, on the 24th. June 1915) 200 men were 
transferred to the 16th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles. See, S. N. White, The Terrors, 
16th (pioneer) Battalion, Royal Irisb Rifles, The Somme Association, Belfast, 1996, 
p II. Eric Mercer notes that pre-war the Young Citizen Volunteers had a strength of 
just 750 men and thus were not actually in a position to provide an entire battalion for 
overseas service. See, E. Mercer, "For King, Country and a Shilling a Day: 
Recruitment in Belfast during the Great War, 1914-18", unpublished M.A. thesis, 
Queen's University ofBelfast, 1998, pp.1O-ll. 
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Links between the North Belfast Regiment, U.V.F. and the 15th. Battalion, 
Royal Irish Rifles were further weakened by the low levels of officer overlap. The, 
then, Second Lieutenant, J. H. Stewart-Moore, on joining the battalion noted; "All the 
men of the 15th. Rifles came from north Belfast but only a minority of the officers, 
being essentially a working-class area it contained relatively few of the officer class." 17 
Outside Belfast, overlap between the U.V.F.and the 36th. (Ulster) Division 
was even less distinct. On the 3rd. October 1914, one month after the division was 
established, its strength per battalion was as detailed in table 4.2, below. 
Table 42 The strength of battalions of the 36th. (Ulster) Division, 3rd October 
1914 18 
Battalion Officers 
81R0yai Irish Rifles (East Belfast) 
91R0yai Irish Rifles (West Belfast) 
101R0yai Irish Rifles (South Belfast) 
151R0yai Irish Rifles (North Belfast) 
lllRoyai Irish Rifles (South Antrim) 
121R0yai Irish Rfiles (Mid Antrim) 

l3lRoyai Irish Rifles (lst. Co. Down) 

91R0yai Irish Fusiliers (Armagh, Cavan and Monaghan) 

91R0yai Inniskilling Fusiliers (Tyrone) 

101R0yai Inniskilling Fusiliers (Derry Volunteers) 

l11R0yai Inniskilling Fusiliers (Donegal and Fermanagh) 

141R0yai Irish Rifles (Young Citizen Volunteers ofBelfast). 

15 
19 
17 
12 
16 
20 
23 
20 
7 
21 
15 
17 
Other 

Ranks 

1065 
1102 
1119 
1048 
666 
668 
1246 
940 
643 
740 
471 
1038 
17J. H. Stewart- Moore, "'Random Recollections", unpublished manuscript, I.W.M., 
p.7. 
~8This table is based on figures given in the Belfast Evening Telegraph, 3110114, p.6. 
The subtitles are those of the U.V.F. regimental areas from which the battalions were 
recruited and, as was the case with the English Pals units, these appeared after the 
official regimental title. The 16th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles (2nd. County Down), 
the divisional pioneer battalion, was not formed until the 20th. October 1914 and thus 
is absent from this return. S. N. White, The Terrors, 16th. (Pioneer) Battalion, Royal 
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As this demonstrates, only in County Down and Belfast had recruitment to the 
36th. (Ulster) Division, much of it presumably from the UV.F., been satisfactory in 
the first month of the division's existence. Rural units also had widely varying 
UV.F./36th. (Ulster) Division continuity. 
In the case of the 13th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, it appears that this unit 
obtained the vast majority of its officers and men from U.V.F. units in County 
Down. 19 However, even within the county the response was variable. Bangor, in 
North Down contributed 97 men and the Ards Peninsula 85 men, yet the entire South 
20Down UV.F. Regiment found just 102 men. While this battalion recruited up to 
strength very quickly, it effectively marked County Down's manpower ceiling. The 
16th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles (2nd. County Down), the divisional pioneer 
battalion had severe recruiting difficulties and did not reach its established strength 
until the 24th. June 1915.21 
Other rural 36th. (Ulster) Division battalions faced more serious recruiting 
problems. In late October 1914, Lieutenant Colonel A. Ricardo, 9th. Battalion, Royal 
Inniskilling Fusiliers, had the following handbill distributed amongst members of the 
Tyrone UV.F.; 
Carson says 'Quit yourselves like men. ' 
Kitchener's Army. 
9th. Service Battalion Royallnniskilling Fusiliers (Tyrone Volunteers). 
The Tyrone Battalion at Finner Camp is now 864 strong. 300 more are 
required to complete. 
Come and join your comrades. Ifthe Ballot Act is put into force you will not 
be able to choose your regiment. 
Irish Rifles, p.l. 
19Anon., ''Historical Records ofthe 13th. Service Battalion, R.[oyal] l.[rish] R.[ifles], 

part 3", Royallllster Rifles Museum, Belfast, pp.1-3. 

20ibid, pp.I-4. 

21S. N. White, The Terrors, 16th. (pioneer) Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, p.ll. 
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Hire this time with your Chums to fight against your Country's enemies. 
£9 for the half year with free food and clothing. AND YOUR WIFE AND 
CHILDREN WILL BE PROVIDED FOR; no delay now in receiving 
Separation Allowance. 
IN THE TYRONES 
you will find GALLANT COMRADES AND A COMFORT ABLE 
REGIMENT. SURE PROMOTION FOR SMART MEN. 
TRAIN NOW FOR EMPIRE AND ULSTER. 22 
Privately, Ricardo stated~ ''We have done fairly well, but require 300 men to 
complete if we do not get these at an early date there is a great risk of our being filh;::d 
up from outside which would be a great slur on our country [sic]."23 Ricardo's 
recruitment statistics are even less impressive when we consider that, as C.O. of the 
Royal Innislcilling Fusiliers' depot at Omagh, he had started recruiting for the 36th. 
(Ulster) Division in early August 1914, before it was officially sanctioned by the War 
Office. Therefore, he had, almost literally, lcidnapped recruits who should have gone 
to the 10th. (Irish) Division, into the 36th. (Ulster) Division!24 
Equally, the 11th. Battalion, Royal Innislcilling Fusiliers relied on non~Irish 
recruits to fill its ranks. Indeed "C" company was formed by the British League for 
the support of Ulster amongst Ulster Unionist sympathisers in Great Britain. 25 
22Handbill included in U.V.F. recruiting correspondence, Royal Innislcilling Fusiliers' 
Museum, Ennislcillen, Box, 12. The expression "hire" in this handbill suggests that it 
was particularly aimed at agricultural labourers, attending hiring fairs at this time of 
year. 
23Letter, Ricardo to Mr. Robinson, ? October 1915, U.V.F. recruiting 
correspondence, Royal Innislcilling Fusiliers' Museum, Ennislcillen, Box, 12. 
24C. Falls, The History of the 36th (Ulster) Division, p.5. 
2SW. J. Canning, Ballyshannon, Be1coo, Bertincourt; The History of the ) lth 
Battalion, The Royal InniskiJJjng Fusiliers (Donegal and Fennanagb Volunteers) in 
World War One, Privately Published, Antrim, 1996, p.15. Nicholas Perry's work 
suggests that almost half of the 11 tho Battalion, Royal Innislcilling Fusiliers were 
non-Irish, although most battalions in the division obtained over ninety percent oftheir 
original establishment from Ireland, N. Perry, "Maintaining Regimental Identity in the 
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Ultimately, the 36th. (Ulster) Division, before it left for overseas service was to 
contain a number ofmen from Glasgow and Liverpool. 26 
Therefore, there were, clearly, strong links between the U.V.F. and the 36th. 
(Ulster) Division, but these should not be over stated. No U.V.F. unit transferred en 
bloc into the British army and U. V.F.l36th. (Ulster) Division overlap varied greatly 
from battalion to battalion. This was for a wide variety of reasons. Firstly, many 
members of the U.V.F. had joined up shortly after the outbreak of war, not prepared 
to wait until the Ulster Division became a reality. For example, one private in the 6th. 
Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, a unit in the 10th. (Irish) Division, claimed that nearly 
600 men in the battalion were former members of the u.V.F..27 Secondly, the U.V.F., 
naturally, had no imperial service obligation. On the outbreak of war, all U.V.F. 
members aged 18 to 42 were asked to testifY whether they would be available for 
service; anywhere in the United Kingdom, overseas or in Ulster only.28 Significantly, 
the results of this canvas were never made public. However, F. P. Crozier, who 
helped to compile the Belfast returns freely admitted; 
There was difficulty in obtaining the signatures of the men to serve 
'unconditionally anywhere' in a Division, not because they did not want to 
go, but on account ofthe accursed Irish question. They feared the South, ... , I 
now plead guilty to putting many a 'yes' in the more patriotic column in order 
to swell the numbers for publication. 29 
Great War: The Case ofthe Irish Infantry Regiments", Stand To, 52, 1998, pp.6 and 
11. 

26F. P. Crozier, A Brass Hat in No Man's Land, Cedric Chivers Ltd., Bath, 1968, 

p.33; D. Starret, "Batman", Imperial War Museum, 79/35/1, pp.28-30 and P. 

Simkins, Kitchener's Army, p.71. 

27Belfast Evening Telegraph, 6/10114, p.8. See also, M. T. Foy, "The Ulster 

Volunteer Force. Its Domestic Development and Political Importance in the Period 

1913 to 1920", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Queen's University ofBelfast, 1986, p.206. 

28A copy ofthis form survives in the papers ofPrivate R. Grange, 12th. Battalion, 

Royal Irish Rifles, Liddle Collection, University ofLeeds. 

29p. P. Crozier, A Brass Hat jn No Man's Land, pp.20-21. 
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Thirdly, if members of the V.V.F. in Belfast were reluctant to enlist 
unconditionally, then their counterparts in rural areas must have been even less 
enthusiastic. Not only were many rural U.V.F. members small farmers, whose land 
would be left untended if they enlisted, but in areas such as South Armagh and South 
Down, any sectarian tensions could well led to violence against Vnionist families or 
property, both ofwhich would be unprotected while volunteers were on active service. 
Finally, there was also the fear that, denuded of its best men, the V.V.F. would 
be unable to resist Home Rule if this was imposed either during or immediately after 
the war. One volunteer stated, on the 7th. August 1914; 
The Volunteers are to be asked tomorrow if they are unwilling to serve 
abroad. It may be assumed that those who will agree to do so will be the 
youngest and most efficient men. It is highly probable that many of them will 
never return. When the war is finished, and the Home Rule situation has to 
be faced again, the U.V.F. will be without many of its most useful members, 
and as a fighting force it will be less formidable. Therefore I ask you, is it 
desirable that any Volunteer should offer himself for foreign service?30 
While Kitchener saw the V.V.F. as an efficient military force and was prepared 
to offer concessions to secure the service ofV.Y.F. personnel in the British army3I his 
view of the IN.V. was very different. Therefore, while the 16th. (Irish) Division 
became known as the 'Irish Brigade' the overlap between the IN.V. and the 16th. 
(Irish) Division was considerably less than that between the V.Y.F. and the 36th. 
(Ulster) Division. In many ways this was because John Redmond began bidding for 
higher stakes with a weaker hand. While Carson had insisted that Home Rule be 
suspended until Ulster exclusion could be considered at the end of the war, his actual 
30Beljast News Letter, 7/8114, cited, P. Orr, The Road to the Somme, pAO. 
31 A. T. Q. Stewart, Edward Carson., Gill and Macmillan Ltd., Dublin, 1981, p.93. 
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demands in respect of the 36th. (Ulster) Division were not extortionate. The use of 
the term 'Ulster' in the divisional title, the utilisation of the Red Hand of Ulster as the 
divisional badge, the addition of UV.F. titles to proper unit names in the style of 
English 'pals' battalions and the return ofa small number of former UV.F. officers to 
the division, could be easily accommodated within the existing British army structure. 
By contrast Redmond, to demonstrate his support for the war, primarily wanted the 
I.N.V. to be recognised by the War Office as a military force, for home defence duties 
only and equipped at government expense.32 
As discussed in chapter one, the I.N.V. were, even in comparison to the 
UV.F., an inefficient military force in 1914, lacking trained officers, finance and 
equipment. Kitchener certainly was not inclined to, as he saw it, waste valuable 
officers and equipment on a force which, at best, would relieve Territorial Force 
troops from garrison duties and, at worst, would provide Irish Nationalists with the 
ability to enforce Home Rule on their own terms. Despite receiving support from 
Asquith, Redmond's attempt to have the I.N.V. recognised had failed by mid August 
1914.33 It was against this background that Redmond 'adopted' the 16th. (Irish) 
Division. As Terence Denman notes; 
There was no indication at first that the division was intended to satisfy 
Redmond's demands for a specifically nationalist and catholic formation. But 
on 12. October [Lieutenant General Sir Lawrence] Parsons was ordered to 
'clear' a brigade to receive recruits from the Redmondite Volunteers. 34 
32C. Hannon, "The Irish Volunteers and the Concepts ofMilitary Service and Defence 

1913-24", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University College, Dublin, 1989, pp.82-3 and 

115-6. 

33ihi.d.. p.83. 

34T. Denman, Ireland's Unknown Soldiers~ The 16th (Irish) Division in the Great 

War, 1914.1918, Irish Academic Press, Dublin, 1992, p.38. 
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Despite this development, the links between the I.N.V. and the British anny 
remained very loose. A proposal that the 8th. Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers 
should have the title ''Limerick Battalion" was agreed in principle by Parsons. 
However, insufficient numbers ofLimerick I.N.V. enlisted to allow this proposal to go 
ahead.35 Certainly numbers, and indeed bodies of the I.N.V., joined the 16th. (Irish) 
Division and it is noticeable that some units based their recruitment on politics rather 
than place ofdomicile. Thus, 100 men of the Enniskillen I.N.V. and 500 of the Belfast 
I.N.V. joined the 6th. Battalion, Connaught Rangers36, despite the fact that all of these 
recruits came from outside the Connaught Rangers' regimental recruiting area. 
The political nature of the 16th. (Irish) and 36th. (Ulster) Divisions shaped 
their development in a number of ways. Firstly, in terms of the officers and other 
ranks joining these units. Secondly, in the actual structure of the Divisions. Thirdly, 
in relation to the emblems and mascots adopted by these divisions and, lastly, in the 
more practical side of the equipment made available for these units. 
In terms of officers, both the 16th. (Irish) and 36th. (Ulster) Divisions were at 
a disadvantage as most of the experienced officers in Ireland had already been posted 
to the 10th. (Irish) Division, or to non Irish units. N. E. Drury, joining the 6th. 
Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, a unit in the 10th. (Irish) Division, as a second 
lieutenant in November 1914, noted that the officers of the rank of captain and above 
consisted of two serving officers of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers, four former officers of 
the same regiment, two Indian Army officers, one former officer of the Rifle Brigade 
and two inspectors of the Royal Irish Constabulary.37 This left very few experienced 
officers for the later Irish divisions. 
35Letter, Parsons to Colonel Maurice Moore, 29110114, Maurice Moore papers, 

N.L.I., Ms. 10,561119-40. 

36Letter, Parsons to Tennant, 27/2115, Correspondence and Diary Extracts of 

Lieutenant General Sir Lawrence Parsons, 1915-18, N.L.I., Ms.21 ,278 and T. 

Denman, Ireland's Unknown Soldiers, pp.49-50. 

37Diaries of Captain N. E. Drury, 6th. Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, N.A.M., 

7607-69-1, pp.8-9. 
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U.V.F. influence certainly managed to secure some regular officers for the 
36th. (Ulster) Division, who otherwise would have gone to other units. For example, 
F. P. Crozier, who, as a captain on the reserve of officers was ordered to report to a 
Royal Irish Fusiliers battalion in Dublin, simply ignored this order, preferring to stay 
with the U.V.F.. He became a major and, later, a lieutenant colonel in the 9th. 
Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles. 38 The U.V.F. also requested the services of a number of 
officers who had reported for duty with other units on the outbreak: ofwar. A number 
of these, for example, Lieutenant Colonel R. D. P. S. Chichester (Guards Reserve), 
Major W. S. Blacker (Royal Field Artillery), Captain the Earl of Clanwilliam 
(Household Cavalry), Captain A. Ricardo (Royal Irish Fusiliers Depot) and Captain 
W. B. Spender (South Eastern Coastal Defences) were returned for duty with the 
36th. (Ulster) Division.39 
U.V.F. influence also saw the appointment of Major General C. H. Powell, ex 
Indian Army, and in 1914, the commander of the North Down Regiment, U.V.F. as 
G.O.C. of the 36th. (Ulster) Division, 40 Colonel G. Couchman, late Somerset Light 
Infantry and an unattached officer in the U.V.F., as Brigadier General commanding the 
107th. Infantry Brigade and Colonel G. Hacket-Pain, late Worcester Regiment and 
U.V.F. Chief of Staff, as Brigadier General commanding I08th. Infantry Brigade.41 In 
addition, James Craig, M.P., who had served as a captain in the Boer War, was 
appointed Quartermaster General of the 36th. (Ulster) Division, with the rank of 
lieutenant colone1.42 
38F. P. Crozier, A Brass Hat in No Man's Land, pp.18-19. 
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41Lieutenant General Sir George Richardson papers, P.R.O.N.I., D.1498/7 and 
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The usefulness of these officers secured by U.V.F. influence was variable. 
Brigadier General G. Couchman did not prove to be an effective commanding officer, 
and one of Major General Sir Oliver Nugent's first acts, on becoming G.O.C. of the 
36th. (Ulster) Division, was to remove Couchman from his command.43 Equally, 
while Craig was able to secure some U.V.F. equipment for the 36th. (Ulster) Division, 
he was so ill, and indeed on sick leave from the 5th. July 1915 to 10th. March 1916, 
that his deputy had to take on his workload. Nevertheless, Sir Edward Carson 
personally intervened with the War Office in an attempt to allow Craig to accompany 
the 36th. (Ulster) Division overseas!44 By contrast Lieutenant Colonel S. W. Blacker 
turned the 9th. Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers into, arguably, the best battalion in the 
36th. (Ulster) Division, in terms ofboth discipline and combat effectiveness.45 
Nevertheless, political influence could do nothing to remedy the shortage of 
experienced officers in either the 16th. (Irish) or 36th. (Ulster) Divisions. In the 16th. 
Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, there was only one retired regular officer, the C.O., 
Major John Leader.46 The 8th. Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers had two regular 
officers, the C.O., Lieutenant Colonel John Kevin O'Meagher, who had commanded 
the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers on the outbreak of war, and Major M. 
Williamson, a retired Indian army officer, while the 9th. Battalion, Royal Munster 
Fusiliers had only one regular officer, Major Henry F. Williams.47 The 9th. Battalion, 
43Letter, Nugent to his wife, 26/10/15, Farren Connell papers, P.RO.N.I., 

D.3835/E/2/5/20A. The circumstances surrounding Couchman's removal are 
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Royal Irish Rifles had only two officers with previous regular experience; Lieutenant 
Colonel G. S. Ormerod, late Royal Munster Fusiliers, who was almost seventy years 
old and Major F. P. Crozier, a reformed alcoholic.48 
At the battalion level these officers were, again, a variable quantity. Crozier 
proved to be an efficient officer and ended the war as a brigadier general. By contrast, 
other veteran officers proved a severe embarrassment. During December 1914, 
Captain Wake, a South African veteran with only one leg, reported for service with the 
14th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles. Following a route march; 
Capt. Wake gave the command 'Halt!', as the men had been 'Marking 
Time', Capt. Wake's next command was 'Fallout the Gentlemen.' For some 
unknown reason he then fell off his horse. He lay where he fell, apparently 
unhurt. He made no attempt to rise. He then gave the final command, 
'Battalion Dis-miss', whereupon the parade did a Right Turn, saluted and 
then dispersed. Only then did Capt.[sic] Wake get up, and hand his mount 
over to the groom, who was waiting. Captain Wake remained only a short 
time with the 14th. Battalion.49 
There were similar problems in the 16th. (Irish) Division. For example, the 
7th. Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers had two C.O.s during their training period in 
the United Kingdom. 50 Lieutenant Colonel M. Hughes relieved Lieutenant Colonel 
Cox as C.O. in April 1915 due, it would seem, to recruiting and disciplinary problems 
in this unit. 51 
48F. P. Crozier, A Brass Hat in No Man's Land, pp.32-4 and D. Starret, ''Batman'', 
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49Anon, "Service with the 14th. Battalion Royal Irish Rifles", Royal Ulster Rifles 
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However, there is some evidence that other ranks in the New Armies were 
prepared to tolerate and work for officers who were not entirely competent in their 
duties. Rifleman MacRoberts of the 14th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, noted that his 
company commander, Captain Peter Kerr-Smiley (M.P. for North Antrim 1910-22); 
was a cavalry officer, as most ofus knew, and had little experience with 
infantry and was therefore bound to make mistakes, but we were to do the 
right thing, to support him loyally and he would do his best, so we would get 
along well together. He had a good voice and seemed to be very cool and 
collected.52 
Apart from regular officers, there were two other types of officers with some 
previous military experience available to the 16th. (Irish) and 36th. (Ulster) Divisions. 
Namely, former militia or special reserve officers and officers from pre-war 
paramilitary bodies. Retired militia officers appear to have been largely unsuccessful 
appointments. Major Sir Francis Vane, writing of his fellow officers in the 9th. 
Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers, noted; 
Several things were pathetic enough. Several old officers of Irish 
Militia regiments had volunteered to corne out, expecting jobs on the 
remounts etc.. They were enthusiastically patriotic and admirable, but as 
captains of modem companies the work was much too great for their 
strength, and having left the Army for a score of years they did not know 
much about modem drill. When I was on parade they were constantly 
coming to me for advice - one asked me how many men there were in a 
modem company, another to give him a few useful words of command, etc .. 
52Diary ofRiflernan J. MacRoberts, 14th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, Liddle 
Collection, University ofLeeds, p.14. 
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I did my best to help them at their request, but applied for them to be 
removed to more convenient employment. This was eventually done - but 
one at least died of the strain ofit al1. 53 
A number of officers from the pre-war paramilitary groups received 
commissions in the 16th. (Irish) and 36th. (Ulster) Divisions. In the 16th. (Irish) 
Division, Lieutenant General Sir Lawrence Parsons refused to give commissions to 
such officers en masse. While Parsons gave four or five commissions in the Divisional 
Artillery to IN.V. officers, he would only give commissions in infantry battalions to 
IN.V. officers who brought a number of their men with them.54 Thus John Wray, an 
officer in the Enniskillen IN.V., received a commission in the 6th. Battalion, 
Connaught Rangers when he brought 200 of his men with him.55 Therefore, by 
November 1914, Colonel Maurice Moore, the Inspector General of the IN.V., was 
referring IN.V. officers, desirous ofa commission in the British army, to the Tyneside 
Irish Brigade, where their claims would be dealt with more sympathetically. 56 
In the 36th. (Ulster) Division, many more openings were available for former 
paramilitary officers. For example, C. F. Falls, who had commanded the 3rd. 
Battalion, Fermanagh Regiment, U.V.F. was, by November 1914, a captain in the 
II tho Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, having never been a member of the regular 
or reserve forces. 57 Meanwhile, in the 13th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, it appears 
that nine of the twenty nine officers of this unit, including three of the four captains 
and the adjutant, had been commissioned purely on the basis of their U. V.F. 
experience.58 
53F. Vane, Agin the Goyernments, Samson Low and Marston, London, 1928, p.248. 

54Letters, Parsons to Colonel Maurice Moore, 27110114 and 29110114, Maurice 
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When the supply of regular, reserve, ex-special reserve/militia and former 
paramilitary officers had been exhausted, other methods had to be resorted to in order 
to obtain officers. Lieutenant General Sir Lawrence Parsons established a cadet 
company in the 7th. Battalion, Leinster Regiment. This was created in response to 
what Parsons saw as the poor quality of candidates presenting themselves for 
commissions. He noted; 
Many of the Candidates are quite socially impossible as Officers - men 
who write their applications in red or green ink on a blank bill-head of a 
village shop. These are the class most successfully weeded out by the 
enlisting ordeal [into the cadet company in the 7th. Battalion, Leinster 
Regiment], as they think it beneath their dignity to enlist as 'Common' 
Soldiers to be herded with 'riff-raff'. 59 
Parsons's cadet company was to prove a great asset to the 16th. (Irish) 
Division, between November 1914 and December 1915; 161 cadets passed through it, 
to become officers in the division.60 This company was particularly useful, as in 
Ireland, very few schools or colleges had established Officer Training Corps (O.T.C.) 
by 1914. Indeed, the only O.T.C. in Ireland were at Trinity College, Dublin, The 
Queen's University of Belfast, The Royal College of Surgeons of Ireland, The Royal 
Veterinary College, Cork Grammar School, Campbell College, Belfast. S1. Andrew's 
College, Dublin and St. Columba's College, Dublin.61 These institutions were 
Royal Ulster Rifles Museum, Belfast, p.12 and War Office, Monthly Army List for 
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attended, almost exclusively, by Protestants. Parsons's cadet company thus provided a 
manner in which Irish Catholics could receive an a.T.C. type training. 
However, the cadet company in the 7th. Battalion, Leinster Regiment, was not 
endorsed by a number of leading Nationalists. Colonel Maurice Moore, noted, in 
November 1914; 
though the latter [parsons] is very sympathetic and an old friend of 
mine, he may be inclined to take from us the only privilege we have, viz. - the 
appointment ofofficers. He says he has 200 applications and is going to lump 
them together into a company for drill and choose the best, that is I admit a 
very good plan from his point of view, but may mean the officering of the 
[Irish] Brigade by Unionists, whereas we want it as a training place for our 
officers to be ready after the war. 62 
Parsons's cadet company gained unpopularity amongst Nationalists as it 
developed. It was clear that Parsons did not see it as a training school for I.N.V. 
officers. Equally, his decision that Irish Parliamentary Party, M.P.s, even, in the case 
ofWilliam Redmond, those with military experience, would have to serve in the cadet 
company was tactless in the extreme. 63 Indeed, Parsons's insistence that William 
62Letter, Moore to Joseph Devlin, M.P., 7/11114, Maurice Moore papers, N.L.I., 
Ms. 10,56111-18. 
63The Nationalist M.P.s concerned were; William Redmond, who had served as a 
subaltern in the Wexford Militia in 1879 and trained in the cadet company. (T. 
Denman, A Lonely Grave; The Life and Death ofMajor WiJ]jam Redmond. Irish 
Academic Press, Dublin, 1995, pp.86-7) and Stephen Gwynn, who had no military 
experience, and served in the cadet company. (M. Lenox-Conygham, An Old LUster 
House, p.225). In addition Tom Kettle, a former M.P. became a lieutenant in the 
16th. (Irish) Division, but it is unclear whether he served in the cadet company, as he 
was utilised in recruiting work. (1. B. Lyons, The Enigma ofTom Kettle; Irish patriot, 
Essayist, poet, British Soldier. 1880-1916, The Glendale Press, Dublin, 1983, 
pp.267-81). Finally, the Independent Nationalist M.P., Daniel D. Sheehan became an 
officer in the 9th. Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers. It is unclear whether he served 
in the cadet company. (M. Staunton, "The Royal Munster Fusiliers in the Great War", 
pp.220-1). 
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Archer Redmond, M.P. would have to serve in the cadet company was seen as a 
personal snub by his father, John Redmond.64 
There were, of course, sound military reasons why such men should go 
through some fonn of training before being commissioned. However, politically, for 
the Irish Parliamentary Party, this policy was damaging. As Nora Roberts, Parsons's 
daughter, noted ofthe cadet company; 
as a means of training officers it could not have been more satisfactory 
nor, for the majority, more popular. But as a political device for a distracted 
leader trying to entice M.P.s, JP.s, touchy publicans, and financial supporters 
to send their sons to an extremely dangerous and not very popular war it was, 
to say the least of it, rebuffing. 65 
Parsons's cadet company and whole policy on commissions was further 
discredited by three factors. Firstly, pitifully few Catholics received commissions in 
the 16th. (Irish) Division. Scarcely one officer in five was a Catholic66 and of the 
officers above the rank of major, only one, Lieutenant Colonel 0' Meagher, 8th. 
Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers, was not a Protestant.67 
Redmond highlighted the problems this created for the morale of men serving 
in the 16th. (Irish) Division, stating that; 
The fact that every one of the three Brigadier-Generals of the 16th. 
Division is an Englishman, every Colonel in the Division, and, with one or 
two exceptions, every Major and Captain, Protestants, and that the smallest 
64T. Denman, Ireland's Unknown Soldiers, p.48. W. A. Redmond won the M.C. 
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possible proportion of Officers of these Regiments are Catholics has been, 
and is, doing the greatest possible hanD.68 
Secondly, the cadet company was easily by-passed by a number of Englishmen 
who obtained temporary commissions. Some received direct commissions from the 
War Office69, while a number of Englishmen, who had been privates in exclusive 
London Territorial Force units, were directly commissioned into the 16th. (Irish) 
Division.70 
Finally, many Nationalists contrasted the difficulty they had in obtaining 
commissions in the 16th. (Irish) Division, with the apparent ease with which Ulster 
Unionists received commissions in the 36th. (Ulster) Division. Stephen Gwynn noted 
that John Redmond had no influence in appointing officers to the 16th. (Irish) 
Division, continuing; 
Does anyone suppose that Sir Edward Carson had no voice in the 
staffing of the Ulster Division? He had at all events received from the first a 
clear promise that all professional soldiers who had been officers in the Ulster 
Volunteers would be officers in the Division and that any who had been 
mobilised should be restored to their associates in the Division. 71 
68Memorandum by John Redmond relating to an interview with Lord Kitchener at the 
War Office, 29/9/15, John Redmond papers, N.L.I., Ms. 15,261(7). 
69Denman gives, as an example ofthis, the case of Ivone Kirkpatrick, who he states, 
was refused a commission by Parsons, but was then posted, as a second lieutenant to 
the 8th. Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers in the 16th. (Irish) Division, by the War 
Office, T. Denman, Ireland's Unknown Soldiers, p.42. In fact, Kirkpatrick was given 
a direct commission into the 5th. Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, serving in the 
10th. (Irish) Division. See, I. Kirkpatrick, The Inner Circle, Memoirs ofIvone 
Kirkpatrick. Macmillan & Co. Ltd., London, 1959, p.4. Nevertheless, in November 
1914, Parsons requested that the War Office send no more second lieutenants to the 
16th. (Irish) Division, as his cadet company would fill the vacancies. Letter, Parsons 
to the Secretary, War Office, 29111114, Parsons's papers, N.L.I., Ms.21,278. 
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By August 1915 John Redmond stated; "I would be very glad to see a real 
Officer Training Corps started in Ireland. The one at Fermoy, established by General 
Parsons, has proved a perfect fraud + fiasco.',72 At this time, Redmond was firmly 
supporting the Inns of Court O.T.C. selection board established in Dublin.73 
In the 36th. (Ulster) Division, no cadet company on Parsons's model was 
established and, indeed, it does appear that many men without any previous military 
experience found it relatively easy to obtain commissions in this unit. Nora Robertson 
argued that; "practically all Ulstermen of officer standing had had some form of 
military training, even at school in the O.T.C .. The Nationalist type had not.,,74 
Terence Denman has repeated this argument.15 However, given the small number of 
O.T.e. units existing in LUster in 1914 (namely, Campbell College and The Queen's 
University of Belfast) this does appear to be overstating the case. 
Indeed, many men appear to have been commissioned into the 36th. (Ulster) 
Division simply as they were prominent businessmen, or had some professional 
qualifications. For example, of the captains in the 9th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles in 
mid-1915, George Gaffikin had been a schoolmaster pre-war and Horace Haslett, a 
Belfast merchant. 76 The only training given to such men, except informally, by senior 
officers in their own battalion, was at a special officers' course which took place at 
The Queen's University of Belfast. 1. H. Stewart-Moore, commenting on the 
usefulness of this course stated; "I do not think that we learnt much that was useful 
but the course provided an opportunity for one or two pleasant tea parties.,,77 
72Letter, Redmond to Maurice Moore, 20/8115, Maurice Moore papers, N.L.I., 
Ms. 10,561119-40. 
73ibid, and Letter to Colonel Erington from Knight Ryan(?), 12/8115, in file entitled, 
"Inns of Court, O.T.e., Details ofRegional Selection Boards", Guildhall Library, 
Ms. 17,684. 
74N. Robertson, Crowned Harp, p.125. 
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237 

Thus the political involvement in the 16th. (Irish) and 36th. (Ulster) Divisions, 
from the point ofview of officer appointments was, generally, damaging. A number of 
experienced officers, notably, Colonel Couchman of the 107th. Infantry Brigade, 
appear to have been selected on the basis of their political allegiances, rather than their 
efficiency in creating well trained and disciplined units. Likewise, enthusiastic 
amateurs who attained their commissions through political connections often did not 
become efficient officers. For example, Tom Kettle was an intelligent and witty man, 
who proved to be an excellent recruiting agent. However, his chronic alcoholism 
made him a disastrous choice as an infantry officer. 78 
However, having said this, political jobbery in officer appointments was 
certainly not as blatant in the 16th. (Irish) and 36th. (Ulster) Divisions as it was in the 
38th. (Welsh) Division.19 Equally, it should be remembered that many of the 
experienced officers obtained by political influence were no less efficient than many of 
the "dug-outs" who officered the New Armies. 80 
In terms of discipline and morale the importance of the composition of the 
officer corps is unclear. Certainly, as will be examined later in this chapter, a number 
of New Army officers proved to be very poor at maintaining discipline in their units. 
Meanwhile, the effect on morale of finding that your C.O. had served in the Second 
Mghan War of 1878-80, cannot have been to raise it appreciably. 81 Nevertheless, it is 
clear that many other ranks understood the problems involved in establishing new units 
and were prepared to co-operate with officers who were not fully competent. 
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The other ranks in the Irish New Anny divisions appear to have come from less 
varied social backgrounds than their counterparts in Great Britain.82 Pauline Codd, 
writing in relation to County Wexford and Martin Staunton, regarding County Clare 
suggest that over eighty per cent of recruits from these areas, during the war, were 
labourers.83 Even from industrial Belfast, many of the recruits were unskilled 
workers. For example, in June 1917 a roll of honour unveiled in Harland and Wolff 
shipyard's boilershop, listed 260 men from that workshop on active service. Of these, 
36 were skilled workers, 42 apprentices and 182 unskilled workers.84 Also, in the 
10th. Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, evidence suggests that seventy-four 
percent of men serving in this unit between October 1914 and July 1916 were 
unskilled workers. 85 
This contrast to the general British experience was important for two main 
reasons. Firstly, it made the number of potential N.C.O.s very small, especially in the 
16th. (Irish) and 36th. (Ulster) Divisions, which had few veterans in the ranks. David 
Starret noted the situation at Donard Camp, where the 107th. Brigade was quartered; 
'"Acting' sergeants came round half-a-dozen times a day to ask your name. I doubt if 
some of them could spell their own."86 Likewise, J. H. M. Staniforth, serving in the 
6th. Battalion, Connaught Rangers, wrote; "Well, our sergeant was a mild, helpless old 
thing with a 'strong weakness' himself, so he let us get out of hand altogether and we 
scattered over the town, drinking hard. ,,87 Secondly, the unskilled background of 
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many Irish recruits may have retarded the pace of training in these New Army units 
and thus delayed their departure to the front. 
Nevertheless, as in the rest of the United Kingdom, many middle class recruits 
to the Irish New Army divisions, found it difficult to adapt to army life. When J. H. 
M. Staniforth joined the 6th. Battalion, Connaught Rangers in October 1914 he noted; 
I turned in early, on an iron bed-cot, under two ragged brown 
verminous horse-blankets. I got my best sleep between then and midnight; 
and then the rest of my fellow-recruits began to come in, blind drunk. The 
place resembled a casual ward; about a dozen seedy, ragged, lousy, unshaven 
tramps, who lurched in and lay on their cots smoking, spitting, quarrelling, 
making water all over the room (excuse details) hiccuping and vomiting. It 
was after three before the last of them settled into a repulsive noisy slumber 
among his rags. It was the quaintest night I ever spent. 88 
Later, Staniforth described his fellow recruits as, "these, filthy, sodden, 
smelling, staggering, slobbering lepers who sang and cursed and quarrelled and snore 
by turns.,,89 By early February 1915, such problems were being rectified in the 14th. 
Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, as Rifleman J. MacRoberts noted; 
we were beginning to recall the little conventions that constitute 
modem good manners and everyone who forgot himself at table now, was 
tossed in a blanket, after having been properly tried and condemned by a 
special judge with jury. We had quite a number of offenders each night. 90 
88ibid, pp.2-3, citing letter ofStaniforth to his parents, 18110/14. 
89"b"dI 4.I ,p. 
900iary ofRifleman J. MacRoberts, 14th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, Liddle 
Collection, p.7. 
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In disciplinary tenns, the backgrounds of some recruits posed potential 
problems. Fonner soldiers or militia men could cause difficulties for their new 
officers. A. M. Cooper, serving in the Sth. Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, 
remembered~ 
There were militia-men among us, wearing South African war ribbons, 
who were amused at the large body of civilians who had become soldiers 
overnight. They were always ready to make fun of any arduous drill and 
training which they thought to be unnecessary - for them anyway. 91 
Another major problem faced in Irish service battalions, especially in the 36th. 
(Ulster) Division, was the over-familiarity of N.C.O.s with other ranks. This was a 
result of the finn territorial basis of many service battalions. Cyril Falls stated that~ 
"The Infantry of the 36th. Division was fonned on perhaps the most strictly territorial 
basis of any Division of the New Armies, ... The company. the platoon, was a close 
community, an enlarged family."92 This point is refined by Nicholas Perry, who notes 
that while, in 1914, the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, contained just forty four per 
cent of its men from the regimental recruiting area, in 1916 the 13th. Battalion, Royal 
Irish Rifles derived just ten per cent ofit manpower from outside Belfast and Counties 
Antrim and Down.93 
This "family" atmosphere in some units caused difficulties when N.C.O.s were 
appointed. As G. D. Sheffield notes; 
Typically, the N.C.O. was from a similar social background as the men 
he commanded, and possibly had been on friendly tenns with them 
91M. Cooper (ed.), We Wbo Knew, The Journal ofan infantry subaltern during the 
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previously. On promotion, however, the fledgling N.C.O. was required to 
hold aloof from his erstwhile barrack mates and refrain from social 
intercourse with them, ... , Even the Lance Corporal and the Private were 
obliged to observe a form ofapartheid.94 
Philip Orr mentions that this strict localisation of some battalions of the 36th. 
(Ulster) Division, meant that many N.C.O.s found it difficult to perform their duties 
properly; 
Many N.C.O.s were relatives or friends of men they had commanded, 
and orders, which should have been issued with military brusqueness, came 
out, often enough, as friendly requests. To counter this some N.C.O.s were 
changed about, to be in charge of men with whom they were not so 
familiar. 95 
The formation and training of the Irish New Army units faced problems on a 
number of other levels, all of which influenced the morale of the service battalions. 
Firstly, there were political issues surrounding the names of units and the badges, flags 
and mascots used. Secondly, there was the purely practical problem of trying to train 
men with insufficient numbers of trained officers and N.C.O.s or equipment. Thirdly, 
there were problems associated with the slow recruitment of units. Lastly, there were 
difficulties with billeting the large numbers of new recruits. 
As has already been discussed, the overlap between the I.N.V. and 16th. (Irish) 
Division and the nV.F. and the 36th. (Ulster) Division was far from absolute. 
However, these divisions' political patrons wanted to influence how the divisions 
940. D. Sheffield, "The Effect ofWar Service on the 22nd. Battalion, Royal Fusiliers 
(Kensingtons) 1914-18, with special reference to morale, discipline and the 
officer/man relationship", unpublished M.A. thesis, University ofLeeds, 1984, p.6. 
95p. Orr, The Road to the Somme, p.S4. 
242 
developed and what symbols they used. Many of these political trappings caused 
controversy and were potentially damaging to morale. 
One of the earliest decisions to be made in these divisions was the exact name 
of the units concerned. The title "Ulster" for the 36th. Division was reluctantly 
conceded by Kitchener, as the title had never appeared in the British army before.96 
Likewise the so-called "Dixie" badge was issued to the 36th. (tnster) Division. The 
latter decision shocked a number of officers serving in the division. As F. P. Crozier 
related; 
A single instance will illustrate this pride of regiment. Someone - I 
know not who - devised a Divisional cap badge, comprising the Red Hand of 
Ulster, to be worn by the whole of the Ulster Division. The political 
suggestion was approved by the higher authorities, without our knowledge. 
The badges arrived, were issued, and of course worn, since an order is an 
order~ but regimental tradition prevailed over political stupidity. Protests 
reached Divisional Headquarters in such large numbers, in the regulation 
manner, that within a week the Royal Irish Rifles badge was again in every 
cap. It is possible to play on regimental tradition to almost any extent, 
provided the way is known, but it cannot be cut across for apparently no 
good military reason. 97 
Redmond was keen that, to evoke the memory of the "Wild Geese" the 16th. 
Division should be known as the "Irish Brigade" and given a distinctive badge and 
uniforms. 98 However, Parsons was generally unsympathetic to the "Irish Brigade" 
96H. Montgomery Hyde, Carson, p.378. 

97F. P. Crozier, A Brass Hat in No Man's Land, p.4S. 

98c. Hannon, "The Irish Volunteers and the Concepts ofMilitary Service and 
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title and the trappings which this entailed. In a letter to John Redmond in December 
1914 he noted; 
I have always been opposed to any special Badge being stuck to the 
16th. Div.[ision], ... , [members of new units are serving in battalions of] old 
Irish Reg[imen ]ts. whose honours and badges they have a right to + should be 
proud to wear, ... , These old Batt [ alio ]ns. are all wearing their old Badges, 
why should their new brothers in arms require a new badge? 
The only reason I can see is that the Ulster Div[isio ]n. has a silly badge 
replacing the time honoured badges of the Regiments they belong to. I am 
not in favour of copying the Ulster Div[isio ]n .. 
Remember I view the question entirely with a soldiers eyes. I have 
spent 44 years in the Army + know its traditions, history + sentiment + share 
with all other old soldiers a dislike of 'Fancy' Corps + an intense love and 
admiration for our old Regimental institution. 99 
Nevertheless, the whole issue of a badge for the 16th. Division continued for 
almost a year. This involved a three way correspondence between Redmond, the War 
Office and Parsons. Designs were submitted which incorporated almost every symbol 
which was seen as embodying the Irish spirit. Complex badges involving harps, coats 
of arms, shamrocks and crowns, which would have required men of super-human 
proportions to wear them, proliferated. Finally, no less a personage than Field 
Marshal Lord Kitchener himself, decided that a shamrock would be the divisional 
badge. lOO 
The 16th. (Irish) Division also received three mascots from John Redmond, 
namely, three Irish wolfhounds. As these animals carried no party political baggage, 
9~etter, Parsons to Redmond, 12/12/14, Redmond papers, N.L.I., Ms.15,519. 
l~etter, Parsons to Redmond, 27/6/15, Redmond papers, N.L.I., Ms.15,519. 
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Parsons appears to have welcomed them. as an aid to morale. The only controversy 
they caused was over which battalions of the division should receive them. Finally, 
Parsons decided that the senior battalions of each brigade, viz., the 6th. Battalion, 
Royal Irish Regiment, 7th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles and 7th. Battalion, Royal 
Inniskilling Fusiliers, should receive one wolfhound each. 101 
In terms of morale, the preservation of the regimental system was probably the 
most important result of these discussions. Given the fact that the 49th. Infantry 
Brigade did not arrive in France until February 1916, three months after the rest of the 
16th. (Irish) Division and the early date at which some service battalions in the division 
were disbanded, it is questionable whether the 16th. (Irish) Division ever attained a 
corporate identity like that enjoyed in the 36th. (Ulster) Division. 102 Certainly, one 
imagines that Kitchener, Parsons and, even Redmond, had more important matters to 
consider than the badges and buttons ofthe 16th. (Irish) Division. 
The 10th. (Irish), 16th. (Irish) and 36th. (Ulster) Divisions all faced problems 
in their training, which were similar to those experienced by other New Army units in 
Britain.103 Training in the 10th. (Irish) Division was reasonably comprehensive, given 
the large number of regular or recently retired officers and N.C.O.s available in this 
formation. Indeed, the 10th. (Irish) Division was the only Irish division to complete 
the course laid down by the War Office. 104 
101Letter, Parsons to Redmond, Redmond papers, N.L.l, Ms. 15,261 (3). 

10200 the divisional loyalty in the 36th. (Ulster) Division, see, Wilfrid Spender, 
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In the 16th. (Irish) Division, training was less organised, and this has led to 
some historical debate. Terence Denman believes that Parsons was an effective 
training officer, stating; 
Parsons was energetic and methodical in his frequent inspections of his 
troops in a determined, and largely successful, attempt to prepare his division 
for the realities of trench warfare and to counter the debilitating effects of 
long months of training and waiting. 105 
By contrast, Tom Johnstone believes that Parsons proved to be an ineffective 
divisional commander. He believes the training programme to have been insufficiently 
intensive, involving only eight to nine hours work per day; Parsons set no uniform 
standards which battalions were expected to meet and, as late as August 1915, 
Parsons had not even visited some of the units under his command. 106 Certainly, 
training in the 16th. (Irish) Division could verge on the shambolic; 
On the 11th. February [1915], Major-General Vesey Dawson, C.V.O., 
inspected the four battalions of the [49th.] Brigade in training, and seemed 
quite pleased with their progress. An amusing and needless to say, 
unrehearsed incident occurred during his inspection of 'The Seventh' 
[Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliersl A sham attack had been planned, 
with various objectives, etc., in the vicinity of Ballyglass. Three companies 
were detailed to participate in the scheme, and 'B' Company were to do 
company training independently. By the strict instructions of Major Blasse, 
'B' Company were not to appear anywhere in the neighbourhood of the 
rendez-vous for the main scheme. 
I05T. Denman, Ireland's Unknown Soldiers, p.56. 
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The Inspecting-General, the C.O. and second-in-command watched the 
companies attacking from the high ground at the final objective. All went off 
well until the assault troops were within about 150 yards of the General and 
his party. Suddenly, from the left flank, there was a yell from a hundred men 
simultaneously and through the hedge appeared 'B' Company, who 
determined not to miss the 'show', charged with fixed bayonets, obliquely to 
the main attack. For a moment the C.O. and second-in-command seemed 
dumbfounded by this sudden onslaught, but the Major-General was highly 
delighted, and said, 'a most carefully planned flank attack, delivered just in 
the nick oftime'. The C.O. said nothing, but probably thought much. 107 
Elsewhere, the situation was little better. In July 1915 in a 48th. Brigade 
wargame the 8th. Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers attacked the 9th. Royal Munster 
Fusiliers, by mistake. 108 By June 1915, deficiencies in the 16th. (Irish) Division's 
training were blindingly obvious. Lieutenant S. E. 1. C. Lushington, serving in the 
11 tho Battalion, Hampshire Regiment, the divisional pioneer unit, noted; '~e just 
heard the very unwelcome news that we have been turned into the 4th. Reserve army 
which means which [sic] shan't go out for another six months, all because these rotten 
Irishmen are absolutely hopeless.,,109 At about this time, Major Sir Francis Vane 
commented that the 16th. (Irish) Division had become; "a patchwork of men in 
different stages of instruction. " 110 
While Parsons must be held responsible for some of the defects in 16th. (Irish) 
Divisional training, Johnstone's criticisms are, to some extent, unjustified. Firstly, the 
training of the 36th. (Ulster) Division was not noticeably better; despite its early access 
107G. A. Cooper Walker, Ihe Book ofthe Seventh Service Battalion, The Royal 

Inniskilling Fusiliers, p.5. 

I08Entry for 14/7/15, Captain O. L. Beater Diaries, I.W.M., 86/65/1. 
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to U.V.F. anns and equipment. David Starret, on arriving at Donard Camp, as a 
member of the 107th. Brigade, in mid-September 1914 remembered; ''Things were 
topsy- turvy, ... , The first two-three days was Babel. My! it was a picnic. Others as 
well as myself did not know to what they belonged so roamed together in and about 
the camp."IIl Indeed, the work schedule in late September was actually less intense 
than that in the 16th. (Irish) Division, with only five and three-quarters hours work a 
day.Il2 
U.V.F. equipment was used in training; most notably Sir James Craig obtained 
10,000 unifotms from Moss Brothers in London, for the 36th. (Ulster) Division, paid 
for out of U. V.F. funds. 113 This meant that, unlike many other New Army units, 
including the 16th. (Irish) Division, men of the 36th. (Ulster) Division did not have to 
drill for months in civilian clothes, the infamous "Kitchener blue" unifotms, or obsolete 
scarlet jackets. 114 
The use ofU.V.F. equipment could, however, be damaging to morale, in some 
instances. When the 36th. (Ulster) Division fired their final musketry course in 
England it was with defective ammunition, manufactured in the U.S.A., which 
compared poorly to many men's experiences with U.V.F. equipment. As Cyril Falls 
noted; ''The writer saw one man, at whose shoulder he had stood on a U.v.F. range 
while he put five huge bullets from an Italian Veterli into the bull's-eye, miss the target 
twice at 600 yards.,,1l5 
Finally, under Major General Powell, the training of the 36th. (Ulster) Division 
appears to have consisted merely of marching. 116 Certainly, when Major General Sir 
111D. Starret, ''Batman'', p.5, LW.M., 79/35/1. 
112Jhe County Down Spectator and Ulster Standard, 2519/14, p.5. 
113p. Buckland, James Craig. Gill and Macmillan, Dublin, 1980, p.36 and St. John 
Ervine, Craigavon; Ulstetman, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1949, p.298. 
114c. Falls, The History of the 36th anster) Division, p.6 and G. A. Cooper Walker, 
The Book ofthe Seventh Service Battalion, The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, p.3. 
U5C. Falls, Ihe History of the 36th. (Ulster) Division, p.20. 
116ibid, pp.13-4. 
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Oliver Nugent took over command of the division,. he felt it to be unfit for front line 
service. 1l7 
The experience of the 36th. (Ulster) Division suggests that Parsons coped, as 
well as could be expected in the circumstances, with the training of the 16th. (Irish) 
Division. Iohnstone's criticism also ignores another key factor which retarded the 
training of and, as discussed later, possibly caused discontent in,. the 16th. (Irish) 
Division. This was the serious manpower problems faced in the unit. By March 1915, 
the 16th. (Irish) Division did, indeed, present a 'patchwork appearance' in terms of 
unit strengths, as table 4.3, demonstrates. 
Table 4 3. Unit Strengths in the 16th (Irish) Division, March 1915. 118 
Unit Strength 
47th. Brigade 
6!Royal Irish Regiment 1066 
6/Connaught Rangers 1235 
7ILeinster Regiment 1078 
8!Royal Munster Fusiliers 625 
48th. Brigade 
7!Royal Irish Rifles 352 
9!Royal Munster Fusiliers 646 
8!Royal Dublin Fusiliers 928 
9!Royal Dublin Fusiliers 946 
49th. Brigade 
7!Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers 406 
8!Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers 386 
7!Royal Irish Fusiliers 726 
Irish Fusiliers 679 
The varying unit strengths in this division, at this date had a political 
dimension. Due to Redmond's influence, it had been decided to 'clear' one brigade of 
117Letter, Nugent to his wife, 16/10/15, Farren Connell papers, P.R.O.N.I., 
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the 16th. (Irish) Division in October 1914 to be filled up with men recruited from the 
IN.V. Parsons had selected the 47th. Infantry Brigade for this dubious honour, 
presumably as its units had the largest geographical catchment areas. 119 As can be 
seen from the unit strengths, this clearing scheme certainly provided a flood of recruits 
for the 47th. Infantry Brigade. 
However, while some of Parsons's battalions were thus politically favoured, 
others were not as fortunate. The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, Royal Irish Rifles and 
Royal Irish Fusiliers were all linked, in nationalist eyes, with the 36th. (lUster) 
Division. 120 The bizarre result of this was that Derry IN.V. members, from the Royal 
Inniskilling Fusiliers regimental area, enlisted in large numbers in the 6th. Battalion, 
Royal Irish Regiment and Belfast I.N.V members, from the Royal Irish Rifles 
regimental district, enlisted in the 6th. Battalion, Connaught Rangers and 7th. 
Battalion, Leinster Regiment. 121 
Parsons's attempt to equalise the numbers of men in his battalions ran into 
immediate difficulties. R. J. Tennant mistakenly believed that when Parsons 
transferred men from the 47th. to the 49th. Infantry Brigades, he was forcing I.N.V. 
members to serve with U.VF. personnel. 122 Parsons replied, noting that he had been 
ordered to clear the 47th. Infantry Brigade for I.N.V. and that this had led to 
difficulties; 
These poor ill used men [referring to I.N.V from Enniskillen who had 
initially joined the 6th. Battalion, Connaught Rangers and then been divided 
119Parsons's diary entries for 12110/14, 17/10114,23/10/14 and 30110/14, Parsons' 
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amongst all battalions in the 47th. Brigade] have been asked to Volunteer [to 
transfer to the 49th. Brigade] + 487 have volunteered to go though I am only 
sending 250. 
I cannot tell what 'the dominating Political Sentiment' is in the 7th. + 
8th. Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers is as in the Army [no details?] of Political 
faiths are recorded. The largely predominating religious faith is Roman 
Catholic; which perhaps gives a clue to the other. 
What would Lord K.[itchener] say if he saw my returns of strength 
showing some Battalions as 1,300 strong, others 400! 123 
This situation became increasingly complicated for Parsons, when, in March 
1915 the 7th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles received six officers and 225 other ranks 
from the Jersey Militia, the 7th. Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers, men from the 
Guernsey Militia and the 6th. Battalion, Royal Irish Regiment, a complete company 
and machine gun section of the Guernsey Militia. 124 The former must have been 
welcome to battalions which were all but failing. The latter, however, were a mixed 
blessing; not only had the Guernsey Militia company been posted to the strongest 
battalion in the Division by the War Office, but the fact that the Guernsey Militia had 
been disbanded in 1896 due to a mutiny,125 suggested that this company would not 
provide a stabilising influence in the 16th. (Irish) Division. 
Parsons was also under pressure, from John Redmond, given the weakness of 
some units in the 16th. (Irish) Division, to apply for the Tyneside Irish Brigade to join 
123Letter, Parsons to Tennant, 27/2/15, Parsons papers, N.LJ., MS.21,278. 
124C. Falls, The History of the First Seven Battalions, The Royal Irish Rifles (now the 
Royal Ulster Rifles) in the Great War, Gale and Polden Ltd., Aldershot, 1925, vol.II, 
p.20, 
S. Geoghegan, The Campaigns and History of the Royal Irish Regiment, vol II; From 
1900 to 1922, William Blackwood & Sons Ltd., Edinburgh and London, 1927, p.111, 
E. Parks, The Royal Guernsey Militia; A Short History and List ofOfficers, La Societe 
Guernesiaise, St. Peter Port, Guernsey, 1992, p.22 and E. Parks, "Guernsey's 
Contribution to the 16th. (Irish) Division", The Irish Sword, vol.XVIII, no.73, 1992. 
125E. Parks, The Royal Guernsey Militia, pp.20-1. 
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this formation. 126 Parsons managed to alienate much nationalist support by stating 
that Irishmen living in British industrial cities; "are slum-birds that we don't want. I 
want to see the clean, fine, strong, temperate, hurley-playing country fellows such as 
we used to get in the Munsters, Royal Irish, Connaught Rangers.,,127 
Another controversy over the manning of the 16th. (Irish) Division came in 
June 1915 when the division had to send 1,200 men to the 10th. (Irish) Division to 
complete it for overseas service. 128 Redmond was incensed that these men were all 
drawn from the 49th. Brigade; "which was the one Brigade of the Division 
undermanned."129 This loss ofmanpower led to serious concerns amongst Nationalist 
politicians that this brigade, if not the entire 16th. (Irish) Division, would be used as a 
draft finding body. 130 
This decision also condemned the 49th. Infantry Brigade to an uncertain future. 
As one officer in the 8th. Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers stated; 
In the autumn of '15 we were again a respectable fighting unit. We 
were clothed in khaki and equipped for war; and in the late August we left 
Newry for Pirbright en route, as we thought, for France. The days at 
Pirbright dragged on into weeks. We fired our course at Bisley, and then 
fired it again. We were introduced to weird and cunning engines ofwar - the 
Leach catapult, the West Spring Gun, and a crop of others as fantastic. We 
marched from Pirbright to Witley in the rain, and having got there we sold 
our cap badges to the Canadians. We marched from Witley to Bordon in the 
126D. Gwynn. The Life ofJohn Redmond, George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd., London, 
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rain and fought a battle with French Canadians. We drilled and manoeuvred 
and got thoroughly restless, disgruntled and fed-up; for the rest of the 
Division, who had not been denuded of their early men, had long gone 
abroad. Finally, about the 1st. of February, 1916, all the rumours came true, 
orders arrived, and we set out for France. 131 
The political nature of the 36th. (Ulster) Division also affected its recruiting 
policy. Some units in this division were perfectly happy to accept Catholic recruits, 
for example, the 14th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles had five officers and ninety-eight 
other ranks serving in it during this period, who were Catholics. 132 However, the case 
of P. J. Kelly highlighted the sectarian nature of some units in the 36th. (Ulster) 
Division. Kelly alleged that he had enlisted into the Royal Engineers in Londonderry 
and had then been sent to join a Royal Engineer unit in the 36th. (Ulster) Division, 
based in Belfast. When the officer there took his details and discovered that Kelly 
was a Catholic, he stated that Kelly could only join the unit if he changed his religion. 
Kelly refused to do so, whereupon the officer announced that the unit had no 
vacancies and discharged Kelly. 133 
This incident appears to have caused serious embarrassment to the War Office, 
who traced Kelly to Noble's Explosive Works in Ayrshire and invited him to return to 
Londonderry and re-enlist. Kelly did so and was sent to the Royal Engineers depot at 
Chatham. 134 
Ulster Unionists saw no need to apologise over this affair. The Unionist, 
Belfast News Letter, carried an editorial suggesting that Kelly's case was a fabrication 
and ending with the singularly unconvincing suggestion that, as no complaint had been 
131M. Cunliffe, The RuyaJ Irish Fusiliers, 1793-1950, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1952, p.300. 
132Details from, ''Membership ofthe 141R0yal Irish Rifles (Y.C.V.)", Royal Ulster 
Rifles Museum. 
133The Irish News, 12/4115, p.6. 
134ibid, 16/4/15, p.4. 
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made to any officer of the Royal Engineers in Belfast, there was clearly no case to 
answer.135 An unrepentant letter from Richard Dawson Bates, the Secretary of the 
Ulster Unionist Council, did not even attempt to deny that the Kelly incident was 
fabricated, pointing out that Catholics could join the regular army or 16th. (Irish) 
Division with ease. Dawson Bates went on to state that there were only fifteen 
Catholics in the entire 36th. (Ulster) Division and these were all sergeant instructors, 
sent by the War Office. 136 This blatant piece of misinformation, with the implication 
that Catholics were not welcome in the 36th. (Ulster) Division, can have done little to 
improve either the morale of Catholics serving in the division, or, indeed, recruitment 
for some of the rural battalions of the division which had not reached their 
establishment. 
One final issue which caused discontent in New Anny units was the poor 
accommodation arrangements. As in the rest of Britain, many old barracks were 
utilised for the New Anny battalions. Equally, a number of hastily constructed tented 
or hutted camps were built to accommodate these troops. Finally, a number of men 
were billeted in private houses and public buildings, an issue which caused particular 
controversy in Ireland. 
Many battalions were formed and quartered during most of their training in 
barracks in Ireland. F or example, from its formation in September 1914 until August 
1915 the 7th. Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers was quartered in Tipperary 
Barracks. 137 Equally, the entire 31 st. Infantry Brigade was housed in the Dublin 
Barracks from August 1914, until the 10th. (Irish) Division moved to Aldershot. 138 
Irish barracks suffered from a number of defects in compat1son to their equivalents in 
Great Britain. Most were a great deal smaller than their counterparts as the use of 
135Belfast News Letter, 14/4/15, p.12. 
136ibid. As Dawson Bates never held any military rank, let alone in the 36th. (Ulster) 
Division, it is unclear how he would have been in a position to know how many men 
of the Roman Catholic faith were serving in this formation. 
137G. A. Cooper Walker, The Book of the Seventh Service Battalion, Royal 
Inniskilling Fusiliers, p.lO. 
138T. Johnstone, Orange, Green and Khaki, p.89. 
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soldiers for policing duties saw regiments based in Ireland in the nineteenth century, 
widely dispersed, and few were capable of accommodating a full battalion.139 In 
addition, most Irish barracks were much older than the British average, most having 
been constructed between 1786 and 1813,140 some were even older, the Royal 
Barracks in Dublin dating from 1697. 141 
Many of these old barracks were not only cramped, but had serious sanitation 
defects. In 1859 the Army Sanitary Committee had inspected Dublin barracks, 
describing them as; "an excellent illustration of what oUght to be avoided in barrack 
construction".142 Minor alterations were made to these barracks, but in 1889 Dublin's 
Royal Barracks still had poor sanitation, hygiene and ventilation. 143 It would appear 
that conditions had not changed considerably by 1914.144 The situation was little 
better at Birr Barracks, where insanitary conditions led to an outbreak of "spotted 
fever". This led to four deaths in the 11tho Battalion, Hampshire Regiment. 145 
If barracks could be insanitary and overcrowded, many tented and hutted 
camps were little better in terms of the degree of comfort they provided for the troops. 
As an extreme example, in Autumn 1914 a severe storm levelled the 1 09th. Brigade 
camp at Finner. 146 Similar conditions at Donard camp led to a mutiny in early winter 
139£. M. Spiers, The Late Victorian Army. 1868-1902, Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 1992, pp.216-7. This comment is also based on the author's visits to the 
old barracks at Enniskillen (now the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers' Museum) and 
Fermoy. 
140£. M. Spiers, The Late Victorian Anny, p.216. 
141J. M. Brereton, The British Soldier; A Social History from 1661 to the Present 
~ The Bodley Head, London, 1986, p.lO. 
142Report of the Army Sanitary Committee, 1861, p.15, cited, A. R. Skelly, ~ 
Victorian Anny at Home; The Recruitment and Terms and Conditions ofthe British 
Regular, 1859-1899. Croom Helm, London, 1977, p.38. 
143ibid, p.39. 
144Indeed the Royal Barracks (renamed Collins Barracks in 1922) is still in existence 
today. The Irish army vacated them in 1998 and they are now part of the Irish 
National Museum. This is despite the fact that in 1886 army authorities recommended 
the demolition ofa number ofbuildings in these barracks, ibid, p.38. 
145Letter, Lieutenant S. E. J. C. Lushington to Miss D. Daubeny, 1812115, Daubeny 
papers, I.W.M., 96/37/1. 
146G. Mitchell, Three Cheers for the Den:ysl A History ofthe 10th RQyallnniskillini 
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1914, when tents began to collapse due to heavy rain. A number of men of the 9th. 
Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles left the camp, stating that they were returning home, to 
Belfast. Colonel Wallace and Major F. P. Crozier rode after the men, and they all 
agreed to return when these officers promised them new billets. No disciplinary action 
was taken against these men. 147 Meanwhile, by July 1915, Captain O. L. Beater noted 
of the camp inhabited by the 9th. Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, near Buttevant~ 
"This camp is getting into a very unhealthy state [due to heavy rain] and fairly stinks. 
The sooner they shift us the better.,,148 
The billeting of men on private houses during the Great War was a 
controversial issue throughout the United Kingdom.149 However, in Ireland, billeting 
attained sectarian overtones. In September 1914 when Clandeboye camp was flooded 
by heavy rain, the 11tho Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles were billeted in Lisbum. This led 
to accusations that an outrageously large number of men were billeted on nationalist 
homes. 150 Nevertheless, many men, billeted on their own families, enjoyed this 
expenence, not only could they live at home, but their families received the 
government's generous billeting allowance. 151 
The billeting of men in public buildings caused other problems. When the 
I1Oth. Brigade's tented accommodation was levelled by storms at Finner in Autumn 
1914, the 9th., 10th. and 11th. Battalions, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers simply had to 
re-erect their tents and stayed there throughout the winter. By contrast, following this 
disaster, the 14th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, moved to hotels in Ballyshannon~ 
Fusiliers. Yes! Publications, Derry, 1991, p.24. 

147D. Starret, "Batman", p.13, I.W.M., 79/35/1. 

148Entry for 31/7115, Captain O. L. Beater diaries, I.W.M., 86/65/1. 

149p. Simkins, "Soldiers and civilians~ billeting in Britain and France", in I. F. W. 

Beckett and K. Simpson (eds.), A Nation in Anus, pp.166-87. 

150Wilfiid Spender papers, P.R.O.N.!., D.1295/2, cited, P. Orr, The Road to the 

Sornme, p.55. 

1511. H. Stewart, "Random Recollections", p.5, LW.M .. 
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The Y.[oung] C.[itizen] V.[olunteers] [14th. Battalion, Royal Irish 
Rifles] were from the more affluent families ofBelfast and there was a certain 
degree of antagonism between them and the men from the west of Ulster, 
many ofwhom were from very poor homes. It would take a long time before 
they were fully accepted by the rest of the Brigade. 152 
Other recruits were quartered in less salubrious public accommodation. Given 
the basic working class dislike of the Poor Law,153 one cannot imagine that men of the 
49th. Brigade were oveIjoyed at being housed in Tipperary workhouse. 
A number of breaches of discipline occurred in the Irish New Army divisions 
during training. The worst of these were mutinies, of which at least nine took place 
during this period. Absenteeism was another serious problem, especially in the 10th. 
(Irish) and 36th. (Ulster) Divisions, when men were quartered near their homes. 
Drunkenness was a persistent problem and resulted in action from both the local and 
military authorities. However, it appears that none of these military crimes was of a 
political nature. In 1915 the Athgorvan company of the Irish Volunteers was 
spectacularly unsuccessful in attempting to purchase rifles from Irish soldiers training 
at the Curragh camp. 154 
As with other New Army divisions, the 16th. (Irish) and 36th. (Ulster) 
Divisions contended with a number of mutinies during their training. 155 However, 
uniquely, men in the 16th. (Irish) Division were actually tried and found guilty of 
mutiny by courts martial. 156 On the 17th. June 1915, Lance Corporal J. Austin of the 
152G. Mitchell, "Three Cheers for the Denys!" A History of the 10th Battalion, 

Royal Inniskjl1ing Fusiliers, p.24. 

153T. Johnstone, Orange. Green and Khaki, p.192. On the widespread dislike of the 

Poor Law see, 1. Benson, The Working Class in Britain. 1850-1939. Longman, 

London, 1989, p.49. 

154C. Costello, A Most Delightful Station; The British Army on the Curragb of 

Kildare, Ireland, 1855-1922, The Collins Press, Cork, 1996, p.290. 

155p. Simkins, Kitchener's Army, pp.239-44. 

156p.R.0., W086/65, p.77 (case of1. Austin, 8th. Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers, 

tried on 17/6/15) and W086/66, p.III. 
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8th. Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers, was tried at Tipperary for mutiny by a District 
Court MartiaI and sentenced to eighty-four days detention. Meanwhile, on the 6th. 
September 1915, seven privates of the 8th. Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers were 
tried for mutiny and drunkenness at Enniskillen, they were each sentenced to one year 
hard labour. Unfortunately the case transcripts, or indeed any contemporary accounts 
of these incidents do not survive. Nevertheless, it is possible to posit, with some 
certainty, the reasons why these mutinies occurred. 
Both of these mutinies took place in the 49th. Brigade, which had the most 
serious recruiting problems in any Irish New Anny unit. The mutiny in the 8th. 
Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers (and it would appear that Lance Corporal Austin was 
the ringleader, as no other men were tried for mutiny, whereas, by its very definition, a 
mutiny must be a combination of two or more men) occurred in Iune 1915, the very 
time when the 49th. Brigade had to send 1,200 men to the 10th. (Irish) Division. IS7 
The result of this was, not only to split up men who had joined the army, on the 
explicit understanding that they would serve together, but to disperse the brigade, as 
battalions were sent to Ulster to recruit. 
The mutiny in the 8th. Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers would appear to 
have occurred for similar reasons, with the added grievance that, by September 1915 it 
appeared that the 49th. Brigade was being converted into a draft finding unit. Indeed, 
it is possible that even by this date, men in the brigade were aware that they would not 
accompany the rest ofthe 16th. (Irish) Division overseas. IS8 
A number of other incidents which can properly be described as mutinies 
occurred in the 16th. (Irish) and 36th. (Ulster) Divisions during their training. While 
IS7T. Denman, Ireland's Unknown Soldiers, p.55. 
lS8While the 47th. and 48th. Brigades went to France in November 1915, the 49th. 
Brigade did not embark until February 1916. T. Iohnstone, Orange, Green and Khaki, 
p.198. Also, in August 1915, the divisional artillery, engineers and field ambulances 
had been transferred to the newly formed Guards Division, which must have 
accentuated fears that the 16th. (Irish) Division would never serve overseas as a 
composite unit, T. Denman, Ireland's Unknown Soldiers, pp.55-6. 
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no men were court martialled for their part in these incidents, at least a clearer picture 
is available as to why they occurred. 
The unit most dogged with mutinies during this time was the 6th. Battalion, 
Connaught Rangers. It would appear that mutinies occurred in this battalion on the 
23rd. October 1914, another, later in October 1914 and, finally, one on the 24th. or 
25th. December 1914. 159 The most serious of these was that occurring in late 
October, as the then Sergeant Staniforth observed; 
We had a fearful mutiny last week The prisoners in the guard-room 
and cells (50 men, all drunk) rose again - this is not the row I was telling you 
about last time, but another - and got possession of the place and smashed it 
to splinters, and then sallied out armed with bayonets upon the crowd 
outside. For about a quarter of an hour there was all hell let loose: bayonets 
going and bricks flying, until they could get the fire-hose limbered up and tum 
on to them. That settled them, but there were six men lying unconscious, and 
many more bleeding from small wounds. Two subsequently died in hospital, 
one from a stick of a bayonet and one from a bang of a brick over the heart. 
We had a frightful kick-up over it next day; they brought the General over 
from Mallow to curse us. 160 
Despite these fatalities, Parsons decided not to institute courts martial 
proceedings, as he noted in his diary; ''Motored to Fermoy on getting news ofdrunken 
row in [6th. Battalion] Connaught Rangers. Made a speech to N.C.O.s of [6th. 
Battalion]Connaught Rangers and [7th. Battalion] Royal Irish Rifles and then to men 
159J. H. M. Staniforth, letters to his parents, 24/10/14, 1111114 and 25/12114, cited in 
J. H. M. Staniforth, 'Xitchener's Soldier", pp. 14-5,23 and 35-6, I.W.M., 67/4111. 
16<>.Letter, Staniforth to his parents, 1/11/14, cited in 'Xitchener's Soldier, 1914-18", 
p.23, I.W.M., 67/4111. 
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and gave them pepper."161 It would appear from this comment that similar problems 
had occurred in the 7th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles. 
Staniforth believed that the first two mutinies were simply drunken brawls 
which got out of hand. The third mutiny in the 6th. Battalion, Connaught Rangers, 
occurred on either Christmas Eve or Christmas Day 1914 and appears to have been 
written off, simply as seasonal high spirits. On this occasion the men invaded the 
mess, while the officers were having dinner, and carried them outside. The officers 
then had to 'orate' to the men before being returned to their quarters. 162 
Parsons possibly refused to institute courts martial in these cases as the C.O. of 
the 6th. Battalion, Connaught Rangers, Lieutenant Colonel John Lenox-Conyngham, 
had been personally recommended for his command by Parsons, himself 163 However, 
having said this, Stephen Gwynn, M.P., while serving as an officer in the 6th. 
Battalion, Connaught Rangers, certainly believed Lenox-Conyngham to be an efficient 
C.O.. I64 Indeed, Lieutenant Colonel John Lenox-Conyngham must have been viewed 
as an efficient C.O. by his superiors, as he survived the purge of senior officers carried 
out by the War Office and Major General W. B. Rickie, before and shortly after the 
16th. (Irish) Division arrived in France, and was killed in action, leading his battalion 
at Guillemont in 1916. 165 
In the 36th. (Ulster) Division, at least three mutinies took place during the 
division's training. That in the 9th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, over poor 
accommodation, has already been referred to. Another mutiny occurred in the 14th. 
161Entry of2/11114 in Parsons's diary, Parsons papers, N.L.I., Ms.21,524. It is worth 
noting that a mutiny in the 1 st. Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers in 1887 appears 
to have been similarly dismissed as a "drunken row". See G. Dominy, "More than just 
a 'Drunken Braw!'? The Mystery of the Mutiny of the Inniskilling Fusiliers at Fort 
Napier, 1887", Southern African-Irish Studies, I, 1991. 
162Letter, Staniforth to his parents, 25112/14, cited, "Kitchener's Soldier, 1914-18'" 
Staniforth papers, I.W.M., 67/4111. 
163Entry of2/10/14 in Parsons's diary, Parsons papers, N.L.I., Ms.21,524. 
164Comments by Gwynn, cited in M. Lenox-Coyngham, An Old Inster House and the 
people who lived in it, Dundalgan Press, Dundalk, 1946, p.225. 
165ibid, p.224. 
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Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, following manoeuvres by the 109th. Brigade in the 
Antrim hills, between the 9th. and 11tho of June, 1915. The men of the 14th. 
Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, refused to march back to Shane's Castle camp, insisting 
on a train being provided. The battalion's CO., Lieutenant Colonel Robert Chichester 
diffused the situation by conceding to this demand and chartering a train. No man in 
the 14th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles received any official punishment for this action, 
but from then on the other battalions in the brigade (the 9th., 10th. and 11th. 
Battalions, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers) referred to them as; "Chocolate Soldiers". 166 
Much more serious was the mass mutiny of the 36th. (Ulster) Division in early 
September 1915. At this time a number of battalions of the division mutinied as they 
believed that they were to be sent immediately overseas, without home leave first. 
Rifleman 1. MacRoberts related how this situation was diffused in the 14th. Battalion, 
Royal Irish Rifles; 
One evening a rumour reached us from the huts that no leave was 
going to be granted before going to the front, and that several of the 
battalions had - to use the only possible word - mutinied. That night we were 
paraded and addressed by Major B---, at that moment in a lamentable, 
intoxicated state. 
Ifwe did not get leave he said, we were not to mutiny, no matter what 
other battalions might do and what they might say about us. We had joined 
the army for King and Country and had undertaken to obey its rules and 
commands. This was the first war most of us had been in and probably it 
would be the last, thus it behaved [sic] us to abide by the rules like men. So 
let us play the game and to hell with the Pope. The proceedings were a 
1660. Mitchell, "Three Cheers for the Den:ys!" A History of the 10th Royal 
Inniskillilli Fusiliers, p.29 and P. Orr, The Road to the Somme, p.64. 
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scandal and a shame to the British Army, but the reckless, dare-all manner of 
the Major had a great influence with the troops. 167 
Throughout the 36th. (Ulster) Division, the mutiny was quelled by granting 
every man four days home leave, before the division went to France, starting on the 
15th. September 1915. 168 
Table 4.4, overleaf, demonstrates, as in table 3.2, the sheer difference in 
number of courts martial held in units serving in similar circumstances. However, 
some anomalies can be explained. The 14th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles had a very 
small number of courts martial during this period, as the battalion's adjutant, Captain 
Bentley, refused to refer absent without leave cases to courts martial. 169 Also, the 
difference between the courts martial records of the 6th. and 8th. Battalions of the 
Royal Dublin Fusiliers may be explained, partly, by the different social classes 
represented170 and partly by the proximity in which the 6th. Battalion, Royal Dublin 
Fusiliers were stationed to Dublin. Henry de Montmorency, serving as a captain in the 
7th. Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, along with the 6th. Battalion of the regiment in 
30th. Brigade stated; 
It is quite true that the Irishmen in my battalion have been recruited from the 
poorest, unskilled casual labourers ofDublin, the lowest strata ofour society 
167Diary ofRifleman 1. MacRoberts, 14th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles,pp.63-4, 

Liddle Collection. The officer refered to was Major H C. 1. Bliss, who had been a 

Captain in the Royal Irish Fusiliers before the war, War Office, The Monthly Army 

List for December 1915, HM.S.O., London, 1915, column 1496d. 

168ibid, p.64. 

169Anon, "Service with the 14th. Battalion, R[oyal] I.[rish] Rif[le]s. (YC.V.), 

1914-18", p.61, Royal Ulster Rifles' Museum. 

1701 would like to thank Mr. Tom Burke of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers Association for 

showing me his work in progress, which suggests that men killed while serving in the 

6th. Battalion of the regiment were born overwhelmingly in largely working class areas 

ofDublin, while those of the 8th. Battalion came, in many cases, from lower middle 

class backgrounds. 
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Table 4 4 Offences for which men servina in sample Service.. Special Reserve and 
General Reserve battalions were tried, while training in the U K 171 
8 10 9 13 14 3 3 18 
R R R. R. R. R. R. R. 
Inns. Inns. L L L C) C) 8 L L 4 L 
Offenee F T Rifs. Rifs. Rifs. C.R. RDF RDF Re Rlfs. RDF Rifs. 
War Treason o 0 o 0 0 0 000 o o 0 
D.O.R.A. o 0 o 0 0 0 o o o o o 0 
Offence against an 0 o o o o o000 o 0 o 
inhabitant 
Mutiny 7 o o o o 000 o o 0 o 
Cowardice 0 o o o o 000 o o 0 o 
Desertion 1 o 12 o 2 6 6 10 6 4 
Absence 2 8 1 o o 65 1 5 6 5 1 
Striking or violent 6 I o o 300 3 o 0 o 
lnsuoordination 2 3 o o 260 2 I 0 o 
Disobedience 0 o o o o 000 o 0 o 
Quitting post 0 o o o o 000 I I 0 o 
Drunkeness 2 o o 220 9 3 2 o 
Injuring property 0 o o o o 000 o o 0 o 
Loss of property 0 o o o o o 0 o o 0 o 
Theft 0 o 2 0 3 o 0 o 
Indecency 

Resisting escort 

Escaping 

confinement 

Misc. and multiple 

offences 

Misc. civil offences: 

Self-inflicted wound! 

Fraudulent enlistment: 

Enlisting after 

discharge 

False answer 

Neglect 

Fraud 

TOTAL 

0 
0 
0 
31 
0 
0 
0 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o i 0 o o o o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
11 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
21 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
o 
o 
o 
3 
4 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
4 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
000 
000 
000 
33 38 9 
000 
000 
o 0 0 
o 0 
o o ' I 
I 
o 
0 
37 
0 
0 
o 
o 0 
o 0 
0 0 
38 21 
0 0 
0 0 
0 
o o 
o o 
o 
o 
o 
7 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
13 
171The cases considered in the case of service battalions, are those which occurred 
between the formation of the unit and its embarkation for overseas. The cases totalled 
for the 3rd. Battalion, Royal Irish Regiment, 3rd. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles and 4th. 
Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, occurred between the 4/8114 and 30/9/15. The cases 
totalled for the 18th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, a general reserve unit, are from its 
formation in early 1915 until the 30/9/15. 
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- and there has been undoubtedly a great deal of absence without leave, but 
absence without leave is a purely military offence, it is not immoral, besides 
the prevalence of this 'crime' is, in no small measure, due to the men being 
stationed within reach of Dublin i.e. within reach of temptation, ... , If the 
authorities had exercised a little tact and had quartered these Irishmen in 
England, Scotland, or in some remote part of Ireland, they might never have 
been guilty of absence to the extent complained of. As a result, numbers of 
Irishmen, who would make splendid soldiers when it comes to fighting, have 
been discharged as incorrigible on account of continual absence without 
leave. 172 
As always, the courts martial records do not provide a complete picture of 
disciplinary problems. As already noted the 14th.. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, did not 
try absent without leave cases by courts martial. This appears to have been 
widespread in the 36th. (Ulster) Division as a whole, since as Cyril Falls noted, one of 
the most serious disciplinary problems in the division; 
was that of week-end leave. The great bulk of the men of the 107th. 
and 108th. Brigades and most of the Divisional Troops were training near 
their homes. They could not understand why they should be kept in camp 
doing nothing on Sundays when they might have been visiting them. Though 
leave was given generously enough, this remained a sore point till the 
Division moved to England. Apart from 'absence without leave' there was 
no crime to speak of 173 
172Letter, de Montmorency to John Redmond, 2411115, Redmond papers, National 
Library ofIreland, Ms. 15,261 (2). In the same letter, de Montmorency alleged that the 
officers in his battalion, who were mainly English, were unsympathetic to the other 
ranks, and had them court martialled at every available opportunity. 
173C. Falls, The History ofthe 36th (Ulster) Division, p.13. 
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By contrast, Table 4.4 shows relatively few absent without leave cases in the 
sample battalions of the 36th. (Ulster) Division, viz.; the 9th., 13th. and 14th. 
Battalions, Royal Irish Rifles and the 10th. Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. It 
should be noted that even absent without leave cases were seen as potentially political 
crimes in the 36th. (Ulster) Division, as it appears that the War Office moved the 
division to England in early July 1915, partly due to the fears that many men would 
desert to take part in Orange Order parades on the 12th. July, if the formation 
remained in Ireland. 174 
In terms of punishments, as detailed in table 4.5, overleaf, there are three 
points worthy of note. Firstly, Special Reserve battalions, generally, had more men 
sentenced to hard labour than service battalions. This is an indication of the tolerance 
with which the military authorities treated the ''temporary soldiers" of the New 
Armies. Secondly, a large number of men tried in the 13th. Battalion, Royal Irish 
Rifles, were found not guilty. This is explained by the fact that four soldiers charged 
with rape were all acquitted. Finally, the number of quashed or not confirmed cases in 
the 10th. Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers is abnormally high. This reflects the 
number of men incorrectly tried by Field General Courts Martial, while serving in the 
United Kingdom. 
Ofcourse, while training in the United Kingdom, soldiers could also be tried by 
civil law for various offences. A case-study of the 108th. Brigade, 36th. (Ulster) 
Division, during its training at Clandeboye camp, in County Down, demonstrates the 
actions taken against this formation by the civil authorities. Drunkenness was an 
offence which the civil authorities were keen to act on. On the 28th. October 1914, 
the local magistrates, gathered at Bangor Petty Sessions, agreed to a request by 
District Inspector Gerrity, Royal Irish Constabulary, that all Public Houses in Bangor 
should close at eight o'clock in the evening on Saturdays. 175 
174J. H. Stewart-Moore, ''Random Recollections", p.10, I.W.M. and P. Orr, Ihe Road 
to the Somme, p.78. 
175County Down Spectator and Ulster Standard, 30110/14, p.5. 
Table 4,5 Sentences passed by courts martial, relating to sample service, special reserve and general reserve units, serving in the United Kingdom. 
1914-16, (dates as per table 4.4). 
Sentences 
Death 

Penal Servitude 

Hard Labour 

Imprisonment 

Detention 

F,P.l 

F.P.2 

Discharged with 

ignominy/cashiered 

Reduced or reprimanded 

Stoppages, fines, etc. 

Quashed! not confirmed 

Suspended sentence 

Not guilty, acquitted, etc, 

TOTAL 

8lRInF 
o 
o 
21 
o 
16 
2 
o 
o 
1 
1 
1 
1 
lOlRInF 9lRIRfs 
~~ 
1 I ~ o 0i 
i 
6 I 32 
010 
1 0I 
o 0 
o 10 
o 1 
8 1 
o 0 
2 1 
18 47 
l3lRIRfs 14lRIRfs 6/CR 
o 0 
o 0 
o 2 
o 0 

4 3 

o 0 

1 0 

o 0 
o 0 
o 0 
o 0 
o 0 
4 0 

9 5 

6IRDF ,8/RDF: 3!RIRgt 131RIRfS~F 
000 
01 0 10' 0 0 
18 
2 0 1 
74 10 35 
3 0 0 
8 5 1 
o o 
5 10 
1 o 
1 2 
o o 
o 3 
115 70 
12 0 
0 0 
39 26 
0 0 
1 0 
1 o 
2 4 
1 o 
3 3 
o o 
1 1 
60 34 
181RIRfs 
0 
0 
0 
0 
11 
0 
0 
o 
1 
o 
o 
o 
1 
13 
265 
266 
A fight between two civilians and unidentified soldiers on the 6th. March 1915, 
at Conlig Public House, led to the two civilians concerned being fined five shillings 
each, with recognisances of five pounds, and the public house being closed to troops 
at all times. 176 
No soldier at Clandeboye camp during this period was tried by the civil 
authorities for drunkenness, and this would appear to be as a result of intimidation of 
the police by the troops. W. Moore, writing to the local paper stated; "One of the 
magistrates told me, ... , that he saw a young fellow lying hopelessly drunk, but as his 
comrades had charge of him the police did not interfere.,,177 Certainly, at Finner 
camp, County Donegal, men of the 10th. Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers clashed 
with Royal Irish Constabulary officers in April 1915, resulting in three men being tried 
by courts martial. 178 
Other, more serious cases, however, were dealt with by the civil authorities. 
On the 10th. March 1915, at Bangor Petty Sessions, Private Brice Stewart, otherwise 
John Brown, was prosecuted by the Royal Irish Constabulary for making a false entry 
on his attestation form. The accused had deserted from the 6th. Battalion, Royal Irish 
Rifles and then enlisted in the 11th. Battalion of the same regiment. He was found 
guilty and sentenced to one months imprisonment.179 Under the 1881 Army Act it 
was at the military authorities discretion whether this offence should be tried by court 
martial or a civil court. l80 This was the only case of a soldier serving in the 108th. 
Brigade being tried by the civil courts while the brigade was stationed at Clandeboye, 
possibly as it was a case which contained a number of legal techica1ities, which it was 
felt the inexperienced New Army officers would be unable to deal with. 
176ibid, 26/3115, p.8. 
177ibid, 14/5/15, p.5. 
178For further details see appendix 8 (the Irish Home Service database), cases of 
Privates, Loughrey, Mc Guiness and Wray, 10th. Battalion, Royal Inniskilling 
Fusiliers. 
179County Down Spectator and Ulster Standard, 12/3115, p.5. 
180H. Humphreys, The Justice of the peace for Ireland, Hodges, Figgis & Co., Dublin, 
1890, p.12. 
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One military crime, which had been a constant problem in the British army, 
namely the contraction of venereal disease, appears to have been practically absent 
from the Irish New Anny divisions while they were training in Ireland. Apart from the 
Curragh camp, where prostitutes were a well established local feature by 1914,181 few 
provincial towns in Ireland provided such dubious delights. F. P. Crozier noted that 
men of the 9th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, only began to visit prostitutes when the 
battalion moved to Seaford in England. As he noted; 
My attention was first called to the trouble by the entry of a very 
efficient young officer into a private hospital where an operation was 
performed. He was only eighteen years of age. At first I thought he had 
fallen a victim to venereal disease, but on making enquiries I found out he had 
submitted to an operation because he had injured himself while indulging 
himself for the first time, at a high-class brothel which was conducted on very 
select and exclusive lines at a private house. 182 
Crozier reacted by arranging for a supply of disinfectants to be made available 
for his men, after they had visited brothels. 183 
A number of the measures which had proved successful in maintaining morale 
in Irish units on the Western Front were adopted by the Irish service battalions during 
their training. Sports were an important element of this process. The 16th. Battalion, 
Royal Irish Rifles established regimental rugby and cricket teams at an early date and 
played against a number of local and school teams. l84 On' a larger scale, the 108th. 
Brigade held a sports day in Bangor on the 17th. April 1915. This included events 
such as, 100 yards, one mile and three mile races,.the long jump and tug of war. This 
181C. Costello, A Most Delightful Station, p.17!. 
182F. P. Crozier, A Brass Hat in No Man's Land, p.49. 
183ibid, p.50. 
184S. N. White, The Terrors, 16th (Pioneer) Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles. p.15. 
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event was open to the public and the band of the 13th. Battalio~ Royal Irish Rifles 
performed, while Riflemen Saunders and Montgomery and Lance Corporal Rule of the 
same battalio~ entertained the crowd, dressed as clowns. ISS 
Even at this early date, other measures had been taken to reinforce morale, 
some battalion comforts funds had been formed,I86 and the Young Mens' Christian 
As~ciation (Y.M.C.A.) had established canteens and huts at the various military 
camps. Indeed, Major-General Powell, G.O.C. of the 36th. (lnster) Divisio~ was so 
impressed with the work of the latter that he wrote to Mr. Black, the Y.M.C.A. 
organiser in Belfast; 
I cannot tell you how greatly the Ulster Division is indebted to you and 
your Association for the excellent work you have carried out in the several 
Camps of this Division. You have been the means of cheering the men up 
many an evening during the monotony of their lives in camp; you have kept 
many a man away from drink and evil living, and no one realises this more 
than do the men who have benefited. 187 
Individuals and organisations also provided entertainments for the troops. For 
example, on the 26th. January 1915, the entire 14th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, was 
admitted, free ofcharge, to a concert in Randalsto~ where Percy French, the famous 
Ulster singer, songwriter and artist, was the star performer. 188 Meanwhile, in Bangor, 
18S1he County Down Spectator and Ulster Standard, 23/4/15, p.5. 

186Colonel F. 1. M. Mc Crory, The History of the 36th. (Ulster) Division; The 10th. 

Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers (The Derrys)", p.5, unpublished manuscript, Royal 

Inniskilling Fusiliers' Museum. 

187Letter, (undated, but c. July 1915), Powell to Black, cited, W. E. Doman, 

1850-1950, One Hundred Eventful Years, An outline history ofthe City ofBelfast 

Y M C A, Nicholson & Bass Ltd., Belfast, 1950, p.44. 

1881. MacRoberts's papers, p.5, Liddle Collection, University ofLeeds. 

269 

County Down, local citizens enabled Trinity Hall to be made avaliable, as a 
recreational facility, to men of the 108th. Brigade. 189 
Military bands were also seen as an important method to maintain morale. 
However, when Lord Kitchener sanctioned the New Anny divisions he made no 
official provision for these. Nevertheless, private initiatives insured that most Irish 
service battalions did secure a band of some description. By January 1915 the 14th. 
Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, had no less than three bands; a bugle, pipe and flute. 19O 
Following an approach by Major Sir Francis Vane, Gordon Selfiidge, of the famous 
London department store, provided instruments for the 9th. Battalion, Royal Munster 
Fusiliers. 191 Finally, and most famously, John Redmond presented a band to each 
battalion in the 16th. (Irish) Division. 192 
Finally, in terms of morale in the 36th. (Ulster) Division, the influence of one 
organisation, the Orange Order, must be considered. How many battalions in the 
division possessed Orange Lodges is unclear,193 certainly there was one in the 9th. 
Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers from 1915 to 1919, which came under the 
jurisdiction of the Ballymena District in County Antrim, 194 and Loyal Orange Lodge 
number 865 was formed in the 16th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles. 195 As there was 
189The County Down Spectator and Ulster Standard, 27111114, p.5. 

19OJ. MacRoberts's papers, p.2, Liddle Collection, University ofLeeds. 

191F. Vane, Agin the Governments" pp.253-4. 

192Letter, Redmond to General H. C. Sclater, 8/7115, Redmond papers, N.L.I., Ms., 

15,225. 

193The only academic study ofthe Orange Order is H. Senior. Orangeism in Ireland 

and Britain, 1795-1836. Routledge, Kegan and Paul, London, 1966. On the Orange 

Order in the twentieth century see, M. W. Dewar, J. Brown and S. E. Long, 

Orangeism~ a new historical appreciation, the Grand Lodge of Ireland, Belfast, 1969 

and T. Gray, Ihe Orange Order, The Bodley Head, London, 1972. Unfortunately, 

neither ofthese make any reference to Orange Lodges in the 36th. (Ulster) Division. 

The Grand Lodge of Ireland claim to have minute books ofthe military lodges which 

were active on the Western Front between 1914 and 1918, unfortunately, I was denied 

access to these. 

194J. Brown, Orangeism Around Ballymena., Mid Antrim Historical Group, Ballymena, 

1990, p.9. 

1955. N. White, The Terrors, 16th. (pioneer) Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, p.67. 
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clear "Orange" activity in the 12th. Battalion, Royal Irish Riflesl96 and 11th. 
Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers 197 it would be logical to assume that they, too, 
had formed Orange Lodges. The role of Orange Lodges in maintaining morale is, 
given the lack of material available relating to them, almost impossible to assess. If 
lodges contained a significant number of men, then it may have increased unit cohesion 
and loyalty, and also maintained important links with events at home. Conversely, if 
lodges contained only a dozen or so men, as had been the case with military lodges in 
1830,198 then their influence would have been negligible. Finally, it should be noted 
that Orange Lodges could, actually have compromised discipline. If an N.C.O. was 
the master of a lodge and officers members (as was the case in the 16th. Battalion, 
Royal Irish Rifles, where R.S.M. Gordon was the Worshipful Master and Major 
Gardiner, Captains Allen and Shepperd and Lieutenants Dickson and White, 
members199), then this would create a difficult situation, with problems of partiality in 
applying the army's disciplinary code. 
Reaching a balanced assessment of the state of discipline in the Irish New 
Anny divisions, during their training period in the United Kingdom, is not a simple 
task While the 16th. (Irish) and 36th. (Ulster) Divisions both had a relatively large 
number of mutinies, the court martial record of their units compared very favourably 
with that of the 10th. (Irish) Division. Nevertheless, a few factors are clear; firstly, the 
Irish New Anny units during this period appear to have had a worse record than any 
other New Anny units in Britain; certainly the Irish units appear to have had a 
decidedly disproportionate number ofmutinies. 
Secondly, the political influence exerted, at least on the 16th. (Irish) and 36th. 
(Ulster) Divisions, appears to have been mostly malign. This saddled both divisions 
with incompetent officers, many of them from the pre-war paramilitary organisations, 
1961. H. Stewart Moore, "Random Recollections", p.2. 

197The diary ofLieutenant Guy Owen Lawrence Young, pp.66-7, P.R.O.N.!., 

D/3045/6/11. 

198T. Gray, The Orange Order, p.131. 

1995. N. White, The Terrors. 16th (Pioneer) Battalion., Royal Irish Rifles, p.67. 

271 

and threatened many of the regular army's tried and trusted methods of maintaining 
morale, most notably, the regimental system. Perhaps most damagingly, sectarian 
recruitment policies, fostered by the political nature of these divisions meant that both 
were painfully slow at recruiting to establishment, indeed, with the exception of the 
39th. Division, 200 the 49th. Brigade was the last New Army formation to be sent 
overseas, in February 1916. This delay in sending these Irish divisions overseas led to 
boredom and discontent, especially in battalions which had recruited up to their full 
strength by the end of 1914. 
Thirdly, the localities in which the New Army units were billeted almost 
encouraged indiscipline. Men of the 10th. (Irish) Division, stationed in Dublin and of 
the 36th. (Ulster) Division, located in the vicinity ofBelfast, were based in areas which 
were very close to their own homes, which, often, led to desertion and absence 
without leave. 
Fourthly, we should note that units which adopted many of the tried and tested 
methods of maintaining morale, from the regular army, appear to have maintained 
much better disciplinary records. For example, the courts martial record of the 13th. 
Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, serving in the 108th. Brigade, where a large number of 
sporting activities were organised, compares favourably with that of the 10th. 
Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers and the 9th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, where 
such activities did not take place to the same extent. 
Finally, it should be stressed that, as in the regular army, each service battalion 
had its own unique courts martial record. The 14th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, for 
example, appears to have maintained an excellent record, not because it was a 
particularly good battalion, in terms of either discipline or combat effectiveness, but 
because its adjutant, Captain Bentley did not want to try men by court martial! 
Equally, with reference to the regular army, it appears that men in the service 
2001. F. W. Beckett and K. Simpson, (eds.), A Nation in Anus, p.235. 
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battalions very quickly adopted the same patterns of military crime as their regular 
counterparts. 
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Chapter 5 
"A Citizen Army at War"; Irish units on the Western Frogt, October 1915 to 
September 1916. 
The period from October 1915 to September 1916 saw the peak of Irish 
involvement on the Western Front, with the arrival of the 16th. (Irish) and 36th. 
(Ulster) Divisions in that theatre. This period also saw a number of disciplinary 
problems occurring in Irish units. Some regular units, which had reformed on a 
number of occasions, witnessed indiscipline from members of the unit who felt 
insulted at being left as a cadre, when their comrades went into action. The 16th. 
(Irish) and 36th. (Ulster) Divisions, as examined in the previous chapter, suffered from 
a number of inherent defects in discipline which became increasingly obvious in 
France. A number of officers and N.C.O.s proved completely unsuitable for front line 
service and insufficient training contributed to poor trench discipline. Finally, the High 
Command feared that the Easter Rising of April 1916 would led to serious breaches of 
discipline in some Irish units. 
This chapter will begin with a consideration of disciplinary problems in Irish 
regular battalions serving on the Western Front during this period. Secondly, the 
experiences of the 16th. (Irish) and 36th. (lnster) Divisions in adapting to active 
service will be considered, especially in terms of their courts martial records. Thirdly, 
the experiences of the 16th. (Irish) Division at Hulluch and Ginchy and the 36th. 
(Ulster) Division at Thiepval will be assessed with reference to discipline. Fourthly, 
the impact of the Easter Rising on Irish units serving on the Western Front will be 
assessed. Finally, consideration will be given to the development of measures, official 
and unofficial, designed at maintaining morale. 
As illustrated in table 5. 1, overleaf, the disciplinary record of the regular Irish 
units serving on the Western Front between October 1915 and September 1916 was 
very varied. Nevertheless, some general trends are noticeable, if this table is compared 
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Table 5.1. Men tried by Courts Martial while serving in Irish regular units, October 
1215 to September 1916 1 
Units 	 0 N D J F M M J J A S 0 T 
4th. R.I.D.G. 4 0 2 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 11 
6th. Dragoons 3 2 1 2 3 1 1 0 1 3 2 4 23 
8th. Hussars 3 4 3 1 1 4 0 0 1 0 2 1 20 
5th. Lancers 3 0 3 0 2 0 1 0 5 1 0 0 15 
N.I.H. 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 1 10 
S.I.H. 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 6 
ll1rish Guards 5 4 8 9 6 8 5 5 11 4 2 1 68 
211rish Guards 0 4 4 3 4 3 1 2 3 4 4 1 33 
l/Royal Irish Regt. 0 9 0 / / / / / / / / / / 
2/Royal Irish Regt. 1 1 4 4 5 3 3 3 2 1 5 3 35 
l/Royal Inns. Fus. / / / / / 12 3 7 7 3 1 3 36 
2/Royal Inns. Fus. 4 1 5 12 : 3 17 22 15 11 6 17 4 117 
l/Royal Irish Rifles 6 14 8 6 8 6 6 8 5 3 5 0 65 
2/Royal Irish Rifles 4 4 10 4 7 4 2 3 13 0 8 8 67 
l/Royal Irish Fus. 0 4 3 10 5 3 i 6 3 1 6 8 5 54 
2/Royal Irish Fus. 4 
l/Connaught 2 
Rangers 
IlLeinster Regiment 2 
2ILeinster Regiment 4 
l/Royal Munster / 

Fus. 

2/Royal Munster 
 1 
Fus. 
l/Royal Dublin Fus. / 
2/Royal Dublin Fus. I 5 
I: 

I 
4 
4 
/ 
1 
/ 
3 
/ 
1 
1 
13 
/ 
3 
i / 
i 9 
/ 
/ 
/ 
, 
12 
/ 
5 
/ 
:9 
/ 
/ 
/ 
' 7 
/ 
1 
/ 
; 14 
/ 
/ 
/ 
19 
10 
i 
i 
[4 

7 

! 13 

/ 
/ 
/ 
4 
5 
4 
:10 
i 6 
/ 
/ 
/ 
3 
5 
16 
2 
'17 
/ 
/ 
/ 
·6 
7 
I 	3 
3 
5 
i / / / / 
/ / / / 
/ / / / 
4 5 3 64 
7 7 6 '37 
5 0 4 37 
6 6 13 47 
3 7 4 95 
1In cases where units spent some months in this period in theatres other than the 
Western Front, months spent elsewhere are marked "f' and where such units served on 
the Western Front for less than four months, no total has been calculated. 
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with table 3.1. A number ofunits with large numbers ofcourts martial in August 1914 
to September 1915 had improved considerably in the October 1915 to September 
1916 period. For example, the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers with 150 cases 
in the former period, shrank: to just 95 in the latter, while the number of courts martial 
held on men serving in the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles fell from 119 cases to just 
67. However, this picture is by no means uniform. The 2nd. Battalion, Royal 
Inniskilling Fusiliers had 94 men tried by courts martial between August 1914 and 
September 1915, but 117 from October 1915 to September 1916. Nevertheless, 
overall, the disciplinary record of the Irish regular units was improving over these 
periods. If we compare the fifteen Irish units which served continuously on the 
Western Front from 1914 to September 1916, the number of men tried by courts 
martial had fallen in ten units, remained the same in two and risen in three, when the 
figures for August 1914 to September 1915 and October 1915 to September 1916 are 
compared. 
As noted in chapter three, it is very difficult to account for many of these 
variations. In terms of casualties the 1 st. Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers had a 
much higher number than the 2nd. Battalion of the same regiment, but a better 
disciplinary record, whereas the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers had a worse 
courts martial record that the Ist. Battalion of the regiment and a higher casualty rate. 2 
Nevertheless, a few trends are clear. Firstly, it is noticeable that units which 
moved to other formations had improved disciplinary records while serving in their 
new formation. This is perhaps most noticeable in the case of the 2nd. Battalion, 
Leinster Regiment. This unit had 145 men tried by courts martial in the August 1914 
to September 1915 period, but this fell to 64 during October 1915 to September 1916. 
This dramatic reduction would appear to be a result of this battalion's movement to 
the 73rd. Brigade, 24th. Division in October 1915. Similar reductions occurred in the 
2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles which joined the 74th. Brigade, 25th. Division, also 
21 am grateful to Mr. Nicholas Perry for providing me with details on casualty figures. 
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in October 1915 and the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Regiment, which was transferred 
to the 4th. Division in May 1916. 
The impact which these moves had on discipline are somewhat surprising, 
given that they were breaking up formations which had served together since the start 
of the war. Certainly the transfer from the 6th. to the 24th. Division was regarded as 
"sad news" by officers in the 2nd. Battalion, Leinster Regiment. 3 
By contrast, men in the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles seem to have been 
very enthusiastic about their transfer. As Father Henry Gill noted; "It is now certain 
that we are to be put into 25th, Division, one ofK[itchener],s. All are delighted at the 
prospect of getting away from Hooge and Salient,., " We shall be the only regular 
Brigade in the Division and will I suppose, be its back-bone,,>4 Gill further noted that 
Major General Haldane, G.O.C., 3rd. Division, told the men that they were being sent 
to the 25th. Division as they were his most senior Brigade.5 This tactful speech made 
it clear that the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles were, in no way, being passed to 
another formation as a form of punishment. 
John Lucy, commenting on how the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles acted as 
instructors, wrote; 
We were a bad lot to bring into that peaceful scene. Incredibly [sic] we 
listened to stories of flat-capped enemy troops who showed themselves at 
dawn and wished the British 'Good Morning', Now we knew why the 
Regulars were broken up, and we automatically did what was expected. 
There was no choice anyway. The morning greeters were shockingly killed 
off, ... The New Army battalions got used to the more warlike atmosphere we 
brought with us, and shortly took it very much for granted,... These 
3F. C. Hitchcock, "Stand To", A Diary of the Trenches. 1915-1918, Gliddon Books, 

London, 1988, p.1 06. 

4H. V. Gill, "As seen by a Chaplain with the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles", p.59, 

Jesuit Archives Dublin. 

5ibid, pp.59-60. 
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battalions got over their awe of us when they discovered they could do some 
things as well or better than we could, and they were far keener in the main 
than we were, because they had a tradition to build up, whereas we had 
become used to ours, and did not exert ourselves in any outstanding way 
simply to maintain it.6 
Lucy mentioned that this experience with service battalions gave men of the 
2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles a great respect for the Kitchener units.7 His account 
also suggests that the regulars of his battalion enjoyed their role of instructors. 
Therefore, they presumably did not want to see their battalion lose its prestige by 
having a worse courts martial record than its New Army comrades. 
While the exchange of regular and New Army units, following the failures of 
the 21st. and 24th. Divisions at Loos,8 may have improved the disciplinary record of 
the 2nd. Battalions of the Royal Irish Rifles and Leinster Regiment, it has been judged, 
generally, as a failure. As C. Hughes comments; "The regulars were intended to 
'stiffen' the new formations, and, while there might have been some success in Lucy's 
case, generally it had little effect in the long term.,,9 
A number of other Irish units saw a change in their brigading, or duties, which 
it is worth examining with reference to discipline. The 1 st. Battalions of the Royal 
Inniskilling Fusiliers, Royal Munster Fusilier~ and Royal Dublin Fusiliers, all in the 
29th. Division, arrived in France in March 1916, having served at Gallipoli. These 
battalions appear to have adopted well to service in France, indeed, in June 1916, 
6J. F. Lucy, There's a Devil in the Drum, Faber and Faber Ltd., London, 1938, 

pp.339-4l. 

7ibid, p.343. 

8C. Hughes, "The New Armies", in I. F. W. Beckett and K. Simpson (eds.), A Nation 

in Arms; A Social Study of the British Army in the First World War, Tom Donovan 

Publishing Ltd., London, 1990, p.113. 

9ibid, p.113. 
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Major General H. B. Delisle, G. O. C., 29th. Division, stated that; "The discipline in 
the lst. Batt.[alion] R[oyal] Inn[i]s.[killing] F.[usiliers] is excellent."lO 
Other battalions faced less popular assignments. Following heavy losses at 
Loos in September 1915, the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers became pioneers 
to 1 st. Division. As one officer noted; 
From the end ofNovember until early February 1916 over 2 months of 
a bitter winter, we spent our lives in the most demoralising assignment it is 
possible to imagine. Every night at dusk we marched up the line from 
Mazingarbe under intermittent shellfire to the trenches, ... , From then until an 
hour before dawn we worked solidly in the most appalling conditions, 
rebuilding trenches, ... , Dawn would find us back in Mazingarbe, a revolting 
and unrecognisable collection of sewer navvies caked from head to foot, mud 
in our hair, our ears, our eyes, and gritting between our teeth. To crown it 
all, we had casualties nearly every night and we were not even recognised as 
fighting men. The most heartbreaking part of the whole affair was that we 
had to spend the day trying to clean ourselves up and dry our clothing 
knowing all the time that we must start allover again that evening, ... , 
Throughout January drafts of young Irishmen arrived and put new blood into 
the regiment. When at last, in February, the news came through that the 
battalion was to rejoin the Third Brigade, morale went sky~high overnight. 
Pioneer work had slowly been eating out the souls of the old soldiers. 11 
This period of pioneer work, therefore, appears to have sapped morale and, as 
table 5.1 demonstrates, led to a small, if significant rise in the numbers of courts 
lOComment included in the transcript of the court martial ofPrivate James Cassidy, 
P.RO., W071/484. 
IIp. R Reid, Winged Diplomat, London, 1962, pp.55~6, cited in M. Staunton, "The 
Royal Munster Fusiliers in the Great War, 1914~18", unpublished M.A thesis, 
University College, Dublin, 1986, pp.34~5. 
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martial in the battalion. It is, perhaps, no coincidence that it was during this period 
that Private 1. Graham was executed for desertion and obtaining money with false 
pretences, although, unfortunately no officer commenting on this case, gave any 
indication of how the High Command viewed discipline in the 2nd. Battalion, Royal 
Munster Fusiliers. 12 
Another issue with regard to discipline, which becomes clear when tables 3.1 
and 5.1 are compared is that units with good courts martial records were often sent to 
other theatres. Thus the 1 st. Battalion, Royal Irish Regiment, 2nd. Battalion, Royal 
Irish Fusiliers, 1 st. Battalion, Connaught Rangers and lst. Battalion, Leinster 
Regiment, were all sent to Salonika. This would appear to suggest that units which 
maintained good disciplinary records while serving on the Western Front were 
transferred to less arduous theatres as a reward, although no direct evidence of such a 
policy has come to light. 
The final point which should be made with direct reference to table 5.1 is the 
impact of officers being tried by courts martial. This was particularly evident in the 
2nd. Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers, where the C.O., Major and Temporary 
Lieutenant Colonel T. T. Stubbs, was cashiered for drunkenness on the 25th. March 
1916. Six weeks later, Lieutenant S. S. Byrne, of the same unit, was cashiered for 
cowardice and offences under section 40 of the Anny Act.13 This failure of 
leadership, especially in Stubbs' case does not appear to have adversely affected 
discipline in the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers, which had one of the best 
disciplinary records of any Irish unit during this period. This would suggest that 
officers serving in regular units who were clearly failing in their duties were quickly 
removed, before their actions led to similar problems amongst the rank and file. 
The 2nd. Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers faced another disciplinary problem 
during the October 1915 to September 1916 period over the establishment of a cadre 
12Transcript of the court martial ofPrivate 1. Graham, P.R.O., W071/438. 
I3See the entries in the Irish Western Front database for further details of Stubbs and 
Byrne's cases. 
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system, which, paradoxically, demonstrated high morale in this unit. On the 14th. July 
1916 the warrant officers of the battalion caused 'serious unrest'; 
They had a grievance, and demanded an interview with the 
Commanding Officer. On inquiry by the latter, he elicited the information 
that the warrant officers considered they were being very unfairly treated in 
being kept out of the battle, and wanted to know what they had done to 
deserve such a fate. Headed by Regimental Sergeant Major Ring (who had 
most properly been awarded the first D.C.M. earned by the Battalion), they 
requested, almost demanded, that they should be allowed to take their usual 
places in action. Finally Colonel Lyons permitted two of the company 
sergeant-majors to fight with their companies, the remainder being left 
behind. The toss of a coin decided which these should be, and one of the 
losers to this day asserts that his rival used a double-headed penny. 14 
The 2nd. Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers had introduced the cadre system 
of keeping a reserve ofN.C.O.s on which to rebuild the battalion after a major action, 
in August 1914. 15 This preservation of experienced N.C.O.s, which was not 
introduced into the B. E. F. as a whole until July 1916,16 along with the constant 
refusal of Regimental Sergeant Major John Ring to accept promotion, may well 
14S. Mc Cance, History ofthe Royal Munster Fusiliers. vol. II, From 1861 to 1922 

(Disbandment), Gale and Polden Ltd., Aldershot, 1927, p.137. 

15Information supplied by Mr. Tadhg Moloney, Secretary, Royal Munster Fusiliers 

Association. 

16See letter from Brigadier General William Francies Jeffiies to Historical Section, 

C.I.D., 29/3/30, Jeffiies Papers, Liddle Hart Centre ofMilitary Archives, King's 

College, London. Jeffiies, who was serving as a Second Lieutenant in the 2nd. 

Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers at the time, stated that this cadre system was 

introduced on the 1 s1. July 1916, when every battalion was ordered to leave behind; 

"the 2nd. in command of the Battalion, and ofCompany and a percentage ofmen from 

every Company so that should the Battalion suffer very severely - which was the case 

on July 1 st. - it should be reformed with the same spirit and traditions as before." 
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explain how this battalion maintained such a good courts martial record in the face of 
demoralising pioneer work and the court martial of its C.O .. 
Discipline in the regular Irish units was under pressure from two other 
measures during this period, namely the partial collapse of the army's drafting system 
and the transfer of experienced officers, N.C.O.s and, even, other ranks, in Irish 
cavalry regiments to other units. Traditionally, regular units of the British army had 
relied on their depots and post-1908 Special Reserve Battalions to send them drafts in 
the event of war. 17 However, given the high losses experienced by regular Irish units 
and the downturn in Irish recruitment, evident long before the Easter Rising,18 this 
system was beginning to break down. This, of course, was not endemic to Irish units, 
as early as February 1916 it was decided to draft men of the lI9th. Battalion, Argyll 
and Sutherland Highlanders and 1I4th. Battalion, Cameron Highlanders to their 1 st. 
and 2nd. Battalions and to amalgamate the 1I4th. and 1I5th. Battalions, Black 
Watch. 19 The collapse of the drafting system is demonstrated by the number of drafts, 
from various Irish Special Reserve units, sent to the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Dublin 
Fusiliers, during a two week period in July 1916. This battalion received 54 men from 
the Royal Dublin Fusiliers, 52 from the Royal Munster Fusiliers, 63 of the Royal Irish 
Regiment, 18 from the Leinster Regiment, 9 of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, 4 from the 
Royal Irish Rifles, 4 of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers and 2 from the Connaught 
Rangers.20 
What frustrated officers in Irish regular units was the apparent insensitivity 
with which the War Office appeared to deal with their recruiting problems. As 
Hitchcock noted in July 1916; 
17E. M. Spiers, Haldane' an Army Refomer, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 
1980, p.89. 

18p. Callan, "Voluntary Recruiting for the British Army in Ireland during the First 

World War", unpublished Ph.D., University College Dublin, 1984, pp.85-6. 

l~ntry for 14/2/16, Adjutant General's war diary, P.R.O., W095126. 

2~ntry for 21/7/16, war diary of the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, P.R.O., 

W095/2301and H. C. Wylly, Neill's 'Blue Caps'. vol. III, 1914-22, Gale and Polden 

Ltd., Aldershot, 1925, pp.71-2. 
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Owing to the heavy demands for reinforcements from the Sornrne area, 
there seemed to be no discrimination with regard to men being sent to their 
own units. Two hundred men of the Connaught Rangers were sent up the 
line to join the Munsters, who had suffered severely in the attack on Marnetz 
Wood. A Leinster draft of over fifty was sent to the Black Watch! Posting 
men of one Irish regiment to another was reasonable, but sending Leinsters to 
join any regiment but an Irish one gave cause for much legitimate grousing.21 
An officer of the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers felt even more strongly 
about the reinforcements denied to his battalion, noting that the spirit and traditions of 
the regiment were undermined by; ''That pernicious habit of drafting officers and men 
to different Regiments to fiU up casualties often quite unnecessarily, i.e. 50 Dublin 
Irishmen put into kilts in the Seaforths in the same brigade whilst in same draft 50 
English recruits were sent to the Dublins. ,,22 
This indiscriminate drafting policy therefore appears to have been deeply 
resented by officers in the units concerned and, presumably, was also unpopular 
amongst members of new drafts, who had enlisted into a specific regiment and 
expected to serve in one of its battalions overseas. However, having acknowledged 
this, there is no indication that this policy led to any serious disciplinary problems in 
Irish regular units. Indeed, it may have led to greater discipline amongst members of a 
new draft, in the hope that this would lead to their acceptance by the battalion 
concerned. 
The stalemate of trench warfare meant that, increasingly, cavalry units on the 
Western Front became redundant. This situation meant that they were seen as an 
excellent source of trained officers, N.C.O.s and other ranks for infantry units and, 
2IC. C. Hitchcock. "Stand To!" A Diary ofthe Trenches, p.130. 

22Letter, Brigadier General W. F. Jeffries to Historical Section, C.I.D., 29/3/30, 

Jeffries Papers, Liddle Hart Centre ofMilitary Archives, King's College, London. 
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indeed, that many ambitious officers, seeking faster promotion, applied for transfer to 
front line infantry units. On the 28th. November 1915, alone, the 6th. Inniskilling 
Dragoons lost three of their Squadron Sergeant Majors, who were promoted and 
transferred to other units, namely, T. H. Yolden sent to the 9th. Battalion, East Surrey 
Regiment, L. Tynan to the 6th. Battalion, Wiltshire Regiment and T. Ashard to the 
8th. Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders. None of these men had less that sixteen and a 
half years service.23 In May 1916 it would appear that a draft ofone lieutenant and 75 
other ranks of the 8th. Hussars was sent to the 36th. (Ulster) Division.24 While, in 
August 1915 the 1st. Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers received a number of men 
compulsorily transferred from Lancer regiments. 25 
With regard to officers, the 5th. Lancers alone lost two experienced officers in 
this period. In September 1916 Lieutenant Sharpe transferred to the 2nd. Battalion, 
Leinster Regiment,26 while, in July 1916 Captain A. G. Mc Clintock was promoted 
and became the CO. of the 9th. Battalion, Yorkshire Light Infantry.27 By October 
1916 there were serious concerns that this process had gone too far and the G.O.C., 
Cavalry Corps stated that, in future, no officers or N.C.O.s were allowed to transfer 
from cavalry to infantry or Royal Flying Corps units.28 
Finally, with respect to regular units, the point must be made that, purely from 
a practical point of view, the numbers of men tried by courts martial in regular units 
would naturally fall, as the war progressed. In August 1914 units of the original 
B.E.F. embarked for active service with, in their ranks, a relatively large number of 
men who had already committed military crimes and when they committed another, 
23Entry for 28111/15, war diary of the 6th. Inniskilling Dragoons, P.RO., 

W09511176. 

24Entry for 27/5/16, war diary of the 8th. Hussars, P.RO., W095!l185. 

25M. G. Staunton, "Soldiers Died in the Great War, 1914-19 as Historical Source 

Material", Stand To, 27, 1989, p.7. 

26F. C. Hitchcock, "Stand To", A Diary of the Trenches, p.176. 

27J. R Harvey, The History ofthe 5th (Royal Irish) Regiment ofDrajoons, from 

1689 to 1799, Afterwards, The 5th Royal Irish Lancers, from 1858 to 1921, Gale and 

Polden Ltd., Aldershot, 1923, p. 327. 

28ibid, p.337. 
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these men would automatically be tried by court martial. By contrast, in October 
1915, many of these men were dead, their places taken by wartime recruits, who 
would be tried by their C.O. for their first and, perhaps, even second or third military 
crime, as long as this was of a minor nature, before being referred to trial by court 
martial. This partially explains why, in the face of high losses, especially of officers 
and N.C.O.s, the disciplinary record of regular Irish units, based on courts martial 
records, generally improved in the October 1915 to September 1916 period. 
The disciplinary problems faced by Irish New Army units serving on the 
Western Front were, in the main, very different from those faced by the regular units, 
during this period. Indeed, between October 1915 and September 1916 the major 
disciplinary issues faced by service battalions were, how would they adapt to active 
service and behave in major actions? 
The transition of the New Army divisions from training in the United Kingdom 
to active service was, by no means, an easy one and this is particularly apparent in the 
case of the 36th. (Ulster) Division. This Division experienced a number of changes 
when arriving in France, most importantly the replacement of Major General Powell 
with Major General Sir Oliver Nugent. Unlike his predecessor, Nugent had experience 
of commanding troops in the Great War itself, having commanded 42nd. Brigade, 
14th. (Light) Division, itself a New Army formation.29 Also, unlike Powell, Nugent, 
despite his involvement in the U.V.F. pre-war, was to resist Ulster Unionist 
interference in the 36th. (Ulster) Division. Thus, in his first address to the division, 
following a field day, far from praising his new formation, he made it clear that he felt 
that it was poorly trained and unfit for front line service. Most officers who heard this 
speech appear to have remembered it all too well. Second Lieutenant Guy O. L. 
V oung of the 11 tho Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers recalled; 
29There is, as yet, no biography of Sir Oliver Nugent. However, there is a brief 
biographical sketch in, Department of the Environment for Northern Ireland. Annual 
Report 1992-93 of the Public Record Office ofNorthern Ireland. P.R.O.N.I., Belfast, 
1994, pp.53-6. 
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At the pow wow after the 'ceasefire' he [Nugent] told us quietly + 
firmly what he thought of us as a Division. His remarks in brief may be 
summed up as follows we had a good name as a division but he did not know 
how we got it. Every rudimentary mistake that could be made had been made 
by officers that day. They showed total ignorance of modern conditions + 
lamentable ignorance. He did not know what sort of training we had had in 
Ireland, but it was very poor. Such were the remarks General Nugent made 
to his new officers at his first 'pow wow'. They left an impression on the 
minds of many who heard them that will never die out, but they had their 
effect on all ranks.30 
Colonel (then Major) F. J. M. McCrory of the 10th. Battalion, Royal 
Inniskilling Fusiliers, recounted the same lecture; 
This Field Day was the first occasion on which the new Divisional 
Commander had seen the Division as a whole, and few of the officers who 
were privileged to listen to his 'pow wow' after the performance will forget 
it. Very gravely, he opened his remarks by saying how glad he was to have 
seen at last, the famous Ulster Division going through an Attack Practice, but 
(still more gravely) how much more glad he was it was only a Practice 
Attack, for had it been a 'pukka' attack on the German lines he very much 
feared that he would not have had the pleasure of speaking to any of the 
participating officers again in this world. The general went on to compliment 
the officers on their excellent North of Ireland eyesight - he observed that 
although we were all equipped with Field Glasses, none of them [sic] had 
30The diary of Second Lieutenant Guy Owen Lawrence Young, 11tho Battalion, Royal 
Inniskilling Fusiliers, P.R.O.N.I., D.304516/11, pp.18-19. 
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ever found it necessary to use them, even during the initial stages of the 
attack. As a lecture it was superb, and did a lot of good, even though the 
officers did feel a little bit small, and more than a little aggrieved, at the 
nature of their commander's witticisms.31 
However, Nugent's lecture was not simply a critical diatribe, it included some 
considered and informed comments on modem military discipline; 
Discipline is the cement which binds every body of men into a 
homogeneous whole and without which any body of soldiers has little to 
distinguish it from an ordinary mob. 
Training, good behaviour, intelligence, education and physical fitness 
are all essential qualities in an army but without discipline what use are they in 
the field. 
It is the spirit of discipline which enables you and the men you have to 
lead to face losses, to go steadily to your front and to comfort difficulties and 
dangers which would probably [have] frightened you into a lunatic asylum 8 
months ago, ..., All men are not equally brave or equally [steady?] under 
discipline, some have less control than others over their emotions. Those are 
the men who in a big fight begin to look behind them, who become seized 
with panic and try to get away to the rear. 
The bad example of one man is contagious and may affect a number in 
his vicinity. 
Every officer and N.C.O. has a great responsibility at such times. A 
rot must always be stopped before it spreads. You would be justified in using 
31Unpublished account by F. J. M. Mc Crory, "The History of the 36th. (Ulster) 
Division, The 10th. Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers (The Derrys)", p.4, The Royal 
Inniskilling Fusiliers Museum, Box 70. 
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every means even to the most decisive to prevent an individual whose nerve 
has gone from being a cause of infection to others. 
You would be not only justified in any step you took to deal with such 
cases but I shall expect it of you,... Successful leading is largely a matter of 
the confidence of the men in the officers and N.C.O.s they know and trust, 
but men will not trust where they do not respect. They do respect the man 
who is strict and just. The easy going officer or N.C.O. who lets things pass 
which it is his duty to notice, may be popular in quarters, but he does not earn 
respect, and the men do not give him the obedience which a leader in battle 
must exact and get or pay the penalty in failure. 
It is to the regimental officers and N.C.O.s that all higher commanders 
look for maintenance ofdiscipline. Ifyou fail in that, you fail in all besides. 
Don't forget that much depends on the way in which you give orders. 
That is where the blessed quality called tact comes in. Tact is like charity. It 
covers a multitude of sins. Don't bully men. You will sometimes have to 
extract a days work out of men who are already dead beat and whose nerves 
are raw. 
Avoid criticising your superiors.32 
Nugent therefore made it clear to his officers, even by example, that he felt that 
the officers and N.C.O.s in his division should not court popUlarity. Instead, he 
believed in firm discipline, to be maintained, if necessary, by shooting retreating men. 
His final comment, regarding criticism of superiors, demonstrates his understanding of 
the new "citizen soldiers" and propounds his view, more firmly expressed in February 
1918, that problems in the Division should not take on a political dimension or appear 
in the press. 
32Lecture by Major General Sir Oliver Nugent to the 36th. (Ulster) Division, October 
1915, Farren Connell papers, P.R.O.N.I., MIC/571111. 
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Nugent's criticisms of the 36th. (Ulster) Division were sincerely felt. Writing 
to his wife on the 16th. October 1915, he stated; "I had a field day today, ... , which was 
quite interesting and after which I delivered a long criticism. There were too many 
mistakes and shortcomings I am sorry to say in a Division supposed to be ready for 
The new G.O.C. of the 36th. (Ulster) Division acted quickly to remedy 
problems in the division. On the 10th. October, Nugent decided to replace Brigadier 
General Couchman as G.O.c., 107th. Brigade, noting; "I have had to write to one of 
my Brigadiers and tell him he won't do, so beastly, but quite unavoidable. I might 
have delayed it, but what good and a good man is badly wanted at once.,,34 On the 
12th. October he decided to remove one of his staff officers as; ''Meynell is I am afraid 
a useless Staff Officer, always making heavy weather of everything and no more 
intelligent than a clerk. I have to think of every thing in his branch and he gets on my 
nerves. I am afraid I shall have to get him removed."35 
Nugent also moved quickly to replace battalion C.O.s who he judged to be 
incompetent. On the 1st. November 1915 Lieutenant Colonel G. Bull replaced 
Lieutenant Colonel R C. A. McCalmont as C. O. of the 12th. Battalion, Royal Irish 
Rifles.36 Likewise, on the 2nd. December 1915 Lieutenant Colonel F. L. Gordon 
33Letter, Nugent to his wife, 16/10115, Farren Connell papers, P.RO.N.I., 

D.38351E12/5112A. 

34Letter, Nugent to his wife, 10/10/15, Farren Connell papers, P.R.O.N.I., 

D.38351E12/5/8. 

35Letter, Nugent to his wife, 12110115, Farren Connell papers, P.R.O.N.I., 

D.38351E12/5/10. The only Meynell, or indeed officer with a similar surname, with a 

staff position in the November 1915 Anny List was Major (Temporary Lieutenant 

Colonel) G. Meynell of the Shropshire Light Infantry. He had been serving as an 

Assistant Adjutant and Quarter Master General since the 31 st. August 1915. (War 

Office, Monthly Army List for November 1915, H.M.S.O., London, 1915, column 

38b.). On the 4th. November 1915 MeyneIJ returned to regimental duty as C.O. of the 

6th. Battalion, King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry (War Office, Army List for July 

l.2lQ. HM.S.O., London, 1916, column 1362 a.). This would seem to suggest that 

this was the officer Nugent was referring to. 

36 War Office, Anny List for July 1916, H. M. S. 0., London, 1916, column 1496c. 

McCalmont became a Lieutenant Colonel in the Irish Guards on the 14th. February 

1916 (War Office, Anny List for July 1916, column 887.). However, in a letter of the 
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replaced Lieutenant Colonel G. H. Ford-Hutchinson as C.O. of the 15th. Battalion, 
Royal Irish Rifles.37 As Ford-Hutchinson did not hold any further command in the 
British anny, this would appear to be a clear case ofdismissal for incompetence. 38 
However, Nugent found that one of his brigades needed more drastic changes. 
While he had observed the 108th. and 109th. Brigades during the field day on the 
16th. October 1915, the 107th. (often known as the "Belfast") Brigade was serving in 
the trenches, on attachment to 4th. Division. Reports on its performance were 
unfavourable and, as table 5.2, overleaf: demonstrates, it had the worst disciplinary 
record in the 36th. (Ulster) Division Writing to his wife, following the 107th. 
Brigade's return from the trenches, Nugent wrote~ 
1 am not too happy about the tnster Division for it cannot be denied 
that some of them have very little discipline. The Belfast [107th.] Brigade is 
awful. They have absolutely no discipline and their officers are awful. 1 am 
very much disturbed about them. 
1 don't think they are fit for service and 1 should be very sorry to have 
to trust these. Don't breathe one word of this to a living soul please. It is all 
due to putting a weak man [i.e. Brigadier General Couchman] in command of 
the Brigade to start with and giving commissions to men of the wrong 
class.39 
12th. October 1915, Nugent stated~ "I have to recommend the removal ofanother 
C.O. today." (Letter, Nugent to his wife, 12110115, Farren Connell papers, 

P.R.O.N.!., D.38351E12/5110). McCalmont's replacement less than three weeks later 

strongly suggests that this was the officer Nugent was referring to. 

37War Office, Army List for July 1916, column 1496f. 

38The Army Lists for January, July and December 1916, make no mention of 

Ford-Hutchinson being on the active or reserve lists, which suggests that he had been 

compulsorily retired. 

3~er, Nugent to his wife, 26110/15, Farren Connell papers, P.R.O.N.!., 

D.3835/E/2/5/20A. 
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Table 52. The number of men tried by courts martial, while servina in the 36th. 
(Ulster) Division, October 1915 to September 1916. 
Units. o N D J F M A M J J A S T 
l07th. Brigade. 
81R. I. Rifs. 2 6 3 3 0 1 0 1 2 0 2 1 21 
91R. I. Rifs. 6 3 3 4 3 1 5 2 1 0 2 1 31 
101R. I. Rifs. 3 1 8 4 4 1 4 6 1 2 2 2 38 
151R. I. Rifs. 2 3 5 3 6 2 1 0 3 0 6 1 32 
l08th. Brigade. 
I11R. I. Rifs. 1 6 1 0 0 2 2 1 1 0 0 3 17 
121R. I. Rifs. 2 0 0 1 0 3 0 0 1 1 1 0 9 
131R. I. Rifs. 1 3 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 i 8 
I 
91R. Ir. Fus. 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 2 0 I 7 
I II 
109th. Brigade. 
91R. Inns. Fus. 
101R. Inns.Fus. 
2 
I 
I 0 
0 
4 
5 
3 
I 
i 
I 3I 
i 1 
1 
1 
4 2 
1 6 
I 1 i 0 
4 1 
I 
I 
1 
1 
0 
2 
4 
2 
I 
I 
'23 
26 
I11R. Inns.Fus. I I 0 
I 
i 3I 4 
I 5I 4 0 4 2 1i 1 2 1 27 
141R. I. Rifs. i 0 1 1 I 0I 0 0 1 0 I 0 0 1 4 8 i 
Div. Pioneers. I I i 
161R. I. Rifs. 1 I 0 1 I 1 0 o J 0 i 0 1 2 -1 0 i 1 j 1 7 
-1 
Nugent had no hesitation in telling officers of the 107th. Brigade exactly what 
he thought of their units. In November 1915 Nugent "strafed" Major F. P. Crozier of 
the 9th. Battalion, Royal Irish Regiment, castigating him for bringing" such a mob" to 
France.40 
The High Command offered a solution to Nugent's disciplinary problems, by 
breaking up the 36th. (Ulster) Division. Initially, Nugent was not enthusiastic about 
this, on the 23rd. October 1915 he wrote; 
40D. Starret, unpublished manuscript entitled 'CSatman", p.39, I.W.M., 79/35/1. While 
only a private, as Crozier's servant, Starret was uniquely qualified to comment on such 
conversations. 
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The lllster Division is being broken up I am sorry to say. That is to say 
we are to lose 1 Brigade ofillster men and get another Brigade in its place of 
regulars. This is to happen to all the New Divisions I understand. I am very 
sorry and I am afraid it will cause a great feeling of disappointment and will I 
fear have a bad effect on recruiting in lllster. I hope it may only be for a 
while and that later on the 3 lllster Brigades will be all under one roof again. 
It is in many ways a good idea no doubt as the new battalions will have a 
better opportunity of picking up useful knowledge when they have regular 
battalions along side ofthem.41 
Nugent, faced by this situation, did what any sensible G.O.C. would do and 
jettisoned his problem formation, the 107th. Brigade, on to 4th. Division, receiving the 
12th. Brigade in return. Initially, it would appear that this transfer was to be 
permanent.42 
Nugent made it quite clear to officers of the 107th. Brigade that they were to 
regard this transfer as a punishment. As F. P. Crozier recollected, a number of senior 
N.C.O.s in the 9th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles became 'dead drunk,43 and; 
It so happened that other unfortunate 'accidents', such as mmor 
looting, take place in other battalions of the brigade at about the same time, 
with the result that Major-General Oliver Nugent, the newly appointed 
Divisional Commander, begins to think one ofhis brigades is an undisciplined 
mob! As a matter of fact two of the battalions were always much better that 
the other two, although the men in all the battalions were magnificent. There 
41Letter, Nugent to his wife, 23/10115, Farren Connell papers, P.R.O.N.I., 
D.38351E12/5/17. 
42C. Falls, The History of the 36th (illster) Division, Constable, London, 1996, p.24. 
43In October and November 1915, alone, the 9th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles had 
one company sergeant major, four sergeants, two corporals and one lance corporal 
and one rifleman found guilty ofdrunkenness. See entries in appendix 6, and the Irish 
Western Front database. 
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had been an absence of intellectual and uniform training at the outset, which 
was often the case in the new armies. General Nugent, taking the bull by the 
horns, assembles all the officers of our brigade in a village schoolroom where 
he delivers a strafe, not wholly deserved but very good for us, which I shall 
always treasure in my mind as the complete example of what can be said by 
the powerful to the powerless in the shortest space of time possible, 
consistent with the regulations of words and space for breathing, in the most 
offensive, sarcastic and uncompromising manner possible, ... , At last the 
sentence is pronounced! 'Banishment - to the 4th. Division!,44 
The incorporation of the 12th. Brigade into the 36th. (Ulster) Division meant 
that the 11 tho Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers and 14th. Battalion, Royal Irish 
Rifles, from the lO9th. Brigade, were attached to 12th. Brigade, while the 2nd. 
Battalion, Essex Regiment was attached to 109th. Brigade and the 2nd. Battalion, 
Lancashire Fusiliers to 108th. Brigade.45 The impact of these changes on discipline in 
the I08th. and 109th. Brigades, as considered in table 5.2, are debatable. For 
example, in the case of the 11 tho Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, the number of men tried 
by courts martial, fell sharply during this period of attachment (from November 1915 
to January 1916). However, in the case of the lIth. Battalion, Royal Inniskilling 
Fusiliers, the number ofcourts martial held increased. 
Certainly this period of attachment did little to tackle more fundamental 
problems in the 108th. and 109th. Brigades. In October 1915, Lieutenant A. C. 
Herdman, noted ofBrigadier General C. Hacket Pain, G.O.c., 108th. Brigade; 
Here we are with our Brigadier who must know he would be absolutely 
useless when it comes to anything especially trenches, as you know he could 
44F. P. Crozier, A Brass Hat in No Man's Land, Cedric Chivers Ltd., Bath, 1968, 

pp.61-2. 

45The diary of Second Lieutenant G. O. L. Young, pp.46-7, P.R.O.NJ., D.3045/611 L 
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not walk 2 y[ar]ds along ours + here he is kidding himself + everyone else 
that he is fit + some day we shall have another + until then we run along 
wasting time + the nations money.46 
Herdman further felt that, by retaining his battalion in reserve, the military 
authorities were actually promoting indiscipline, noting; 
Everyone complaining of inaction, its affecting the Batt[alio]n in 
different ways, the chiefway is for the S[er]g[ean]t[s] to get drunk + really I 
feel a certain amount of sympathy for some of them. A poor billet, leaky + 
drafty on a bad ey [sic] + poor light naturally they go to the cafes + the 
blasted proprietors, in spite of regulations, sell them 'Rum' which knocks 
them out.47 
In the 14th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, other problems were not remedied by 
the attachment to 12th. Brigade. When in the trenches between the 8th. and the 13th. 
November 1915, Rifleman J. Mac Roberts noted; 
Once again we were under the control of our officers who were nearly 
all ignorant, conservative and bullying, to an intolerable degree. 
Captain S----- 48 was intoxicated for most of the time we were in the 
trenches. I believe he once visited our guard at night. He asked the sentry 
his name and then what were his duties. The sentry replied. 'Is that right?' 
46Letter, Lieutenant A. C. Herdman to his mother, 31110/15, P.R.O.N.J., T.251O/1. 
Hacket Pain remained the G.O.c. ofthe 108th. Brigade until the 4th. December 1916. 
C. Falls, The History of the 36th (Ulster) Division, p.308. 

47Letter, Lieutenant A. C. Herdman to his mother, 11111115, P.R.O.N.J., T.251O/1. 

48The only captain in the 14th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles at this time whose surname 

began with S. was Captain C. O. Slacke, a temporary officer, War Office, Army List 

for January 1915, column 1496d. 
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asked S----- of the sergeant of the guards, who was a Warwick, 'Yes, sir', 
replied the sergeant. 
'And what would you do in case of an alarm?' was the next question of 
the reeky Captain. The sentry gave an answer. 'Is that correct?' queried the 
Captain of the sergeant a second time. 'Not exactly, Sir' was the answer. 
'You are absolutely wrong', said the Captain turning upon the unfortunate 
private, 'you are a sentry and you do not know your duty, you should be 
court-martialled'. Such arrogance from an ignorant, drunken officer was 
unbearable to flesh and blood. 
Our Lieutenant was scarcely more visible during our stay in the 
trenches. He never came round to see how we fared for food, he never 
visited our dug-out and our rifles actually were never inspected once. But 
when in quarters, where we had every opportunity of taking care of our 
equipment, our lives were verily plagued with rifle, kit and billet 
inspections.49 
Also during this period of attachment, Captain Hyndman tried to have 40 men 
of the 14th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, court martialled for losing their iron rations 
in the trenches. Following this the men felt that; "Captain Hyndman was unstable. "SO 
This period of attachment did see one major benefit for the 14th. Battalion, 
Royal Irish Rifles. It occurred when the Brigadier General of the 1 07th. Brigade 
discovered that the battalion had under-drawn bread to the value of £600.51 This 
discovery meant that the men's diet was improved greatly, when full rations were 
again provided. 
490iary ofRifleman 1. MacRoberts, p.92, Liddle Collection, University ofLeeds. 

50Anon., "Service with the 14th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles (Y.C. V.), 1914-18 

War", p.110, unpublished manuscript, Royal Ulster Rifles Museum. 

51Diary ofRifleman 1. MacRoberts, pp.94-5, Liddle Collection, University ofLeeds. 

It is unclear why Brigadier General Whittycombe inspected the finances ofthis unit, as 

it never came, formally, under his command. 
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A number of the problems in the 14th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, appear to 
have been the result of illness amongst veteran officers and N.C.O.s. The C.O., 
Lieutenant Colonel R. P. D. S. Chichester, suffered from persistent lung trouble and 
was away from the battalion during much of the October 1915 to September 1916 
period.52 Major H. R. Bliss of the Royal Irish Regiment became acting C.O. for a 
three month period 53 while Major Llewellyn, who again was posted from another 
unit, also took over temporary command.54 Major P. Kerr-Smiley, one of the few 
officers with previous regular military experience, serving in the unit, was invalided to 
England with a stomach infection. 55 During the same period, Regimental Sergeant 
Major Elphick and Sergeant Irvine were sent to England with lumbag056 while the 
health ofCompany Sergeant Major Griffith also broke down in the trenches. 57 
Attachment to the 4th. Division, equally, appears to have done little to improve 
discipline in the 107th. Brigade. Indeed, following this period of attachment, the 
brigade had its first executions, in February 1916 when the death penalty was imposed 
on Rifleman J. Crozier of the 9th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles and Riflemen J. F. 
McCracken and J. Templeton of the 15th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles. The fall in the 
number ofcourts martial in these battalions, and indeed the entire 107th. Brigade, after 
February 1916 (see table 5.2) suggests that it was these executions, rather than 
attachment to the 4th. Division which reduced the cases of indiscipline in this 
formation. 
In the case of Rifleman James Crozier, while Brigadier General Whittycombe 
noted that; "The discipline of the 9th. R.[oyal] l[rish] Rif[le]s. is good for a service 
Battalion." Major General Nugent felt that the execution should proceed as; "There 
521he Incinerator (troop journal of the 14th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles), May 1916, 
p.15. This journal was consulted at the Somme Heritage Centre, Newtownards. 
53'b'd 91 1 , p.. 
541he InCinerator, June 1916, p.20. 
55ibid, p.20. 
56ibid, p.22. 
57ibid, p.26. 
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have been previous cases ofdesertion in the 107th. Brigade."58 With reference to the 
cases of Riflemen McCracken and Templeton, both Brigadier General Whittycombe 
and Major General Nugent felt that the death penalty should be enforced to prevent 
further desertions from the 15th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, Whittycombe noting 
that; ''The discipline of the 15th. Batt.[alion] R.[oyal] I.[rish] Rif{le]s is fair for a 
Service Battalion. ,,59 
The effect of the transfer of 107th. Brigade to the 4th. Division on morale is 
difficult to assess. Falls comments; "Any advantages they may have had were found 
insufficient to counterbalance the dislike of the break-up of their old formations felt by 
battalions of both Divisions.'>60 However, Crozier stated that men of the 107th. 
Brigade wanted to stay with the 4th. Division and petitioned the High Command, 
asking not to be returned to the 36th. (Ulster) Division.61 
F. P. Crozier noted that, during the period with 4th. Division, the 9th. 
Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles suffered from a number of problems, mainly as a result of 
the poor quality of officers in the unit. While in the trenches Captain Gaffikin turned 
to alcoholism and, one evening, attempted to led two platoons into No Mans Land in a 
suicidal attempt to recover two men, captured by a German patrol. Crozier prevented 
this attack, but refused to report Gaffikin. Instead, he simply requested that Gaffikin 
gave up alcohol while serving with the battalion. 62 Crozier also covered up for a 
young second lieutenant who contracted venereal disease, allowing him ten days leave 
to have this privately treated in Amiens.63 
58Comments included in transcript ofthe court martial ofRifleman James Crozier, 

P.R.O., W071/450. 

59Comment included in the transcript ofthe courts martial ofRiflemen J. F. Mc 

Cracken and J. Templeton, P.R.O., W071/453 and W0711454. 

60C. Falls, History of the 36th. (Ulster) Division, p.25. 

61F. P. Crozier, A Brass Hat in No Man's Land, p.62. 

62ibid, pp.68-70. 

63ibid, pp.64-5. 
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Crozier's decision, in Gaffikin's case was to prove a sensible one. Gaffikin, by 
then a major, died bravely, on the 1st. July 1916, leading his men into action.64 
However, in the case of the second lieutenant, who Crozier refers to as Rochdale, but 
who was actually Second Lieutenant A. 1. Annandale, Crozier's oversight was to have 
serious consequences. On the 1st. February 1916, Annandale was tried by a General 
Court Martial for offences under section 40 of the Army Act, for; "Conduct to the 
prejudice of good order and Military Discipline, in that he, in the fire trenches, when 
his Commanding Officer was discussing certain Military work with him, left the 
dug-out in which the discussion was taking place without permission and did not 
return.'065 While the sentence of the court martial was that he be dismissed from the 
army, there was a recommendation to mercy on health grounds66 and it was not 
confirmed by the military authorities.67 Annandale had, by all accounts, ran from the 
front line trenches, in full view of his men, while under fire from trench mortars. 68 
Crozier stated that he refused to accept Annandale back into his battalion, 69 however, 
it is unclear ifthis was, indeed, the case. Annandale was placed on sick leave from the 
2nd. March until the 29th. August 1916, when he was forced to relinquish his 
commission. A medical board concluded that, not only had he developed serious eye 
problems, but that he was suffering from shell-shock. 70 
Annandale's apparent free pardon, days after Rifleman Crozier had been 
sentenced to death for a similar offence was an unpopular decision in his battalion. As 
Starret noted; "If the officer did not know what he was doing, did the man? We did 
64C. Falls, History ofthe 36th (Ulster) Division, p.59. 

65Report on Annandale's General Court Martial, included in the personnel file of 

Second Lieutanant Arthur J. Annandale, P.R.O., W0339/14160. 

66ibid. 

67See entry for Annandale in the Irish Western Front database for further details. 

68F. P. Crozier, A Brass Hat in No Man's Land, pp.80-1 and D. Starret, ''Batman'', 

p.56, I.W.M., 79/35/1. 

69p. P. Crozier, A Brass Hat in No Man's Land, p.81. 

7~eport ofMedical Board, meeting on 17/8/16, included in the personnel file of 

Second Lieutenant A. 1. Annandale, P.R.O., W0339/14160. 
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not think so, and Bell actually chanced his three stripes, and was placed under arrest 
himseJfby taking the handcuffs off the chap.,,71 
The 9th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles apparently faced another, similar, officer 
problem, when on the 1st. July 1916 a second lieutenant deserted and was later found 
in a billet. This officer was not tried by court martial as most of the witnesses to his 
desertion were killed in action. The officer was forced to resign his commission, but 
escaped conscription as he was then resident in Ireland.72 
Two other officers in the 9th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles proved themselves 
unfit to command front line infantry. Lieutenant Colonel Ormerod was evacuated with 
pneumonia; not surprisingly the health of this veteran, nearing seventy years of age, 
broke down in the trenches.73 In less meritorious circumstances, an elderly subaltern 
who Crozier refers to as Felucan became an alcoholic after his "nerves went" and 
Crozier sent him home. 74 
In an army which has long believed that; ''there is no such thing as a bad 
soldier, only bad officers,,75 the court martial of one officer, forced resignation of 
another, transfer ofone due to alcoholism and clear evidence of alcoholism in another, 
is a damning indictment of any unit. The ill-health of the e.o. which forced him to 
leave the unit, did little to help matters. 
However, not all disciplinary problems in the 9th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles 
were on the part of officers. Captain W. A. Montgomery noted that drunkenness was 
a serious problem in the battalion; "Over the drink troubles I have taken the drastic 
71D. Starret, ''Batman'', p.57, I.W.M., 79/35/1. 

72F. P. Crozier, The Men I Killed, Michael Joseph Ltd., London, 1939, p.163. 

73F. P. Crozier, A Brass Hat in No Man's Land, p.74. On the 1st. September 1916 

Ormerod was appointed C.O. of the 82nd. Training Reserve Battalion. (War Office. 

Army List for December 1916, column 1582k). This suggests that, while regarded as 

unfit for active service, Ormerod was still seen as a perfectly competent officer. 

74F. P. Crozier, A Brass Hat in No Man's Land, p.79. There was no officer named 

Felucan serving in the 9th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, it is likely that Crozier was 

referring to Second Lieutenant E. W. P. Feneran, War Office, Army List for January 

12.16, column 1495b. 

751 am grateful to Major Ivan Nelson, Royal Irish Regiment (retired) for this 

reference. 
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step of not paying the company, ... , I understand they were stunned with horror. They 
are now blacklisting all the doubtful boys with a view to taking care of them when 
within a mile of drink. ,,76 Perhaps the most shocking aspect of this indiscipline in the 
9th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles is that it was one of the better disciplined units in the 
107th. Brigade, as table 5.2 demonstrates. 
Evaluating how well the 16th. (Irish) Division adapted to service on the 
Western Front is much more difficult than in the case of the 36th. (lnster) Division, 
largely due to the absence of primary source material.77 As in the case of the 36th. 
(Ulster) Division, active service saw a new G.O.C. for the 16th. (Irish) Division, in the 
form of Major General W. B. Rickie. The replacement of Lieutenant General Sir 
Lawrence Parsons was not a particularly popular move in the division. For example, 
Captain William Redmond, writing to Parsons, stated; "I regret the fact that you are 
leaving us. This regret is universal in the Division which you have seen grow under 
your care."78 This is in sharp contrast to the 36th. (Ulster) Division, where no-one 
appears to have felt any remorse at the removal ofMajor General Powell. 
However, Rickie, as that rare breed, a senior, Irish, Catholic officer, was a 
popular replacement. As Father J. Wrafter, chaplain to the 8th. Battalion, Royal 
Munster Fusiliers noted; "The General of the Division - Parsons - was changed 
yesterday. It was a great disappointment to everyone. He was very much liked + had 
raised the Division, ... , The new General is William Rickie, so we can't complain.,,79 
Rickie was a much more diplomatic and tactful man than Nugent, indeed his 
political awareness is shown by the fact that he became one of the first senators in the 
Irish Free State,80 and when taking over the 16th. (Irish) Division, unlike Nugent, he 
76Letter from Captain W. A. Montgomery to his parents, 13112/15, P.RO.N.I., 

D.2794/1/1/4. 

77In particular, the papers ofMajor General W. B. Rickie, for this period, do not 

survive. 

78Letter, Redmond to Parsons, 28/11/15, Parsons' papers, N.L.I., Ms. 21,278. 

7~etter, Father Wrafter to his Father Provincial, 26/11115, Jesuit Archives Dublin. 

soT. Johnstone, Orange, Green and Khaki, pp.427-8. 
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spoke of the pride which his new command gave him.81 Hickie was particularly 
tactful in that what he initially commanded was not actually an entire division: while 
the 47th. and 48th. Brigades arrived in France on the 18th. December 1915, the 49th. 
Brigade did not reach the Western Front until February 1916.82 As a result, it would 
probably be true to say that no-one expected a great performance from the 16th. 
(Irish) Division, an incomplete formation, which had only been sent to France under 
pressure from the I.p.p..83 
Certainly there were serious problems in the 16th. (Irish) Division, as table 5.3, 
overleaf, demonstrates. The courts martial records of some units of the 16th. (Irish) 
Division, for example the 6th. Battalion, Connaught Rangers, compared very badly to 
battalions of the 36th. (Ulster) Division. However, unlike in the case of the 107th. 
Brigade, 36th. (Ulster) Division, no one brigade could be singled out as having a 
worse disciplinary record than the others. 
Furthermore, the whole ethos in training the 16th. (Irish) Division was very 
different to that in the 36th. (Ulster) Division. While units of the 36th. (Ulster) 
Division had been sent into the front line, soon after their arrival in France and then the 
107th. Brigade had been exchanged with the 12th. Brigade, the system of training in 
the 16th. (Irish) Division was to be very different. Whether this was a policy devised 
by Hickie or the Higher Command is unclear, but certainly Hickie was a firm advocate 
ofthis alternative system. As Staniforth noted; 
8IT. P. Dooley, Irishmen or English Soldiers? The Times and World of a Southern 
Catholic Irish Man (1876-1916) Enlisting in the British Army During the First World 
War. Liverpool University Press, Liverpool, 1995, p.195. 
82T. Johnstone, Orange, Green and Khaki, The Story of the Irish Re,giments in the 
Great War. 1914-18, Gill and Macmillan, Dublin, 1992, p.198, T. Denman, Ireland's 
Unknown Soldiers, The 16th (Irish) Division in the Great War, 1914-18, Irish 
Academic Press, Dublin, 1992, p.62. 
83Letter, J. Redmond to General H. C. Sclater, 2717115, Redmond papers, N.L.I., 
Ms. 15,225, lettersH. H. Asquith to J. Redmond, 1112115 and 11/12/15, Redmond 
papers, Ms.15,165 (5) and T. Denman, Ireland' Unknown Soldiers, pp.55-6. 
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Table 5.3. The number ofmen tried by courts martial while serving in the 16th (Irish) 
Division, December 19] 5 to September 1916 84 
Unit. DJFMAMJJAST 
'5 
47th. Brigade. 
6/Royal Irish Regt. 
6/Connaugbt Rangers 
7lLeinster Regt. 
S/Royal Munster Fus. 
48th. Brigade. 
7/Royal Irish Rifs. 
9/Royal Munster Fus. 
S/Royal Dublin Fus. 
9/Royal Dublin Fus. 
1 
10 10 1 IS 17 
49th. Brigade. 
7/Royal Inns. Fus. 
0 1 2 1 1 
0 6 5 7 11 
0 3 1 2 1 
0 2 5 6 6 
0 3 0 2 3 
0 ,11 9 4 
/20 3 15 0 
1 
1 
5 IS 
II 
10 [3 
2 4 2 
4 3 12 
0 1 3 
0 4 1 
, 
I 
, 
3 13 2 
11 II I 
11 
I 
'7 '4I ! 
16 
1 
I 
, 
I 
I 
II13 14 1 
0 1 14 
7 2 57 
2 0 13 
3 1 2S 
,5 2 
1 
23 
;1 I 26 
! 
'2 .0 124I I 
:4 4 50I 
I 
i 
I , 
I 
S/Royal Inns. Fus. II 
I 
il 10 :7 :2 
I 
1 3 :2 
! I 
I 
, 113 2 
, 
I 
7/Royal Irish Fus. II II !o il il 
, 
i5 :9 ,4 4 10 
, II I i 
S/Royal Irish Fus. il II ,0 17 '12 16 ,12 ~S 15 3 
! I I 
Div. Pioneers I, I 
! , I 
iO 10 10 10 ,0 :0II/Hampshire Regt. [I il 
, , ! 
o o 
, 
We saw General Hickey [sic] the day before yesterday, and he blamed other 
Divisions very much for sending their men up into the firing-tine right away 
before they got used to new conditions and Boche habits. He intends to keep 
us in French billets for a month, to acclimatise us, far away from the war 
zone. Then a month somewhere behind the lines, taking up officers and men 
gradually bit by bit for a day or so each, for instructional purposes. Then a 
84The 9th. Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers was disbanded in June 1916, therefore 
the entries for June to September are left blank, as are the returns for 49th. Brigade, 
which did not arrive in France until February 1916. 
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month with the whole Division in the trenches, not to take part in attacks, you 
understand, but to accustom the men to trench life and all that sort of thing.85 
Nevertheless, some of Rickie's methods were identical to Nugent's, for 
example in the replacement of officers who were regarded as inefficient. Shortly after 
their arrival on the Western Front the G.O.C.s of the 47th. and 48th. Brigades were 
replaced. In January 1916 Lieutenant Colonel G. E. Pereira took command of the 
47th. Brigade and Lieutenant Colonel F. W. Ramsay, the 48th. Brigade.86 Clearly it 
was felt that the former G.O.C.s of these brigades were not suitable for front line 
commands. As Lieutenant General Sir Henry Wilson stated to Parsons; 
Rickie has thought it right to replace B[.[igadier] Gen[era]l.[s] Miles + 
Buchanan (47th. + 48th. B[riga]des) by younger officers who have had long + 
varied experience of this war. I have endorsed Rickie's action, ... , the 
command ofall units in close contact with the Boch [sic] must be in the hands 
ofyoung experienced officers. 87 
The removal of Brigadier Generals Miles and Buchanan was, apparently, 
popular in the 16th. (Irish) Division. As Father 1. Wrafter, chaplain of the 8th. 
Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers, noted; 
85Letter, Staniforth to his parents, 12112/15, cited in 1. H. M. Staniforth, "Kitchener's 

Soldier", P.93, I.W.M., 67/4111. 

86Entries for 17th. and 18th. January 1916, Assistant Adjutant and Quarter Master 

General's (16th. (Irish) Division) war diaries, W095/1957, T. Johnstone, Orange, 

Green and Khaki, p.203, T. Denman. Ireland's Unknown Soldiers, p.62. 

87Letter, Wilson to Parsons, 14/1116, Parsons's papers, N.L.I., Ms.21,278. 
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Everyone likes Hickie + he is making things fine. He sacked two 
brigadier-generals since he came out. It was hard lines on them being sent 
home before they were a month out, but everyone said he was right. 88 
When the 49th. Brigade arrived in France in February 1916, it likewise 
received a new G.O.C., Brigadier General P. Leverson-Gower.89 
A large number of battalion C.O.s were also replaced shortly after the 16th. 
(Irish) Division landed in France. The first C.O. to be replaced was Lieutenant 
Colonel D. L. Hartley of the 7th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles who, on the 5th. 
February 1916 was superseded by Lieutenant Colonel S. G. Francis.90 On the 9th. 
March 1916, Hartley became a Section Commandant in the Royal Defence Corps,91 
suggesting that he was not regarded as fit to command troops on active service. 
Lieutenant Colonel F. Williams was succeeded by Temporary Lieutenant Colonel E. 
Monteagle-Browne, as C.O. ofthe 9th. Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers on the 12th. 
February 1916.92 Williams had first been commissioned into the 104th. Bengal 
Fusiliers, in 1879,93 it therefore does not seem surprising that he was retired in 
1916.94 The last C.O. to be replaced in February 1916 was Lieutenant Colonel M. J. 
Hughes, who was succeeded by Lieutenant Colonel H. N. Young.95 Hughes was, 
apparently, compulsorily retired.96 
In March 1916 two further battalions in the 16th. (Irish) Division received new 
C.O.s. Lieutenant Colonel S. T. Watson took over command of the 8th. Battalion, 
88Letter, Wrafter to his Father Provincial, 2111116, Jesuit Archives, Dublin. 

89T. Johnstone, Orange, Green and Khaki, p.203. 

90war Office, Army List for July 1916, column 1495. 

91War Office, Army List for December 19] 6. column 1621. 

92ibid, column 1544a. 

93T. P. Dooley, Irishmen or English Soldiers?, p.195. 

94There is no mention ofWilliams on the active or reserve list ofofficers after his 

removal as C.O. ofthe 9th. Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers, see War Office, Army 

List for July 1916 and Army List for December 1916 

95War Office, Army List for July 1916, column 1159. 

96There is no mention ofHughes in War Office, Army List for July 1916 and Army 

List for December 1916 
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Royal Irish Fusiliers,97 his predecessor, Colonel 1. S. Brown became C.O. of the 86th. 
Training Reserve Battalion.98 Likewise, on the 14th. March 1916, Lieutenant Colonel 
F. S. Thackery took over command ofthe 9th. Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers.99 He 
succeeded Lieutenant Colonel W. E. G. Connolly, who became C.O. of the 2nd. 
Garrison Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers in April 1916. 100 Finally, on the 18th. March 
1916, Lieutenant Colonel H. 1. Downing was relieved of his command, the 8th. 
Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, Major I. M. Wadmore becoming acting C.O .. lOl 
On the 19th. lune 1916, Downing took command of the 10th. Reserve Battalion, East 
Lancashire Regiment. 102 
Therefore Hickie made sweeping changes amongst the senior officers in the 
16th. (Irish) Division, replacing all three Brigadier Generals and six battalion 
commanders. Of course, not all of these officers were completely incompetent, as 
testified by the fact that many were later posted to command reserve units. It is 
possible that most of these officers were removed from their commands as, like 
Lieutenant Colonel Ormerod of the 9th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, their health had 
collapsed while on active service. Indeed, many officers who had proved perfectly 
satisfactory as C.O.s of New Army units, while in training, were simply regarded as 
too old for active service, especially when, in early 1916, there were a number of 
officers, experienced in trench warfare, available to command these units. 
However, it is significant that Lieutenant General Sir Lawrence Parsons had 
never wanted Lieutenant Colonel H. I. Downing to serve as a C.O. in his division,103 
while Captain O. L. Beater was certain that Lieutenant Colonel W. E. G. Connolly had 
been removed for incompetence,l04 and his suspicions are borne out by the recent 
97War Office, Army List for July 1916, column 1508a. 

98War Office, Army List for December 1916, column 1583a. 

99war Office. Army List for July 1916, column 1552a. 

lOOWar Office, Army List for December 1916, column 1504e. 

101War Office, Army List for July] 916, column 1159a. 

102War Office, Army List for July 1916, column 1188. 

103T. Derunan. Ireland's Unknown Soldiers, p.45. 

I04Entry for 8/11/16 in Captain O. L. Beater's diaries, I.W.M., 86/65/1. 
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release of Connolly's personnel file. In January 1916, Major General W. B. Hickie 
stated to H.Q., IV Corps; 
I have to report that I consider Temp.[orary] L[ieutenan]t. Col.[onel] 
W. E. G. Connolly (retired Major Royal Marines) unfitted for the command 
of a Battalion, and I beg that he may be relieved at once, from the command 
of the 9th. [Battalion] Royal Dublin Fusiliers, ... I can recommend an officer, 
now serving with the Division, for the appointment. 
As this Battalion is very shortly for a tour of duty in the trenches I beg 
that I may be empowered to send L[ieutenan]T. Col.[onel] Connolly Home 
[sic.] pending the receipt ofauthority for his relief, ... He is not educated up to 
the requirements of modem War, ... The Battalion is not well trained or as 
efficient as it should be. I cannot recommend L[ieutenan]t. Col. [onel] 
Connolly for employment for training purposes. I do not recommend that his 
services be dispensed with, as there may be work in his late branch of the 
Service in which he might be useful. 105 
Hickie's reservations, with regard to this officer, were well founded. Connolly 
was relieved of his command of the 2nd. Garrison Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers, in 
May 1917, after carrying out a poorly planned, and costly, trench raid, at Salonika. As 
Lieutenant General G. F. Milne stated; "he state of discipline in his [Connolly's] 
Battalion was bad and the raid, largely due to vague orders and to want of 
organisation, entirely failed, ending in a most discreditable retreat, I am sending him 
home."106 
105Letter, Hickie to H.Q., IV Corps, 2511116, contained in the personnel file of 
Lieutenant Colonel W. E. G. Connolly, P.RO., W0339/760S. 
l06Letter, Milne to Secretary, War Office, 3015117, in ibid. The personnel records of 
other C.O.s replaced when the 16th. (Irish) and 36th. (Ulster) Divisions arrived in 
France were not avaliable in the P.R.O., W0339 series. 
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Nevertheless, the pruning of senior officers in the 16th. (Irish) and 36th. 
(Ulster) Divisions, while drastic, was not an atypical experience for New Army units 
embarking on active service. For example, two Brigadier Generals in the 38th. 
(Welsh) Division were replaced by younger officers before this formation embarked 
for overseas service. 107 
As in the case of the 36th. (Ulster) Division, units of the 16th. (Irish) Division 
did not behave particularly well in their first tour of duty in the trenches. As J. H. M. 
Staniforth, then a Second Lieutenant in the 7th. Battalion, Leinster Regiment, noted in 
January 1916; 
We have got rather a bad name in the English Division to which we 
were attached in the trenches, because the men would not keep under cover 
in the daytime, and we had to put the sergeant-major with a rifle loaded with 
candle-grease bullets to keep them in the trenches. 108 
Likewise, Brigadier General Frederick Shaw, the then acting G.O.C. of the 
48th. Brigade, informed Parsons of the; "Breaking up of discipline", of the 7th. 
Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles and 9th. Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, while in the 
trenches. 109 
However, in general, the trench discipline in the 16th. (Irish) Division was seen 
as good, as Lieutenant Colonel William Rennie, a senior staff' officer in the 16th. 
(Irish) Division, commented; 
The 48th. [Brigade] have finished their attachment in the trenches it 
was of a pretty practical nature as it entailed about seventy casualties 
107C. Hughes, Mametz~ Uoyd George's 'Welsh Army' at the Battle of the Somme, 

Gliddon Books, London, 1990, p.38. 

108Letter, Staniforth to his parents, 3011/16, cited in J. H. M. Staniforth, "Kitchener's 

Soldier", I.W.M., 67/41/1. 

109Entry for 10/2/16 in Parsons' diary, N.L.I., Ms. 21,524. 
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including seven junior officers, ... , the 48th. [Brigade] as far as one could learn 
did well except in such matters as looking after their trench stores + similar 
side issues, ... , He [Major General Hickie] was very pleased with the 8th. 
Munsters [i.e. 8th. Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers] today marching to 
forward billets + I think that battalion are going to end by doing very well 
indeed. Williamson's rough + ready methods seem really to have got a grip 
of this tough lot ofLimericks which he collected. 110 
Similarly, Lieutenant Colonel Fitzroy Curzon, C.O. ofthe 6th. Battalion, Royal 
Irish Regiment, noted that the 47th. Brigade had received" a good report ofour men's 
behaviour in the trenches", and that, as a result, none of the battalion C.O.s in the 
Brigade were to be replaced. III 
The actual performance of the 16th. (Irish) and 36th. (Ulster) Divisions in 
action during the October 1915 to September 1916 period, demonstrated no serious 
disciplinary problems and indeed, these actions have been well covered elsewhere. 1l2 
However, in terms ofassessing the development ofeach division, it is worth examining 
three separate engagements: Hulluch, in March 1916, which brought into question gas 
discipline in the 16th. (Irish) Division; the performance of the 36th. (Ulster) Division 
on the lst. July 1916, in which this formation, unlike most other units in the British 
army, achieved its objectives, and finally, the performance of the 16th. (Irish) Division 
at Ginchy in September 1916, when units, which were already desperately 
under-strength were sent into the attack 
Hulluch, in early 1916, was seen as a relatively quiet part of the front line and, 
as a result, the 16th. (Irish) Division, as an untried formation, was, on the 27th. March, 
llOLetter, Rennie to Parsons, 1511116, N.LJ., Ms. 21,278. 

lllLetter, Fitzroy Curzon to Parsons, 8/2116, Parsons papers, N.L.L, Ms. 21,278. 
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given the responsibility of defending this sector. l13 However, on the 27th. April, the 
16th. (Irish) Division suffered heavy casualties from a gas attack. 114 A number of 
contemporaries alleged that these losses were a result of poor gas discipline in the 
division. llS 
Certainly the gas discipline of the 16th. (Irish) Division was not excellent and 
some panic did set in. 116 Also, a number of soldiers appear to have thought it very 
unlikely that the Germans would use gas again; indeed Father William Doyle, chaplain 
to the 8th. Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers, attributed his survival to divine intervention; 
I must confess for a moment I got a shock, as a gas attack was the very 
last thing I was thinking about - in fact we thought the Germans had given it 
up, ... , That morning as I was leaving my dugout I threw my helmet aside. I 
had a fairly long walk before me, the helmet is a bit heavy on a hot day, and, 
as I said, German gas was most unlikely. So I made up my mind to leave it 
behind. In view of what happened, it may appear imagination now, but a 
voice seemed to whisper loudly in my ear: 'Take your helmet with you; don't 
leave without it.' I turned back and slung it over my shoulder. 117 
Doyle further noted that some men did not put on their gas masks, others had 
tom or lost them. 118 
Nevertheless, at the time, a number of officers, including Hickie himself, felt 
that the 16th. (Irish) Division had behaved well under this attack. 1I9 Objective 
113T. Denman, Ireland's Unknown Soldiers, pp.67-8. 

114jbid, p.69. 

llSSee the comments ofA. Solly Flood, 25/7/29, C. Grant, 3014/29 and J. K. D. 

Cunyngham, 2015/29, P.R.O., CAB 45/2898, cited, ibid, p.70. 

116G. A. Cooper Walker, The Book ofthe Seventh Service Battalion, The Royal 

Inniskilling Fusiliers from Tipperary to Ypres., Brindley and Son Printers, Dublin, 

1920, pp.35-8. 

Il7Undated letter from Doyle, cited in A. O'Rahilly, Father William Doyle, S 1., 

Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1922, p.233. 

118ibid, p.237. 
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research has suggested that high casualties at Hulluch were mainly due to defective gas 
masks, the 'sack helmet' then in use being useless in concentrated gas clouds. 120 
Certainly, it would appear that while gas training in the 16th. (Irish) Division was far 
from extensive, it was rather better than that in some other New Army formations, for 
example, the 31st. Division. 121 
The experience of the 36th. (Ulster) Division on the 1st. July 1916 is of 
importance due to its comparatively successful attack on that day. This, in itself, 
raises the question of how had a formation which had, frankly, suffered from a 
multitude of problems in October 1915, become one of the most successful in the 
British army a mere nine months later? 
Initially, it should be noted that the attack was severely compromised by the 
orders of Fourth Army that senior officers should not accompany their troops into 
action. 122 This removal of senior officers (in the 36th. (Ulster) Division, C.O.s, 
Majors and Regimental Sergeant Majors, amongst others, were held back) especially 
when this was, effectively, the first time that the 36th. (Ulster) Division went into 
action, was to mean that the attack lost momentum and inadequate preparations were 
made to meet German counter attacks. 123 These orders, themselves, led to some 
indiscipline in the division, as Colonel H. C. Bernard, C.O. of the 10th. Battalion, 
Royal Irish Rifles and Lieutenant Colonel F. P. Crozier, C.O. of the 9th. Battalion, 
119G. A. Cooper Walker, The Book ofthe Seventh Service Battalion, The Royal 
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122T. Johnstone, Orange, Green and Khaki, p.228, P. Orr, The Road to the Somme, 

p.200 and F. P. Crozier. A Brass Hat in No Man's Land, pp.97-8. 
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Royal Irish Rifles, disobeyed these orders and took part in the attack. 124 Bernard was 
killed in action and Crozier faced no disciplinary action. 
The attack also witnessed some cases of straggling, especially after most of the 
officers had been killed and German counter attacks were taking place. Crozier 
witnessed a second lieutenant firing into a group of men, forcing them to return to the 
line. 125 Likewise, Captain W. A. Montgomery, of the 9th. Battalion, Royal Irish 
Rifles and Major W. J. Peacocke, of the 9th. Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers 
rallied a group ofaround 40 stragg!ers. 126 
While many men of the 36th. (Ulster) Division did act with great bravery on 
the 1 st. July 1916, it would appear that the success of the attack had much more to do 
with tactical planning than excellent discipline. Major General Nugent, unlike most 
officers on the 1st. July, ordered his men into No Man's Land ten to fifteen minutes 
before zero hour.127 As Myles Dungan comments, Nugent's decision~ "was to prove 
crucial in the almost unprecedented gains made on 1 July by his Division." 128 This 
decision meant that units of the division were attacking the German front line, seconds 
after the barrage lifted, at the time most other British units were just leaving their 
trenches. 
Equally, the artillery support given to the 36th. (Ulster) Division was superior 
to that afforded to most British formations. T. Travers notes that, at a time when 
many artillery barrages were based on guesswork, officers of the 36th. (Ulster) 
Divisional Artillery were carrying out much more accurate, predicted shooting off a 
1: 10,000 map. 129 
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However, having considered these points, in terms ofdiscipline we should note 
that following the lst. July 1916, the numbers of men tried by courts martial in the 
36th. (Ulster) Division generally fell (see table 5.2). This was in sharp contrast to the 
46th. (Midland) Division which, following heavy losses on the Somme experienced a 
large increase in its crime rate and the 56th. (London) Division which saw a minimal 
increase in the numbers of men tried by courts martial. 130 Nevertheless, there were 
some breaches of discipline in units of the 36th. (Ulster) Division, and the fall in the 
number of men tried by courts martial may simply demonstrate that following a major 
offensive, officers were unwilling to refer disciplinary cases to courts martial. Private 
Ellison Whitley, who, as a member of the 1 17th. Battalion, West Yorkshire Regiment, 
was sent to relieve the 36th. (Ulster) Division on the night of the 1/2nd. July 
remembered~ ''The Ulster [sic] Rifles who were still alive were all roaring drunk." 
While Private James A Eastburn of the 1/8th. Battalion, West Yorkshire Regiment 
recalled; "the trenches were jammed with drunks." 131 
Following this battle, the 36th. (Ulster) Division appears to have experienced 
low morale. Even Cyril Falls, the divisional historian, acknowledged this, although, by 
the 12th. July he felt that; "confidence was returning," to the division.132 Rifleman 
John Doran ofthe 14th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, confessed to his mother; 
I don't feel in very good form after what we have went through so this 
note will be very short but I will write a longer one when I get my mind 
settled a little it was our first big fight and I am not feeling at all like 
myself 133 
1301. Brent Wilson, "The Morale and Discipline of the RE.F., 1914-18", unpublished 
M.A. thesis, University ofNew Brunswick, 1978, p.199. 
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Likewise, Lieutenant Maxwell, ofthe 16th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, wrote, 
on the 10th. July; 
Now we are resting, but the experiences of the first week in July, 1916, 
will long remain as unpleasant memories that we long to curtain and blot out 
for ever. But even time can not erase these incidents - they are carved deep 
on our memories, haunting us in our waking moments like ghastly spectres, 
reminding us unceasingly ofwhat the horrors ofwar really are, and reviewing 
again our sorrow for the loss ofgallant comrades. 134 
Finally, in assessing discipline in action, some mention should be made of the 
16th. (Irish) Division's attack on Ginchy, on the 9th. September 1916. Both morale 
and discipline appear to have been maintained in this action, which is rather surprising, 
given that the battalions had been used 'piecemeal' in support of other units,135 and 
were seriously understrength before the attack. Indeed, before the attack, the 47th. 
136Brigade was close to battalion strength, with just 1,318 men. Many officers felt 
that, given this situation, the men should not be asked to assault Ginchy.137 Major 
Rowland Feilding, who had become C.O. of the 6th. Battalion, Connaught Rangers on 
the 7th. September, after the deaths, at Guillemont, of Lieutenant Colonel 1. Lenox­
Conyngham and his second in command, certainly held this view. His 'battalion' 
consisted ofjust 200 men, 91 of them from a recent draft,138 and, as he commented; 
"Those that were not raw recruits from the new drafts were worn out and exhausted 
by their recent fighting, and much more fitted for a rest camp than an attack." 139 
134Letter, cited in, S. N. White, The Terrors, 16th (pioneer) Battalion, Royal Irish 
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Despite these difficulties, the 6th. Battalion, Connaught Rangers only suffered 
from one serious disciplinary breakdown at Ginchy, when, during the battle, the 
adjutant went sick. His replacement, a young second lieutenant, felt that the only 
illness his predecessor was suffering from was; ''wind up.,,140 
Indeed, in general, it was felt that the discipline of the 16th. (Irish) Division 
had held up well. Major General W. B. Hickie noted; "The Division leaves the Somme 
with a very high reputation for discipline and good behaviour as well as for 
fighting.,,141 Meanwhile, the C.O. of the 9th. Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers 
commented; 
When you come to think that we had bad weather + that our Brigade 
were five days in so-called trenches before we made the attack [on Ginchy] 
with never a hot meal and not much water their performance was 
wonderful,... , after all our trials + loss when the remnants of my Battalion 
had accomplished a tiring dirty march of eleven miles the men sailed into the 
billets splendidly dressed and singing 'Brian Born'. The next morning we 
paid the men + that afternoon every man had all his brass work shining + 
boots cleaned. 142 
These battles, with their attendant losses had, of course, serious repercussions 
for New Army units in terms of drafts. As early as September 1915, James Craig, 
M.P. had stated; 
the only fear in my mind is the break up of the ~ [Division], in the 
event of casualties being heavy. The Reserve Battalions are not filling up as 
140lnterview with Colonel F. W. Seymour Jourdain, I.W.M., Sound Archives, 
11214/4. 

141Letter, Hickie to Parsons, 17/9116, Parsons papers, N.L.I., Ms.21,278. 

142Letter Lieutenant Colonel E. Bellingham to Parsons, 20/9/16, Parsons papers, 
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they should and consequently some of your batt[alion]s. when wasted away 
may be replaced by 'strangers', or, worse again, yours [sic] Batt[alio]ns. may 
be given away to:fill other Annies!143 
Craig had good reason to be concerned about the reserve battalions of the 
36th. (Ulster) Division. In early January 1916, it was established that, since the 10th. 
October 1915, the 10th. Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers had recruited just 284 men, the 
12th. Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, 583, the 17th. Battalion, Royal Irish 
Rifles, 271, the 18th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, 672, the 19th. Battalion, Royal Irish 
Rifles, 341 and the 20th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, just 77. 144 By March 1916, 
Craig was reporting that recruits in Ireland had; "dried up + there is no sign of any 
improvement."145 
Officers in the 16th. (Irish) Division were also expressing concern about 
reinforcements. In September 1916, Lieutenant Colonel Bellingham, C.O., 8th. 
Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, wrote; "Tomorrow we come out + it will be only a 
poor little shadow of a Division. There is every hope of our being filled up with 
English [drafts] as the other sort simply don't exist.,,146 
The impact ofdrafting non-Irish soldiers into Irish New Army units during this 
stage of the war is unclear. The then Private W. E. Collins, drafted into the 9th. 
Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, from the 25th. Battalion, London Regiment, remembered 
receiving a good welcome in his new unit, continuing; "The [9th.] R.[oyal] I[rish] 
R.[ifles] when I joined them had come back from the Somme 16 strong out of 600 
men and so they were only too pleased to get all the reinforcements they could."147 
143Letter, James Craig, M.P. to Major Wilfrid Spender, G.S.O. 2, 36th. (Ulster) 
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However, service battalions had built up a firm esprit de corps and men were 
reluctant to leave them. J. H. M. Staniforth, in hospital with scabies in August 1916 
commented; 
they have started a poisonous system of pooling all drafts at the Base 
and sending them to the unit that needs them most; so although its not often 
done with officers, its quite on the cards that I might find myself packed off 
to the West Rutlandshire Militia instead of the 7th. (S[ervice]) B[attalio]n., 
P.[rince] O.[f] W.[ales] Leinster Regiment. 148 
Equally, some men ofthe 10th. Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, wounded 
on the 1 st. July 1916, were, when they had recovered, posted to the 1 st. Battalion, 
Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, in August 1916. As one veteran remembered~ "Every day 
we used to report to the Commanding Officer of the 1 st. Battalion and requested to be 
sent back to our Battalion, but again and again we were refused,,,149 
One major event of this period, the Easter Rising, is important to assess with 
relevance to its impact on Irish soldiers serving on the Western Front. A number of 
historians, commenting on this issue, have concluded that the Rising had no 
detrimental impact on Irish troops,150 The courts martial held in Irish regiments 
serving on the Western Front, between October 1915 and September 1916 (as detailed 
in tables, 5,1, 5.2 and 5,3) would appear to confirm this analysis. The aforementioned 
148Letter, Staniforth to his parents, 28/8116, cited in J. H, M, Staniforth, "Kitchener's 
Soldier", p, 180, I.W,M., 67/41/1. 
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tables demonstrate that there was no great upsurge in the numbers of men tried by 
courts martial in Mayor June 1916, when news of the Rising reached the front. 
However, three issues should be emphasised relating to the reaction of Irish 
soldiers to the Rising. Firstly, some soldiers did have some sympathy for the rebels. 
John Lucy, then a sergeant in the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, noted; 
My fellow soldiers had no great sympathy with the rebels, but they got 
fed up when they heard of the executions of the leaders. I experienced a cold 
fury, because I would see the whole British Empire damned sooner than hear 
ofan Irishman being killed in his own country by any intruding stranger. 151 
Secondly, a number of men who had republican sympathies served, without 
any disciplinary problems, in the British army, until they were demobilised at the end 
of the war. Some prime examples are Tom Barry, who served in the Royal Artillery in 
the Middle East during the war, but, in 1919, was leading I.R.A. units in Cork,152 and, 
of more relevance to this study, Second Lieutenant Emmet d'Alton, who won the 
Military Cross, serving with the 9th. Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers at Ginchy, but 
post-war, became a leading figure in the Dublin I.R.A.. 153 
Thirdly, the response of Irish battalions on the Western Front to the Rising 
varied enormously. The trench journal of the 14th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, 
writing from a firm unionist perspective, carried a strongly worded editorial stating~ 
What about the Sinn Feiner business? Soldiers are not allowed to talk 
politics, otherwise much might be said. Speaking for ourselves, we'd rather 
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have seen a little less mercy to some of the rebels. If a man out here plays 
any old tricks he is given short shrift - shot at daybreak. Remember this man 
may have fought long and sturdily for his Empire - but still he'd be shot. 
Then what kind of death do those insurgent dogs deserve - those swine who 
seize upon the fact that the soldiery is away, fighting and dying to save Sinn 
Feiner worthless skins - to rifle and riot and murder a whole host of innocent 
people. Ugh! Doesn't it make your blood boillads?IS4 
The same issue carried an 'advertisement' stating; 
Wanted. 
1,000 Sinn Feiners to replace lost and deported comrades. Applicants must 
be thieves, murderers or opium maniacs. Hereditary insanity a 
recommendation. No honest man need apply. 
Also required, a Sound Scheme for blowing up Cork, Limerick and the 
last few standing stones ofDublin. 
Also required, a New Leader. Any qualified Nationalist may apply. ISS 
Those serving in service battalions with a more nationalist ethos, equally felt 
little sympathy for the rebels. Lieutenant T. M. Kettle, a former I.P.P., M.P., then 
serving in the 9th. Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, wrote; 
The Sinn Fein nightmare upset me a little, but then if you tickle the ear 
of an elephant with a pop-gun, and he walks on you that is a natural 
concatenation of events. We took the side ofjustice, we did the right thing, 
we helped to bring North and South together. IS6 
IS4The Incinerator, June 1916, p.19. 
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In other units, especially regular ones, there appears to have been little interest 
in the Rising. Father Henry Gill noted that, in the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles; 
"On the whole the event created very little comment." 157 Meanwhile, Private A. R. 
Brennan, serving in the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Regiment remembered; "Although 
we were all mildly interested, nobody took the thing very seriously.,,158 
Finally, some battalions made a point of demonstrating their opposition to the 
Rising, to the Germans. The Sth. Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers captured a 
placard erected by the Germans which read; "Irishmen! Heavy uproar in Ireland, 
english [sic] guns are firing at your wives and children! 1st. May 1916.,,159 S. 
McCance states that the Sth. Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers organised a raid to 
capture this placard and also; "straffed the huns."I60 However, both M. Staunton and 
T. Dooley believe that a patrol simply found these in an abandoned dugout 161 In 
whatever fashion this placard was acquired, it is significant that it was presented to the 
king by Lieutenant Colonel Williamson. 162 
The response ofthe 7th. Battalion, Leinster Regiment was rather different; 
The Germans put up three large placards this morning. One said, 
'IRISHMAN: [sic] GREAT UPROAR IN IRELAND ENGLISH GUNS 
ARE FIRING ON YOUR WIFES [sic] AND CHILDREN.' Another said, 
'KUT CAPTURED 13,000 ENGLISH PRISONERS!' The third and largest 
said, 'IRISHMAN! [sic] IN IRELAND REVOLUTION ENGLISH GUNS 
FIRING ON YOUR WIFES [sic] AND CHILDREN ENGLISH 
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DREADNOUGHT SUNK. ENGLISH Mll..ITARY BILL REFUSED. SIR 
ROGER CASEMENT PERSECUTED. THROW YOUR ARMS AWAY. 
WE WILL GIVE YOU A HEARTY WELCOME.' Aren't they impudent 
devils? We played Rule Britannia and lots of Irish airs on a melodeon in the 
front trench to show them we weren't exactly downhearted. It was a 
company commander who played, and he stuck to it for an hour, although 
they push all sorts of stuff at him. We also stuck up a notice which annoyed 
them so much that they threw rifle grenades at it. 'PLEASE TELL YOUR 
DESERTERS TO COME OVER SINGLY NEXT TIME, AS THE LAST 
SIX WERE TAKEN FOR A PATROL AND UNFORTUNATELY FIRED 
UPON'. which was a fact. 163 
The 9th. Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers adopted a similar policy. They 
hung an effigy of Sir Roger Casement in No Man's Land. 164 
Finally, in assessing discipline in Irish units during this period, something 
should be said regarding comparisons between the various Irish battalions and the 
relationship of discipline in Irish units to that in the B.E.F. as a whole. The first point 
to make, relating to comparisons between Irish units, is that the number of men tried 
by courts martial was generally lower in service, than regular battalions. Secondly, the 
number of men tried in the 36th. (Ulster) Division, was lower than in the 16th. (Irish) 
Division. Thirdly, it should be noted that the transition from training in the United 
Kingdom to active service affected service battalions differently. If we compare table 
4.5 with tables 5.2 and 5.3 this becomes clear. For example, the crime rate in the 6th. 
Battalion, Connaught Rangers rose on active service, while that of the 9th. Battalion, 
Royal Irish Rifles, fell. 
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In chapter three, it was demonstrated, admittedly with the use of a very small 
non-Irish sample, that Irish units had a much larger number of men tried by court 
martial than their counterparts from Great Britain. Table 5.4 (below), if compared 
with tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 demonstrates that this is no longer the case. 
Table 5.4. The number of men tried by courts martial. whiJe serving in sample non 
-Irisb units. October 1915 to September 1916 165 
Unit. ONDJFMAMJJAST 
lIAI.F. 
I/Glouchestershire 
Regt. 
1114th. London Regt. 
Anson Batt. 
lIKO.S.B. 
'I 
I 
10 
I 
10 
! 
II 
II 
I 
0 
0 
I 
II 
I 
I 
1 
0 
I 
.I 
i 
If 
7 
! 
0 
II 
1/ 
I 
1 
0 
~ I 
I 
0 
1 
I 
I 
I 
4 
0 
I 
I, 
! 
I~o 0 2 
I 
10 0 
II 0 
1 
3 11 
.0 0 
Is 3 
• 
1 
0 0 
10 ,0 
11 13 
0 
1 
0 
2 
3 
10 
134 
11 
'2 
I 
11 
2/South Wales Brds. II It 'I II II [I II 13 11 I 1 12 1 i8 Ir I , 
•IIlBorder Regt. II I II 2 39I 1 10 17 16 14 91, 
I 1 I 
6/Cameron Highs. 10 !2 o 12 0 6 3 1 13 11 12 I~ 121 i I I 26fNorthumberland II I 9I 10 .0 !2 13 10 1111 12IFus. 
11 I • 
141R0yal Welsh Fus. 10 !o 10 0 0 10 6 i312 14I 1 1 1r 
6/Gordon Highs. 10 10 10 10 10 1.1 10 it 10 10, I 
i 
I 
0 10 115 
I 
0 11 i3 
A number of Irish regular units, for example, the 2nd. Battalions of the Irish 
Guards and Royal Irish Regiment, compare favourably with their non-Irish 
counterparts, while the crime rate in the 14th. Battalio~ Royal Welsh Fusiliers is 
higher than that offive battalions in the 36th. (Ulster) Division. 
In broader terms, it is interesting to note that the Anson Battalion of the 63rd. 
(Royal Naval) Divisio~ although raised as a wartime expedient and outside the British 
165As with table 5.1, in cases where units spent part of this period in other theatres, 
these months are indicated with a "f'. 
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regimental structure, had a commendable record, during the period May to September 
1916, while serving on the Western Front. 
Another point worthy of note is the great variation between non-Irish, as well 
as Irish units serving in the same formation. The 1st. Battalion, King's Own Scottish 
Borderers, 2nd. battalion, South Wales Borderers, 1st. Battalion, Border Regiment 
and 1st. Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers comprised the 87th. Brigade, 29th. 
Division, yet each battalion had its own, distinctive courts martial profile. Finally, the 
examples of the North Irish Horse, South Irish Horse (Special Reserve units) and 
1114th. London (Scottish) Regiment and 6th. Battalion, Gordon Highlanders, 
(Territorial Force units), suggests that the discipline of units which, pre-war had been 
reserve formations only, was very good. 
An examination of tables, 5.5 and 5.6 (overleaf) demonstrates some interesting 
issues. Firstly, a number of service battalions (for example, the 8th. Battalion, Royal 
Inniskilling Fusiliers, 9th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, 6th. Battalion, Connaught 
Rangers, 14th. Battalion, Royal Welsh Fusiliers and 26th. Battalion, Northumberland 
Fusiliers) have patterns of offences which are very similar to regular units, with 
drunkenness remaining a persistent problem in regular and service battalions. 
Secondly, desertion appears to have been a much more serious problem in the Irish 
units. However, when comparing tables 5.5 and 5.6, what is striking are the 
similarities between the types ofmilitary crime conunitted by Irish and non-Irish units. 
This is also a striking feature in comparing tables 5.7 and 5.8 (overleaf). In 
April and May 1916, some senior officers had expressed concerns about the loyalty of 
Irish units. Private A. R. Brennan noted that the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Regiment 
was kept in reserve for two weeks, in case there was a reaction to events in Dublin. 166 
Meanwhile the 1 st. Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers was withdrawn from the front 
line due to similar concerns,167 and the C.O. of the 1st. Battalion, Irish Guards was 
166A. R. Brennan's diary, p.7, I.W.M., P.262. 
167Letter to the authors from John Murphy, September 1965, cited in G. Dallas and D. 
Gill, The Unknown Army, p.S9. 
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Table 5 5 Offences for which men serving in a sample number of Irish units were 
tried by courts martial. October 1915 to September 1916 
81 91 131 101 141 21 11 
RRRRR RR5th.N. 
61 81 Inns I. I. Inns I. 21 I. Inns Lan I. 
Offences C R RDF F Rifs Rifs F Ri1S RDF Rifs F. cers H. 
War Treason 10 0 10 10 '0 10 0 0 0 
D.O.RA. 10 0 ~ 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 
Offence against an 10 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 
inhabitant 
Mutiny 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cowardice 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Desertion 1 1 1 3 0 1 0 10 11 3 1 0 
Absence 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 
Striking/violent 2 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 10 0 
Insubordination 5 0 1 2 
Disobedience 14 2 I~ 12I Quitting post 0 12 I~ 10 
0 
1 
0 
0 3 
0 9 
0 12 
1 
1 
11 
11 
10 
10 
0 1 
0 0 
0 0 
Drunkeness 
Injuring property 
Loss ofproperty 
Theft 
Indecency 
Resisting escort 
Escaping 
confinement 
II~o 13 10 112 i5 6 12 !43 i18 :13 4 0 
0 0 10 10 10 10 10 
i 
0 o 0 0 
1 
10 0 0 10 10 10 11 o 10 1 
10 0 
1
0 0 10 10 11 10 0I~ 
1 
1 
0 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 010 I~ 
1I ! 1 
10 0 10 10 !O 10 10 10 10 ;0 0 I I 
0 '0 10 10 0 10 10 10 il 1 0 
1 I 117Misc. and multiple 31 17 10 '10 3 6 126 i32 16 9 9 
offences 
1 ! 
1 I 
Misc. civil offenceslO 10 10 10 10 0 0 .0 0 0 0 0 
Self inflicted 
wound 
Fraudulent 
enlistment 
Enlisting after 
discharge with 
disgrace 
False answer 
Neglect 
Fraud 
TOTALS 
10 10 
I1, 
1 
10 
i 
1 
!O 10 10 10 0 10 0 0 0 
i ; i 
10 10 ,0 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 0 0 
10 
1 
10 
10 
10, 
10 
I 
10 
i 
1 
0 
I 
I 
10 
10 
1 
, 
1 
0 
10 
10 
:, 
1 
0 
! 
I 
! 
1 
0 
10 
i 
1 
0 
,I 
! 
10 
10 
, 
1 
0 
10 
10 
, 
1 
I 
1 
0 
I 
i 
j 
! 
io, 
10 
10 
I1 
I 
1 
0 
10 
10 
I 
1 
1 
10 
10 
10 
1 
1 
I 
10 
10 
,0 
10 
10 
10 
157 
10 
124 
10 
I 
130 
I 
10 
I 
131 
10 
, 
18 
iO 
i26 
10 
i8 
[0 
195 
10 
167 
10 
136 
10 
i15 
10 
! 
110 
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Table 56 Offences for which men serving in sample non - Irish units were tried by 
courts martial, October 1215 to September 1210. 
141 
11 II 61 R 61 
11 KO 21 Bord- Cam 26/ W. Gord 
Offences Glou Anson SB SWB er Hi N.F. F. 
War Treason 0 0 0 I~D.O.RA 0 0 0 
Offence against an 0 0 0 0 
inhabitant 
Mutiny 0 0 0 0 
Cowardice 0 0 0 0 
Desertion 5 0 0 0 
Absence 10 I~ 0 0 12StrikinglViolent 1 0 
Insubordination 12 0 10 :0 
12 /0 12 11Disobedience 
10 10Quitting post 0 2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
1 
14 
0 0 10 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
1 0 0 
0 0 :0 
I 
[010 '0 
1011 21 
1211 10 
I 
10 10 10 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
;0
I 
10 
Drunkeness is I 
I 
Injuring property 10 
1 
0Loss ofproperty 
Theft 
1 
0 
Indecenecy 10 
Resisting escort iO1 
Escaping confinement 12 
Misc. and multiple ,13 
10 
1 
0 
I~ 
I 
10 
I 
10 
10 
!12 
14 
10 
'01 
10 
10 
, 
!O 
'0 
14 
11 
10 
I 
1 
0 
I~ 
ijo
! 
10 
I 
14 
i5 
1 
0 
0 
I 
11 
! 
10 
101 
0 
i 
125 
!7 
'0 
10 
11 
10 
I 
'0 
10 
'10 
12 
10 
, 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
I 
i5 
16 
10 
I
:0 
10 
I 
0 
10 
I 
10 
17 
11 
10 
I 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
12 
offences I I 1 ! 1 1 I 
Misc. civil offences 
Self inflicted wound 
Fraudulent enlistment 
Enlisting after 
,0 
10 
0 
10 
io 
10 
10 
10 
10 
'0 
10 
i 
0 
10 
I 
10 
10 
10 
10 
,0 
10 
10 
:0 
I 
10 
: 
'0 
10 
10 
!O 
!O 
10 
10 
10 
10 
I 
10 
10 
10 
10, 
10 
discharge with disgrace I I 
False answer 
Neglect 
Fraud 
TOTALS 
0 
10 
0 
:34 
io 
101 
10 
, 
12, 
:0 
I 
0 
:0 
11 
10 
! 
10 
10 
Is 
:0 
to 
10 
139 
0 
10 
:0 
i2l 
10 
10 
10 
19 
1 
0 
10 
10 
115 
10 
10 
1 
0 
:3 
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168called to the War Office to discuss the implications of the Rising on his men. 
However, these fears do not appear to have resulted in a harsher sentencing policy for 
men serving in Irish units, tried by courts martial. 
Table 5 7 Sentences passed on men serving in sample Irish units, tried by courts 
martial, October 1915 to September ] 916. 
8/ 101 11 
R 91 131 R 141 21 R 5th. 
61 81 Inns Rl Rl Inns Rl 21 Rl Inns Lan-
Sentence CR RDF F. Rifs Rifs F Rifs RDF Rifs F. cers NIH 
Death 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Penal Servitude 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 0 0 
HardLahour 6 1 0 3 0 3 0 7 10 3 4 0 
Imprisonment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 
Detention 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 1 0 0 0 
F.P.l 29 14 15 14 4 15 6 60 30 15 3 7 
F.P.2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 6 0 0 
Discharged with 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ignominyl cashiered 
Reduced/reprimanded 8 6 1 7 3 2 1 7 8 2 2 1 
Stoppages, fines, etc. . 1 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Quashed/not 1 0 3 1 0 1 0 4 2 1 1 0 
confinned 
Suspended sentence 1 0 4 1 1 0 
Not guilty, acquitted, 9 2 7 5 4 1 
etc. 

TOTALS 57 I 24 . 30 
 36 15 10 
1681. Denman, Ireland's Unknown Soldiers, p.143. 
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During the period October 1915 to September 1916 a number of policies were 
used to attempt to maintain morale in the B.E.F .. Traditional 'morale builders' such as 
battalion and divisional sports were organised and the traditional St. Patrick's Day 
'holiday' observed. While chaplains continued to be seen as important in maintaining 
morale and a collection of military and civilian leaders visited Irish units. Other, more 
modem concepts, also made their appearance; divisional concert troops, cinemas, 
baths and comforts funds were all seen as useful in building morale. While, in the 
16th. (Irish) and 36th. (Ulster) Divisions, use was made of political emblems. Finally, 
and most controversially, trench raids were seen as an important morale booster. 
Sporting events remained, probably the most popular ways of maintaining 
morale, with, in turn, soccer remaining the most popular event. In April 1916 the 9th. 
Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers and 10th. Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers played a 
match against each other, apparently as part of a Divisional Cup game. 169 Meanwhile, 
in December 1915, the 14th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, had inter-company and 
officers against sergeants matches, prior to a match with the 11tho Battalion, Royal 
Inniskilling Fusiliers,170 and officers were keen to maintain a supply of footballs for 
men in the 5th. Lancers. 171 
Equestrian events also remained popular. In May 1916, the officers of "D" 
Squadron, 5th. Lancers, organised a steeplechase, which consisted of two races and on 
which a sweepstake was held. 172 Less ambitiously there was a mule race organised in 
the 36th. (Ulster) Division in April 1916. 173 Captain L. B. Brierly, serving as a Staff 
Officer in the 16th. (Irish) Division, noted; ''Being an Irish Division, when out of the 
line we would have Horse Shows, driving and riding events." 174 
I69Captain E. A. Godson Papers, p.4, I.W.M., p.446. 

170The InCinerator, May 1916, p.1l. 

171Letter, Captain J. A. T. Rice to his mother, 21110/15, N.A.M. 7511-80-140. 

172Letter, same to father, 2115/16, N.A.M., 7511-80-204. 

I73E. A. Godson papers, p.4, I.W.M., p.446. 
I74L. B. Brierly, unpublished manuscript entitled, "A Civilian's Military Career", p.4, 
Liddle Collection, University ofLeeds. 
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Table 58 Sentences passed on men serving in sample non-Irish units, tried by courts 
martial, October 1915 to September ]916 
llKOS IlBor 6/Cam 14IRW 6/Gord 
Sentence 11010. Anson B 2/SWB der Highs. 26/N.F F Highs. 
Death 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Penal Servitude 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 
Hard Labour 4 0 1 0 1 1 0 2 0 
Imprisonment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Detention 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Field Punishment 1 21 0 6 1 18 14 3 5 ! 3 
Field Punishment 2 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 
Discharged with 
ignominy/cashiered 
0 
I 
i 
I 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Reduced/reprimandi 
ed 
3 0 2 2 6 2 3 1 0 
Stoppages/fines, 
etc. 
Quashed/not 
confirmed 
Suspended 
sentence 
Not 
guilty/acquitted, 
etc. 
TOTALS 
00 !0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 3 0 1 3 0 
3 0 1 2 2 2 1 1 0 
2 2 0 2 6 2 1 0 0 
I34 8 39 21 9 3 
Chaplains also retained their role in maintaining morale. Father Gill obtained a 
'parlour cinematograph' from Messrs. Butlers ofDublin and showed six different films 
each week to men of the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, until the resumption of 
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open warfare in 1918. 175 Gill also gave a demonstration of 'muscular Christianity', 
when he accompanied his battalion in an attack on a German trench. Following his 
part in this action, Gill was recommended for a Distinguished Service Order. 176 
Father F. M. Browne, appointed Chaplain to the 1st. Battalion, Irish Guards, in 
March 1916 was warmly welcomed by the C.O., who stated; "You are the man we 
have been wishing for since Fr. Gwynn's death we have been wishing for an Irishman 
+ a Jesuit." 177 Browne noted that men of the 1 st. Battalion, Irish Guards voluntarily 
found and cleared out a room in an old barracks and furnished it with salvaged 
furniture, to serve as his chapel. 178 
In the 36th. (Ulster) Division, chaplains and religion in general, were also seen 
as important in maintaining morale. When the 16th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles first 
went on active service, Reverend Gibson, from Lurgan, had been the battalion's 
Presbyterian Chaplain. However, when it was found that most men in the battalion 
were members of the Church of Ireland, he was replaced by a chaplain of that 
denomination. Lieutenant Colonel Leader, finding his new chaplain, "useless" 
re-applied for Gibson's services, even though he was an Anglican himself - which 
brought him into conflict with Major General Nugent. I79 Major W. B. Spender, 
G.S.O.2, 36th. (Ulster) Division, commented on the religious observance of the men, 
noting the surprise of the G.O.C., 4th. Division that so many Ulstermen read their 
bibles while in billets. 180 
Regimental holidays were also useful in maintaining morale, the most 
important for Irish regiments being St. Patrick's Day. Brigadier General Pereria, 
I75H. V. Gill, "As Seen by a Chaplain", pp.57-8, Jesuit Archives, Dublin. 
176Letter, Redmond to H. J. Tennant, 11/4/16 and letter, Tennant to Redmond, 
17/4116, Redmond papers, N.LI., Ms. 15,229 (1). 
I77Letter, Father Browne to his Father Provincial, 15/3116, Jesuit Archives, Dublin. 
178Same to same, 15/4116. 
179S. N. White, The Terrors, p.75. For Nugent's problems in balancing Church of 
Ireland and Presbyterian chaplains in his division see letter from Nugent to his wife, 
7111115, Farren Connell papers, P.RO.N.I., D.38351E/2/6/6. 
18<Manuscript history ofthe V.V.F. and 36th. (Ulster) Division, by W. B. Spender, 
p.29, P.R.O.N.I., D.1295/2I1A-9. 
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G.O.c., 47th. Brigade, did, however, cause some surprise when he solemnly infonned 
the men of the 6th. Battalion, Connaught Rangers; "The holy saint's favourite 
beverage, ... is well known to have been a good glass of pure, sparkling water. 
Moreover we have it credibly reported that he had a great aversion from Government 
rum."181 
Comforts funds were also retained and extended in this period. Major General 
Nugent established his own comforts fund for the 36th. (Ulster) Division which, 
amongst other projects, purchased a cinema unit and established canteens. 182 Nugent 
also used this fund to purchase 'Woodbine' cigarettes for his men, commenting; 
"Woodbines are the only cigarettes the men really care for and naturally, therefore the 
W.[ar] O.[ffice] give them some other kind."183 
Other ideas were also developed in this period to maintain morale. In May 
1916 Major Lord Farnham fonned the 36th. (Ulster) Division's follies, who were, 
improbably named, "The Merry Mauve Melody Makers".184 However, by June, one 
officer felt that their perfonnance was a "fair show only." 185 Major General Nugent 
purchased a cinema outfit, at a cost of £200, out of Divisional funds, for the 36th. 
(Ulster) Division, however, as he mentioned to his wife; "I had to send a committee to 
inspect the first lot of films as the French Comic Films might not always be good for 
these innocent Ulster men.',186 At a more mundane level, a staff officer of the 16th. 
(Irish) Division, noted that the Divisional baths were thoroughly enjoyed by the 
men. 187 
181J. H. M. Staniforth, "Kitchener's Soldier", p.144, I.W.M., 67/41/1. 
182Letter, Lord Dunleath to Nugent, 6/1/16, P.RO.N.!., MIC/571111 and Divisional 
Comforts Funds accounts, P.RO.N.I.. , MIC/571/9. 
183Letter, Nugent to his wife, 1111/15, Farren Connell papers, P.RO.N.!., 
D.3835/E/2/6/5A. 
184Anon, "Service with the 14th. Royal Irish Rifles (Y.C.V.)", p.138, Royal Ulster 
Rifles' Museum. 
185A. A. Godson diaries, p.7, I.W.M., P.446. 
186Letters, Nugent to his wife, 12/11/15 and 7112/15, Farren Connell papers, 
P .RO.N.I., D.3835/E/2/6/1 OA and D.3835/E/2/6/31. 
187Entry for 15/2/16, 16th. (Irish) Division, Adjutant General and Quarter Master 
General's war diary, W09511957. 
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Visits of senior officers and politicians to Irish units were intended to boost 
morale, although the extent to which these achieved their aims are debatable. When 
the then G.O.C. of Thiid Army visited the 16th ..Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, his 
inspection degenerated into high farce. As Major General Nugent related; 
I hear Gen. [eral] Allenby inspected the Pioneer battalion ofmy Division 
unexpectedly the other day while they were at work. He was not expected 
and only the Orderly Officer was there. When he saw AlIenby coming he was 
so frightened that he tried to run away + fell into a barbed wire fence and 
there was so terrified that he could not remember what regiment he belonged 
to. Then AlIenby got into a trench and used such language that the guide 
climbed out of the trench + did run away. Allenby then slipped + sat down 
very hard on the point ofa brick and his language was such that the men took 
refuge in dugouts. Finally he stepped on to the roof of a dug out which was 
unfinished and fell through and ended his inspection by saying, 'So you're the 
kind of men we have got to expect from the New Armies, are you'. As a 
matter of fact they are very intelligent men in my Pioneers and more nearly 
gentlemen, ... than A. [llenby] himself 188 
Civilian visitors appear to have been more welcome. In February 1916 Colonel 
Jamieson-Davis, of the I.N.V.s received a warm reception when he visited the 9th. 
Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers. 189 However, by far the most popular political 
visitor to the Irish regular units was John Redmond, M.P.. Father Henry Gill 
described Redmond's address to the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles in November 
1915, in which the leader ofthe I.P.P. stated that; 
188Letter, Nugent to his wife, 3011 1115, Farren Connell papers, P.R.O.N.I., 
D.38351E/2/6/24A. 
189T. P. Dooley, Irishmen or English Soldiers. p.200. 
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He was glad to meet a regiment which contained men of every creed 
from different places in Ireland, especially the North. They were brothers in 
arms and he was sure their harmony and unity in the great cause in which they 
were fighting was a happy omen of the relationship which would exist 
between all Ireland after the war, etc.. The CO. called for three cheers and 
someone said, 'and an Irish one',... , Seeing that the regiment is in a great 
part from the North of Ireland and containing many Protestants the reception 
ofMr. Redmond was very remarkable. 190 
Redmond's visit to the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers was similarly 
appreciated. 191 Redmond, himself, certainly enjoyed these occasions, thanking Field 
Marshal Sir John French for his kindness, he added; "I feel my visit has done good - at 
any rate to me.,,192 Press reaction was critical of Redmond's tour of the front, a 
cartoon in the Daily Sketch, showed John Redmond firing a gun, saying; "That finishes 
the Germans on the West Front," while The Westminster Gazette showed him,; "After 
Mestrovic's statue of Marko Kraljevic, Champion of the Serbian Race,"193 (i.e., in 
heroic pose, on horseback). 
Political imagery also became seen as important in maintaining morale in the 
16th. (Irish) and 36th. (lllster) Divisions. Major General W. B. Hickie introduced a 
Divisional Parchment award, surmounted by a shamrock, which carried the heading, 
'The Irish Brigade' .194 Orange imagery, in the 36th. (lflster) Division, was used in a 
much more unofficial fashion. There remains controversy over the presence ofOrange 
190fI. V. Gill, "As seen by a Chaplain", p.63, Jesuit Archives, Dublin and C. Falls, The 

History of the First Seven Battalions, The Royal Irish Rifles (Now the Rnyallflster 

Rifles) in the Great War, voLII, Gale and Polden Ltd., Aldershot, 1925, pp.48-9. 

1915. McCance, History ofthe Royal Munster Fusiliers, voLII, p.132. 

192Letter, Redmond to French, 25/11115, French papers, LW.M., PPIMCRlC33/806. 

193Extracts from the Dairy Sketch 3/12115 and The Westminster Gazette, 29/11115, 

Redmond papers, N.LJ., Ms.7541. 

194A photograph of the certificate awarded to Lieutenant Colonel G. A M. Buckley is 

reproduced in T. Denman, Ireland's Unknown Soldiers, p.94. 
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sashes on the 1st. July.195 However, the division enthusiastically celebrated 'Lundy 
Day', the Orange festival in which an effigy of Colonel Robert Lundy, who advocated 
the surrender of Londonderry in 1689, is burnt in effigy.I96 As Second Lieutenant 
Young related; 
the 18th. ofDecember [1915] being lundy [sic] day it was celebrated by 
some Derry men and other Ulster boys, ... , Two Lundys had been prepared 
one large and the other smaIl some of the inhabitants suggested they were 
father + son the father was about 11 feet long stuffed with straw and rockets 
put in unexpected places with large wooded [sic] feet and wire knees head 
filled with gunpowder and surrounded by a large yellow trimmed admirals 
[sic] hat. On his chest was a large placard with 'Lundy the traitor' on it. The 
procession headed by torchlights and the band marched through the village 
playing no surrender, Derry Walls and the Boyne Water. Then Lundy was let 
down on a wire rope from the tree where he had been strung up and set fire 
to amid great cheering + boohing - he was well soaked with petrole [sic] + 
burnt well every now + then they gave him a shake and his knees wobbled in 
a most realistic fashion. bombs [sic] made of jam tins were thrown into a 
pond just beside him, there [sic] burst and of course broke all the windows of 
houses round. The procession then reformed + marched up to the top of the 
village where Lundy junior was burnt with like ceremony. 197 
195For a discussion of this issue see, M. Dungan, Irish Voices from the Great War, 

p.I09. 

196The most concise account ofLundy's role in the siege ofLondonderry is, R. F. 

Foster, Modem Ireland, 1600-1972, Penguin, London, 1988, pp.146-7. 

197The diary of Second Lieutenant G. O. L. Young, pp.67-8, P.R.O.N.I., 

D.3045/6111. For a similar account see, Anon. (A.P.I.S. and D.G.S.), With the Ulster 

Division in France; A Story ofthe lIth Battalion Ro.yal Irish Rifles (South Antrim 

Yolunteers) from Bordon to ThiepvaI, William Mullan & Son, Belfast. N.D., p.34. 
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While this was, clearly, a well attended and popular event, apparently 
organised by N.C.O.s of the 10th. Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, morale in this 
unit must have fallen when the men were told that they would have to pay for the 
windows broken in Gorenf1os.198 
A final mechanism used to raise morale in this period, and the most 
controversial, were trench raids. Trench raids were, of course, not solely designed to 
raise morale, they were, more practically, used to gather intelligence on opposing 
forces and, arguably, to reinforce divisional control over battalions. 199 
In the Irish units a number of units built up reputations as efficient trench 
raiders. Perhaps, as Denman believes, this was as trench raiding fitted in with officers 
pre-conceived views of Irish soldiers as 'shock troops,.2oo Lieutenant Colonel F. P. 
Crozier, built up an unenviable reputation in the 36th. (Ulster) Division, due to his 
advocacy of trench raiding. The then Second Lieutenant Stewart-Moore noted of 
trench raids; 
Their object was supposed to be the maintenance of an offensive spirit 
but so far as I could see they never achieved anything on our part ofthe front. 
Colonel Crozier who commanded the 9th. [Royal Irish] Rifles was 
particularly keen on sending out such patrols all to no purpose except to 
show off. He had the reputation of being a callous and overbearing 
martinet.201 
In the 16th. (Irish) Division, trench raiding was carried out with more 
enthusiasm. The division practised raids while in reserve202 and Brigadier General 
198G. S. Mitchell, Three Cheers for the Den:ys!, p.49. 

199The whole issue oftrench raids is well covered in, T. Ashworth, Trench Warfare 

1914-1918; The Live and Let Liye System, Macmillan, London, 1980, pp.176-203. 

2ooT. Denman, "The Catholic Irish Soldier in the First World War: The 'Racial 

Environment"', Irish Historical Studies, XXVII, 108, 1991, p.356. 

2011. L. Stewart-Moore, "Random Recollections", p.26, I.W.M., p.26. 

202T. Denman, Ireland's Unknown Soldiers, p.72. 
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Pereria was a particularly forceful exponent of this policy.203 Major General Sir N. 
Holmes, who, during the Great War served as a junior staff officer in the 47th. 
Brigade, commented that Pereria; "was a devil to go out with because he was always 
in the front-line and always when there was shelling he would go and have a 100k."204 
However, despite 'dummy runs', raids carried out by the 16th. (Irish) Division 
were often poorly organised,205 and led to heavy losses.206 As Denman concludes; 
Whether the constant raiding did much harm to the Germans is 
debatable. Nearly all the big raids cost the 16th. Division heavy casualties, 
disproportionately high among junior and non-commissioned officers. Far 
from sharpening the fighting edge of the division it seems likely that the 
constant raiding blunted its effectiveness by depriving it of many outstanding 
leaders.207 
Regular battalions were rarely more successful in trench raids than their New 
Army counterparts. One of the more successful raids launched by the 2nd. Battalion, 
Royal Irish Rifles, resulted in the capture of eleven Germans, but also led to the deaths 
of two officers and eleven other ranks, and wounding of a further two officers and 
thirty seven other ranks in the battaiion.20S A raid by the 1 st. Battalion. Royal Dublin 
Fusiliers on the 28/29th. June 1916 led to three deaths, two officers and seven other 
203ibid, p.75. 

204Interview with Major General Sir N. Holmes, Liddle Collection, University of 

Leeds, Tape 430. 

205See, for example a report by Pereria on a raid by the 7th. Battalion, Leinster 

Regiment on the 3/4th. June 1916, 16th. (Irish) Division General Staff, War Diary, 

P.RO., W095/1955. 

206T. Denman, Ireland's Unknown Soldiers, p.72. 

207ibid, p.76. 

20Se. Falls, The History of the First Seven Battalions, The Royal Irish Rifles, voUI, 

p.61. 
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ranks wounded and thirteen other ranks missing. The raiding party did not even reach 
the enemy front line.209 
Indeed, the only occasion on which an Irish unit captured a significant number 
of German troops during this period, apart from during major battles, was when two 
officers and 125 men surrendered to the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, after being 
bombarded with rifle grenades. As Father H. V. Gill remarked; "This success acted 
like a tonic on the men, who seemed to come to life again. ,,210 
To some extent trench raids were necessary operations, to probe defences and 
ascertain the strength of the opposing forces. There seems to be little evidence, 
however, that trench raids did anything to raise morale. Equally, in terms of discipline, 
it is noticeable that units which actively engaged in trench raids, such as the 9th. 
Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, often had poor disciplinary records. This would seem to 
confirm Denman's view that such actions deprived battalions of effective junior 
officers and N.C.O.s, who, in normal circumstances, had a key role in maintaining 
discipline. 
In conclusion, the disciplinary record of Irish units on the Western Front during 
October 1915 to September 1916, demonstrates a great deal of variation. Broadly 
speaking, Irish regular battalions had come to terms with their earlier disciplinary 
problems, the number of men tried by courts martial decreasing drastically in this 
period. It is interesting to note that as losses in units increased, discipline actually 
appears to have improved. 
The arrival of Irish New Army units in France, demonstrated many of the 
failings in training and officering these units, inherent in the rapid expansion of the 
British army in 1914, discussed in chapter 4. Major General Nugent, in particular, felt 
initially, that the 36th. (Ulster) Division was unfit for service. However, the 
replacement of inefficient officers and the executions of three men in the 107th. 
209H. C. Wylly, Neill's 'Blue Caps', voJI, 1914-22, Gale and Polden Ltd., AIdershot, 
1925, p.66. 

210pather H. V. Gill, "As seen by a Chaplain", p.98, Jesuit Archives, Dublin. 
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Brigade, appear to have led to improved discipline in many service battalions, in his 
division. While, as argued above, much of the 36th. (Ulster) Division's success on the 
1 st. July 1916 relied on tactical planning, remarkably few breaches of discipline 
occurred in a raw formation, attacking for the first time. Equally, the 16th. (Irish) 
Division's attack at Ginchy demonstrated that service battalions could remain as 
effective combat units, even after suffering heavy losses. 
Comparisons between Irish and non-Irish units suggest that the number of men 
tried by courts martial in Irish units was, generally, higher than that in their 
counterparts from Great Britain. However, it is worth stressing that each British, as 
well as Irish, or for than matter, Australian. unit, appears to have had its own unique 
courts martial profile. 
The reaction of Irish units to the Easter Rising varied greatly. However an 
assessment of courts martial trials for this period simply confirms what historians have 
long believed. Namely, that no acts of indiscipline occurred in the Irish Regiments as a 
result ofthe Rising. 
Finally, it is apparent that the military authorities, by this stage of the war, were 
supporting a wide range of morale boosting activities, including divisional sports, 
concert troupes and cinemas, which, collectively, appear to have fulfilled their tasks 
well. 
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Chapter 6. 
"Amalgamation. Reduction and Conscription", Irish units on the Western 
Front October 1916 to Febman 1918. 
The period October 1916 to February 1918 is a crucial one for understanding 
the development of discipline and morale in the Irish units of the B.E.F.. The 
aftermath of the Battle of the Somme left both the 16th. (Irish) and 36th. (Ulster) 
Divisions seriously understrength, at the very time that voluntary recruiting in Ireland 
had all but ceased. This resulted in the disbandment and amalgamation of many Irish 
units, a process which meant that, by February 1918, both the 16th. (Irish) and 36th. 
(lister) Divisions were mainly composed of regular Irish battalions. Conscription, of 
course, did not apply to Ireland; however, a number of Irish battalions did receive 
drafts of English conscripts and, in assessing discipline and morale, it is important to 
assess the impact of this change of personnel. Also, Irish units stationed in Ireland 
were moved to Great Britain in late 1917, suggesting that the military authorities were 
suspicious of Sinn Fein infiltration into Irish regiments. 
In broader terms 1917 was very much, a crisis year, for many European armies. 
The Italian army collapsed at Caporetto, the Russian army dissolved in the revolution, 
the French experienced serious mutinies, the Austro-Hungarian army faced growing 
ethnic tensions and, recent research suggests, even the German army faced serious 
disciplinary problems. Out of this picture ofa general crisis of morale. only the B.E.F. 
emerged immune from collapse. 
By October 1916 it was abundantly clear to both senior officers and leading 
politicians that Irish recruiting was at a standstill. 1 In late September 1916 the 
Adjutant General, Sir Neville Macready, stated that the Irish infantry units were 
1 ''Minutes ofthe Proceedings of, and Precis Prepared for, the Army Council for the 
Years 1915 and 1916", P.R.O., W0163/21, pp.23-4. 
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17.194 men below strength. He offered five solutions to this problem, namely. the 
introduction of conscription in Ireland. amalgamating the 16th. (Irish) and 36th. 
(Ulster) Divisions. reinforcing Irish units with English conscripts. allowing the 
divisions to waste away or, transferring Irish units from non Irish to Irish formations. 2 
The Army Council opted for the second of these options. the amalgamation of the 
16th. (Irish) and 36th. (Ulster) Divisions.3 
However. the Army Council realised the political sensitivity of such a move 
and felt that the final decision, regarding the fate ofthe Irish divisions. should be made 
by the War Cabinet.4 David Lloyd George wrote. quite bluntly. to John Redmond~ 
The state ofthe two Irish Divisions in France - the 16th. and 36th. - has 
been giving a good deal of anxiety lately. The 16th. Division in particular is 
now little stronger than one Brigade. and the Ulster Division is hardly up to 
two-thirds of its war establishment .... , I propose to amalgamate the two 
Divisions into one.5 
Both Carson and Redmond, were eager to retain their own "private armies" on 
the Western Front, even when their political prestige had fallen to depths where they 
could no longer provide men for them. This meant that this decision was politically 
unacceptable. After some discussion, Redmond came to the conclusion that the 
amalgamation was unnecessary as~ 
if a Dublin Brigade could be established, we would have little difficulty 
in obtaining the necessary recruits to keep it up to its strength, ... , My idea is, 
2ibid, p.55. 

3N. Perry, "Nationality in the Irish Infantry Regiments in the First World War", War 

and Society. 12, 1, 1994, p.8t. 
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5Letter, David Lloyd George to John Redmond, 29/9/16, Redmond papers, N.L.I., 
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that the two Dublin battalions, I think the 7th. and the 8th. [actually the 8th. 
and 9th.], that are in the 16th. Division already should have associated with 
them the 10th. Dublins, which was sent to the Naval Division, and also the 
2nd. Dublins. In this way, a Dublin Brigade could be created. I am sure that 
this creation would arouse a great deal of interest and satisfaction in Dublin 
City.6 
Meanwhile, Carson favoured amalgamation, but proposed that the 36th. 
(Ulster) Division should merge with the 51st. (Highland) Division, rather than the 
16th. (Irish) Division.7 Significantly, Major General Oliver Nugent, himself an {TIster 
Unionist, felt that; 
If however the question of amalgamation becomes imperative, I hope 
the 16th. and 36th. will be amalgamated so that there may be at least one Irish 
Division. 
I am sure that this will be the view of Officers and men of both 
Divisions and I have written to Carson to teU him so.8 
Of course, the Army Council's decision had not been an inspired one. The 
amalgamation of the 16th. (Irish) and 36th. (Ulster) Divisions would have simply 
created a formation which, after another two to three months service, would again 
have proved unviable. However, political interference did nothing to provide a 
solution. The rather bizarre compromise reached was that men recruited in Ireland 
would be sent to Irish regular battalions, while English drafts would be used to 
6Letter, John Redmond to General Sir Neville Macready, 31110116, Redmond papers, 

N .L.I., Ms. 15,205/2. 

7Letter, Major General Sir Oliver Nugent to [Macready ?], 6110116, Farren Connell 

papers, P.R.O.N.I., D.1s071A119116. 

8'b'd
.
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maintain Irish service battalions.9 This, in itself, threatened both the regimental system 
and the national identity of Irish units, both of which Nicholas Perry believes were 
important in maintaining Irish troop morale in 1917 and 1918.10 
The political compromises over the reinforcement of the Irish units also caused 
some difficulties for the Adjutant General's office. Army Council Order 1246 of 1916 
meant that any man, conscripted in Great Britain, who was of "Irish nationality" was, 
if he expressed the desire to join an Irish regiment, to be sent to the depot of the 
regiment he requested. 11 This imprecise phraseology meant that this system was open 
to abuse. Redmond took up the case of a Private, J. Barret, conscripted into the 3rd. 
Battalion, East Lancashire Regiment, who stated that his request to join an Irish unit 
had been ignored. After making enquiries, the Adjutant General stated; 
Steps have been taken to transfer him to an Irish unit. It looks to me 
like one of those cases in which a man does not take advantage of the 
privileges at his disposal and gives us all a great deal of trouble through his 
own carelessness and neglect. 
If this turns out to be the case, I hope you will vent your displeasure on 
him. 12 
Conceivably, almost every man conscripted in Great Britain, with a vaguely 
Irish sounding name, or Irish relations, could have requested a transfer to an Irish unit 
under this regulation. This would seriously have disrupted the dispatch of 
replacements to France. 
~. Perry, '"Nationality in the Irish Infantry Regiments", pp.82-3, letter Macready to 
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The impact ofabsorbing English drafts and conscripts, on discipline and morale 
in the Irish regiments, appears to have varied considerably. In October 1917. the 1 st. 
Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, rather incredulously, received a large draft from, 
of all units, the Army Pay Corps, who had only been afforded rudimentary training~ 
"but they were not as bad as all that, for they looked pretty good physically and, when, 
after Paschendale [sic. 1. we were able to knock them into shape, they became really 
good fighting men." 13 Indeed. this draft was found to be much more intelligent and 
thus, quicker to learn, than the average soldier and, significantly, it was discovered that 
these men had all voluntarily enlisted in 1914.14 
Conscripts generally appear to have received a less enthusiastic welcome. Like 
most English officers, those serving in Irish battalions mainly viewed conscripts with 
suspicion. 15 For example, Sir Barclay Nihill, emphasising the volunteer nature of his 
old battalion, stated~ 
My Division was the 16th, Irish and my regiment the 1 st. Battalion The 
Royal Munster Fusiliers, recruited largely from the counties of Cork and 
Kerry. We were a professional unit of the pre-war regular army, ... , although 
by March 1918 most of the officers and men were in for the duration of the 
war only. Except for a handful of Tyneside Irish who joined us early in 1918, 
there was not a conscript among us. 16 
13J. E. Nelson, "Irish Soldiers in the Great War, Some Personal Experiences", The. 
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Conscripts, or even suspected conscripts received poor treatment when joining 
Irish units. A draft of English conscripts to the 14th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles 
appears to have been dubbed the "Gawd blimy brigade".17 Edward Bowyer-Green, 
drafted into the 15th. Batta1ion, Royal Irish Rifles, from the 25th. Batta1ion, London 
Regiment, received an even less effusive welcome. As he noted; "We were the pariahs 
you see, although we were helping their battalion we weren't one of them, they made 
out we were conscripts but we weren't, we were volunteers, territorials.,,18 
Other Irish soldiers felt that the policy of drafting Englishmen to Irish 
battalions had all but destroyed the regimental system. When Captain W. T. Colyer 
rejoined the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, from a school of instruction, in 
April 1917, he noted; 
when I got there, what a change! In the first flush of disappointment I 
felt as if I might just as well have been sent to the 8th. Battalion, not to 
mention the 18th. Manchesters or the 118th. Cheshires! There was a new 
C.O., Colonel Jeffiies, also a new Adjutant, Captain Mallory-Scott, and 
two-thirds of the other officers I had never met before. As for the 
rank-and-file, not only did nearly all their faces seem to be new, but about half 
of them made no pretence of having come from Ireland at all. Two large 
drafts of Londoners had been sent to the battalion; and, Londoner as I was 
myself, I resented their intrusion as keenly as if I had been born and bred on 
the banks of the Liffey.19 
17Anon., "Service with the 14th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, (Y.C.V.), 1914-18 
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Nevertheless, some Irish officers did have a more positive view of English 
drafts. Lieutenant Colonel G. A. M. Buckley, C.O. of the 7th. Battalion, Leinster 
Regiment, was even complimentary about conscripts~ 
I got a draft of 109 from the Shropshire L.[ight] Inf[antry] during the 
show. [Third Battle of Ypres]. They were conscripts - mere boys of 19 ­
never seen a shot fired. I hated taking them straight into a fiery furnace like 
we've been through but I had no alternative. They behaved splendidly our 
fellows were very pleased with them but after the way of new drafts they 
were unfortunate and suffered heavily. 20 
Equally, the ever pragmatic Nugent stated in September 1916~ 'We can't get 
Irishmen so we must have others and personally I don't care tuppence who they are as 
long as they make us up.,,21 Nugent must have been reflecting the views of many 
officers, that it was better to hold a trench with a company, nearing full establishment, 
than with one which, ifmore ethnically pure, was not an effective fighting unit. 
Ironically, the use of English drafts to maintain Irish battalions proved to be 
unviable. By February 1917 the Army Council believed that the strength ofthe B.E.F. 
could not be maintained at its current level. 22 In this situation amalgamations and the 
disbandment of some Irish battalions to provide drafts for others became increasingly 
necessary. Indeed, as early as May 1916 the 9th. Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers 
had been disbanded and its men sent to the other three battalions of the regiments 
serving on the Western Front.23 
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While the issue of the reduction of Irish battalions in the October 1916 to 
February 1918 period has already been well researched by Nicholas Perry,24 it is vital 
to examine these reductions with regard to discipline and morale. 
Of course Irish service battalions were not the only elements of the B.E.F. to 
face amalgamation in this period. January 1918 saw the introduction of the nine 
battalion infantry division, which cut the infantry strength of all British divisions by 
almost one quarter.25 However, in the B.E.F. as a whole, these disbandments were 
carried out in a logical fashion. As Ian Beckett notes~ ''in 1916 and in 1918 second 
line territorials in particular took the brunt of the reductions consequent upon the 
reorganisation ofthe expeditionary force.,,26 
At the regimental level, this meant that, for example, the 1I8th. Battalion, West 
Yorkshire Regiment, the most junior territorial battalion of the regiment serving on the 
Western Front was disbanded in early 1918, most of its personnel were drafted to the 
1I6th. Battalion of the regiment. Likewise, when the 2l7th. Battalion, West Yorkshire 
Regiment was disbanded in June 1918, men serving in it were given the option of 
transferring to the 117th. Battalion.27 
By contrast, many of the disbandments and amalgamations of Irish service 
battalions appear totally illogical. In the Royal Irish Rifles, for example, the most 
senior service battalion in France, the 7th. was disbanded in November 1917, while the 
most junior battalion of the regiment on active service, the 16th. survived until the end 
of the war. There are similar anomalies in other Irish regiments, for example, the 10th. 
Irish regiments, 1916-18. 
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Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, disbanded in February 1918, outlived the 8th. and 
9th. Battalions of the regiment, amalgamated in November 1917. 
Of course, some very localised political and regional concerns influenced the 
choice ofunits to be disbanded. Major General Oliver Nugent, explaining the rationale 
for reductions in the 36th. (Ulster) Division in February 1918, stated; 
The Division now consists of 5 Regular North Irish battalions and of 5 
battalions of the original Division. 
As General Officer Commanding the Division, I had the most 
unpleasant duty of selecting 2 battalions of Inniskilling Fusiliers and 4 
battalions ofRoyal Irish Rifles for disbandment. 
I decided that the battalions to remain in the Division should be those 
which were composed of the men who first came forward to form the tnster 
Division. 
I therefore selected the senior of the three battalions of Inniskilling 
Fusiliers to remain. 
In the case of the Royal Irish Rifles, I selected the senior battalion to 
remain. This was the 15th. Battalion, a Belfast Battalion, originally raised as 
the 7th. Battalion. 
The next senior of the original battalions of the tnster Division would 
have been the 10th. Royal Irish Rifles. 
This was also a Belfast Battalion and I decided that it would be unfair 
to the Counties of Down and Antrim that they should have no representation 
amongst the original units of the Division. I therefore selected the 12th. 
Royal Irish Rifles as the other battalion to remain. 
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The remaining third battalion of Royal Irish Rifles is the 16th. Royal 
Irish Rifles, the Pioneer Battalion, which was not affected by the 
reorganisation of the Division.28 
This explanation, to the Lord Mayor of Belfast, does shed some light on the 
decisions taken on disbanding specific units. However, Nugent, doubtlessly aware that 
this letter would be publicly circulated,29 did not reveal all of the considerations 
behind his decision. While Nugent had informed Belfast's leading citizen that he 
regretted that the 14th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, a Belfast raised unit, which 
Johnston had been eager to save, had been disbanded,30 the truth was rather different. 
In December 1917, Nugent, writing confidentially to the Adjutant General, stated; 
The 14th. Royal Irish Rifles now in the 109th. Brigade, to be broken up 
and used to make up casualties in the Royal Irish Rifles battalions in the 
Division. 
This battalion should in my opinion be broken up in any case. 
About a year ago, I reported them as totally wanting in military spirit 
and asked for a C.O. and a large draft of Englishmen to try and create a 
fighting spirit in them. You gave me both, and while Cheape was in 
command they certainly improved, but since he left they have been tired and 
found wanting. It is significant that their present C.O. told me two days ago 
that most of the English draft sent to them a year ago have become casualties. 
The Brigadier says he cannot trust them and I know that he is right. 
28Letter, Nugent to James Johnston, Lord Mayor ofBelfast, 28/2/18, Farren Connell 
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They are poor stuff, either as workers or fighters and have been a 
constant source of anxiety during the past three weeks.31 
Nugent's comments in this letter suggest that, in addition to local interests, 
disciplinary records and combat effectiveness also determined a battalion's fate. 
Nicholas Perry, mentioning the circumstances behind the disbandment of the 14th. 
Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, noted that its number of English drafts was not 
disproportionate to that in other battalions in the 36th. (Ulster) Division and that 
Nugent had written this letter in a fit oftemper.32 The disciplinary record of the 14th. 
Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles (see graph 6.3) appears to be a very good one, and this, to 
some extent, bears out Perry's views. 
However, there is strong evidence to suggest that both discipline and combat 
effectiveness were considerably worse than these statistics suggest. At Langemarck in 
August 1917 the 14th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles appear to have retreated 
precipitately, when facing German machine gun fire. 33 Equally, as examined in the 
previous chapter, this battalion had suffered from a number of problems, mainly 
inefficient officers, during the December 1915 to September 1916 period and there is 
little to suggest that there was any marked improvement during most of late 1916 and 
1917. Indeed, J. MacRoberts noted that, following the Somme, tensions between 
officers and other ranks increased in the battalion, as veterans did not enjoy being 
commanded~ ''by those new officers whose experience ofwarfare had been obtained at 
Newcastle in Ireland.,,34 
31Letter, Nugent to the Adjutant General, 11112/17, Farren Connell papers, 
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On the broader question of disbandments in the 36th. (Ulster) Division, it 
would appear to be no coincidence that the 8/9th. and 10th. Battalions, Royal Irish 
Rifles, which were both disbanded in February 1918 had the worst courts martial 
records of the service battalions then serving in 107th. Brigade, (see graph 6.1). It is 
also interesting to note that the amalgamations policy, adopted in late 1917, provided 
very mixed disciplinary results. The number of courts martial in the 8/9th. Battalion, 
Royal Irish Rifles soared from the amalgamation of August 1917, until November 
1917 (see graph 6.1), while, by contrast, the 11113th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles had 
no courts martial cases from the amalgamation until disbandment, (graph 6.2). It is 
also worth noting that the incorporation of300 men, compulsorily transferred from the 
North Irish Horse to the 9th. Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers in September 1917,35 
appears to have actually improved that battalion's already exemplary disciplinary 
record. 
Graph 6 1 Men tried by courts martial while serving in the 107th. Brigade, 36th. 
(Ulster) Division October 1916 to February 1918. 
-- 81RIRifs. -- 91RIRifs. -.. 8/9/RIRifs . 
.. ..- 101RIRifs. -- 15IRIRifs.+- llRIrF. 
35C. Falls, The History ofthe 36th (Ulster) Division, p.132. 
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Graph 62 Men tried by courts martial while serving in the 108tb Brigade. 36th 
(Ulster) Division. October 1916 to February] 918. 
-+-- lllRIRifs. -.- 121RIRifs. -.- l3lRIRifs. 
-.- 1l/131RIRifs. -.- 91RIrF. 
Graph 63 Men tried by courts martial while serving in the lO9th. Brigade, 36th. 
anster) Division. (including men of the pioneer battalion, 16th Battalion. Royal Irish 
Rifles) October 1916 to February 1918 
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In tenns of the 16th. (Irish) Division, we can be less sure about the reasons for 
the disbandments of some units. Indeed, some of the measures taken to reinforce this 
division appear incredibly bizarre. For example, when the decision was taken to utilise 
the South Irish Horse as infantrymen, instead ofbeing incorporated into existing units, 
they were formed into the 7th. (South Irish Horse) Battalion, Royal Irish Regiment. 
This unit survived until the end of the war, while the, technically, more senior 6th. 
Battalion was disbanded in February 1918. 
Unlike in the case of the 36th. (Ulster) Division, disbandments in the 16th. 
(Irish) Division appear to have taken little account of local sensibilities. Of the four 
provinces of Ireland, only two were represented by service battalions in the 16th. 
(Irish) Division by the end of February 1918. It is perhaps a comment on the 
perceived decline of the I.P.P. that this state of affairs had been reached and that, 
despite John Redmond's proposal to form a Dublin Brigade, no Royal Dublin 
Fusiliers' service battalion, serving in the 16th. (Irish) Division, survived beyond 
February 1918. The latter is even more surprising, given that Dublin was one of the 
very few areas in Ireland which had provided anything resembling a satisfactory 
number ofrecruits. 
In terms ofdiscipline, it would appear that the 7th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles 
and the 9th. Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, were both disbanded due, at least partly, 
to disciplinary problems. In March 1917 Major General W. B. Hickie noted that the 
7th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles had been unable to retaliate effectively against a 
German trench raiding party, although he did add that on the 8th. March 1917 the 
battalion had a trench strength of just 22 officers and 318 other ranks. 36 It is 
noticeable (from graph 6.4), that the 7th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles had the highest 
number of courts martial in the 47th. Brigade in May, June and July 1917 and, indeed, 
36Report by Hickie to IV Corps relating to enemy raids, 16th. Divisional Front, 8/9 
March 1917, dated 10/3/17, war diary of 16th. Divisional general Staff, P.R.O., 
W09511955. 
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one of the worst disciplinary records of any service battalion in the 16th. (Irish) 
Division (see graphs 6.5 and 6.6 overleaf). 
Meanwhile, Captain O. L. Beater noted, in November 1916; ''the [7th. 
Battalion] Royal Irish Rifles, from whom we are taking over had left the dugout, and 
in fact everything else in a rotten state. They have not got a very good reputation for 
keeping trenches in good repair, in fact I consider them a dashed lazy 10t.,,37 In 
January 1917 Beater, when relieving the 7th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles in the 
trenches, found one of their Majors; "gloriously drunk, quite incoherent, and almost 
incapable ofmovement.,,38 
There may also have been a more obvious political influence on discipline 
which led to the disbandment of the 7th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles. Major Denys 
Reitz, who was posted to the battalion in August 1917, stated; 
I do not know whether it was one more ramification of Irish politics, 
but Colonel Francis was transferred to the command of a brigade, and the 
7th. [Royal] Irish Rifles were broken up. I heard it said that there were too 
many Sinn Feiners among us. The men certainly talked a lot of politics, and 
even my mend Freeney [Reitz's batman] waxed hot on occasion, but, coming 
as I did from a country [South A£Hca] where everyone talks politics, I paid 
little attention to their frequent wranglings. Whatever the cause, we were 
disbanded.39 
37Entry for 26/11116, Captain O. L. Beater's diaries, I.W.M., 86/65/1. 
38Entry for 20/1117, ibid. 
390. Reitz, Trekking On, Faber and Faber Ltd., London, 1933, pp.184-5. 
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Graph 64 Men tried by courts martial while serving in the 47th Brigade, 16th 
(Irish) Division, (including the divisional pioneer battalion. 11th Battalion. Hampshire 
Regiment), October 1916 to February 1918 
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Graph 6.5 Men tried by courts martial while serving in the 48th Brigade, 16th 
(Irish) Division. October 1916 to February ) 918. 
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Graph 6 6. Men tried by courts martial while serving in the 49th Brigade. 16th. 
(Irish) Division, October 1916 to February 1918. 
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Graph 6.4, demonstrates that the 7th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles had a 
relatively small number of courts martial in August to November 1917. However, this 
is somewhat misleading; while during this period only eight men of the battalion were 
tried by courts martial, five were tried for desertion, four of whom were found 
guilty.40 
In addition to this, the fate of the 7th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles itself does 
something to bear out Reitz's comments. When the unit was disbanded, its men were 
drafted to battalions of the Royal Irish Rifles, serving in the 36th. (Ulster) Division, 
which would probably have been viewed as more loyal than the 16th. (Irish) Division, 
with regard to possible Sinn Fein infiltration. 
There is also some evidence to suggest that the 9th. Battalion, Royal Dublin 
Fusiliers faced amalgamation due to disciplinary problems. Captain O. L. Beater noted 
40For further details please see appendix 6. 
353 

a catalogue of failings of the officers in his battalion. One of his main complaints was 
about officers and N.C.O.s in the 9th. Battalion. In November 1916 he noted; 
We have a terrible pair ofjunior subs in this company, to wit Howe and 
Brown, who are forever speculating on their chances of being done in by a 
Trench Mortar, asphyxiated by gas shells, or done to death while on their way 
home to their dugout, by some brutal sniper. They are invariably late for 
breakfast, and incidentally for parade. They are nearly always bemoaning 
their fate, and bewailing the fact ofever having joined the army.41 
Later in November, Beater suggested that Captain Long of "A" Company had 
"lost his nerve" and faked illness to be sent home.42 He was even more condemnatory 
of Captain Green, who, in January 1917 was recovering at a rest camp following a 
breakdown, stating; "Green is a most accomplished lead-swinger and manages to work 
these little stunts to perfection.,,43 The situation had further deteriorated by February 
1917, when Beater noted; "Captain Shine who is acting C.O. during the temporary 
absence of Colonel Thackerary is laid up in bed: unkind people say it is the over 
indulgence in John Jameson [whiskey] which has laid him low.,>44 
In terms ofN.C.O.s the 9th. Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers also had serious 
problems. In March 1917 their R.S.M. was reduced to corporal and transferred to the 
8th. Battalion, for drunkenness.45 Likewise, in September 1917, Acting R.S.M. 
McCullagh was reduced to sergeant for being absent and breaking out of camp.46 
41Captain O. L. Beater diary, lW.M., 86/6511, entry for 4111116. 

42ibid, 14/11116. 

43ibid, 19/1117. 

44ibid, 9/2/17. 

45ibid,9/2/17. I have found no mention ofthis case in the courts martial registers. 

However, under certain circumstances a C.O. could reduce an N.C.O. without 

reference to a court martial, War Office, Manual ofMilitary Law, H.M.S.O., London, 

1914, pp.32-3. 

468ee appendix 6 for further details. 
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Also, in September 1917, Hon. Lieutenant and Quartennaster 1. Merry was found 
guilty of an offence under section 40 of the Army Act and received a reprimand and 
forfeiture of seniority.47 The fact that two key members of the battalion were 
convicted by courts martial in Iuly 1917, suggests that it is no coincidence that this 
battalion was disbanded in October 1917, while the more junior 10th. Battalion, Royal 
Dublin Fusiliers was not disbanded until February 1918. 
However, disciplinary records were by no means solely responsible for 
deciding which units should be amalgamated or disbanded. The 6th. Battalion, 
Connaught Rangers, for example, had a relatively poor disciplinary record over this 
period (see graph 6.4), yet survived until August 1918. This is particularly surprising 
when we consider that the battalion experienced two mutinies, of a sort, during this 
period and that there was a serious personality clash between the C. O. and second in 
command. 
The two mutinies in this unit are really of a very minor nature. Captain C. A. 
Brett recalled that, at some point in the Winter of 1916/17 there; "was a near mutiny in 
the Battalion when one day we had served up to us boiled chestnuts instead of 
potatoes, which naturally evoked so much furious protest from an Irish Regiment that 
the powers that be never again (in my experience) tried it on.,>48 The second mutiny 
occurred in November 1916 and was, in essence an officers' protest. When Lieutenant 
Colonel Rowland Feilding ordered the arrest of Captain Lambert, on a charge of 
drunkenness, most of the other officers in the battalion joined Lambert in his room and 
removed their Sam Browne belts (the removal ofthis article ofequipment denoted that 
an officer was under open arrest).49 
What exactly this officers' mutiny was about is unclear. In September 1916 
Feilding50 had taken over command of the 6th. Battalion, Connaught Rangers 
47ibid. 

48C. A. Brett, "Recollections", p.15, N.A.M., 7608-40. 

49Interview with Colonel F. W. S. Iourdain, lW.M., Sound Archives, 11214/4. 

5~le there are no adverse comments about Feilding in his personal file, his wartime 

career was highly unusual. Originally an officer in the Lancashire Fusiliers, Feilding 
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following the death ofits popular C.O., Lieutenant Colonel John Lenox-Conyngham at 
the Battle of Guillemont. As a Coldstream Guards officer, FeUding was something of 
an outsider, which made it doubly difficult for him to replace Lenox-Conyngham. 
FeUding, receiving a promoted sergeant of the Coldstream Guards as a 
second-lieutenant shortly after the Battle of Ginchy, appointed him Adjutant and set 
him to teaching the officers of the battalion how to salute properly. 51 This latter 
measure would appear to account for the protest. 
This situation was exacerbated in March 1917 when Major H. F. N. Jourdain, 
who had actually been the C.O. of the 5th. Battalion, Connaught Rangers and 
commanded, temporarily, a brigade of the 10th. (Irish) Division, became acting C.O. 
of the 6th. Battalion, Connaught Rangers while FeUding was on leave. Jourdain was 
far from pleased with his new command, following an inspection on the 13th. March 
he noted; 
The men were very young indeed, and were disgracefully dressed and 
equipped, their clothes were worn out and dirty beyond words, and their 
bearing was good, but they were too inexperienced. The officers were good 
as far as I could see but the Battalion was not at all fit for service in an 
offensive. I was much depressed by the knocked about appearance of all 
ranks. What a change from my 5th. Battalion at Salonika! 
The shirts worn by the men were almost black, and their caps and 
putties were long worn out. 
transferred to the City ofLondon Rough Riders with the rank ofTemporary Major on 

the 29/11/13. However, on the 30/3/15, following personal intervention by the O.C., 

Coldstream Guards, he transferred to that regiment. His subsequent transfer to the 

Connaught Rangers and Post Office Rifles does seem strange given the efforts 

involved to secure his services for the Coldstream Guards. (All details from, P.RO., 

W0339/48941 ). 

51Interview with Colonel F. W. S. Jourdain, I.W.M., Sound Archives, 11214/4. 
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I saw nearly all the men, but was not struck with the demeanour of the 
N.C.O.s and men.52 
Three days later, Jourdain applied for some cavalry recruits; ''to stiffen up the 
Batt.[allion]",53 and, by the 22nd. March 1917 he stated that Major General Rickie 
believed that there had been; "a tremendous improvement in the Battalion ... 54 
There does appear to be some truth in Jourdain's comments; however, we 
should be aware that Jourdain was trying to replace Feilding as the C.O. of the 6th. 
Battalion, Connaught Rangers and was, possibly, painting a rather too negative picture 
of the discipline in the battalion. Jourdain noted that Feilding's return from leave saw 
the return of; ''the unsatisfactory state of affairs ... 55 
When Feilding was C. O. and Jourdain his second in command, the situation 
became unbearable. Jourdain appears to have turned most of the officers against 
Feilding, while Feilding mobilised the N.C.O.s against Jourdain.56 By the 23rd. April 
1917 Jourdain had applied to transfer and was given a staff post in the 47th. 
Brigade.57 
The rights and wrongs of this dispute are difficult to assess. Jourdain, an 
officer in the Connaught Rangers of twenty four years standing, had some justification 
in thinking that he should replace a Coldstream Guards officer as C.O. of the battalion. 
Equally, Jourdain appears to have uncovered some irregularities in the battalion 
accounts. 58 
Feilding, whose selection of a commissioned Coldstream Guards sergeant as 
adjutant, was tactless, nevertheless appears to have become a popular C. 0.. Captain 
C. A. Brett noted; "Colonel Feilding - Snowball he was known by the men (he was 
52Entry for 13/3117, diaries ofColonel H. F. N. Jourdain, N.A.M. 5603-12-1. 

53Entry for 16/3117, ibid. 

54Entry for 22/3/17, ibid. 

55Entry for 21/4/17, ibid. 

56Entry for 22/4/17, ibid. 

57Entries for 23/4117 and 24/4/17, ibid. 

58Entry for 23/4117, ibid. 
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about 40 but his hair was quite white) was always at hand in any difficult or dangerous 
situation."59 Even the then Second Lieutenant F. W. S. Jourdain (Colonel H. F. N. 
Jourdain's nephew) seems to have approved of Feilding, although he did, waspishly, 
suggest that Feilding had been sent to the 6th. Battalion, Connaught Rangers simply 
because he was a Roman Catholic.6O 
Jourdain, presumably was not seen as a particularly effective C.O .. In August 
1914 he was a Major and, in a war in which promotion was unusually fast, he had only 
reached the rank of Lieutenant Colonel by November 1918. Also, Captain C. A. 
Brett, who served in the 3rd. Battalion, Connaught Rangers in 1917, stated; "Our 
Colonel was then Colonel Jourdain, a Regular, who had been second in command of 
the 6th. Battalion in France while I was there. I knew him well and we got on well 
together, he was a good and just man but not a great Commanding Officer:>61 
Nevertheless, the Jourdain/Feilding rivalry appears to have had a serious impact on the 
6th. Battalion, Connaught Rangers and therefore, it is difficult to explain why this 
battalion survived the February 1918 disbandments, while the, apparently more 
deserving, at least in terms of discipline, 7th. Battalion, Leinster Regiment was broken 
up. 
Amalgamations of service battalions appear to have had very little impact on 
morale in the units concerned. Second Lieutenant T. H. Witherow showed no 
resentment at the creation of the 8/9th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles,62 while Captain 
E. A. Godson's only complaint regarding the transfer of men of the North Irish Horse 
into the 9th. Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers was that, with eleven new officers, some 
of them senior captains, joining the battalion, his chances of becoming adjutant were 
very small.63 Perhaps many officers and men shared the sentiments of the historian of 
the Leinster Regiment, who noted; 
59C. A. Brett, ''Recollections'', p.24, N.A.M., 7608-40. 

60Interview with Colonel F. W. S. Jourdain, I.W.M., Sound Archives, 11214/3. 

61Captain C. A. Brett, unpublished ''Recollections'', I.W.M., 7608-40, p.36. 

62T. H. Witherow, ''Personal Recollections ofthe Great War", p.21. 

63E. A. Godson, unpublished diaries, I.W.M., P.446, p.lO. 
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The failure of recruiting in Ireland had rendered it impossible to 
maintain all the Irish battalions at full strength, and very wisely the authorities 
decided so far as possible to amalgamate existing Irish formations instead of 
endeavouring to keep them all alive by watering them down with alien 
stock, ... , This system of allowing the Regular Irish battalions to absorb their 
Service ones had the outstanding merit that nationality and regimental esprit 
de corps were preserved. 64 
This is. perhaps. to over state the case. While amalgamations seem, largely. to 
have been viewed as necessary measures, the actual disbandment of units was 
unpopular. Writing about the 7th. Battalion, Leinster Regiment, J. H. M. Staniforth 
commented~ "The old Battalion was simply disbanded - not amalgamated at all: a big 
proportion of officers and men was absorbed into the regular B[attalio]n., the 
remainder went to form, of all things - a new Entrenching Battalion. (I was offered 
the post of senior captain in this - but not for this kid. thank you).'>65 Second 
Lieutenant Witherow, who had little difficulty in accepting the amalgamation of the 
8th. and 9th. Battalions, of the Royal Irish Rifles. was mortified at the disbandment of 
the battalion; 
That day the 6th. February [1918] I will always remember as one of the 
most depressing that I have ever come through. We had received orders to 
join the 2nd. Battalion Royal Irish Rifles which had some time previous come 
into our Division, .... We were such a happy crowd that it is difficult to realise 
the feeling of depression that settled down on everybody at the prospect of 
64F. E. Whitton, The History of the prince ofWales Leinster Regiment (Royal 

Canadians), vol II, The Great War and the Disbandment of the Regiment. Gale and 

Polden Ltd., London. no date, p.442. 

65Letter from Staniforth to his parents, 28/2/18, I.W.M., 67/4113. 
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parting, ...• We were looked upon as strangers by most of the officers who 
were not originally Ulster Division officers at all and who were not inclined to 
look at things from the Ulster point of view. They were most careful to 
distribute us all over the battalion so that we could not collect together in a 
clan. Although I was senior to several company commanders and therefore 
ought to have got a company things were so arranged that I should only be a 
platoon commander. Only officers from Sandhurst were fit to command 
companies in a regular battalion. 66 
In an attempt to retain the "Irishness" of the 16th. (Irish) and 36th. (Ulster) 
Divisions, most regular Irish battalions serving on the Western Front were drafted into 
them. This would appear to have adversely affected morale in most of the units 
concerned. When the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles was transferred to the 36th. 
(Ulster) Division, Second Lieutenant John Lucy, with the support ofmost of the other 
officers of this unit. issued men of the battalion with green flags so that they could 
show their disgust at being sent to this; "poisonously loyal" formation.67 Father 
Henry Gill, the chaplain of the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles noted; 
We were to be transferred to the 36th. (Ulster) Division. This news 
came as a surprise and disagreeable shock to almost everyone in the 25th. 
Division where we had a well established place in the esteem and good will of 
all. We were the only Irish battalion in the Division, and had an excellent 
reputation and were on good terms with our English neighbours. The 
prospect of a change into a political division was not pleasant, nor did the 
66T. H. Witherow, ''Personal Recollections of the Great War", pp.34-5, Liddle 

Collection, University ofLeeds. 

67J. F. Lucy, There's a Devil in the Drum, Faber and Faber Ltd., London, 1938, 

pp.378-9. 
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outlook appear very bright. Everything possible was done to have the 
decision changed, but without success.68 
In a similar vein, Captain A. 1. Trousdell, writing of the transfer of the 1st. 
Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers to the 36th. (Ulster) Division, stated; ''The 87th. has 
been ordered off to join the illster men and they are all mud sick about it. ,>69 In only 
one case does there appear to have been any enthusiasm over the transfer of a regular 
battalion to one of the Irish New Anny divisions. Major Guy Nightingale of the 2nd. 
Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers, wrote in January 1918; ''we are off again + this 
time we are going to join the 16th. Div.[ision], ... , The men are awfully pleased + in 
many ways I think it will be a good thing, though we have now been 6 years into the 
lst. Division, ... , It will be the first time the lst. + 2nd. B[attalio]ns. have been 
together since S.[outh] Africa."70 However, it is significant that Nightingale favoured 
the transfer as it would reunite the two regular battalions of his regiment, rather than 
as a move to the 16th. (Irish) Division, per se. 
The proposal to amalgamate the 16th. (Irish) and 36th. (Ulster) Divisions 
produced the effect of both formations serving in the same corps. Members of the 
I.P.P. were very much in favour of this policy as a purely political demonstration that 
men from all parts of Ireland could work together. Speaking to Captain W. T. Colyer, 
shortly after the Battle of the Somme, Major William Redmond explained his political 
VISion; 
I am out for an ideal. Probably you'll think I'm a stupid old buster. 
Perhaps I am. Perhaps my ideal is impossible. I do want to see a united 
Ireland. As you know, there is a big gulf between South and North between 
68H. V. Gill, "As seen by a Chaplain with the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles", 

pp.154-5, unpublished manuscript, Jesuit Archives, Dublin. 

69A. 1. Trousdell, Journal for 1916-17, p.34, unpublished manuscript, Liddle 

Collection, University ofLeeds. 

70Letter, Nightingale to his mother, 30/1118, Nightingale papers, P.R.O., PR03011113. 
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Catholic and Protestant. Catholic as I am, I want that gulf to be bridged 
over, and I believe it can be. I have worked for it all my life. Out here is a 
golden opportunity. Here we have two whole Divisions, the 16th. Irish 
Division, representing the Catholic, and the 36th. Ulster Division. At present 
these two Divisions are kept severely apart, on the traditional assumption that 
they would fight each other like wild cats if they came into contact. Well, I 
am exerting the utmost political pressure to bring them together, because I 
believe they would do no such thing if they were fighting side by side against 
a common foe. It would be the first step towards the ideal. Then - well, if 
only I could get amongst these Irish lads in the trenches, if only I could see 
for myself Ulster shaking hands with County Cork, I should feel that I have 
not shriven in vain. 71 
Meanwhile, Captain Stephen Gwynn, M.P., was writing~ ''we are alongside of 
the Ulster division + making great friends with them - which is well.,,72 
However, it appears that relationships between men of the 16th. (Irish) and 
36th. (lnster) Divisions were not all that satisfactory. Lieutenant Colonel Feilding 
noted that while the divisions played football against each other, in front of crowds of 
3,000 spectators; "a wag on the Ulster side was heard to say, 'I wonder if we shall get 
into trouble for fraternising with the enemy. ",73 Denys Reitz related how he, as the 
C.O. of the 7th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, prevented a major outbreak of violence 
between the 16th. (Irish) and 36th. (Ulster) Divisions; 
In the course of the evening I sent a fatigue party to fetch supplies for 
our canteen from the Ulster depot. Soon after their return I heard a violent 
71W. T. Colyer, "War Impressions ofa Temporary Soldier", unpaginated, chapter 12, 

I.W.M., 76/51/1. 

72Letter, Gwynn to his cousin, Amelia, 26112116, P.RO.N.I., D.2912/1/19. 

73R. Feilding, War Letters to a Wife, p.170. 
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commotion in the marquee tent where we kept our stores. There was the 
sound of breaking crockery, mingled with oaths and shouts, and, rushing up 
to enquire, I found that the men were busy wrecking the place. When I 
demanded the reason, several of them angrily flourished bottles in my face, to 
the accompaniment of threats and curses against the bloody Orangemen. To 
me the bottles seemed harmless, for they contained only soda-water, but, 
when I asked for enlightenment, it appeared that the root of the trouble was 
the labels, which bore the title 'Boyne Water'. The men started offin a body 
for the Ulster Division, to avenge what they considered a mortal insult. I had 
heard of the Battle of the Boyne, but it conveyed no political implications and 
I thought the men had gone crazy. Fortunately, I was able to telephone 
through to the Ulster headquarters, who hastily turned out several hundred 
men to surround the malcontents~ and with the tactful assistance of our 
Adjutant, young Hartery, who understood Irish politics, we managed to get 
our men back to camp without bloodshed. 74 
At a more basic level, Lieutenant Witherow, an officer of the 8th. Battalion, 
Royal Irish Rifles, was arrested by a sentry of the 6th. Battalion, Royal Irish Regiment, 
when he strayed into the 16th. (Irish) Divisional area. It took the intervention of 
Captain Stephen Gwynn, M.P., to release him.15 Likewise, officers of the 2nd. 
Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers felt that bringing the two Irish divisions together in 
this way would damage the men's morale.76 Therefore, it appears that while the joint 
service of the 16th. (Irish) and 36th. (Ulster) Divisions provided good political 
propaganda for the I.P.P., its effect on discipline and morale in these formations was, 
in many cases, a negative one. 
74D. Reitz, Trekking On, p.182. 

75The papers of Second Lieutenant[sic.] T. H. Witherow, Liddle Collection, 

University ofLeeds, p.5. 

76W. T. Colyer, "War Impressions ofa Temporary Soldier", unpublished manuscript, 
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The actual battlefield performance of Irish units during this period 
demonstrates very few problems in discipline and morale. Certainly morale in both the 
16th. (Irish) and 36th. (Ulster) Divisions, was adversely affected by the botched action 
at Langemarck, late in 1917, especially as this followed the highly successful action at 
Messines. Indeed, at least one staff officer felt that the 16th. (Irish) Division was too 
tired to carry out this attack. 77 
In terms of front line discipline, it would appear that there were two unofficial 
truces carried out by Irish units in this period. The most serious of these took place in 
the 6th. Battalion, Connaught Rangers in February 1917, when, following a trench 
raid, a cease-fire was organised to evacuate the wounded. Apparently Major General 
W. B. Hickie established a Court of Inquiry to look into this affair. 78 Also, in 
February 1917, the 9th. Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers allowed the Germans to rescue 
some of their wounded after the Germans erected a notice which read, 'Let save two 
wounded Kamerards. ,79 
Having considered the whole issue of amalgamations, disbandments and 
breaches of front line discipline, it is worth making some comments about the 
differences in discipline in Irish regular and service battalions. Table 6.7, overleaf, 
demonstrates that, even by this stage of the war, there were marked differences 
between regular and service battalions. For example drunkenness is noticeably higher 
in regular infantry battalions, than their service equivalents. 
A comparison of tables 6.7 and 5.5 demonstrates some interesting points. 
Firstly, it is noticeable that the numbers of courts martial in some units had changed 
little in the October 1916 to February 1918 over the October 1915 to September 1916 
periods, even allowing for the different timescales involved. The 6th. Battalion, 
Connaught Rangers, with 60 men tried by courts martial in the first period had 57 in 
771nterview with Major General Sir N. Holmes, tape 430, Liddle Collection, 

University ofLeeds. 

78R. Feilding, War Letters to a Wife, pp.154-9. I have been unable to trace a copy of 
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79Captain E. A. Godson diaries, p.13, I.W.M. 
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. Table 67 Offences for which men serving in sample Irish battalions were tried by 
Courts Martial, October 19] 6 to February 1918. 
81 101 11 
R 91 R 141 21 R 5th. 131 
61 81 Inns RI. Inns RI. 21 RI. Inns Lan- RI. 
Offence CR RDF F. Rifs. F. Rifs RDF Rifs F. cers NIH Rifs 
War Treason 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D.O.RA. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Offence against an 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
inhabitant 
Mutiny 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cowardice 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Desertion 0 4 5 2 4 0 11 2 12 1 0 0 
Absence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Striking/violent 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Insubordination 1 1 3 1 0 0 2 0 0 3 0 0 
Disobedience 3 4 3 0 0 1 9 2 4 0 0 0 
Quitting post 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Drunkeness 12 4 3 7 4 4 19 9 15 1 2 1 
Injuring property 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 
Loss ofproperty 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o i 0 0 0 
Theft 

Indecency 

Resisting escort 

Escaping confinement 

Misc. and multiple 

offences 

Misc. civil offences 

Self-inflicted wound 

Fraudulent enlistment: 

Enlisting after 

discharge 

False answer 

Neglect 

Fraud 

TOTALS 
 j 
2 
0 
0 
0 
36 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
60 
2 
0 
0 
0 
30 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
12 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
7 
0 
0 
;0 
;0 
0 
10 
I 
:0 
I 
18 
0 
0 
0 
0 
15 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
24 
0 
0 
0 
0 
14 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
19 
2 
0 
0 
0 
49 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
38 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
31 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 1 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
3 4 4 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 
0 
0 
7 
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the latter, while similar figures for the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers were 93 
and 95. Secondly, units which received, as we have already seen, large drafts of 
English conscripts, such as the 14th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, appear to have seen 
a small, though not excessive, rise in their courts martial rate. Thirdly, it is noticeable 
that the number of men tried for drunkenness rose sharply in the October 1916 to 
February 1918 period, in the 9th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, the numbers rose from 
seven to twelve, while in the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, it was from 19 to 
43. A final point worth stressing, in regard to both tables is that battalions of the 36th. 
(Ulster) Division generally had fewer men tried by courts martial, than their 
counterparts in the 16th. (Irish) Division. 
David Englander has suggested that 1917 saw a tightening of the British courts 
martial system, with harsher punishments being awarded, most notably in September 
1917 when twenty men were executed, the most for any month of the war.80 Tables 
6.1 to 6.6 demonstrate that indiscipline was not escalating in 1917, while table 6.8, 
overleaf, equally does not support this view. Most offenders were still sentenced to 
periods of field punishment number one, with executions and periods of penal 
servitude being imposed very rarely. Only in the 2nd. Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers 
is any significant change in this direction clear, when tables 5.7 and 6.8 are compared, 
as the number of men sentenced to hard labour increased from seven during the 
October 1915 to September 1916 period, to thirteen in the October 1916 to February 
1918 period. Another point worthy of note is that, in the latter period, a much higher 
number of N.C.O.s of the 1st. Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, were reduced 
following trial by courts martial. 
It would seem appropriate, at this stage ofthis thesis, to discuss the reasons for 
the removal of most of the Southern Irish regiments' Special and General Reserve 
battalions from Ireland in November 1917. While none of these units served on the 
800. Englander, ''Discipline and morale in the British army, 1917-18", in 1. Home 
(ed.), State, society and mobilization in Europe during the First World War, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997. 
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Table 6 8 Sentences imposed on men serving in sample Irish units tried by Courts 
Martial. October 1916 to February 1918 
8/ 10/ 1/ 5th. 
R 9/ R. 14/ 2/ R. Lanc 13/ 
8/ Inns R.I. Inns R.I. 2/ RI. Inns - R.I. 
Sentence 6/CR ROF F Rifs F. Rifs ROF Rifs F. ers NllI Rifs. 
Death 0 0 i 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 i 0 o i 0 
Penal Servitude 1 0 2 1 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 0 
Hard Labour 7 4 3 3 4 0 13 3 3 0 1 0 
Imprisonment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Detention 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F.P.l 26 22 14 . 8 11 7 43 32 22 4 5 4 
F.P.2 4 4 1 0 3 0 1 4 3 0 1 0 
Discharged with 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ignominy/cashiered 
i 
Reducedlrepriman­ 4 I 2 12ded I i I 
3 2 2 12 5 13 0 0 0 
Stoppages, fines, 1 I 2 0 
i 1 0 4 2 1 2 0 0 0 
1etc. I II 
Quashed/not I 1 0 10 i I0 0 1 2 0 4 1 0 1 I,confirmed IIi 
ISuspended sentence 1 I 6 I 3 1 0 i 0 8 4 12 I 0 0 1 ! 
i 
I 
Not guilty, I 15 6 I 3 i 1 4 4 10 3 3 3 1 1 
acquitted, etc. i I ! I 
TOTALS I 60 146 i 28 18 24 19 93 54 63 9 8 7i1 i 
Western Front, they provided a large number of drafts to Irish regular and service 
battalions, and thus merit some attention in this work. In November 1917 the Special 
Reserve and General Reserve battalions of the Connaugbt Rangers, Leinster Regiment, 
Royal Munster Fusiliers and Royal Dublin Fusiliers were all moved to Great Britain. 
The Special Reserve battalions of the Royal Irish Regiment, Royal Inniskilling 
Fusiliers, Royal Irish Rifles and Royal Irish Fusiliers all left Ireland in April 1918.81 
81These transfers are outlined in Appendix 1. 
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The removal ofall remaining Irish reserve battalions from Ireland in April 1918 
is simply explained by the fact that it was not felt helpful to have Irish units enforcing 
conscription, if it was introduced in Ireland.82 However, the reasons for the move of 
twelve Irish reserve battalions in November 1917, are more complex. 
Certainly, at the time, a number ofofficers believed that disloyalty in Irish units 
was responsible for the transfer. J. H. M. Staniforth, then serving with the 4th. 
Battalion, Leinster Regiment, commented; "All the Irish battalions have been moved 
out of Ireland and replaced by English troops to prevent Sinn Fein contagion.,,83 
Meanwhile, Second Lieutenant P. 1. Mansfield, whose unit, the 3rd. Battalion, 
Cameron Highlanders, had been sent to Ireland in November 1917 noted; 
Without any previous warning, the whole of the troops in Ireland (i.e .. 
Irish troops) were shifted over to Scotland in one night, and all Scottish 
troops sent over here, the reasons being (1) The increased activity of the Sinn 
Feiners (2) the proposal to bring conscription into Ireland, in which latter 
case, the Irish troops were considered by the higher authorities to be 
unreliable in the case of their being ordered to fire on their own countrymen ­
hence the importation of Scotchmen to do the dirty work. 84 
However, there appears to be little evidence to suggest that Irish reserve 
battalions were transferred to Britain due to fears of subversion. Indeed, since the 
outbreak of the war, Irish republicans had simply opposed recruitment, seeing those 
who enlisted as, at best misguided and at worst traitors. For example, James Connolly 
referred to Irish recruits as; ''these poor misguided brothers of ours [who] have been 
82D. Fitzpatrick, politics and Irish Life 1913-1921; provincial Experience ofWar and 

Revolution, Gregg Revivals, Aldershot, 1993, p.26. 

83Letter, Staniforth to his parents, 7112117, I.W.M., 67/41/3. 

84Letter, Second Lieutenant P. J. Mansfield to Dr. B. O. A Mansfield, 21111117, copy 

in Judge Advocate General's papers, P.R.O., W083/30, p.793. Second Lieutenant 

Mansfield was tried by court martial for sending this sensitive information to Dr. 

Mansfield, who was living in the U.S.A.. 
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tricked and deluded into giving battle for England.,,85 While Roger Casement 
suggested that recruits were; "Not Irishmen but English soldiers. ,,86 It therefore 
appears that Sinn Fein. or other advanced nationalist groups, had no concerted policy 
of attempting to infiltrate Irish units of the British army, seeing men in them as already 
lost to the republican cause. 87 
In this respect Sinn Fein differed greatly from earlier Republican groups. The 
Fenian movement in the late 1860s had been relatively successful in infiltrating the 
British army, as A. J. Semple states; 
In the final analysis it is impossible to say how many Fenian soldiers 
there were in Ireland or outside of it. There may have been some hundreds or 
some thousands but no matter how many there were, they were ineffective 
largely because the Fenian organisation in the army was ineffective.88 
In the 1790s a number of unconcerted, but effective attempts were made by 
United Irishmen to infiltrate Irish regiments. This policy was particularly successful in 
yeomanry units in counties Wexford, Kildare, Cork and Dublin corps and one County 
Dublin corps, the Rathcoole Infantry proved disaffected almost to a man.89 By 
contrast, Sir Henry McAnally concluded that attempts to disaffect the Irish militia in 
85J. Connolly, "The Slums and The Trenches", in J. Connolly, Collected Works, vo1.II, 
New Books Publications, Dublin, 1988, p .147. 
86T. P. Dooley, Irishmen or English Soldiers? The Times and World ofa Southern 
Catholic Irish Man (1876-1916) Enlisting in the British Army During the First World 
.war, Liverpool University Press, Liverpool, 1995, p.1. 
87p. Callan, ''Voluntary Recruiting for the British Anny in Ireland during the First 
World War", unpublished Ph.D., U.C.D., 1984; C. Townshend, political Violence in 
Ireland~ Government and Resistance since 1848, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988 and 
E. O'Halpin, The Decline ofthe Union, British Goyernment in Ireland 1892-1920, Gill 
and Macmillan, Dublin, 1987, all make no mention ofany Sinn Fein attempt to 
infiltrate the Irish regiments and nothing has been found to contradict this. 
88A. J. Semple, ''The Fenian Infiltration of the British Anny", Journal of the Society 
for Army Historical Research, 52, 1974, p.160. 
89A. Blackstock, An Ascendancy Anny~ The Irish Yeomanry 1796-1834, Four Courts 
Press, Dublin, 1998, pp.lSI-2. 
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the 1790s were, generally, unsuccessful.90 However, more recent research has shown 
that United Irishmen counted 15,000 Irish Militia men amongst their supporters, and, 
indeed, that this confidence in the disaffection within the Crown forces led to a neglect 
of training amongst the United Irishmen. 91 The most famous example of United Irish 
infiltration into a military unit in the 1790s was actually in a regular regiment, the 5th. 
Royal Irish Dragoons. This unit enlisted a large number of disloyal recruits in 1798 
and, following the discovery of a planned mutiny, was disbanded on the 10th. April 
1799, not being re-embodied until 1858.92 
However, Sinn Fein appears to have made few inroads into Irish reserve units. 
As graph 6.9, overleaf, illustrates, the number of courts martial held in these sample 
reserve units varied considerably. However, post April 1916 there was no massive 
upturn in military crime. The high courts martial rate in the 3rd. Battalion, Royal Irish 
Rifles, from May to October 1918 seems to be explained by the fact that, over this 
period, this unit absorbed most of the other reserve battalions of the Royal Irish Rifles. 
Thus, during 1918 this battalion simply had more men than previously. Instead these 
transfers of Irish units to Great Britain can be explained by cases of rifle stealing, 
violence against Irish soldiers by the general public, defective training in Irish 
Command and recruiting problems. 
The theft of Irish soldiers' rifles by Irish Volunteers appears to have been 
increasing in 1917.93 The worst example of this occurred in November 1917, in 
Longford, when two hundred rifles were stolen from the 11 tho Battalion, Royal Dublin 
00fl. McAnally, The Irish Militia 1793-1816, A Social and Military Study, Clonmore 

and Reynolds, Dublin, 1949, pp.112-3. 

91T. Bartlett, "Defence, counter-insurgency and rebellion: Ireland, 1793-1803", in T. 

Bartlett and K. Jeffery (eds.), A Military History oflre1and. Cambridge University 

Press, Cambridge, p.264. 

92A. E. C. Bredin, A History of the Irish Soldier, Century Books, Belfast, 1987, 

p.219. 

93 See Chief Secretary's Office Registered Papers, 1917, entries 19147 and 25012, 

National Archives, Dublin. 
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Fusiliers.94 How exactly this theft occurred is unclear. Captain Terence Poulter, a 
former officer in the battalion, wrote, sixty seven years after the event that men of the 
Longford I.RA. had infiltrated the 11 tho Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers.95 
Nevertheless, this appears unlikely, as, in a report to the War Cabinet~ 
Lord French reported that, in regard to the unit most concerned with 
the recent loss of rifles [11 tho Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers] this unit had 
paraded for embarkation with only two absentees, which pointed to the 
fact that the loyalty and discipline of the unit were not seriously affected, 
and the loss of arms could not be attributed to treacherous or seditious 
action.96 
Violence against Irish soldiers also appears to have been on the increase. J. H. 
M. Staniforth, writing of the situation in Limerick, noted; "This town in particular is a 
nest of Sinn Feinery, and our men won't go through the riverside streets after dark 
unless there are two or three of them together.,,97 The situation in Dublin was little 
better; General Sir Bryan Mahon, the G.O.C. in Ireland noted, in June 1917; "In 
addition to many other unsatisfactory indications, several cases have recently been 
reported to me of abuse and hostile demonstrations being levelled against the Troops 
in Dublin when proceeding on their normal duties through the streets."98 It appears 
that soldiers in Cork were also being attacked on a frequent basis. 99 
94p. Callan, "Voluntary Recruiting for the British Anny in Ireland", p.267. 

95/rish Times, 24/4/84, cited, ibid, p.267. 

96Extract from War Cabinet 267, 9/11/17, included in "Measures to be taken with 

regard to unauthorized drilling of parties in Ireland", P.RO., W032/9507. 

97Letter, Staniforth to his parents, 14/3/17, cited 1. H. M. Staniforth, "Kitchener's 

Soldier", p.195, I.W.M., 67/4111. 

98''Report by Commander in Chief on the Situation in Ireland, 1917", P.R0., 

W032/9513. 
99ChiefSecretary's Office Registered Papers, 1917,28936, National Archives, Dublin. 
While this file is included in the catalogue of the Chief Secretary's Office it was not 
avaliable when I visited the National Archives. It appears that in 1922 many files on 
military topics were removed from Dublin and, while the staff at the National Archives 
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Training policies in Irish reserve units also appear to have been defective and it 
is possible that the transfer ofunits to Great Britain was intended, partially, to remedy 
this. In March 1917, Captain Staniforth commenting on his posting to the 4th. 
Battalion, Leinster Regiment lOO stated; "They've given me B Company to play around 
with, but as far as I can see nobody ever dreams of doing any work or attending any 
parades whatever, leaving it all to the N.C.O.s .. One subaltern hasn't been on parade 
yet, and he arrived over six months ago, ... , or so he says."IOI 
Meanwhile, Major General Sir Oliver Nugent was so dissatisfied at the drafts 
which the 36th. (Ulster) Division was receiving that he asked one of his staff officers, 
while on leave, to inspect the division's reserve formations. Nugent wrote to 
Brigadier General Hacket-Pain, the former G.O.C. of 108th. Brigade, who was then 
commanding the 15th. Reserve Brigade; 
The gist ofMudie's report was that young officers are not taught their 
duties as regards their personal responsibility towards their men, ... , I might 
mention that a number of wounded officers returned to the Division after a 
tour of duty with the Reserve Brigade to whom I have spoken, make the 
same comment, viz. that such experience as they have gained out here is not 
made use offor purposes ofinstruction at home. 102 
Finally, with regard to reserve formations, the point must be made that the 
downturn in Irish recruiting removed one of their raisons d'etre for staying in Ireland. 
informed me that these were now in the P.R.O., I was unable to trace them there. 

Indeed, it would seem likely that the hasty withdrawl ofthe British Administration 

from Dublin in 1922 meant that many sensitive papers were simply destroyed. 

lOOStaniforth had been invalided to Britain from the 7th. Battalion, Leinster Regiment, 

as he required extensive dental treatment, Personnel file on Lieutenant [sic.] J. H. M. 

Staniforth, P.R.O., W0339/23115. 

IOILetter, Staniforth to his parents, 4/3117, cited, J. H. M. Staniforth, "Kitchener's 

Soldier", p.192, I.W.M., 67/4111. 

I02Undated letter (November 1917?) Nugent to Hacket -Pain, Farren Connel papers, 

P.R.O.N.I., MIC/571/10. 
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Rifleman Hutchinson, serving in the 18th. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, in 1917 and 
1918, noted that many of his comrades were English or Scottish conscripts,I°3 
Equally, when a number of Irish reserve units were disbanded in England, this appears 
to have, simply, been in response to recruiting difficulties. Cyril Falls noted that the 
17th., 18th. and 19th. Battalions, Royal Irish Rifles were disbanded and their personnel 
sent to the 3rd. Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles in April 1918 as; "There were no longer 
anything like the number of Irish recruits to fill the ranks ofso many battalions." 1 04 
Finally, in this chapter, some brief comments must be made regarding morale 
and discipline in the B.E.F. as a whole in 1917. Historians have, generally, found this 
a difficult issue to examine. D. Englander and 1. Osborne commented; "The Russian 
armies collapsed, the Italians deserted, the French mutinied: the British soldier 
however, apparently did little more than curse his fate."105 This sort of approach has 
led to some rather bleak portraits of British discipline and morale in 1917. The 
presumption of some historians appears to be that as there were serious problems in 
other European armies, then there must have been equally forceful pressures on British 
soldiers. David Englander has given a further demonstration of this in his most recent 
work. After concluding that the British Fifth Army did not suffer from major 
disciplinary problems in late 1917 and early 1918, he continued; 
It had been a close run thing. How close is still a matter for 
speculation. Whether there was a mutiny in the making which, but for the 
March offensive, would have issued in a spectacular conflagration comparable 
with those in other armies is an intriguing possibility, ..., The 
103See 1. Hutchinson, ''The Early Reminiscences of a Royal Irish Rifleman, 1917-19", 
P.RO.N.I., D.3804, pp.19 and 24. 
104C. Falls, The History of the First Seven Battalions. The Royal Irish Rifles. (Now 
the Royal Ulster Rifles) in the Great War, vol. II, Gale and Polden Ltd., Aldershot, 
1925, p.162. 
105D. Englander and J. Osborne, "Jack, Tommy and Henry Dubb: The Armed Forces 
and the Working Class", Historical Journal, 21, 3, 1978, p.S94. 
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British anny, like others, became deeply depressed during 1917-18. 106 
Of course, Englander's views are based on some inescapable facts. 1917 
witnessed the largest mutiny in the B.E.F. during the Great War, namely that at 
Etaples Base Camp; the High Command was concerned about Socialist and Pacifist 
political pressure on British troops,107 and, of course, the B.E.F. now contained a 
large number ofconscripts. 
Before considering these issues in more detail, the point must be made that the 
British anny was, in many respects, different from other European armies in 1917. 
Firstly, British losses, while high, were comparatively low in European terms. For 
example, in the French case, casualties in the first fifteen months of the war, almost 
equalled those of the next three years. 108 Related to this point is the fact that Britain, 
entering the war with a small, volunteer, regular anny did not reach its maximum 
effort on the Western Front until 1916. 109 Thirdly, there was still consent for the war 
in Britain, which was certainly no longer the case in Russia or Italy.IIO Fourthly, the 
British anny did not face the serious ethnic tensions faced by the Austo-Hungarian, or 
1060. Englander, ''Discipline and morale in the British anny, 1917-1918", in J. Home 

(ed ), State, Society and Mobilization in Europe during the First World War, 

Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p.141. 

107G. Dallas and D. Gill, The Unknown Army; Mutinies in the British Army in World 

WaLL Verso, London, 1985, p.77 and N. Macready, Annals of An Active Life, 

Hutchinson and Co., London, 1924, voU, p.277. 

1080. Porch, ''The French Army and the Spirit of the Offensive, 1900-14", in B. Bond 

and I. Roy (eds.), War and Society, A Yearbook ofMiJitary History, Croom Helm, 

London, 1975,p.117. 

1091. F. W. Beckett, "The Nation in Arms, 1914-18", in I. F. W. Beckett and K. 

Simpson (eds.), A Nation in Arms; A social study ofthe British army in the First 

World War, Tom Donovan Publishing, London, 1990, p.12. 

1lOSee, R. Service, ''The Industrial Workers", in R. Service, Society and Politics in the 

Russian Revolution, The Macmillian Press Ltd., London, 1992, p.154 and G. Procacci, 
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even German armies, in 1917-18. III Finally, the point must be made that some armies 
which "collapsed" in 1917 were actually able to take the field again. 112 
To return to disciplinary and morale problems in the B.E.F. in 1917, it is clear 
that a number of these have been overstated. The Etaples mutiny was, in many ways, 
a disaster waiting to happen and was also a very atypical mutiny. Colonel S. Jourdain, 
who, as a Second Lieutenant, served at Etaples in mid 1916, was shocked by the 
"brutal N.C.O.s", slack organisation and pointless bayonet practice, which took place 
there. ll3 Captain C. C. Miller, of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, who served at 
Etaples during the mutiny commented that the camp~ "was a matter of constant 
nagging and petty irritation combined with rotten rations and wretched organisation," 
and, indeed, after the mutiny, he refused to identify ringieaders.1I4 There was, 
therefore, some sympathy from officers for the plight of other ranks at Etaples and, 
indeed, those targeted by the mutineers were military policemen rather than 
officers.1I5 However, as appendix 3 demonstrates, Etaples was by no means the only 
mutiny which occurred in the B.E.F. during the Great War and, given that it involved 
troops in reserve, it was, arguably not the most serious. Appendix 3 illustrates that 
mutinies were a constant, if infrequent, aspect ofBritish military life. 
111 M. Cornwall, '"Morale and Patriotism in the Austro-Hungarian Army, 1914-18", in 
J. Home (ed.), State. society and mobilization in Europe, pp.175-7, G. Wawro, 

'"Morale in the Austor-Hungarian Army: the Evidence ofHapsburg Army Campaign 
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pp.11 0-114. 
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Smith, Between Mutiny and Obedience; The Case ofthe French Fifth Infantry Division 
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1l3Interview with Colonel S. Jourdain, I.W.M., Sound Archives, 11214/2. 
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Concerns about Socialist and Pacifist influence on British soldiers were largely 
unfounded. Attempts by some socialists to create soldiers' councils, in imitation of 
Russian soviets were almost totally unsuccessful. 116 Nevertheless, the British High 
Command reacted relatively quickly to this perceived threat. By January 1918 a 
lecture series on current affairs had been approved for use in all B.E.F. formations 
with a view to providing both education in citizenship and to provide men with useful 
skills for their return to civilian life. 117 Due to the return of open warfare in March 
1918 this lecture programme was largely abandoned. Nevertheless, it is perhaps 
significant that one of the earliest of these citizenship lectures, entitled, "America and 
the War", was delivered to the 16th. (Irish) Division in October 1917 by Dr. 
Kelman. 118 
The assimilation of conscripts into the British army appears to have caused 
relatively few problems, as graphs 6.1 to 6.6 and 6.10, overleaf. demonstrate. In the 
sample of non-Irish units, indiscipline did not greatly increase over this period. 
Equally, as Englander and Osborne point out, indiscipline in the Royal Navy was much 
more likely to occur amongst regulars than conscripts and the fact that most regular 
soldiers had been killed by 1917 meant that there was little serious indiscipline in the 
B.E.F.. 119 
Finally, the admittedly very sparse number of censorship reports surviving, 
suggest that the B.E.F. was suffering from relatively few morale problems. One such 
report stated~ 
1I6D. Englander and 1. Osbourne (ed.), "Jack, Tommy and Henry Dubb", pp.604-5 
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118Entry for 12110/17, Adjutant and Quarter Master General's war diary, 16th. (Irish) 
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The Morale of the Anny is sound. In spite of increasing references to 
peace which occupy mu~h space in the newspapers, in spite of the Russian 
. debacle and the Italian set back there is ample ground for the belief that the 
British army is firmly convinced, not only of its ability to defeat the enemy 
and its superiority man to man, but also of the dangers of a premature 
peace. 120 
In conclusion, it would appear that, contrary to the scenario outlined by some 
historians, the British army di.d not suffer from a major crisis of morale in 1917. D. 
Englander's findings, that there were no serious disciplinary problems in 5th. Anny, 
appears to be borne out by the study of the courts martial records for the sample of 
non-Irish units. 
The situation, with regard to Irish units is rather more complex. Sinn Fein, 
unlike previous republican groups, did not seek to infiltrate Irish units in the British 
army, and there is no evidence to suggest that Irish battalions serving on the Western 
Front were subverted during this period. However, the decision to remove Irish 
Special Reserve battalions from Ireland in late 1917 and early 1918 does demonstrate 
that there were some doubts regarding the reliability ofIrish soldiers. 
While the decision to amalgamate and disband Irish service battalions was 
inspired purely by recruiting difficulties, it is noticeable that, in practice, this was used 
in a disciplinary fashion. While, when the decision was taken to reduced British 
divisions from thirteen to ten battalions, the most junior battalions were disbanded, this 
was not the case with Irish battalions. Thus, for example, the 7th. Battalion, Royal 
Irish Rifles and 9th. Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers were disbanded, before their 
more junior sister battalions, due to disciplinary problems. 
120Censor's report on morale, c. January 1918(?), P.R.O., WOI06/401. 
